

47 QA

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88 QA

52 QA

56 QA

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N-0038

0504

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Foreign Relations, 1920
Galley 47QA

Communication of December 8, 1919, from the Japanese
Embassy to the Department of State

X
The Japanese Government have watched with deep concern the recent unfavorable development of the military situation with which Admiral Koltchak's forces have been confronted. Should he fail in his attempt to check such development in time, the Allied troops now stationed in Eastern Siberia might find themselves placed directly face to face with the Red Army, while Bolshevik elements would no doubt take advantage of such a turn of events for renewing activities ~~to~~ aggression and lawlessness in the zone now guarded by the Allied forces.

It seems to the Japanese Government that to meet this situation, three alternative courses are open for the Allied and Associated Powers to take:

1. To send a re-inforcement of sufficient strength, and, acting on the offensive in co-operation with the anti-Bolshevik forces, to crush the Red Army;
2. To avoid direct contact with the Red Army and to effect entire or partial withdrawal of the Allied troops;

3.

3. To maintain the guarding of the districts now under Allied military protection, and, without assuming the offensive, to check the continued eastward advance of the Red Army.

The execution of the first plan would naturally call for (1) further westward extension of operations by the Allied troops, and (2) reinforcement of a considerable strength. The Japanese Government, in view of the overwhelming trend of public opinion in Japan unalterably opposed to both of these two eventualities, have been brought to the conclusion that, so far as Japan is concerned, the first plan is impracticable.

No less difficulties are involved in the second plan under examination. Even a partial withdrawal of the Allied troops would, to that extent, open the way for the spread of Bolshevism influence, and would in the end lead to the necessity for the Allied forces to proceed to complete withdrawal. The consequences will be the entire annihilation of anti-Bolshevik elements, leaving Eastern Siberia in a sea of anarchy and Bolshevism. The Japanese Government feel that the final decision on the second plan might be reserved for the present, pending further developments of the situation.

They are persuaded that the only practicable course responsive to the need of the actual conditions would be the adoption of the third plan. Under that plan, a reinforcement

to

to such extent as may be imperatively required should be sent to those points which are now inadequately guarded, with a view to maintaining the present position against Bolshevik invasion. Having regard to the prevailing conditions, reinforcement of a strength between 5,000 and 6,000 men will, in the opinion of Japanese military experts, be possibly needed.

The fundamental solution of the Russian problem evidently remains to be worked out in common accord among the Allied and Associated Powers. In the meantime, sincerely desiring that on the question of sending reinforcement, an understanding be reached between Japan and the United States as a measure designed to meet the pressing requirements of the situation, the Japanese Government would feel grateful for a frank expression of the views of the American Government on that question. They would also highly appreciate any information which the Honorable the Secretary of State may feel at liberty to give them as to whether the United States proposes to maintain status quo, or to proceed to entire or partial withdrawal of its troops, or whether it is ready to send a reinforcement in case of need.

At the same time, having reference to the recent public utterances of the British Prime Minister at Guild Hall and at Parliament, and also to the reported exchange of views between the British and French Governments on the question (occasion) of the late visit of President Poincaré to London, it seems important to ascertain whether the British and French Governments are decided to refuse all assistance to anti-Bolshevik elements, regardless of any disorderly activities in which the Red Army may

may eventually be engaged in Siberia. The Japanese Government hope that the American Government may find it possible to co-operate with them in approaching the Governments at London and Paris with an inquiry on that subject.

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X
Foreign Relations, 1920
Galley 47QA

JAPAN

Note from the Japanese Ambassador (Shidehara) to the
Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, December 22, 1919.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have received a telegram from Viscount Uchida, ²⁶ transmitting a recent telegraphic report from Ambassador Kato, now staying at Irkutsk. It appears by that report, that on December 16, the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of Admiral Koltchak's Government called on Mr. Kato to communicate to him the result of a special meeting of the Russian Cabinet which had just been held. The Acting Foreign Minister explained the serious situation which was rapidly developing in the region near Irkutsk. He feared that Bolshevik eruption might break out at any moment, and he requested on behalf of his Government that Japan would send at once troops of one or two thousand men to Irkutsk to co-operate in the maintenance of order. Mr. Kato, in conveying to Viscount Uchida this request of the Koltchak Government, adds that all information in his possession also confirms the gravity of the situation. The report has been received at Tokio with deep concern. Should Irkutsk fall in the hands of Bolsheviki, the conditions of unrest and disorder would, in the estimation of the Japanese Government, soon spread

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spread to the whole region east of Chita. The situation evidently calls for immediate attention, and Viscount Uchida is anxious to be favored with an early reply to the questions which I ventured to submit to you in our conversation of December 8th last.

Believe me (etc.)

K. SHIDEHARA

Foreign Relations, 1920
Galley 88QA

JAPAN

Decision of December 26, 1919, by the Allied representative
at Irkutsk

'The control and direction of the Trans-Siberian Railway from Krasnoyarsk to Messovaya including the telegraph line, has been placed in the hands of the director of the Czech-Slovaks and also to the other Allied troops who will replace them under the direction of the Inter-Allied Supreme Director.

They will have the entire policing of the telegraph line on both sides of the railway to such a distance as they will deem it necessary for guarding and have the absolute right to maintain order and neutrality there. In the cities of Krasnoyarsk and Irkutsk this zone is limited to the environs of the station. They will have the right to regulate even the movements of their own echelons. All facilities will be assured for their movements and ultimate disposition in the course of their evacuation towards the Far East.'

「シベリア」出兵関係

○一九一九年(大正八年)十二月八日附、在米大使館↓國務省(通報)

○本通報ハ、聯合國側ノ増兵ノ必要ヲ説キ米(諒解が得)ノ賛成ヲ望ムルヲ要シテモナリ。

○ニ、
十二月二十二日附、在米大使館↓國務省(書翰)

○本書翰ハ、幣原大使カ在「シベリア」加藤大使未電ヲ引用シ、増兵

ノ要ヲ説ケルニ對シ、國務省長官ノ希望ニ依リ、右來電要旨ヲ

交附セルモノナリ

右日本ノ要望ニ對シ、米國ハ一九二〇年一月八日突如單独撤兵ニ決セリ。

「レジュメ」
○ハ非分表申入ルヘキモノ

外務省

依テ右一、及二、ノ發表ハ好シカラス

三、
十二月二十六日附、在「イルクワック」聯合國代表者決議

○本決議ハ、(維持及管理)「クレスノヤールス」(メソソワヤ)向ノ「シベリア」鉄道及電

線ヲ「チエフタル」(テイレクタイ)及「聯合軍」ニ移スコトヲ決定スル

モノナリ

右三、ハ公表差支ヘナカルヘシ

外務省

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Foreign Relations, 1920
Galley 52QA

JAPAN

Memorandum from the Japanese Embassy to the Department
of State

MEMORANDUM

The Japanese Government have carefully examined the Memorandum of the Department of State addressed to the Japanese Ambassador at Washington on January 9, 1920,³⁸ on the subject of withdrawal of American troops and American railway experts from Siberia.

In that Memorandum it is stated that for the United States, neither the sending of a reinforcement to Siberia, nor the further maintenance of the expeditionary forces has been found practicable, and that having regard to the main objects of the American military expedition which have now been accomplished, and also to the situation which has lately developed in Siberia, the decision has been taken by the Government of the United States, to proceed to the withdrawal of American troops and at the same time to recall the American railway experts at present assisting the operation of the Trans-Siberian and the Chinese Eastern Railways. After describing the considerations on which this conclusion is based, the Memorandum expresses the regret of the American Government for the necessity of such decision.

The

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The Japanese Government have no intention whatever of calling in question the propriety of the decision now adopted by the United States of its own accord. Relying, however, on the spirit of harmonious co-operation in which the military enterprise in Siberia was originally undertaken and has since been conducted by the two Powers, the Japanese Government had expected that in proceeding to final decision to put an end to such undertaking, the American Government would be willing to communicate with them in advance.

They are informed that the Honorable the Secretary of State, in the course of his conversation with the Japanese Ambassador on January 10, explained that in view of the conditions prevailing in the United States, the American Government had found it urgently necessary to effect an early withdrawal of American troops from Siberia, and that when the decision was reached, there was no time left for the discussion of the question with the Japanese Government. Preparations for the departure of American troops from Siberia were accordingly ordered forthwith and the Secretary of State regretted that he had not been able to consult the Japanese Government beforehand on the step thus taken. The Japanese Government are happy to be assured that the failure of the American Government to communicate with them on the subject before the decision was finally taken was due to no other consideration than the need of prompt action under special conditions mentioned by the Secretary of State.

They

They are further gratified to learn that, in reply to the questions submitted by the Japanese Ambassador on the occasion of the foregoing interview, the Secretary of State declared that the American Government would have no objection to the decision which might be reached on the part of Japan to continue single-handed the stationing of her troops in Siberia, or, to send a reinforcement in case of need, or to carry on the assistance in the operation of the Trans-Siberian and the Chinese Eastern Railways.

With reference to the last paragraph of the Memorandum of the Department of State under examination, the Japanese Government have already communicated to the British and French Governments the substance of the Aide-Memoire of the Japanese Embassy handed to the Secretary of State on December 8, 39 and they will communicate it equally to the Italian Government. They will also make known to the British, French and Italian Governments the substance of the present Memorandum.

WASHINGTON, January 22, 1920.

Foreign Relations, 1920
Galley 56QA

JAPAN

Communication from the Japanese Embassy to the Department of State

Having regard to the fact that Japan despatched her troops to Siberia for the purpose of rendering assistance to the Czecho-Slovak troops, it may be taken that her troops should be withdrawn, as was clearly stated in the declaration made on the occasion of their despatch, upon the completion of the evacuation of the Czecho-Slovak forces from Siberia. From a geographical point of view, however, Japan occupies a position in Siberia altogether distinct from that of the other Powers. More particularly, the political situation now obtaining in Eastern Siberia is not only gravely affecting the state of affairs in Korea and Manchuria, but is far from affording any assurance of the safety of the lives and property of a large number of Japanese subjects in these regions. This is the sole cause of Japan's inability to effect the immediate withdrawal of her troops, no design whatever of a political nature being entertained in this connection. Expression is therefore again given to the sincere desire of Japan to withdraw her troops as soon as possible after the completion of the Czecho-Slovak evacuation, and as soon as the political situation in the districts bordering on her frontier becomes sufficiently settled to remove all apprehension of danger to the regions of Korea and Manchuria, and to assure the safety of the lives and property of the Japanese residents

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residents as well as the freedom of traffic.

WASHINGTON, April 3, 1920.

Foreign Relations, 1920
Galley 61QA

JAPAN

Note of June 14, 1920, from the Japanese Minister
of Foreign Affairs to the American Chargé (Bell)

"I have the honor to inform you that I am in receipt of a telegraphic message of the following purport from Secretary Hanaoka at Nikolaevsk.

The Bolshevik having sown mines and sunk ships in waters round Pronge promontory near Nikolaevsk and the channel to the port of Pronge, navigation in those waters is dangerous. Further resistance that may be offered by the Partizans may make it necessary to extend the zone of belligerency. In these circumstances the Imperial army of expedition have decided to inhibit navigation of ships in some parts of these waters and also to exercise control in the northern littoral, outside of the above mentioned zone in regard to the landing of goods that are to be or may be put to the use of the Partizans or when (to) that of Russians of whom there is a fear of their being in collusion with the Partisans.

The measures decided to be enforced as above stated being unavoidable under the circumstances and operative quite irrespective of the nationality of ships, I have the further honor to request you to be so good as to advise to the above effect all persons and parties coming under your jurisdiction or protection who may be interested in the matter.

公表

四、一九〇〇年(大正九年)一月二十二日附、在米大使館↓國務省(覚書)

(一月九日附、米政府、米軍撤退通告覚書ニ對シテ回答セリ)

○本覚書ハ、米ノ無通告撤兵決定ノ経緯ヲ諒トスルト共ニ、日本ハ

日本軍ノ駐セ、増兵等ニ付、米ニ於テ異議ナキモト諒解スル旨述

ヘタルモノナリ

(米二月五日附公文ヲ以テ)

本覚書ハ米ニ於テ公表ヲ希望シ、日本ニ於テ異議ナキ旨通報セルモ、米ニ於テ

日本カ前記ノ一通報ノ公表ヲ欲セサルニ於テハ、他ノ關係公文ノミヲ公表スル下、却テ

誤解ヲ招ク虞アルニ付、前記一、二、三、四、五、六、七、八、九、十、十一、十二、十三、十四、十五、十六、十七、十八、十九、二十、二十一、二十二、二十三、二十四、二十五、二十六、二十七、二十八、二十九、三十、三十一、三十二、三十三、三十四、三十五、三十六、三十七、三十八、三十九、四十、四十一、四十二、四十三、四十四、四十五、四十六、四十七、四十八、四十九、五十、五十一、五十二、五十三、五十四、五十五、五十六、五十七、五十八、五十九、六十、六十一、六十二、六十三、六十四、六十五、六十六、六十七、六十八、六十九、七十、七十一、七十二、七十三、七十四、七十五、七十六、七十七、七十八、七十九、八十、八十一、八十二、八十三、八十四、八十五、八十六、八十七、八十八、八十九、九十、九十一、九十二、九十三、九十四、九十五、九十六、九十七、九十八、九十九、一百、

ヲ見合ヒテトシテ申越セリ(但シ、一月九日ノ米覚書ハ一月十六日設ニ米例ニテ

外務省

公表セリ)。然ルニ日本ハ一月九日附^①米覚書及同月二十日、在米大使館
覚書(即チ本件覚書)ハ二月一日、既ニ之ヲ公表セリ。

依テ右四箇公表ハ差文ヘナカルヘキナリ

五、 四月三日附、在米大使館↓國務省(通報)

○本通報ハ、日本派遣軍ニ關スル今後ノ方針ニ付、中外ニ声明ヲナスノ

必要ヲ認メ、三月三十日官報ニ公表セル宣言ニシテ、在外帝國大公使

ヲシテ任國政府ニ通告セシメタルモノナリ

其ノ内容ハ、智軍ノ引揚完了後撤兵スヘキト、但シ地理的關係上

外務省

遂ニ撤兵ヲ決行スル能ハサルコト、然レトモ其間露國ニ對シ何等政
治的野心アルニアラサルコトヲ明カニセルモノナリ

依テ右五、ハ公表差支ヘナカルヘシ

六、 六月十四日附、外務大臣 ↓ 米代代理大使 (書翰)

○本書翰ハ、「ヨラエヌク方面ニ於ケル、」ボリエジエカ水雷ヲ敷設シ

船舶ヲ沈没等ニ鑑ミ、日本派遣軍ハ、同方面一帯ノ航行ヲ「コント

ロール」スルヲ依ル旨通告セルモノナリ

右六、ハ公表差支ヘナカルヘシ

外務省

Foreign Relations, 1920
Galley 62QA

JAPAN

Note from the Japanese Ambassador (Shidehara) to the
Secretary of State

Washington, July 3, 1920.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Permit me to enclose herewith,
for the information of the American Government, a Memorandum
dealing with the recent situation in Siberia. The decision
of the Japanese Government contained in the Memorandum has
just been telegraphed to me, and has at the same time been
announced in Japan.

Believe me (etc.)

K. SHIDEHARA

(Enclosure)

MEMORANDUM

Within a period between March 12 and the end of May
last, about 700 Japanese subjects at Nikolaievsk in the
Province of Sakhalien, including officers and men of the
garrison and members of the Consulate as well as civilian
residents, men, women, and children alike, were subjected to
a wholesale massacre at the hands of the Bolsheviks through

proceedings

- 2 -

proceedings of unspeakable brutality. The Japanese Govern-
ment feel it their duty to take suitable measures for
upholding the dignity of a nation so wantonly assailed. In
the absence, however, of any government at present with which
the Japanese Government can properly conduct negotiations on
the subject, they have come to the conclusion that they have no
alternative but to seize and occupy certain points in the
Province of Sakhalien which may be found necessary, until a
legal government shall have been established in Russia and the
present question satisfactorily adjusted.

With regard to the region of Trans-Baikalia, the Japanese
Government have decided to proceed to the withdrawal of the
Japanese forces from that district, in pursuance of their
repeated declarations, considering that the whole Czecho-
Slavak troops have now taken departure.

In the direction of Vladivostock, however, the situation
constituting a grave menace to the security of Korea not only
shows no sign of improvement, but proves distinctly aggravating,
while a large number of Japanese residents continue to reside
in that district. Accordingly, until the reestablishment of
order and tranquillity in the region, an appropriate number of
Japanese troops will be maintained around Vladivostock, as well
as at Khabarovsk which commands an important position in the
line of communication with the Province of Sakhalien.

(WASHINGTON,) July 3, 1920.

JAPAN

Memorandum from the Japanese Embassy to the Department of State

MEMORANDUM

The Japanese Government are happy to note that the United States Government, through the note of the Secretary of State dated July 10th (16th), giving frank expression to its views upon the declaration made by the Japanese Government on July 3rd respecting (1) occupation of certain points in the Province of Sakhalin (2) withdrawal of Japanese forces from Trans-Baikalia region and (3) maintenance of the Japanese troops around Vladivostok and at Khabarovsk, has expressed much gratification on the decision of the Japanese Government to withdraw their troops from the Trans-Baikalia region. At the same time, the Japanese Government regret that the United States Government fails to see the reasons which compelled the Japanese Government to take the first and third of the above-mentioned decisions.

Passing for the moment the first point, and referring to the third point, the political situation in Vladivostok and its neighborhood is far from being secure, nor is public order there restored as yet owing to the fact that the authority of the Provincial Government in Vladivostok is not yet fully established. The Japanese Government therefore are unable to leave to the Provincial Government there the protection of

Japanese

- 2 -

Japanese subjects in that district numbering about 7,000. Moreover, the lawless Koreans living in the vicinity, evidently under the influence of Russian bolshevism, are not only constantly creating disturbances on the borderland of Korea, but, armed and banded, they often penetrate into the interior of the country and make raid upon the civilian population taking toll of many lives and causing immeasurable damage to their property, a situation which is almost tantamount to a state of war. Confronted with so serious and pressing a danger to the peace and safety of Korea, -danger, -moreover, behind which lies the formidable menace of bolshevism, the Japanese Government, not unnaturally, look upon the situation with grave concern. The maintenance of the Japanese forces in the neighborhood of Vladivostok is thus a measure of self defense absolutely necessary for the protection of the Japanese residents there, as well as for the preservation of order and security in Korea.

As regards Khabarovsk, which is a point of special importance on the line of communication with Nikolaievsk, capital of the province of Sakhalin, it is also indispensable that a certain number of troops should be left there in order to maintain communication with the Nikolaievsk garrison. In this connection it may well be pointed out that the maintenance of the Japanese troops in Vladivostok and Khabarovsk, which is thus necessary

for

for safeguarding the interest of Japan and of the Japanese people in these regions, will also be conducive to the promotion of the general welfare of the Russian population.

To revert now to the first point: the United States Government appears to conclude that the occupation of certain points in the Province of Sakhalin has no relevance to the Nikolaievsk affair, on the assumption that Nikolaievsk is located in Primorskaya or the Maritime Province on the mainland of Siberia, whereas the Sakhalin Province includes only the northern portion of the island of that name. The information in the hands of the Japanese Government indicates that by virtue of the Russian Imperial decree of the 26th of February, 1914, the town of Nikolaievsk and its neighborhood was separated from the Maritime Province and incorporated in the province of Sakhalin together with the northern portion of Sakhalin Island, and Nikolaievsk has since then been the capital of the Province. Thus there being no shadow of doubt as to Nikolaievsk being within the administrative boundary of the Province of Sakhalin, the observation of the United States Government in this respect seems to be not well founded.

The note of the United States Government adds that from the Memorandum transmitted to it by the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, it does not appear that Japanese subjects in the northern portion of Sakhalin Island have sustained any injuries, nor does it appear that the Russian authorities in that Island were in any way involved in the atrocities at Nikolaievsk

Nikolaievsk or chargeable with any responsibility therefor; nor does the Memorandum appear to suggest any reason for assuming that the occupation of the said Island would operate as a protection to the lives and property of the Japanese residents on the Siberian Mainland. The occupation of the northern portion of the Sakhalin Island has been found necessary, at the same time as the occupation of Nikolaievsk, because of the geographic situation in which that port is placed, and is calculated to further a settlement of the present affair.

The occupation of certain points in the Province of Sakhalin is a measure which, -in the absence of any responsible government in Russia to whom representation could usefully be made, with a view to obtaining redress for the wrongs so wantonly committed against the Japanese subjects by an inhumane and lawless band such as the so-called "partisans", -the Japanese Government were compelled to adopt, pending the establishment of a legitimate government and the satisfactory adjustment of the Nikolaievsk incident. Cases of this kind are not wanting in international law, nor does such a step constitute any violation of the mutual understanding which has been maintained by the Governments of Washington and Tokio since 1918.

It is pointed out in the note under review that despite injuries very similar to those sustained by Japan, other nations have refrained from the adoption of any course which involved encroachment upon Russian territory in the time of Russia's

Russia's helplessness. The Japanese Government do not know whether other nations have sustained any such calamity as has now befallen Japan. Apart from that question, however, the occupation of certain points in the Sakhalin Province is a measure, as explained above, unavoidable in the present circumstances where there is no other means for securing redress for the injuries so painfully received, and it would be entirely beside the mark if it were construed as an act of territorial aggression.

The United States Government is believed to be well aware of the enormous sacrifices made by Japan in the past, from a feeling of deep sympathy in the present agony of Russia, and the Japanese Government have not the slightest intention of making any departure from this policy. Yet a disaster such as that which Japan met with at Nikolaievsk being one which has no precedent in the national experience of the country, it cannot be difficult to perceive that the entire nation would on no account have tolerated any measure short of that which has been adopted by the Japanese Government.

The Japanese Government feel persuaded that in full appreciation of the circumstances above set forth the United States Government will not be unwilling to take a sympathetic view of the decision of the Japanese Government as announced in the declaration above referred to.

WASHINGTON, August 13, 1920.

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七、七月三日附、在米大使↓國務長官(書翰)

○本署翰ハ、帝國政府ノ「^(英、イタリヤ方面撤退)」占領宣言ニ因スル朝議決定

スルヤ、内田大臣ヨリ、在米佛伊各大使ニ對シ、七月三日日本件公

(官報外(衆))

表ヲ待テテ、各任國政府ニ通告方訓令セルニ基キ、發セラレ

タレモノナリ

右七、ハ公表差支ヘナカルヘシ

八、八月十三日附、在米日本大使館↓國務省(覚書)

○本署翰ハ、右七ノ覚書中、「サハレン」ト云フハ、海軍ニ日本軍駐

外務省

米海軍公署ニ於テハ、
「サハレン」ト云フハ、
海軍ニ日本軍駐

七、ニ点ニ關シ、米(ヨリ)不同意ナル旨申越セシ對シ、反駁ヲ加ヘタルモノナリ

右八、ハ公表差支ヘナカルヘシ

七月十日米(ヨリ)ハ、非公表ヲ要求シタリ、

但シ、米例ニテ、右米公信、ハ公表ヲ欲スルニキハ、

右八ハ、我が方、右米公信ニ對シ、反駁ニシテ、サハレント云フハ、

海軍ニ日本軍駐在ナルコトヲ示ヘタルモノナリ

故、同時公表ヲ要求スルニ要アルハシ

(七月十日附國務長官↓在米大使館米公信)

外務省