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報告

明治四拾四年八月 四日發

善政務局

公才一四三号

明治四十四年七月十九日

在新加坡

領事代理副領事 山名若謙吉
外務大臣侯爵小村壽太郎殿

日英同盟改訂ニ関スルストリート

タイムズ社送付ノ件

本月本日付公才一四二号ヲ以テ及ハ報告候
通り日英同盟條約ノ改訂繼續ニ関シ
テハ當地ノフリゴレス紙ハ大ニ歡迎ノ聲ヲ
述ヘ我邦ニ對シ好意ヲ表シ候ニ及シ本月
十五日發行當地新聞「ストリート」タイムズハ

新加坡留日本領事館

今日ノ改訂ニ関聯シテ其大體ノ効果ハ
措テ論矣日本ハ英英國ノ利益上甚好
マシカラザル同盟ナリ殊ニ今後更ニ十年尚
同盟ヲ繼續スルハ吾人英國國民ニ取リ面白カ
ラサルモノト稱シ日本ノ朝鮮合併ニ至ル至
過リ叙シテ最近接受セシテ十一回財政
經濟年報ニ挿入セラレタル日本帝國ノ地圖
ニ韓(コリア)ノ字抹殺セラレ新ニ朝鮮ト不熟
文字ヲ以テ代ヘラレタルハ明ニ日本人ノ意
勇ヲ示スモノナリ殖民地施政ニ對スル英國ノ愛
置ト全然趣ヲ異ニシ吾人ノ大ニ不快ニ感ズル
所ナリト云フ一部英國人側ニ利益均等治ノ
不公平ナリト云フ不平ト朝鮮ニ對スル感情

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
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論ヲ發表致居リ候
序御参考ノ社説全
部切抜及御送付候
敬具

新嘉坡留日本領事館

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JAPAN AND OURSELVES.

The full bearing of the discussion which has arisen with reference to the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Alliance is not made manifest in the telegrams which have come to hand. We gather that the treaty of arbitration with the United States has made it necessary to free ourselves from any sort of obligation to support Japan if she were at war with that country, and we gather also, that the feeling in some of our Dominions is not very favourable to an alliance with a Power which is liable to have differences with them in the future. As we have always regarded the alliance as an error, and mischievous in its effects because it gave the Japanese a false idea of their own importance, we do not regret its modification and would have welcomed its dissolution. Britain lost its head a little over the war in Manchuria, and was so pleased to see the Japanese doing successfully what it had shirked the trouble of doing itself, that it broke all its customs and entered into a definite compact which raised Japan enormously in the scale of nations. It may have been sound policy to raise the Japanese and to give them a bigger sense of responsibility—the point is one upon which wide differences of opinion are possible. But there is no denying that we took the step blindly, before we had seen how the new Power would bear itself in its relation to the rest of the world, and more particularly how it would deal with the new responsibilities it had incurred. Almost as we write there comes to hand "The Eleventh Financial and Economic Annual of Japan," and no praise could be extravagant of that compact yet amazingly comprehensive survey of all the facts and figures about the country. On looking at the handsome map which forms a frontal insert we found ourselves puzzling over familiar lines with unfamiliar names, and then it dawned upon us that Korea had disappeared. The Korean Channel is The Chosen Channel: the name Chosen sprawls right up the peninsula we have known as

Korea. Even the provincial designations have totally disappeared and new ones have taken their place. Korea was and is not. It is being wiped out as completely as some old conquerors wiped out a province they had invaded, and in a few years' time Koreans will have to forget that they are not Japanese. Now that change has been pretty evidently in progress for several years, though hitherto the name Korea has been allowed to stand. It does not come as a surprise to us when we think of all that has been done, but the candid brutality of the map brought it home more impressively. In 1904 the Japanese Government undertook to ensure the safety of the Korean Imperial House, and guaranteed the territorial integrity and independence of its possessions. In 1905 Japan took full control of Korean foreign affairs. In 1907 Japanese ministers were put in the place of Korean ministers. In 1909 Japan took over control of justice, and in 1910 the pretext of protectorate was finally abandoned, the territory was annexed, the Emperor pushed aside with a petty title of Prince, and the name was blotted out.

It has been short shrift for a people who possessed no power of resistance, and the change has not been a boon to foreigners. They did very well in Korea under the old Empire, but they will do not at all, now that every office and every chance of trade is guided into Japanese hands. If Britain had taken over Korea the royal family would have been scrupulously respected, the native customs, religious and social, would have been secure as they are in India and in Malaya. But Japan is not formed to rule with a velvet glove, or to care much for sentimental and other interests. Her old spirit may have been delicately artistic, her new spirit threatens to become revoltingly materialistic. That is the consequence of an unnaturally swift transit from one condition of civilization to another which is quite different. In some respects it has a resemblance to the conditions one meets with in the United States. Japan has done more in six years to denationalise Korea than

England has done in India in a hundred and sixty. There is justification for the feeling in British Dominions that we could very easily dispense with an alliance which might seem to associate us with the Japanese methods, and it is not easy to say how many years may pass before new trouble arises. That makes us regret that we are saddled with the alliance for so long a period as ten years. As they have done in Korea, so they are doing farther north, where the patient, long suffering Chinese watch them with a curiously mingled feeling of interest and contempt. We asked a most cultured Chinaman once how he explained that attitude and he gave no direct reply. When other things had been talked about, he asked whether we had ever analysed the feelings of a crowd in front of a cageful of clever monkeys. It was bitter, but true. The crowd admires and is amused, but it is not envious. No doubt the Japanese will pass through fiery ordeals like every other nation in due course, and they may emerge with a greater degree of pure gold in their natures than most people of the West possess. But for the present they are untrustworthy allies because they have no tradition and no great national prestige to keep them in the straight path. Their pledges to the royal house of Korea counted for nothing, though of very recent date. Would they stand by the terms of an alliance if it seemed probable that more profit would result from repudiation? That is a question no one can answer, and least of all the Japanese themselves, because they have no precedents to guide them, and they do not know the extent to which their actions would be influenced consciously and unconsciously, by that absorption in self-aggrandisement which has become their most marked characteristic. Probably, the alliance will be gradually whittled down until it ceases to bind or embarrass either side. The Japanese as cordial, voluntary allies might be precious, but we would rather have them against us than with us if their support was merely the reluctant fulfilment of a contract which had become unpopular.

新嘉坡日本領事館

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抄出

第3門

明治四拾四年八月 四日

書政局

公身一四二号

明治四十四年七月十九日

受第19260附

在嘉坡

各子代理到知事 山名若儀吉

外務大臣侯爵小村若吉郎殿

日英同盟改訂ニ関スルフリープレス

社説送付ノ件

近時専ラ噂セラル、日英同盟條約改訂ニ関シ昨日發行ノ当地新聞「フリープレス」其社説ニ於テ本問題ニ論及シ條約ノ継続ニヨリテ濠洲及新西蘭ノ蒙ルベキ好影響者ヨリ進テ改訂條約ガ米國ニ此ハ

新嘉坡留日本領事館

ハシ感象ノ良好ナルヲ見米國ニ於テ専ラ喧傳セラル、無然者、日米戰爭論ハ為ニ一掃セラルベク今回改訂ニ依リテ目下懸案中ナル英米仲裁條約ノ訂結ニ何等ノ障害ナキニモテ且佛國ヲモ仲裁條約ニ誘引シ得ハキリ以テ在野殊ニ太平洋方面ノ平和ヲ為ソ本改訂條約ノ大ニ歡迎スベキヲ認シ尤カ本日社説ニ於テハ日米戰爭ノ戦路上ノ見地ヨリ米領非立實ノ地位ニツキ詳述改訂候御意考止社説全部切接及御送付候敬具

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
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would remove the islands from what might be termed a political protectorate into the status of a fiduciary protectorate. A further security would be gained by a recognition of the national Filipino flag, with the American flag hoisted over all administrative, naval and military buildings. We can see no difficulty. In Perak, in Selangor, in Puhang, the flag of these states is the flag of the respective Malay Rulers; while the Union Jack is hoisted over the house of the British Resident. The result of the change we advocate now, as we have before advocated, would be that Japan, Britain, Russia, China, France would all be interested in maintaining the presence of the United States regime in the Philippines as a mandatory of civilisation. Even were a rupture to arise between Japan and the United States at any time, the Philippines would be neutral ground, a sort of sanctuary, not to be violated. And the work of the American officials would go on from day to day quite undisturbed, irrespective of what might happen in regard to diplomatic relations. We have indicated the danger that still lurks within the Pacific, a danger that can only be held at bay if, and as long as, the United States maintains a friendly attitude to Japan. We say Japan, because, in the eventual growth of the power of China, the latter might have to be named as an alternative. Did such a rupture occur, Japan would not trouble about the American Pacific coast but would merely occupy the Philippines, relieve the American officials of their duties, and herself carry on the work of what would then very likely be termed a Protectorate. The United States could

not help itself, because Japan would wait on her own coasts, and no American fleet could survive to reach within shelling range of Japanese ports. American statesmanship has left undone the most important thing it has to do, and that is define the Philippines as a protectorate under international guarantee, and abandon that territorial status that has nothing but utter weakness behind it as a justification. It is surprising that no responsible American statesman has yet seriously suggested what any honest observer of the strategic problems of the Pacific would declare to be by far the most important. But it is the obvious that often evades notice. It certainly is so in this case.

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situation. A protectorate would not have alienated the Filipinos, nor would it have manacled the United States in a military way to Manila, beyond hope of extrication in time of danger as it has done. Like the soldier who caught the Tartar in the story and could not bring him along, as the captive was a great deal too strong for him, the United States has captured the Philippines and has so bound herself to their possession that she cannot get away, although she may with ease be turned out. Any power holds overseas possessions only by the power to defend that possession against challenge. Or it may hold them by the consent and neighbourly good-fellowship of other powers. As regards the United States, in relation to the Philippines, she stands in the second category. Were Japan not "bon camarade," she could, given some cause of rupture, squeeze the United States out of the Philippines with celerity. The highest authority has taught us that most human of all aspirations: "Lead us not into temptation." Let it be granted,—as every one who knows the effort and the expenditure of the United States Government in trying to improve the condition of the Filipinos and their country will gladly acknowledge,—that America means to do its honest best by its recently acquired responsibilities in the Philippines, and that it considers itself as discharging the duties of a trusteeship to a people so little advanced as to be quite unable to guide their own destinies and defend the integrity of their native land. But the weak spot is that America is there by such right of possession as financial arrangement with one foreign power could bestow over the people and country. The honour of the American

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flag is seriously compromised, because nothing that the Americans could do could prevent that flag from being hauled down by that very power that so many Americans seem, with a folly that is incredible, to be bent on irritating into an inimical attitude. America can place her national honour beyond any risk, and do herself true moral justice, by openly, in form, recognising that status of friend and protector, which she desires to be acknowledged as a fact. She would abandon that position that is a really false one, although certain American Chauvinists would blindly hold it to be true, namely, that she is in the Philippines by her own strong right arm, and that alone. She was so as against the weak Spanish force, and later against the Filipinos who welcomed a deliverer and found instead a master. But as against a splendidly equipped power like Japan, the United States, on that side of the Pacific, has neither a right arm nor a left arm, and is purely a tenant-at-will. Therein lies the one possibility of peril in the Pacific; at any rate it is the main one. And the whole difficulty and danger could be dissipated in a moment by a simple proclamation on the part of the American Government, that, having regard to the gradual advance of the Filipino population as a result of education and its share in municipal administration and legislation, it was deemed fitting to declare that thereafter the American Government would no longer hold the Philippines as a territory of the United States, but as a protectorate. And further to the discharge of that function it invited the powers to take cognizance of this change, and to join it in guaranteeing the integrity of the territory of the Philippines. This latter condition

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all. And it would be foolishness of the United States wantonly to court at least a moral disconcertment, merely out of some petulance which refused to be guided to a peaceful issue through diplomacy. It is not a small thing in the interest of the peace of the world, outside of Europe itself, that Britain should be frankly responding to America's invitation to establish the principle of arbitration, that France should be professing a readiness to enter into an identical engagement with the United States, and that Britain and Japan should have prolonged their alliance, with the addition of the valuable proviso that the obligations of the alliance would not hold where the other belligerent was a party to an arbitration treaty with one of the contracting parties. The Pacific looks more like being the true Pacific than ever, compared with any period in its past history.

WEDNESDAY, JULY 19, 1911.

In alluding yesterday to the great strengthening of peace prospects in the Pacific, as between Japan and the United States, as a result of the Treaties and Agreements either concluded or in process of negotiation, we considered the strategic difficulties in the way of actual hostilities between two powers on the opposite sides of that ocean. The one element, however, that had to be taken into account was that one of these Powers was possessed of territories so situated on the remoter side of the Pacific from her own territory that, as a result, hostages were placed in the hands of the other without hope of resistance or rescue. Over and over again we have insisted on the impossibility of the United States holding the Philippines were that tenure of those Islands seriously challenged. From the American point of view the position is undignified, because the Philippines are entirely untenable granting the contingency that so considerable a proportion of the American people still continue to believe to be impending, namely, some eventual rupture with Japan. It is not a creditable position, where external territory is pretended to be held by a power, when ejection from that territory is entirely at the discretion of another nation. Long before the Americans, by the Convention of Paris, finally, and as we always declared foolishly, acquired the Philippines from Spain on terms of purchase, we urged the creation of a protectorate as an elastic arrangement, that committed the Americans to no more than such a tenure as might be capable of subsequent modification according to the development of the

東京朝日新聞

On every hand evidence comes in of the salutary effect of the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese treaty with those minor modifications rendered necessary by the gradual change of conditions since the conclusion of the original treaty. There is a wide and growing sense of peace in the air. The Dominions of Australia and New Zealand are relieved from the tension of anticipation of the possibilities that might have arisen in the East had the Anglo-Japanese treaty been allowed to lapse. The basis of the treaty is the maintenance of the "status quo" and mutual assurance against disturbance by some military or naval intrusion on the part of an outside Power, or a combination of such powers. The effect in the United States is beneficial and sedative, because the renewal of the treaty brings in the influence of Britain in mitigation of the quite ridiculous conception that is too current in the United States, that Japan may enter upon a career of aggression on the Pacific coast of the Western States. President TAFT has expressed gratification at the signing

of the renewed Anglo-Japanese alliance and the State Department of the United States is greatly pleased and believes that there will now be no obstacle to the Senate's ratifying the Anglo-American arbitration treaty when that may be submitted for approval. A further gratifying token of the spread of the arbitration spirit is that France has expressed a readiness to sign an arbitration treaty with the United States similar to that drafted between the United States and Great Britain. It is stated at Washington that possibly both treaties may be signed simultaneously. It can be but flattering to President TAFT and the United States that the original arbitration proposals emanating

from America, and in the first place presented to Great Britain, should have been so readily adopted as a basis for future relations between the United States and at least one other European power. One good effect will be that a great deal of that portentous talk that has infested the United States in reference to the possibility of hostilities with Japan will be dissipated, or ought to be, even in the face of the rather hysterical imaginings of the American press. The unfortunate thing is that this vacuous talk about an America-Japan war has such a vogue in the American press that the Japan papers, which are in the main cold and practical, have been driven into noticing all that talk, and to a certain extent believing that there must be something in it when a nation reputed to be so cultured and well-informed as the United States lays itself out to be scared over the question. A while ago the American talk was of "whipping" Japan. The all-round-the-world trip of the American Battle-fleet educated the Americans into one wholesome thought, namely that while they could cross the Pacific as welcome visitors to the Japanese ports, they could do it in no other way. That made for good, and for a more sober understanding of the hard facts of the naval situation. The American talk more recently has abandoned aggressive conceptions, and has rather contemplated the effect of Japanese aggression on the Pacific coasts. All needless solicitude about a contingency entirely unlikely, unless precipitated by diplomatic stupidities that are inconceivable. The worst of the long educative course of American hysteria is that the Japanese people, not knowing the why or the wherefore, are coming to believe that

新嘉坡留日本領事館

America sooner or later is determined upon war with Japan. We are glad to see that some of the Japan press are setting themselves to combat this impression, which was none of Japan's making. One well informed journal, the "Yorodzu," sets itself to expose the absurdities of all this war-scare business. It cannot explain away the American obsession, but it can make it plain to its own people that that obsession is without rational foundation. As the apprehension of the Japanese people is of American attack, the "Yorodzu" endeavours to show that such fear is groundless. "The United States practically knows nothing of the way to make use of the sea." And it is amusing to note that the Japanese journal states that in this respect "the United States resembles Egypt, India, China, and Russia before the Christian era." America, as a seagoing power with a considerable maritime trade, practically vanished off the sea when wooden ships were supplanted by iron and steel ships. The Atlantic trade is monopolised by Britain and Germany, while in the Pacific the commercial marine of Japan alone is far stronger than that of the United States. The United States is still spending most of its energies on interior development, and is not like those countries which have to seek an outlet for surplus population, like Britain and Germany and Japan, the condition that makes for the existence and expansion of a commercial marine. The United States is entirely unfitted for any war of aggression across the seas against an even moderately equipped nation, possessing a considerable national shipping. As regards the

mobility of the fleet alone there would be difficulties in coaling and in other departments of fleet supply, while the lack of transport would make it impossible to move an army across the seas, even if there was an army to move, and

even if that could be done with safety, because it would be necessary to establish at least a relative command of the seas against the hypothetical enemy. And this for want of auxiliary and merchantman cruisers would be impossible. As far as sending a naval and military expeditionary force across the Pacific, Japan is in far better case, for she has the fleets, she has the host of mercantile marine transports, and she has the army corps that would be needed. But what could she do when there, except achieve a coast occupation which in no very long time would prove resultless? Japan is too longheaded to be betrayed into any such absurdity. Russia fought Japan because she had command of the land route by Siberian railway from her bases in European Russia. Japan moved her armies into Korea and Manchuria, because she gained the command of the sea from the very beginning of the campaign, and possessed the troops and the transport. Britain moved her army into South Africa, also because she had the unchallenged command of the sea and an amplitude of transport steamers. Frankly war, as a serious operation, is denied to the United States and to Japan as parties to hostilities, simply because the conditions forbid, in one case, the attempt; in the other, any real result beyond that of a foolish self-exhaustion. Where Japan would have the real advantage would be in her command over certain American dependencies in the Central and Western Pacific. That is

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明治四十年七月二十七日

公第一〇二號 奉 政務局

附屬書類添附
19602

才三四日英協

明治四十年七月二十七日

在清國

特命全權公使伊集院彦



外務大臣侯爵小村壽太郎殿

日英協約改訂の事新聞論評
印 投 及 大 要 送 附 件

由東條外務大臣海客、雷同して日英同盟繼續、
不可成るにトシ、如ク、昨キ、主ク、傾ク、有ク、高國
臨新報、除、突、然、今、次、更、訂、見、テ、寧

在清國日本公使館

日事ノ意外、驚キタス、如ク、外務部、概、論、及、
先、英、字、新聞、ア、キ、ン、テ、リ、ニ、テ、ス、如キ、正、直、一、大
吃、驚、タ、リ、テ、音、白、真、論、文、中、多、ク、嫌、味、ハ、英、
揚、ケ、テ、我、ク、抑、コ、シ、候、之、同、派、平、生、對、日、論、個
此、レ、シ、テ、著、シ、其、鋒、鋭、ク、收、メ、ル、跡、相、見、候、法
主、維、持、領、土、保、全、ノ、語、ハ、今、同、ク、支、那、ノ、神、經、ヲ、刺
激、シ、タ、リ、ト、見、エ、北、東、日、報、社、説、ハ、之、証、ス、ト、云、フ、
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ハ、之、以、テ、繼、續、條、約、骨、格、キ、テ、リ、タ、ル、モ、ナ、リ、ト、斷
シ、憲、教、數、日、直、リ、考、通、清、國、海、説、ハ、見、テ、ト
軍、心、精、細、論、評、加、シ、之、結、核、新、條、約、影、響、著
上、清、國、前途、悲、觀、致、果、是、一、善、一、般、評、論、
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明治四十四年七月二十七日

公第一四二號

書政警

明治四十四年七月二十七日

附屬書類

アジア歴史資料センター
Asian Center for Asian Historical Records
http://www.jacar.go.jp/

明治四十四年七月二十七日

在清國

特命全權公使伊集院彦

外務大臣侯爵山田壽太郎

日英協約改訂の關係新聞論評
印後及大要送附の件

由東條外務大臣の演説に當りて日英協約の改訂不可決したる事、如く吹すに傾有、
新聞論評、外務大臣の演説、今次、更訂

口事、意外、驚かた、如く外務大臣、
名英字新聞、アキデ、ニ、如く、
吃驚、了、了、其、論、中、多、嫌、
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主、維持、領、土、保、全、之、語、今、同、之、神、
激、し、見、北、京、日、報、社、説、之、証、
一、般、第、四、款、之、規定、重、キ、置、キ、國、民、公、報、
之、以、之、繼、續、條、約、骨、子、ト、ス、
正、憲、教、數、日、之、事、通、清、國、海、況、目、
軍、之、精、細、論、評、加、以、結、核、新、條、約、
上、清、國、前途、悲、觀、致、長、是、一、般、之、
及、御、者、見、之、從、東、免、論、評、之、作、

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回ノ成像ニ由リ殊ニ日本ノ實カヲ認メ且ツ其ノ外交手
 段ニ敬服セ其結果自國ノ悲觀スルノ有様ニシテ掩
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 及大要付付承知ス成後高キ有入今ヨリテ高
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 及直達付付同件査見ト成ル共其ノ中進出致具

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在清國日本公使館

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 改訂日英同盟條約ノ解決 (國民公報)
 新舊日英同盟比較及其真義 (憲報)
 英米仲裁條約ト舊日英同盟條約 (憲報)
 英日同盟條約改訂ト大分關係 (憲報)
 以上

寫り下すに當り唯譯文にて
正しきものなりし
（印）

日英同盟

ワシントン 七月十日

日英同盟継続ノ報ハ諸君ノ所々大噴驚ヲグ
トトカレテ居ラズナリト正直ニ告白スル共ニ極東
於テ英國人ノ為メニ同時ニ深刻ナル失望スルベシト
確信ヲ交ヘ清國ニ於テ英人ガ從來日英同盟ニ甘
心ヲ寄リシツ從テ英人ノ今何事ニ懲スルハ英國
政府ハ彼等ノ意思ニ管見ヤサシクシテ英人トシテカ
中ニ次ノ協約南キ四年ノ歳月ヲ存スル今日之ニ繼續
ノ調印ヲ見タリ再ヒ日英同盟現狀維持ヲ宣明スル
以テ思慮アリ且ツ時宜ニ適シスルト思惟スルヤ明
カナリト云ヒ以下新條約ノ條項ヲ比較シ書キテ
四條ノ結果ノ置キ要スル切要ナル文字ヲ除キテ之
ヲ見レバ新條約ハ必要ニ依リテ東洋ノ

在清國日本公使館

地勢ヲ保持スル純然ナル軍事的協定ナリ外ナ
クト斷じタリ次ノ新條約政府訂ト英國殖民
地會儀ノ關係ニ就キ言ヒ各殖民地ガ改訂
要素ヲナシト共ニ日英同盟シテ少シ軍ニ要ス
方而ノ協約ナリ止スルハ各殖民地中獨ニ
ト本協約ノ純縁ヲ遂行シ得ルヲ稱賛シ新約
才四條ノ濠洲加拿大ニ於テ海軍擴張ヲ云々
ニ要スル日英同盟ノ關係ニ從來幾多ク云々
日本人ヲシテ日英戰事ノ際存在シタル奇異ナル
狀態ヲ結核一掃ニ付シ去ラントシテ領悟セシムル
得ル其效果ニ著シク非ラズト云々同盟ノ將來
水ツサンニテ試ミタリ

但し最近相違ノモトヨリ於テ行動ハ本條約再訂



此は、一國の國境を越えて清國の立場より本
 領事館の支那に文字の「滿洲」が含まれる
 毫も要論なきこと、言明の順序に在り、解款の
 元、ソールスワリ、内閣の事例、年々、勝、英國の注意
 され、高、本、条、約、の、結、核、の、英、國、か、り、本、に、加、つ、得、び、キ
 同、接、の、努、力、が、増、大、し、其、精、神、的、價、値、的、器、械、的
 同盟より強大なる「ソ」稱、進、み、テ、英、國、の、舉、動、に、對、シ、日、本
 的、の、威、情、外、何、等、の、憂、心、を、抱、く、事、を、蓋、し、西、國
 相互の關係、も、其、對、情、的、の、多、度、が、担、懷、の、
 誠、意、の、徵、証、に、有、る、以上、清、國、の、前途、は、多、く、困
 難、の、際、を、逢、へ、り、隨、テ、吾、人、の、將來、兩、國、の、清、國
 疆、域、の、全、体、に、對、シ、全、力、を、用、ひ、テ、改、革、事
 業、の、促進、ス、ル、為、に、益、々、有、力、に、援、助、シ、奉、ル、ニ
 下、リ、希、望、し、且、之、の、信、に、疑、い、ん、も、な、し、云、い、

在清國日本公使館

The new Treaty, however, is not merely a re-affirmation of the Treaty which it replaces; there are certain important modifications. In the first place the preamble has been altered and now shows the pacific character of the alliance more clearly than formerly; then the two articles which dealt with Korea and India have been entirely dropped from the present Treaty; and finally the new article IV, which specifically releases the high contracting parties from coming into any quarrel with any third Power with whom an arbitration Treaty has been concluded, is a very great and important modification. The stipulation will, of course, absolve England from taking part in any possible American-Japanese conflict, as the Anglo-American arbitration Treaty is now virtually a *fait accompli* which only requires formal ratification to become effective. Stripped of useless verbiage the new Treaty is nothing but a military convention which frankly aims at preserving, by force if necessary, the present balance of power in Asia.

It must be plain, however, those who have followed the recent Imperial conference in London, that

the British Self-government Dominions have not only been an important factor in the making of this new agreement but that they have actually carried their point behind the scenes by securing that any arrangement with Japan remains a purely Asiatic compact, and in no wise interferes

July 17, 1911.
THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE.

The news we publish this morning will come as a great surprise, we have no doubt, to most of our readers. To many Britishers in the Far East the news comes not only as a great surprise but also as a deep disappointment. That the alliance would not be renewed has been the prediction of Englishmen in China, especially those representing commercial interest. From time to time articles written by Englishmen have been reproduced in these columns wherein the dominant note has been the denunciation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and it is apparent that in every case the wish that the Alliance would be permitted to lapse upon expiration of the term of agreement has been father of the thought and the prediction. But it would seem from the present development that the British Government has deemed it best to ignore their wishes. The Second Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Alliance, entered into on the 12th. August 1905, had still four years to run before its term expired, and therefore the signature at this early date of a new instrument—the third of the series—undoubtedly signifies that it was held prudent and expedient to declare once more to the world that the status quo, so far as England and Japan are concerned, must be maintained exactly in the same condition as it has remained for a number of years past.

新聞抜
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2-0010



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新刊
名抜

宣明
統治
四十

年年

月月

日日
發行

the Chinese Empire" are
 by both the signatory Powers
 to include Manchuria.
 as has been recently
 out in our columns, the
 government as far back as
 late Lord Salisbury's govern-
 ment of 1900, has always construed
 China as necessarily including
 Manchuria; and, therefore, bearing
 mind the tenacity with which
 English statesmen cling to the
 definitions of their predecessors, we
 are convinced that no departure
 from this reading is contemplated.
 We in China must give weight
 to the fact that the indirect
 influence which England can exer-
 cise on her ally has become all the
 greater because of the new article
 of compulsory arbitration between
 England and the United States
 being tantamount to something
 morally stronger than a mechanical
 alliance.

There is no need, however, for
 the government of this country to
 cherish anything but the friendliest
 feelings towards the two allies. The
 problems which China has to face
 can be very much simplified if
 frankness and good faith mark not

only their relations but also their
 dealings with this Empire. We
 therefore hope and believe that
 both will now increasingly lend
 their powerful aid in hastening the
 reconstruction work which is now
 engaging our energies from the
 frontiers of the Amur river to the
 frontiers of Tonkin.

with the measures which each
 commonwealth considers itself
 justified in taking for the preserva-
 tion of its own economic and indus-
 trial independence. The weight of
 this view in the light of the new
 article IV—that the alliance is
 hedged around with imponderable
 restrictions,—is sure to be increas-
 ingly felt from year to year as
 Australia and Canada develop their
 navies. The vast amount of criticism
 which the Anglo-Japanese alliance
 has called forth, even though it be
 now partially stilled, will have done
 its work if it convinces the Japan-
 ese that the peculiar conditions
 which existed during a brief period
 anterior to, and during, the Russian
 war have at length passed away for
 good and all.

But it must not be forgotten that
 the developments which have
 recently come in Morocco have prob-
 ably also played their part in
 hastening the signing of this new
 Treaty. Germany has at last shown
 her hand; she has occupied by force
 a harbor in Morocco which has an
 excellent strategic position facing
 the Central Atlantic ocean; and from
 now on Germany is committed to a
 policy which will require vigilance
 on the part of those who do not
 welcome her expansion in Europe
 and elsewhere.

So far as concerns China there is
 nothing in the Treaty to which

日英新約論 北京日報七月廿九日
 日英新約、清國、独立ノ領土、保全ヲ維持
 するに、清國、官吏ト安心ノ体ナシ、韓國併
 呑前、日本、其獨立ノ領土、保全トシ、宣言シタルニ
 アラズヤトテ、政府、人民、皆、生志、恠、姑息、偷
 安ト、私利、私慾、為、國事、ヲ、誤、ル、慨、シ、日本、外
 交、ノ、靈、敏、ヲ、稱、シ、清國、現、清、ヲ、悲、觀、シ、タリ

在清國日本公使館

2-0010

0:24

論日英新約

朱洪

英新約第二條曰。保證大清國之領土。與領土之存在。我國醉生夢死之官界中人。輒曰中國幸賴保國。吾輩又可以踴躍荷荷。各謀宴飲矣。嗚呼。日本未併韓國之前。何嘗不布告天下曰。保全韓國之領土。維持韓國之獨立乎。今日之君何如也。韓之民何如也。而待其人保全者。皆其不能保。明証也。獨立而靠人維持者。豈不能獨立之明証也。我國人之不能獨立。當急自警醒之不暇。而可倚賴之以儉安乎。設使有人立一約。曰保全英日之領土。維持英日之獨立。試問英與日本。肯忍受之。政府日以憲政二字粉飾人民之耳目。而民意不存。人民日以助社會以謀自利。而毫無實在之利益。即素以中國主人翁自命之。及其不來。亦必下問。

有所表見。不過日奔走於八大胡同等處。多喫幾盞花酒。多又幾圈麻雀而已矣。觀於日本外交之靈敏。着着進步。我國之外交家甯不自愧乎。今日而望政府之振作難矣。然苟有好國民。持公德之心。合羣以促政府之進行。則亦未嘗不可以有為也。惜今之所謂志士者。口言公益而實則自私自利。互相傾陷。並無真是非耳。以此等國民。而處此外交最烈之時代。吾是以懼也。

七

2-0010

0:25

英日同盟協約年限延長論

憲報 七月十日

日下清國之最大弊害、關係に及ぶ世界外交
 上注意を喚起するに足らざるは、英日同盟十年延
 期、華に如く、其地地延問題、日本朝野、
 政治家が深き憂慮を抱く所にして、其要點三
 下、即ち一、高貴上ノ衝突、日本ノ関稅政策
 二、英國ノ自由貿易主義、相害を引きたる同盟
 繼續、抗キテ自由売肉、同意ヲ得難キ下
 三、英露協商、其英國、取ら日英同盟、價值ヲ
 減キ、其繼續問題、不必要に感するに至
 リ、一、等、存、然、今や突然其、延期繼續、関
 系、條約、調印、見、至、日本、其憂慮ヲ除去

在清國日本公使館

之依然トシテ國有、地地任ヲ保持スシ得ル、至、
 日本が清國ノ方面に於て敵トシテ所ハ、独逸ト米國
 ノシテ、英地關係ヲ利用スル地、極東、於ケル
 勢力ヲ減スル得、米國、對シテ、英米、親交
 以テ、英米仲裁、條約、成ラ、米國、對國ノ援助
 是、積極的行動ヲ執ル、地、至、日本、是
 等ノ保障、依、既得、權利ヲ鞏固、スル、其、米東
 ノ、勢力ヲ擴張スル、得、列、強、對、清、政策、亦
 此、由、因、一、後、至、知、不、滿、鐵、中、三、
 國、借款、等、因、再、之、刺、擊、受、之、日本、同
 盟、繼續、依、現、狀、維、持、ス、カ、カ、米、國
 對、之、最終、目的、達、ス、ル、地、至、日本、改、治

420557

家苦心ノ有る所之ヲ清國カ徒ラテ清末清
独ノ同類ヲ祿道ニ一事ノ成ルナキニ比シ日本外交
家手段ノ敏捷ナルニ敬服ニサルヲ得サレナリキ

在清國日本公使館

2-0010

0:27

件名

新聞名 憲

報

明治四十四年七月十八日發行

論英日聯盟協約展限

十年之關係 (默存)

方今於我國最有緊要關係而又足以引起世界外交上之注意者莫如英日聯盟協約展限十年之一舉自光緒三十一年英日第二次攻守聯盟協約成立日本對於我國之舉動及對於列強之態度皆持英國為後援得藉此以保其地位而日法協約日俄協約日美協約皆由此發生卒收英俄協約之結果但英日第二次協約之有效期間至宣統七年方滿而日本朝野之政治家均以同盟之將來能否繼續久和隱憂其故有二

由於商業上之競爭英國素生親自

由貿易主義自日韓合併後英人要求十年間不變更韓國關稅率然與日本議會所主張乘與列國改正條約之際

改用國定稅率主義

反對英日聯盟本為日本利用英國保守黨政府所協定之政策而自由黨之政見未必相同其彼此利益上之衝突亦復不少今正自由黨內閣進行時代故有不能不引以為憂者矣

一由於英俄之交親自英俄協約成立兩國歷來所紛爭之問題至此而有一結束阿富汗斯坦及波斯灣之北部為俄國之勢力範圍其東南部為英國之範圍兩國可不受拘束各自經營則英國所受俄國之危險日減前此英日聯盟而抵制俄國侵略之目的至此而達

存其固有之地位有進行而無退縮

非十分重要故英國是否欲與日本繼續聯盟為別一問題

雖然今英日兩國關於印度及遠東修正聯盟協約已於西七月十三號在倫敦簽字宣布矣暹日之隱憂可以釋然而日本在吾國之勢力仍得保存其固有之地位有進行而無退縮其在吾國方面而可以為日本勁敵者惟德與美德自定巴枯達鐵路延長於波斯灣之計劃後對於中央亞細亞及吾國方面之活動益熾惟英德兩國政治上之衝突終不能免前之英國保守黨內閣及今之自由黨內閣俱以維持本國在波斯灣之優勢為宣言故日本欲減輕德國在遠東經

件名

新聞名

明治四十四年七月十八日發行

營之實力必聯英以抵制

英美素親善聯英正所以攝美使英美斷條約成美雖欲扶助中國亦不能為積極之行動而日本得乘此保障鞏固其已有之權利復擴張其未來之勢力吾恐列強對於中國所持之政策又將因此而一變自美國提議滿洲鐵路中立之說起而

日本受一刺激自四國借款合同宣布而日本又受一刺激況巴拿馬運河工程告竣之期不遠中美交通日益接近將來無論商業上軍事上美國在東方皆有執牛耳之勢日本欲為遠謀不能不急於維持現狀舍繼續英日

聯盟之效力即無以達其最終之目的

故其苦心孤詣以求其成功宜也獨怪吾國之外交家毫無聞見如聾如瞶及正式發表而始束手咋舌無可如何以視吾國生張中美聯盟中德聯盟之說徒事紛議而毫無影響者何如吾不能不拜服日本外交家之手段敏捷也

17

改訂日英同盟條約の解説

國民公報

七月十日

一千九百零五年日英改訂同盟條約締結時代の日英親交極矣。達々時ニテ日本が東方に於て優先の發言權ヲ有せん。固ヨリ其地位勢力ニ原因スル日本條約が最有力の一原因ナリシ。ハ証ラ可クナラズ。然レモ英國自由党内閣ノ成立迄未同盟ノ基礎決テ薄弱トナリ。最近關稅問題ニヨリテ其暗潮表面ニ露現シ。英米一般仲裁條約ニ成儀ニヨリテ同盟ノ効力半減シ。今則チ新約ヲ其外形ノ輪廓ヲ留ムルモノト見ス。

日米ノ高連ノ果トシテ純一戰免ク得ニヤ。是レ世界政治家共同研究ノ疑問ナリ。而シテ其原因何カ。

在清國日本公使館


力吾等清國人ノ自由之ヲ和ハテ平所ニシテ其言ヲ要ク。從來米米國ノ關係ハ南ニ為シテ諸種ノ提議ハ日露政治經濟上ノ權利利益相及ニ隨テ兩國ノ執リテ外交政策ハ其理由稍ヤ明白シ。且最近仲裁條約ノ提議ハ其理由ニシテ英米兩國ノ英之ヲ諾シ。佛國ニ或ハ之ノ同意ヲ得テ傳フ。然レ日本ハ一次平和會議議決米免申仲裁條約ニ反對。模樣ア。其直正ノ理由何シ。在ヤ。高吾人ノ研究ニ要ス。ハ所ナリ。

一般の仲裁條約ニテ成。英米戰爭ノ原因ハ。除キ。日英改訂同盟ノ衝突ヲ免シ。此ハ衝突。即チ日英米米。向背極東平和。



改革、分岐、其、新、新、条、約、第、四、条、規、定、に
 即、々、仲、裁、審、判、ノ、勝、利、ヲ、意、味、シ、改、守、固、盟、ヲ、討、シ
 一、種、ノ、障、外、例、ヲ、設、ケ、タ、リ、此、レ、本、約、成、立、ノ、要、素、ナ、リ、
 但、シ、新、約、ノ、舊、約、ニ、比、シ、六、年、ノ、延、長、ト、シ、民、衆、ノ、朝、野、
 右、障、外、例、ノ、影、響、ヲ、受、ク、キ、モ、ナ、シ、且、早、ヤ、十、分、
 研、究、ノ、價、値、ト、キ、リ、ナ、リ、ト、シ、テ、

在清國日本公使館



◎改訂日英同盟條約之解釋

一千九百零五年第二次之日英同盟所謂易防衛之同盟而變為攻守之同盟者也是時日英之睦誼殆達極度而日本雖然在東亞有優先之發言權者固其地位及勢力而此同盟實為最有力之一因不可不也英自由黨極國政黨來同盟之基礎稍危益以英日兩關稅之爭兩國之暗潮始稍稍發現於外自英美特別公斷條約之議成而同

盟之輪廓頗其大半茲之新續之約殆留存其外形之輪廓而於其中加異樣之色彩者矣

夫日美之傾軋是否能免於一戰幾為世界上諸政治家所

共同研究之謎其原因安在凡為吾中國人當自知之不得繁論也頻年以來除日英特別

交涉外其關係吾中國者美有滿洲中立之提議有錦愛鐵道與議次以四國一萬萬元之借款皆為日本所不喜亦為俄羅斯所不善此則以其經濟上之權利及政治上之利益所關耳其外

尙待研究矣
特別公斷條約者何也即兩國相約凡關係國家之名譽及權利問題皆得提出公斷綜而言之即有此等條約之國家一切無不可以和平之方法解決之戰爭上之原因可從此斷絕此於世界和平人類進步最可欣喜之現象也

件名

往者普通萬國公斷條約所能付之公斷者普通條約上之解釋而已外交上之問題大半不在其內今若此則英美兩國戰爭之原因絕矣英美兩國戰爭之原因絕矣則日英攻守同盟之效力如何明言之即日本不與美戰英當依公斷條約守和平耶則與英日同盟背當依英日同盟而與美戰耶則與公斷條約背公斷條約與日同盟之接觸點即英日英美離合同背之大較也而和平政策之勝敗所由分也而今

公斷條約勝矣

新約第四款設立約國之一國與一第三國訂立普通公斷條約現在商允本約所有各款不能強該國使其與共立斷約之國相戰爭此即攻守同盟之除外例也即公斷條約效力彌滿之一證也即和平政策優勝之現象也此本約立旨之所在其他各款皆直書舊約一通但據新約又以十年為限比舊約(即第二次)又多加效力六年耳然此新加之六年效力實無十分可以研究之價值蓋時時得以公斷條約除外之耳觀此可知外交界變化之速也

明治四十四年七月二十日發行

新舊日英同盟比較及其真義

憲報 七月二十日

才一次に及ぶ第二次日英同盟條約の比較し才二次改守同盟のあり世界各國のこれ日英兩國の一方の敵トスルハ即チ兩國の敵トスル所以ナリ知ラシク兩國の共同の兵カシテ國際上の利益下其優勢ヲ保持シ各其効力ヲ印度及清韓方面に利用シ日本朝鮮併合の即チ此の同盟の效果トシテ英ハ日本大切ナルモトナリ

然ルレ今用改訂ト才二次協約後世界大勢の軍需たる變更ヲ来タセシテ以テ理由トスル其總綱ニテ條約何等の變動ナリ而シテ其變更の根本ハ英米仲裁條約の爲メ改守同盟の効力ヲ消滅セシニ在リ

在清國日本公使館

是レ固ヨリ最近外交上一大變化タシ大達ナリ此以下新舊條約の比較し重キヲ印度、關東、支那、朝鮮、暹羅、日本、各々接シテ元來印度方面に及ブ下地ナリシテ英前此の過慮トシテ其無用ノ條項ヲ存シタスモ其目的除クハ殆ド然ラズトシ結極重重大ニ變更シテ四款、仲裁條約、團圓スルモ之ヲ英國が日本ト多ク年ノ親交の爲メニ對米關係ノあり改守同盟の効力ヲ減却スルヲ欲シガレ以上其他の條項の變更ナシトスルモ是レ既レ同盟條約ヲ以テ六七十年の無用ノ具文ニ終ラシメタスモノナリ云々

件名

新舊日英同盟之比較及其真義

(思農)

自一千九百零二年日英第一次同盟盟約而為一千九百零五年之第二次同盟中間相距才三年有半耳然後約之力強於前約遠甚蓋前約係以為防衛之同盟即兩國結約之一與他國交戰時必須有別國助其敵人則其他結約國之一乃負援助之義務譬如日俄之戰必德國或法國或他國各助俄國或英法不助日若此等國皆守中立則英亦不能不中立也至於後約則純然攻守同盟矣即兩國結約國之一與他國開戰時則其他結約國之一不論有無別國助其同盟國之敵人均否按照條約皆有援助之義務

新聞名 憲

報

明治四十四年七月二日發行

此等同盟之效直使世界各國之與英為仇或與日為仇者曉然於敵英則不能不並敵日敵日則不能不並敵英英日有連衡之勢則其所保持之國際上之利益及優勢實以兩國公同兵力守之而承其衝者在英則為印度及中國在日本則為朝鮮及中國故朝鮮之治不得謂非此同盟之功即於日本也

今將原約(第一次日英同盟條約)與新約(即此次續訂之約)比較論之(一)原約總綱三項(甲)鞏固及維持東亞與印度和平(乙)保證大清帝國之獨立與領土之存在(丙)保存兩國在東亞與印度所有土地之權利及其特別利益新

件名

新聞名 切拔

明治四十四年七月二日發行

約總綱未加增減(二)原約共八款新約共六款其為原約所有而今約所無者有三(甲)關係日本在朝鮮之事(乙)關係日俄戰爭之事此二事今已完結即新約所謂訂約後所變更之重要情形刪之宜也然原約第四條所載日本當承認英國在印度領地之特別措置云云者亦消歸烏有此為最可注意之事吾人為所以刪去此條之故當有二大理由(一)英國於

邊境若阿富汗波斯諸方面已有英俄協約足以了之固無須日本之助力此其一也(二)日本雖經中日日俄之戰國勢大進然其發言之權尚不能及於印度方面往者英國前內閣震於日本新勝之餘威殷殷以此載在盟書在吾人視之實未免為贅筆今內閣改易方針故刪去之耳其為原約所無今約所有者則四款之公斷條約云云此款實減去攻守同盟之效力者大半蓋英法方結特別公斷條約開往者普通公斷條約之新方面議將關係國家之權利及名譽問題一一付之公斷官言之即兩國之戰爭原因從此消除也兩國之戰爭原因從此消除則英日攻守同盟之效力不能不因

之而減少故曰不能強該國使其與共立公斷約之國相戰爭也夫美日本之勁敵新仇也以日英年來輯睦之交親英乃不惜以美之故而稍減攻守同盟之效力則雖其他條項一一與原約無異而不免因此第四項之故成爲六七分之衍文此眞世界外交大局斬新之變化而東亞大勢之轉機也吾人請繼此論英美公斷條約之性質及日英改約之原因及斯二者與大局之關係亦治國聞者所欲得而省覽之者矣



英米仲裁条約と英日新訂同盟条約

憲報 三月二十日

本論は、英米仲裁条約が今日日英同盟条約、改訂日英根柢条約、前日論者所承仲裁条約と、就中國際法上、性質及海牙平和會議、歴史より、中、日本、才、次、平和會議、於て提起せしむる義務、服従、主義、國、其、實行、時、朝、就、極、力、反對、唱、つ、て、説、き、たり、今日、英米仲裁条約が從來、國際条約、仲裁裁判、範圍、越、え、戦争、終、熄、唯、一、手、段、と、し、て、世界、平和、爲、す、大、之、の、歡迎、ス、ル、共、に、外交、局、而、一、大、善、化、ト、ル、論、道、ヲ、習、習、社、説、身、其、人、既、州、道、信、據、の、英、米、二、國、間、協、商、の、起、原、経、過、に、仲裁、条、約

在清國日本公使館

草案五、条ナルモノヲ舉、グ、其中、才、三、四、五、条、以、テ、是、之、重、要、ト、シ、其、大、体、性、質、カ、義務、的、ト、シ、テ、自由、的、ト、シ、テ、概、括、的、ニ、シ、テ、制、限、的、ト、シ、テ、隨、テ、英、米、仲、裁、条、約、日、英、同、盟、条、約、下、三、条、可、ク、之、レ、ノ、一、ヲ、論、じ、是、レ、日、英、仲、裁、条、約、四、条、設、定、ノ、必、要、ト、シ、以、テ、一、而、英、米、仲、裁、条、約、五、条、ノ、規、定、レ、ル、所、以、ナ、リ、ト、シ、即、チ、英、米、西、國、ハ、右、三、条、に、依、リ、日、本、ニ、對、シ、テ、西、國、カ、其、保、衛、事、件、ヲ、平和、會議、に、附、え、シ、先、テ、之、ヲ、同、意、ニ、參、照、シ、精、神、以、テ、之、ト、共、ニ、日、本、ハ、其、改、訂、同、盟、一、部、分、に、對、シ、テ、特、ニ、之、レ、仲、裁、条、約、成、立、シ、得、ス、ル、モ、之、レ、民、衆、の、於、テ、全、部、ノ、話、カ、ツ、矣、フ、モ、ト、謂、フ、モ、過、言、ニ、シ、テ、何、ト、ナ、ル、今、日、日、本、故、一、米、國、ア、ル、レ、而、シ、テ、英、米、



一戰ヲ終ラズトスレバ改訂同盟實行ノ期ナキモトシハ
 ナル由國ニシテ次ニ英國ナリ英ハ美未英日兩國ノ
 關係ヲ利用シテ東亞ノ優勢ヲ保持スルヲ得ルヲ
 日本ニ而美國ノ感情冷却ト仲裁條約ノ美
 名ニ驅ラシテ今開ク改約ノ餘義ナクモ其地位補
 苐ニキモノアリ然レニ外交ノ要約ニ極ラリ且ツ情
 國政策乃其地位ノ推移不定ノ状態ニ列國ノ
 方針ヲ動搖スルニ是リ今後ノ大勢ハ猶ホ日清
 兩國外交政策ニヨリテ定ムラルベキトシ云

在清國日本公使館

英美公斷條約與英日新續同盟

（參照昨日論說）

英美公斷條約爲此次英日改訂同盟條約之根本原因

此公斷條約實開普通公斷條約之新生命而大有造於世界外交之變化於外交史中又劃分爲一新時代者也蓋公斷裁判由來久矣其載在國際條約者除各國特別條約外有第一次第二次之和平專約大要其種類可分三種（一）臨時所設

常置有公斷員於海牙遇有紛爭事件關係國即於其中選定人員以判理之者也（三）常置裁判所則純然組織法廷以判理國際事件不須關係國之選定人員此

而已日本以實行之非其時反對甚烈云故今茲各國非有特別條約則於國際法上無必須將某種紛爭事件付之公斷之義務且即公私議論之承認義務公斷主義者其範圍亦異常嚴密據俄國際法大家馬丁君所主張則其種類有二（一）以不法損害要求金錢上之賠償者（二）國際條約之解釋及適用之無關政治上之性質者此等以萬國聯合名目所訂條約爲最適宜可謂狹矣第二次和平會議委員會所決議之範圍則如左

420566

件名

（一）貧困者疾病者相互救助事件

（二）關於勞動者之國際保護

（三）海上衝突預防方法

（四）度量衡

（五）船舶容積噸數之計算

（六）死亡船員之給料及相繼

（七）當事者大致必須承認賠償所爭在金錢上之價值者

（八）著作權及工作權諸問題

綜之所列舉事件凡關係國家之重大權利及名譽或政略上之爭斷不在其內若英美今茲所議之公斷條約則決將關係國家之重大權利及名譽或政略上之爭由兩國訂結特別條約隨時

切披 新聞名

付之公斷此爲往者國際條約所未有爲公斷條約所未有爲絕滅戰爭唯一無二方法爲限制軍備之絕好手段爲國際和平之優美福音爲世界外交大局之斬新變化之一大時期故吾人不可不十分研究之者也

明治四十四年 月 日發行
宣統 年 月 日發行
美間訂一完全之和平公斷條約以爲限制軍備除絕戰鬥之先聲本年西三月三號英外務大臣庫雷君演說於下議院極贊其英之自由黨勞動黨愛爾蘭黨均贊頌之統一黨亦無異詞法德議會均以此請於政府遂成現時第一重要問題據華盛頓消息則英國駐美大使卜海斯君已與美國外務卿克羅克斯君開議此事其重要條款如下 未完

切 抜
新聞名 宣
報
明治四十四年七月二十五日 發行
宣統

英美公斷條約與英日

新續同盟 (續) (恩農)

聞此項公斷條約共計五條約文起首大意述英美政府為尊重人道起見兩國之間永不得以兵力從事凡關兩國之獨立暨榮譽問題利益之根本重大問題以及一衝突起而有第三國牽涉其間等事兩國均願付諸公斷裁判其裁判所即海牙法廷是也並訂議於赴海牙法廷之先須就本項衝突事件先商訂一特別規條以為公斷時之根據此規條所應註明者有三事

(一)兩國衝突之點(二)兩國共同取與法廷之權限(三)法廷開判之期間此項規條起草後其在美國須經過上議院通過英國必須諮詢殖民地政府後乃能定議除此等大意之外以第三第四第五等條為最重要第三條謂美英兩國有衝突時倘有第三國牽涉在內此第三國者倘係美英兩國中一方面之同盟國則赴斷之先須經第三國之同意此第三國並有參與規條之權第四條謂兩國於締結此項公斷條約期內倘未經雙方合意即不得與第三國簽定任何條約或協約及同盟(按此條文意當為不得

訂與此項公斷條約有背之協約或同盟云云譯文或有誤第五條謂如兩國之一已經與第三國結有同盟此第三國之同盟與兩國之一有重大衝突時則其約之效力不能遠過於第三條此英美特別公斷條約之大較也(以上並據某君歐洲通信)今吾人得綜言此項公斷條約之性質(第二)為義務的而非自由的即遇有衝突必須付之公斷不得隨意自便(第三)為概括的而非限制的即兩國間之重大利益及榮譽一切問題都須付之公斷而非如尋

件名

420567

常公斷條約僅限定於解釋條約或劃分領土諸事故目前此公斷條約中所未有也夫惟如是故不能不與英日之攻守同盟相衝突倘日美有戰英據公斷條約則應守中立據攻守同盟則應助日敵美夫惟如是故英國不能不為和融之法而融之法如何即新約中所載同盟國不得強令其一與其公斷國相交戰云云是也即公斷條約中所載赴斷之先須經第三國之同意並參預云云是也質而言之即英美以同意與參預之權予日本英日即犧牲其攻

切 拔
新聞名

守同盟效力之一部分以圓滿公斷條約之效力夫曰犧牲其攻守同盟效力之一部分云者謂自條約之文意上解釋則然耳實則自事實論之則謂英日攻守同盟效力已全歸烏有亦非過論何則英日條約之宗旨專在保衛東方讀者試思往日英日在東方之公敵者俄耳今英俄協約日俄協約成矣兩國固無與俄合戰之事今日日本之新敵則美耳英既不能與美戰則更有何地可實行攻守同盟之時若曰以其他各國與英日兩國之一在東方之衝突而有利用此項攻守同盟之時則最近之將來吾人不得而理想及之者矣

英日攻守同盟既以改訂後去其效力之一部分則於英於美於日孰利此繼起之問題也夫美則居最利之地位無待言矣彼與英衝突之點僅美洲之一隅而此約足以為東西兩球之連鎖且於東方發生一種新地位如何不利英亦有利無害者也彼於東方既牽制日本不能別有所聯(謂與攻守同盟相反之聯合)且利用日美兩國之勢力以保護其在東方之優越權力繼此以往吾人可稱英國為西海北海東海南海之霸如何不利然則所待研究者日本矣讀者須知英日

明治四十年 月 日 發行
宣統

件名

新開名

明治四十年
宣統四年
月 日
發行

攻守同盟消滅效力是
 一問題繼此以往日本
 外交上勢力消長又另
 一問題據今茲之事不得謂非英
 之感情變易移愛於美而稍薄於日美
 者日之勁敵新怒英乃顯與為盟日薄
 其所以助日者以和美謂為不利於日
 者近是夫攻守同盟者以感情為精髓
 之同盟也感情既薄則其效滋微且責
 言問罪均無用武之地日本內察幾微
 之變化外制於平和公斷之美名不能
 不有今茲改訂之約其地位亦良苦耳
 然外交之變幻白雲蒼
 狗不足喻之且以中國
 政策及地位之情況游

移尤足以搖蕩列國之
 方針而速其變化此後
 大勢仍視中日兩國外
 交政策定之耳吾將於
 明日詳論之

2-0010

0:38

英日同盟條約改訂大角關係

憲報 七月二十三日

日清今後、關係：對し四ヶ場合豫想し

一、他國二國如し仲裁條約加入し日本其意旨

と及し之を加入せしむる各國聯合協成

二、日本加入の場合於て太平洋上二大勢力

日米一清國、最も密切、關係あり英國公平

和手段、由り經濟的競争、從事し清國勢

危きに至るべし

三、如し清國、之を仲裁條約加入し日本之加入せ

ざれば場合、列國、東洋關係一變スルを清

國既、友邦アリ、毎々敵國ナキヲ能ハス外交

在清國日本公使館

ノ料理、偉大、手暇ナルトテ、之が勝ヲ制ス

ルコト能ハス、以上、例、西清國、之のツクハスベシ

四、若し仲裁條約、調印者、英米二國、此

ノ下、其利實、清國外交、方針、何如

シテ、合し清國外交、其方針、清國、日

英同盟ヲ利用シ、米國ト近接シ、オニオニ、

協約ヲ訂法ス、コト、是、多ク清國、派

スツ免シ、而シテ日本、必ラス、其方針、出スルヤ

疑ナシ

ト論列、其最後、断案：對る理由トシテ

日米、開戦、既ニ世界、震盪シキモ日本外交家ノ

方針、及輿論、平和依然故、如し相ツク、日

本、侵略、平和、一派アリ、若し平和派、之を勝タカ

必之曰英同盟ヲ利用シテ清國ノ於テ特別利
 權ヲ保護シ又々英米仲裁條約ヲ利用シテ未
 ト近接シ經濟的平和戦争ノ從事ヲマシ及今
 改守同盟ノ効力其大半ヲ失フ其本多何ノ害
 カアリシ清國ノ幸ニシテ列國兵戰ノ場タルヲ免シ
 モ其ノ能ク平和經濟的瓜分ヲ免シニヤ否ヤハ
 將來ノ外交政策及國民經濟ノ能ク何如
 在ニ平云々

在清國日本公使館

新聞名 憲

報

明治四十四年七月二十三日 發行

英美續訂同盟與大局

之關係 (星)

吾人於本論中當設假定及確定二前提與種種將來之變態以研究之其假定前提則以為特別公斷條約如英美今日所訂者關係優美高尚之無上主義而今日時局尙非大同時代常無強大諸國一律加入之理其確定前提無論英美公斷條約及英日同盟條約為其注意所在實在東方且實在東方之中國此二前提既定當與讀者論現今外交大勢善夫某君通信之言曰往者之外交大勢德奧義三國同盟與英日法俄兩同盟相對峙者

也美始終獨立於歐陸風雲之外其與俄法關係極薄所交親者德以日本故稍與英國不協耳今者局勢一變美英相親以公斷條約俄德相親以波斯協約英日同盟法同盟皆不能如往時之堅英德美日德法之仇視不能

因英美俄德之關係而有變更 (意謂德不能以與美善而並善英日不能以與英善而並善美法不能以與俄善而並善德也 美德法

之關係而有改變 (意謂美不能以英故而不善德法不能以德故而不善俄也) 此數語者洞中最近外交史中奧妙矣繼此吾人將論將來外交大局之變態 (一) 假使

法德均加入公斷條約而日本不加入者則日本為孤立日本此時必甘就其所不願者而加入之 (據前此外交法德議會皆贊成加入日本與論則不甚贊成) 於是各國聯勢成而吾孤矣 (二) 假使日本遂竟加入者則是太平洋二大有勢力之國(日美)以及於中國最有密切關係之國(英)皆消除戰爭上之原因而從容競爭於吾土吾勢亦危 (三) 假使吾國加入而日本不加入者則是列國在東亞外交上之關係生一變化而吾有所與好者即不能不有所與敵此後外交非有偉大之手腕不能制勝 (以上雖專言日本俄國可以類推) (四) 假使公斷

件名

切拔

明治四十四年七月二十三日 發行

條約之署約者僅英美而止不及他國則亦視中國外交政策之合宜與否而後其利害乃可得而言使中國外交而善也則未嘗不足為平和之保障使其不善則日本未嘗不可因英日同盟之誼而聯交於美又未嘗不可利用其和平柔忍之外交手段以與美為第二次

第二次之協議於是中國之孤立也仍如故矣 (此節具見本報默存君所論) 夫日本則必斷斷出於此途也無疑矣自美日衝突以來歐人日日以為太平洋將有戰事發生而日本外交家之平和如故

且日美宣言日美協議不絕於耳自英日改訂同盟以後日本輿論之謳歌平和也亦如故夫吾人固決不承認日本有絕對的併吞中國之野心也默觀日本蓋有侵略及平和二派侵略者以占據土地為戰勝平和者以經濟競爭為上策倫日本之平和派而勝也則必利用英日同盟以保據其在中國之特別利益復利用英美公斷條約聯交於美為經濟上平和之戰爭則雖

交政策何如與夫國民經濟能力何如及所以自覺以增進其地位者何如矣

存君所論) 夫日本則必斷斷出於此途也無疑矣自美日衝突以來歐人日日以為太平洋將有戰事發生而日本外交家之平和如故

攻守同盟之効力失其大半亦復何害中國繼此以往即幸而免於萬國公戰之場其能幸免於平和之經濟瓜分與否則視中國外

中三國日報の巻


明治四十四年八月九日 接受 主務政務局

送付一三三号

明治四十四年七月二十一日 受第1968号

在横濱

總領事代理 沼野安太郎



新報

外務大臣侯爵中村嘉吉郎殿

新聞切抜送付ノ件

新訂日英同盟ニ對スル論評ヲ載セタル新聞切抜ヲ通函奉考トシ及送付候敬具



明治四十四年九月二十一日 附録一

在漢堡日本帝國總領事館

2-0010



新訂
日英同盟
論評

Hamburger Nachrichten
11.11.1905

Amerika und der englisch-japanische Bündnisvertrag.

Wie wir bereits in der heutigen zweiten Morgenausgabe telegraphisch gemeldet haben, ist die Abänderung des Vertrages zwischen Japan und England in London unterzeichnet worden. Die Revision war nötig geworden, um das Zustandekommen des englisch-amerikanischen Schiedsvertrages zu ermöglichen. Nach den bisherigen Bestimmungen wäre England verpflichtet gewesen, bei einem japanischerseits nicht angeforderten Krieg zwischen den Vereinigten Staaten und dem ostasiatischen Inselreich zu dessen Gunsten mit seiner Flotte einzugreifen. Dieser Artikel lautete:

Wenn durch einen unprovokierten Angriff oder durch eine drohende Handlungsweise, wo immer diese entstehen möge, irgend eine der beiden Vertragsmächte durch irgend welche andere Macht oder mehrere Mächte in einen Krieg zur Verteidigung ihrer territorialen Rechte oder ihrer in der Einleitung erwünschter, besonderer Interessen verwickelt werden sollte, so hat die andere Vertragsmacht sofort ihrem Verbündeten zu Hilfe zu kommen. Der Krieg wird dann gemeinsam geführt werden und Frieden wird nach gegenseitiger Vereinbarung beider Vertragsmächte geschlossen werden.

Das war in der Tat eine sehr weitgehende Verpflichtung, die England in England auf die Dauer eines unangenehmeren Kampfes als man sehr ernsthaft mit der Möglichkeit eines möglichen Zusammenstoßes zwischen den Vereinigten Staaten und Japan rechnen mußte. Wenn Großbritannien in diesem Falle wirklich seiner Bündnispflicht nachkommen und auf Seite Japans treten würde, so hätte wohl ein Sturm der Entrüstung die ganze angelsächsische Welt durchzittert und der Stellung der führenden Kolonialmacht einen irreparablen Stoß versetzt. England stand also seit langem vor dem Dilemma, entweder im gegebenen Augenblicke dem Bündnis unter zu werden oder aber seine Position als Vormacht der angelsächsischen Welt in Schwächen zu gefährden. Man wird in London aufgeatmet haben, als das Angebot eines Schiedsgerichtsvertrages von Washington her die günstige Gelegenheit bot, aus diesen peinlichen Schwierigkeiten glimpflich herauszukommen, ohne die Japaner allzu schroff zu brüskieren. Der neue in London unterzeichnete Vertrag zwischen England und Japan legt fest, daß der oben zitierte Unterstützungsparagraph fortan in dem Falle keine Anwendung finden soll, wenn einer der Verbündeten Krieg mit einer Nation führt, mit der der andere Verbündete einen Schiedsvertrag abgeschlossen hat. Japan wird von dieser Revision sicherlich nicht sehr enttäuscht gewesen sein, aber es hat, wenigstens soweit die offiziellen Kreise in Betracht kommen, gute Miene zum bösen Spiel gemacht und seine Zustimmung gegeben. Wie die Wäse des japanischen Volkes über die Neuerungen denkt, zeigt folgende Depesche:

Tokio, den 16. Juli. (Privattelegramm.) Die einflussreichsten, unabhängigen Zeitungen von Tokio und Osaka sind einig in der Beurteilung der Haltung Englands in der Frage des Schiedsgerichts. Die Zeitung Mainichi

Revidierte Ausgabe

in Osaka bezeichnet England als einen unzuverlässigen Bündeten.

In engem Zusammenhange mit der Tatsache von Muffig bei einem Kriege mit den Vereinigten Staaten völlig auf sich allein angewiesen sein würde, die Meldung über die wachsende Rivalität zwischen der Meer- und Flottenpartei. Letztere bringt nicht ohne gewisse Berechtigung auf eine schnelle Verstärkung selbst auf Kosten der Armee. Der Draht meldet:

Tokio, den 16. Juli. (Privattelegramm.) Gegenströmungen bestehen in den japanischen Kreisen als eine Folge der einander besitzenden Militär- und der Flottenpartei. Die von Yamagata geführte Militärpartei verlangt die Erhaltung einer Armee in Korea; die Flottenpartei, Admiral Yamamoto geleitet wird, wünscht als Ersatz 800 Millionen Yen für schnelle Durchführung eines Flottenprogramms beizubringen zu sehen. Der Kaiser hat sich bemüht, beide Parteien zu einem Kompromiß zu bringen. Die Gegenstände sind erklärlich so nach der Stellung der Frage eintritt, ob Japan sich mehr auf einen Krieg mit Land oder mit den Vereinigten Staaten einlassen will. Hier überwiegt die letztere Ansicht.

Der Hauptvorteil von der Abänderung des englisch-japanischen Vertrages scheint offenbar und die Vereinigten Staaten ein. Letztere könnten künftig, falls es jemals zu einer Auseinandersetzung kommen sollte, lebhaft mit dem auf sich zu Inselreich zu tun. Hierin wieder liegt ein gewisses Übergewicht, denn ohne englischen Beistand in dieser Form wird Japan so leicht keinen Krieg mit den Vereinigten Staaten riskieren. Nachdem in dieser Weise das Dilemma dem eigentlichen Endzweck des englisch-amerikanischen Vertrages gelöst ist, wird man sagen dürfen, daß außerordentlich geschickter Schachzug der englischen Diplomatie vorliegt, der für die Weltrentenverhältnisse in Ostasien gegebenenfalls von großer Bedeutung werden kann. In der englischen Presse bezieht sich auf dem Urteil über die Abänderung des englisch-japanischen Bündnisses erklärlicherweise sehr reserviert, um nicht die Pantheer aus ihrem Herzen eine Wiederholung geben sich ganz dem ersten Eindruck ihrer Freunde über Draht meldet und:

Washington, den 16. Juli. (Telegramm.) Mehrere Prof. Präsident Taft sprach über die Unterzeichnung des neuen englisch-japanischen Vertrages seine Meinung aus. Die Beamten des Staatsdepartements sind erstens und nach ihrer Meinung für die Ratifizierung des englisch-amerikanischen Schiedsvertrages durch den Senat sehr vor.

Der abgeänderte Bündnisvertrag zwischen England und Japan wird, wie weiter berichtet worden ist, sofort in Kraft treten und zehn Jahre in Gültigkeit bleiben. Ein

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新訂 日英同盟 討論

Der englisch-japanische Vertrag

16. Juli. (Priv.-Tel.) Die kleine, aber wichtige Veränderung, die der englisch-japanische Vertrag erfahren hat, ruft in der Presse lebhafteste Kommentare hervor. Darunter ist einer, der auch für Heiterkeit in dem sonst so ernsthaften Diplomatenspiele sorgt. In die verschlafenen Reaktionsfälle des „Reichsboten“ ist die Londoner Depesche von der Vertragsänderung wie eine Bombe hineingefahren. Zwar zitiert das Blatt selbst, daß der neue Vertrag auf einen alten vom 12. August 1905 verweise und ihn abändere, aber von der Existenz dieses Vertrages hat es doch keine klare Ahnung, denn es schreibt:

Wir haben immer zu erkennen gegeben, daß die ruffischen Herrren, die ganz Europa überfluteten und besonders eifrig in Deutschland in die Schule gehen, mit großer Besorgnis zu gesehen seien. Dieser enge Anschluß an England beweist uns aufs neue, daß unser Regime nicht unbegründet ist.

Es hat natürlich durchaus nicht begriffen, daß diese jetzt vorgenommene Änderung eine Lockerung, wenn nicht eine glatte Aufhebung des alten japanisch-englischen Bündnisverhältnisses darstellt. Man mag im „Reichsboten“ ruhig weiterzuschlafen, bis diese Erkenntnis schließlich aufdämmert.

Die „Post“ ist viel zu sehr mit Maxillo beschäftigt, als daß sie die Londoner Nachrichten voll würdigen könnte. Sie sagt:

Ein lazes Urteil über den neuen Vertrag läßt sich auf Grund der bisherigen Nachrichten noch nicht fällen. Es scheint aber so, als ob England der gewinnende Teil dabei gewesen ist.

Diese unklare Vermutung ist nun allen übrigen Blättern schon längst zur Gewißheit geworden. Sie stellen alle fest, daß dieser neue Vertrag den bisherigen Wert des englisch-japanischen Bündnisses und die Mächtegruppierung im fernem Osten entscheidend ändert. So sagt das „Tageblatt“:

Darin, daß man die jetzt erfolgte Änderung in Tokio durchsetzte, liegt kein geringer Erfolg der Londoner Diplomatie, denn man kauft sich in Tokio schwerlich darüber, daß durch die veränderte Situation und durch den neuen Artikel 4 das Bündnis praktisch ziemlich wertlos geworden ist. Man braucht sich nur vor Augen zu halten, daß es sowohl England als Japan unbenommen ist, sowohl mit Rußland oder China als mit jeder anderen Macht einen all-

gemeinen Vertrag abzuschließen, um einzusehen, daß die tatsächliche Lage der Dinge sich dem englischen Bündnis gegenüber nicht zu halten, trotz der Tatsache, daß die Verhandlung auch bei dieser Frage für Japan bestimmt gewesen ist, der englischen Bündnis zu führen.

Man erkennt in der jetzt vorgenommenen Änderung den Einfluß der Engländer an der ostasiatischen Küste und die „Kolonien“, insbesondere Australiens, die fast ohne Ausnahme stets schroff gegen das englisch-japanische Bündnis aufgetreten sind. Man verweist auf Beschlüsse der britischen Reichskonferenz, die nicht veröffentlicht worden sind, und die „Pfälzische Zeitung“ sagt:

Somit hat sich England zur großen Genugung seiner engeren Staatsangehörigen sowie der Bevölkerung seiner Kolonien der Verpflichtung entledigt, in einem etwaigen japanisch-amerikanischen Kriege die Waffen gegen Japan zu erheben. Das ist der springende Punkt der jetzt vorgenommenen Vertragsrevidierung.

Daß das Verlangen nach Abänderung des Vertrages nicht von den Engländern als auch von ihren Kolonien, und von amerikanischer Seite, dringend gefordert worden ist, ist sicher. Denn leicht ist es der englischen Regierung sicherlich gelungen, dem japanischen Bundesgenossen die Notwendigkeit solcher Änderungen klar zu machen. In Japan ist das Bündnis schweremäßig geachtet worden, als ein Vertrag, der auch rein äußerlich Japan zur Ehre und Würde der westlichen Großmächte und modernen Kulturnationen emporhol. Bisher hat man jetzt formell das Bündnis aufrechterhalten und nicht es in dieser praktisch wirkungslosen Form vielleicht auch bei seinem Ablauf erneuern, aber es war doch klar, daß ein Kammerverbot in Japan großen Unmut auslösen würde. Man wird sich darauf gefast machen müssen, daß dadurch das Kabinette des Fürsten Katsura neue Schwierigkeiten wachsen werden, besonders da nach neueren Meldungen zwischen der Heeres- und der Marinepartei in der Rüstungsfrage Unstimmigkeiten entstanden sind. Man wird angesichts der jetzigen Isolierung Japans Amerika gegenüber neue Heeres- und Heeresrüstungen verlangen und Fürst Katsura wird die chauvinistischen Gester nicht so leicht loswerden, die man nach wie vor seinen Feind und es wird sich bei den anschließenden, die die „Deutsche Tageszeitung“ anführt:

Alles in allem ist der Hauptgedanke dieser ganzen Vorgänge ein diplomatischer Sieg und politischer Erfolg der Vereinigten Staaten von großer und weittragender Bedeutung.

Das letztgenannte Blatt verweist auch darauf, daß die Isolierung Amerika gegenüber Japan nun in Gefahr ist, die Feme treiben werde, daß es zu einer Befestigung seiner kontinentalen Stellung komme und daß die dazu auftretenden Pläne von einer endgültigen Aufteilung der Mandchurien zwischen Japan und Rußland wiederum zu neuen Komplikationen mit England und Amerika führen könnten, daß also die Engländer in Ostasien durch diese Veränderung keinerlei Verhängnis erfahren habe. Man wünte auch anderer Ansicht sein und im Gegenteil wünschen, daß die jetzige Isolierung Japans es allen Expansionsgestirten entfremdete und zu dem so dringenden Ausbnu seiner inneren Kräfte und seiner wirtschaftlichen Stellung nötigt. Man wird die Wirkung der neuen Situation in Japan und im Osten überhaupt abzuwarten haben, ehe man ihren Einfluß auf die Entwicklung der künftigen Dinge einwandfrei beurteilen kann.

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新訂 日英同盟 対英論評

明治二十九年八月九日

Das Abrücken Englands von Japan.

Die Wänderung des englisch-japanischen Bündnisvertrages ist ein Vorgang so bemerkenswerter Art, daß wir, obwohl wir ihn bereits in unserer letzten Sonnabend-Ausgabe gewürdigt haben, noch einmal darauf zurückkommen müssen.

Somit Artikel I des neuen Vertrages ist vereinbart worden, daß, wenn nach der Ansicht entweder Großbritanniens oder Japans irgend eines der Rechte oder Interessen, auf die der Vertrag Bezug nimmt, in Gefahr kommt, die beiden Regierungen gemeinsam die Maßregeln erwägen wollen, die getroffen werden sollen, um die bedrohten Rechte und Interessen zu schützen. Dieser Artikel enthält so gut wie gar keine Verpflichtungen für die beiden Kontrahenten, denn wenn sie sich verpflichten, gemeinsam die Maßregeln erwägen zu wollen, die in dem angeführten Falle zur Anwendung gelangen sollen, so ist damit natürlich nicht gesagt, daß sie auch zu einer Verständigung kommen müssen. Bei Meinungsverschiedenheit kann also jeder Kontrahent tun, was er zur Wahrung seiner Interessen für richtig hält. Artikel II statuiert zwar den casus foederis generell in der bisherigen Weise durch die Bestimmung, daß, wenn infolge eines nicht probozierten Angriffs oder einer aggressiven Aktion die eine oder die andere der kontrahierenden Parteien in einen Krieg zur Verteidigung ihrer territorialen Rechte oder speziellen Rechte verwickelt werden sollte, die andere Partei sofort ihrem Alliierten zu Hilfe kommen, den Krieg gemeinsam mit ihm führen und unter gegenseitigem Einverständnis den Frieden schließen soll. Aber es liegt auf der Hand, daß es beiden Kontrahenten ein Recht sein wird, sich dieser Vertragsverpflichtung durch ein Retraitement zu entziehen, der Angriff des Gegners oder seine aggressive Aktion sei von dem Vertragsgenossen proboziert. Die Ansichten in diesen Punkte können selbst bei voller bona fides sehr verschieden sein. Und wenn Artikel III festsetzt, daß keiner der Kontrahenten in besondere Abmachungen mit einer anderen Macht zum Nachteil der Rechte und Interessen tritt, die den Gegenstand des Vertrages bilden, so wird dieser Bestimmung die Bedeutung durch Artikel IV gerade in demjenigen Punkte entzogen, auf den es praktisch so gut wie allein ankommt. Dieser Artikel besagt nämlich, daß, wenn eine der kontrahierenden Parteien einen allgemeinen Schiedsgerichtsvertrag mit einer dritten Macht abschließen sollte, damit für diese kontrahierende Partei die Verpflichtung erlischt, gegen diejenige Macht in den Krieg zu ziehen, mit der sie den Schiedsgerichtsvertrag abgeschlossen hat. Das zielt, wie die Dinge liegen, vor allem auf den Fall eines Krieges Japans gegen Nordamerika ab, bei dem England aus der neulich von uns angeführten Erklärung von der Verpflichtung, auf der Seite Japans zu stehen, dispensiert zu werden wünscht. Artikel IV bildet zweifellos den Schwerpunkt des ganzen Vertrages und ist insofern von politischer Bedeutung, als er klar und deutlich beweist, wie sehr England mit der Möglichkeit, ja Wahrscheinlichkeit eines Krieges zwischen den Vereinigten Staaten und seinem Verbündeten Japan rechnet.

Aus alledem ergibt sich, daß das englisch-japanische Bündnis eine sehr erhebliche Reduktion seiner Tragweite erfahren hat. Es bezieht sich eigentlich nur noch auf Rußland und China. Aber selbst in Bezug auf das letztere ist es, wie wir schon darzutun haben, sehr wesentlich durch die Streichung der Klausel IV des alten Vertrages eingeschränkt, die Großbritannien freie Hand an der indischen Grenze gab. Außerdem liegt der casus foederis für England nach dem neuen Vertrage nur vor, wenn Rußland Japan angreift, oder wenn England und Japan nach Artikel I ein gegenseitigem Einverständnis militärische Maßnahmen ergreifen sollten, wozu England natürlich nicht die Hand bieten wird, wenn es seinen Interessen zuwiderläuft. Die Bündnispflicht Englands ist also auf ein Minimum zusammengeschnitten und es muß als eine sehr achtbare Leistung der englischen Diplomatie anerkannt werden, daß es ihr gelungen ist, Japan zur Einwilligung in die Beschränkung des Bündnisses zu bewegen, selbst wenn man die Streichung der Klausel IV des alten Vertrages als englische Kompensation in Anschlag bringt. Der eigentliche Triumphtator in der ganzen Sache scheint

viel größer zu sein, als man gemeinlich annimmt. Die es durch die Operationen der greifbaren Kapitalmacht Rußland und Japans Wandschures-Abkommen gegenüber den Russischen Vorschlägen genötigt, so hat es sich gezwungen, sich für den Fall eines Konfliktes zwischen Amerika und Japan von seinem Bundesgenossen. Die amerikanische Politik hat nunmehr von vollständig freie Hand in Ostasien. Welchen davon machen werde, bleibt abzuwarten.

Das sind die politischen Gesichtspunkte, unter Wänderung des englisch-japanischen Bündnisses werden muß. Darüber hinaus ist sie insofern als sie einen handgreiflichen Beweis für die Bismarckschen Ansichten über die Schwächen der die Bündnisverträge bieten. Keine sechs Jahre nach dem russisch-japanischen Allianz bestand gehabt und schon Wänderung erfolgen, weil sich die Umstände, unter sie abgeschlossen worden ist, derart geändert haben nicht mehr so, wie ursprünglich verabredet zu halten war. Das lehrt, wie gefährlich die die zwingende Gewalt eines Bündnisses sind. Die Haltbarkeit aller Verträge zwischen Großmächten eben eine bedingte, sobald sie im Kampf ums die Probe gestellt wird. Keine Nation wird je setzen, ihre Lebensinteressen der Vertragstreue zu opfern, sie gezwungen ist, zwischen beiden zu wählen. posse nemo obligatur kann auch durch keine Vertrag außer Kraft gesetzt werden. Ober, wie es in der bereits mehrfach reproduzierten Stelle der großen russischen Reichstagsrede des Fürsten Bismarck 6. Oktober 1888 heißt: „Keine Großmacht auf die Dauer im Widerspruch mit dem Willen ihres eigenen Volkes an den Worten eines Vertrages leben. Sie ist schließlich gezwungen offen zu erklären: Die Zeiten haben sich geändert, es nicht mehr und muß das vor ihrem Volke und den Vertragsgenossen nach Möglichkeit rechtfertigen. eigene Volk ins Verderben zu führen an dem Punkte unter anderen Umständen unterschriebenen Vertrag wird keine Großmacht gutheißen.“ Ebenso wenig durch einen Vertrag das Maß von Ernst und Treue sicher stellen, mit dem die Erfüllung angetrieben wird, sobald das eigene Interesse des Erfüllenden in schriftlichen Texte und seiner früheren Auslegung zur Seite steht. Die internationale Politik ist ein flüchtiges Element und die Klausel rechnet sie nicht bei allen Staatsverträgen, so auch bei Bündnissen schweigend angenommen.

Damit ist natürlich nicht gesagt, daß die Bündnisverträge überhaupt überflüssig wären, weil ihre Erfüllung sicher sei; denn, wie es in den „Gebanden und Gebundenen“ heißt, ist auch auf die Diplomatie in den Worten es sich darum handelt, einen Krieg herbeizuführen zu vermeiden, der Wortlaut eines Traktats und des Vertrags nicht ohne Einfluß. Die Bereitwilligkeit zum losen Wortbruch pflegt auch bei sophistischen und geschäftlichen Verhandlungen nicht vorhanden zu sein, so lange nicht majore unabweislicher Interessen eintritt.

Das Fazit ist also: Man kann auf die Zurechnung Bündnisse mit einiger Sicherheit nur so lange rechnen, die Interessenolidarität fortbesteht, die zwischen den Kontrahenten bei Abschluß des Vertrages obwalte und ihr bevoogen hat. Der englisch-japanische Fall ist ein Schulbeispiel hierfür und ist deshalb besonders lehrreich.

Hamburger Nachrichten
7A78月
1901

0:45

420573

Vossische Zeitung 七月二十五日

Der neue englisch-japanische Vertrag.

Der Paragraphenfassung in einfachere Form übertragen, der bisherige englisch-japanische Bündnisvertrag: "Wir sind gegenseitig nichts zuleide und stehen einander bei für Fall eines Angriffs auf einen von uns beiden in Asien."

England hat durch den ursprünglichen Vertrag für sich selbst eine Sicherung seines asiatischen Besitzes bewirken wollen; indem es mit Japan ein Bündnis schloß, wurde es der Sorge ledig, seine asiatischen Kolonien gegen die große asiatische Seemacht beschützen zu müssen.

Vertical handwritten Japanese text on the right margin.

Was machen wir? Soll man nach den zahlreichen... Zwischenfällen des letzten Jahrzehnts nun doch eine Umwertung der Werte und eine gründliche Revision der bisherigen Anschauungen über die Verhältnisse im Fernen Osten vornehmen?

2-0010

0:46

Die Wanderung
des englisch-japanischen Bandnisses.

Man muss der englischen Diplomatie das Kompliment machen, dass sie es verstanden hat, die Frage der Erneuerung oder Nichterneuerung des Bandnisvertrages mit Japan, der 1905 in erweiterter Form auf zehn Jahre abgeschlossen war, aufs geschickteste zu losen. Der Vertrag hatte durch das russisch-englische Abkommen uber Mittelasien vom August 1907 auferordentlich viel von seiner Bedeutung verloren, denn dieser hatte die Moglichkeit eines russisch-englischen Konfliktes wegen Indiens, fur die allein das Bandnis fur England wirklich wertvoll war, zum mindesten in die Ferne geruckt. Von jenem Augenblicke an wurden die Zweifel laut, ob die Allianz nach ihrem Ablauf erneuert werden wurde. Sie wurden verstarkt durch die japanfeindliche Haltung eines Teils der wichtigsten englischen Kolonien, vor allem Australiens und Kanadas, die wahrend des amerikanischen-japanischen Einmigrationskonfliktes offen gegen den Vertreter des Mutterlandes Partei nahmen. Dementsprechend wurde die Fortdauer des bisherigen Bandnisvertrages in Frage gestellt, als vor nunmehr einem Jahre Japan und Russland sich uber ihre ostasiatischen Interessen in einem Abkommen uberstandigten, das nicht weit vom Charakter eines Schutz- und Trutzbandnisses entfernt war und das wesentlichste Merkmal der sonst so wenig erfolgreichen Politik Japans bildet. Die englischen Staatsmanner haben trotz alledem richtig empfunden, dass die Fortdauer des Bandnisses unter seine Bedeutung als Schutz- und Trutzbandnis gunigen einer Aufkandigung mit der Voraussetzungsweise der Zustimmung vorzuziehen sei. Man ergriff mit Freuden den amerikanischen Vorschlag eines allgemeinen Schiedsvertrages, weil sich aus diesem die Gelegenheit ergab, den groten Stein des Anstoes, den den Kolonien unentzehligen Gebanken eines Krieges gegen Amerika an der Seite Japans, aus dem Wege zu raumen. Die Vermittlung des Schiedsvertrages, an der der ostentlichen Meinung in England heute mehr gelegen ist, als an der japanischen

新訂
日英同盟
對立論評

allianz, war ohne die Aufkandigung oder die jetzt erfolgte Wanderung des Bandnisvertrages nicht moglich. Darin, dass man die letztere in Tokio durchsetzte, liegt kein geringer Erfolg der Londoner Diplomatie. Denn man tauschte sich in Tokio schwerlich daruber, dass durch die veranderte Situation und durch den neuen Artikel 4 das Bandnis praktisch gleichwertlos geworden ist. Man brauchte sich nur vor Augen zu halten, dass es sowohl England als Japan unbenommen ist, sowohl mit Russland oder China, als mit jeder anderen Macht einen allgemeinen Schiedsvertrag abzuschliessen, um einzusehen, wie wenig tatsachlich von dem bisherigen Bandnis brig geblieben ist. Vielleicht ist nur der Wunsch, sich den englischen Weltmarkt wie bisher offen zu halten, so wie bei den Handelsvertragsverhandlungen auch bei dieser Frage fur Japan bestimmend gewesen, sich den englischen Wunschen zu fugen. Von der Seite ist hervorgehoben worden, dass die Neugestaltung des Verhaltnisses zu der ostasiatischen Gromacht ein erfreuliches Ergebnis der letzten Reichskonferenz sei. Das will sagen, dass der Einfluss Australiens und Kanadas auf die Einschlusse des Londoner Kabinetts mitbestimmend gewesen ist, und daraus ergibt sich am deutlichsten, dass nicht die Erneuerung, sondern die Einschrankung der Bandnisverpflichtungen das Wesentliche an dem gestern unterzeichneten Dokumente ist.

2-0010



Frankreich, Deutschland oder Rußland, Schiedsgerichtsver-
träge abschließt. Das ist freilich in der Praxis mit mannig-
fachen Schwierigkeiten verknüpft, aber es ist keineswegs so
weit entfernt, daß man es nicht in den Kreis der Betrach-
tungen ziehen dürfte. Jeder neue Schiedsvertrag aber, den
einer der beiden Verbündeten abschließt, bricht ein weiteres
Stück aus dem Bündnis heraus. So können wir es wohl
eines Tages erleben, daß es noch vor dem vertragsmäßigen
Termin seines Erlöschens dahinsinkt, weil keine Macht mehr
bereit ist, gegen die einer der Verbündeten zur Kriegshilfe ver-
pflichtet wäre, und so bestände denn die freudfertige Aussicht,
an einem praktischen Beispiel zu sehen, wie die internationale
Vermittlungspolitik ein für den Krieg geschlossenes Schutz-
und Trugbündnis unterminiert und stürzt. Freilich ist das
nur eine Möglichkeit, und es wird gut sein, sie nicht
allzu hoch einzuschätzen.

2-0010

0:48

新訂
日英同盟討之論評

裏面三續
七月四日

Frankfurter Zeitung

Der Bundesschlichtervertrag zwischen England und den Vereinigten Staaten bedingt wurde, hat sich rasch bestätigt. Wir haben bereits in den Morgenblättern die wichtigsten Teile des neuen Vertrages mitgeteilt, eine nicht unwesentliche Ergänzung finden die Leser in Depeschen dieser Nummer. Die Änderungen des Vertrages besagen zusammen etwa folgendes: Wenn eine der beiden verbundenen Mächte mit einer dritten Macht einen Schlichtervertrag schließt, so ist sie nicht verpflichtet, im Falle eines Krieges dieser dritten Macht mit dem anderen Verbündeten, diesem, wie es sonst das Bündnis verlangen würde, Bundeshilfe zu leisten. Wenn also der Schlichtervertrag zwischen England und Amerika zustande käme, und dieses würde in einen Krieg mit Japan verwickelt, so wäre England nicht verpflichtet, den japanischen Bundesgenossen zu Hilfe zu kommen, mag nun Japan angegriffen worden sein, oder mag auch Amerika Bundesgenossen in dem Kriege haben — das waren die Fälle, in denen nach dem alten Vertrage das Bündnis wirksam geworden wäre. Gewissermaßen als Korrelat ist nun Japan, wie nachträglich mitgeteilt wird, der Wegfall der Klausel 4 des alten Vertrages von England zugestanden worden, in der Japan Großbritannien das Recht zuerkennt, „in der Nähe der indischen Grenze solche Maßregeln zu ergreifen, welche nötig sein mögen, die indischen Besitzungen zu schützen“. Ferner ist noch vereinbart worden, daß der neue Vertrag sofort in Kraft tritt und daß er zehn Jahre gültig sein soll.

Der englisch-japanische Bündnisvertrag vom 30. Januar 1902 hatte zweifellos eine deutliche Spitze gegen Rußland. Er wurde motiviert mit dem Wunsche, „den status quo und den allgemeinen Frieden in Ostasien, wie auch die Integrität von China und Korea aufrecht zu erhalten“, und verpflichtete die Verbündeten zu gegenseitiger militärischer Hilfe, wenn eine der beiden Mächte bei der Wahrung ihrer Interessen in China oder Korea mit einer anderen Macht in Krieg geraten und es dem zunächst neutralen Verbündeten nicht gelingen sollte, andere Mächte vom Anschluß an den Gegner des in den Krieg verwickelten Verbündeten fernzuhalten. Ueber diesen Vertrag waren von Japan bereits ein Jahr vorher Verhandlungen angeknüpft worden. Als diese zunächst zu keinem Ergebnis führten, knüpfte Japan mit Rußland Verhandlungen über ein Abkommen an, für das von beiden Seiten Entwürfe ausgetauscht wurden. Da aber Rußland einige Bedingungen vorschlug, die Japan die Hände gebunden hätten, so trat dieses, ohne noch eine Antwort auf Rußlands Vorschläge zu erteilen, aufs neue mit England in Verhandlungen, die nun, vermutlich beschleunigt durch Klage Dymitrieffs auf die ihm offenstehende zweite Möglichkeit, rasch zu dem Vertrage führten. Rußland antwortete darauf durch die mit Frankreich vereinbarte Deklaration, in der sich die beiden Mächte vorbehalten, im Falle „feindlicher Handlungen anderer Mächte“ in Ostasien die „der Sicherung ihrer Interessen entsprechenden Maßnahmen zu ergreifen“. Diese Erklärung hat aber wenig Eindruck gemacht, und jedenfalls Japan in seinem Vorgehen nicht eingeschüchtert. Der russisch-japanische Krieg hat gezeigt, daß es sich in der Beurteilung des Wertes jener Deklaration nicht getäuscht hatte. Nach dem Ende des Krieges hielten England und Japan es für angezeigt, dem Vertrage sein besonderes ostasiatisches Gepräge zu nehmen. Am 12. August 1905 wurde ein neuer Vertrag, diesmal auf zehn Jahre, geschlossen, der nicht nur viel genauer gefaßt war, sondern auch einen viel allgemeineren Charakter trug. Als Ziele des Abkommens wurden „die Befestigung und Aufrechterhaltung des allgemeinen Friedens in Ostasien und Indien“, „die Sicherung der Unabhängigkeit und Integrität Chinas, ferner die Aufrechterhaltung der territorialen Rechte Großbritanniens und Japans in Ostasien und Indien und die Verteidigung ihrer besonderen Interessen in diesen Gebieten“ bezeichnet. In dem damals geschlossenen neuen Vertrage wurde der Fall der bewaffneten Hilfe gegeben, wenn einer der beiden Verbündeten „von immer von irgend welcher Macht oder Mächten“ in einen Krieg verwickelt würde. Nur für den Fall eines

Der jetzt veröffentlichte neue Vertrag ist also dritte Form des Bündnisses. Aber während die zweite eine Erweiterung des ursprünglichen, die dritte wieder eine wesentliche Einschränkung würde man zuviel sagen, wenn man etwa den Inhalt des Vertrages spräche. Dieser ist leistunglos geworden. Er würde beispielsweise im Falle eines Krieges zwischen England und einer europäischen Macht, etwa Deutschland, sehr reale Bedeutung nur der Gedanke, daß ein solcher Krieg gleichwohl höchsten Grad der Unwahrscheinlichkeit hat, und daß neuer russisch-japanischer Krieg für lange Zeiten fürchtet werden muß, macht das Bündnis der Mächte beinahe zu einer leeren Staatsverpflichtung. Aber es ist in der Tat nicht zu verkennen, daß das Bündnis der Vereinigten Staaten wie auf der anderen Seite der japanischen Garantie für die besonderen Interessen Englands in Indien und an den Grenzen Indiens stärksten Steine aus dem Bau des Vertrages aufweist. Es ist allerdings ganz logisch, daß ein Schlichtervertrag zwischen England mit einer anderen Macht keinen Zweck hat, wenn ein Krieg zwischen den beiden Vertragsmächten überhaupt ausgeschlossen ist. So haben die britischen Staatsmänner auch von Anfang an die Absicht gehabt, den Schlichtervertrag zu verhandeln. Die Vereinigten Staaten haben überdies wohl bei ihrem Vorschlage die Bedingung gestellt, daß für sie das obligatorische Schlichterbündnis nur annehmbar sei, wenn es ihnen auch für ihre Interessen im Stillen Ozean einen greifbaren Vorteil genähre. Die letzten Nachrichten, in denen die Meinung der amerikanischen Politiker über die Revision des englisch-japanischen Bündnisses gemeldet wird, und die Ankündigung, daß die Annahme des Schlichterbündnisses durch den amerikanischen Senat kein Hindernis mehr im Wege stehen würde, beutlich, wie die Vereinigten Staaten diese Verpflichtung politisch und den mächtigen Mächteverhältnissen gegenüber vereinigen wissen. Ein Zusammenstoß Japans mit Rußland ist eine Möglichkeit, die immer von neuem aufsteht. Die Bundeshilfe Großbritanniens für den gegen Rußland gegen die stammverwandte angelsächsische Nation aber auch für sämtliche britischen Kolonien und wohl auch für Mittel- und Südamerika in hohem Grade unpopulär gewesen. So ist England froh sein, durch den Schlichtervertrag, der nun wohl zustande kommt, eine lästige Pflicht los zu werden. Anders wird natürlich Japan dieses neue Abkommen ansehen. Es ist freilich in dem Wegfall der indischen Klausel ebenfalls von einer lästigen Pflicht befreit worden, und wenn heute England mit China über die indische Klausel im Abteil in einen Konflikt geriet, so ginge das Japan wenig an, als wenn England durch seine indische Klausel politisch mit einer anderen Macht, etwa mit Rußland, aneinanderstieße. Das sind zweifellos Gewinne Japans, die durch die schwere Einbuße im Pacific kaum vollständig aufgehoben werden. Aber Japan mag doch auch noch andere Gründe haben, der Neuversion des Vertrages zuzustimmen, die nicht gleichbedeutend mit der Offenhaltung des englischen Bündnisses ist. Es mußte bestreben, daß England im Falle seiner Weigerung das Bündnis mit dem Jahre 1915 auflösen ließe, während es nun in der reduzierten Form wieder um sechs Jahre verlängert wird. Große Folgen wird man für die nächste Zeit von der Änderung des Bundesvertrages nicht zu erwarten haben. Vorläufig bis zur Ratifizierung des englisch-japanischen Schlichterabkommens, hat ja die neue Vertragsklausel nur den Charakter eines Nonfaktus. Wer auch wenn sie, wie ja wahrscheinlich ist, bald wirksam wird, bedeutet das natürlich nicht, daß die Vereinigten Staaten, nach diesen Umständen hin gehend, eine aktivere oder gar provozierende Politik fernem Osten treiben werden. Immerhin kann sich, ohne die Gelegenheit dazu gesucht wird, doch eines Tages der Zustand für Japan bemerkbar machen. Andererseits Japan in der Lage, auch seine Vertragspflichten sich zu leichtern, indem es mit anderen Mächten, beispielsweise

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明治四拾四年八月拾日 陸軍省 郵政事務局
公信第二四〇號

明治四十四年八月一日

在香港

總領事代理 船津辰一

外務大臣候爵小村壽太郎殿

初生

日英改訂同盟條約。關之新聞論評
切披送附ノ件


這回改訂セラレタル日英同盟ニ關スル本邦新聞紙及專論、論調ニ對シ本日當地發行
ノライリ、プレス、ハ別紙切披、如キ論評場
載致狀、同書等、切披
一在香港日本領事館

第三回日英協定

附屬

1978

2-0010



where it is not intended, and they can hardly be blamed for regarding as a slight a serious modification of an Alliance Treaty which they regarded as one of their highest assets. The Alliance up to now has been a whole-hearted one; Japan could rightly claim that in no other country had Great Britain shown such confidence or placed so much trust. Now there has come between them the shadow of a country which Japan cannot help thinking has acted in a slighting manner towards her in the past, and which shows a tendency to cut the ground from under her feet in the future. The roseate light has faded and Great Britain, it is claimed, is now only desirous of using Japan against her great rival, Germany, with whom Japan has now no cause to quarrel. Nevertheless, the responsible Japanese papers are not inclined to totally condemn the revision. They recognise the value to Japan of an alliance with a great Western Power even on these conditions, and they welcome the prolongation of the term of the treaty.

The Daily Press.

HONGKONG, AUGUST 1st, 1911.

The revised Anglo-Japanese Alliance has had rather a mixed reception in Japan. Compared with the comments of the English Press, the tone of the Japanese Press can hardly be considered favourable, and as there is considerable unanimity of opinion, the fact is significant. The criticisms naturally turn on Article IV., which deals with the arbitration question. Some difficulty appears to be experienced in explaining the reasons for the Anglo-American arbitration proposals. One paper boldly declares that these proposals were forced on Great Britain by the defenceless condition of Canada and the danger of the complete stoppage of food supplies in case of war with the United States. Great Britain therefore decided to throw over Japan for the sake of an arbitration treaty with the States. From this point of view the action of the Japanese Government in consenting to a revision of the alliance which makes it inoperative is severely blamed. None of the Japanese papers or Japanese publicists seem to recognise the value of arbitration *per se*, and the attempt to discover some profound diplomatic subtlety in the arrangement with America would be amusing if it were not discouraging. In some quarters it is proposed that Japan should herself enter into an arbitration treaty with the States, so as to render the revised Alliance Treaty less one-sided. It is alleged, however, that the Japanese Government has a decided aversion to arbitration, due to the decisions so far rendered in matters which she has submitted to arbitral tribunals. The House Tax award is said to still rankle in her memory, although, of course, the justice of the decision in that case has never been officially denounced. It is impossible to believe, however, that the Japanese Government would allow one adverse decision to stand in the way of participation in an arbitration treaty, and

there are not wanting Japanese statesmen who strongly advocate immediate participation in the Arbitration Treaties which the United States seems willing to conclude with all the great Powers. It is sagely pointed out that Japan could enter with good grace into such a treaty now, whereas later it would appear as if it were forced upon her. Indeed, it would not be surprising if negotiations in the matter had already been opened with America, even before the signing of the Alliance Treaty. One fact which has impressed the Japanese critics of the revised alliance unfavourably is that it comes at a time when the United States is showing herself particularly active in Manchuria. The conclusion of the Chinese currency loan, in which American financiers are participating, has been watched with a good deal of suspicion in Japan, and some amount of protest has been raised against the clause in the loan contract which provides that the financiers of the four Powers interested shall be consulted first in the event of China requiring any further loans. This is felt to be a step towards the establishment of a financial monopoly, which can only end in Japan being left out in the cold. There seems to be some idea that the participants in the loan have some official backing, although there is no proof of this; the fact that the financiers concerned happen to be subjects or citizens of four nationalities certainly not establishing the belief that the four Powers themselves have given any guarantees in the matter. However this may be, it is certain the Japanese feel rather sore over the matter and are inclined to imagine that the United States has some deep-laid scheme to deprive them of the paramountcy in South Manchuria which they have won at the cost of so many lives. Thus the revision of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in favour of the exclusion of the United States from its operations comes at an inopportune moment, and although the general applause with which it has been received in the West may sweeten the pill, it still remains somewhat difficult to swallow. The Japanese are a sensitive race, quick to take a slight even

在香港日本領事館

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明治四拾四年八月拾貳日接受

奉政教局

手紙

附屬書百三十一

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八月十四日七月二十日

在英特命全權大使加藤高明
外務大臣侯爵小村新太郎 殿

日英同盟条約改訂に關する新聞

切紙送付件

新聞紙、本件に關する論評切紙一拾
及市送付の官報並に新聞紙の其の
三改訂条約發表前ノツイの社説七
月十日宛フツソニエーテドパリス東京電報
日西日及中者日英、ツイ東京電報、發表
方日ノ日英特別記者、英、從電、一六二
号、以下、新考、乃、七月十日、ツイの改
訂日英条約、對英、社説、切紙、七
日、ツイ、ツイ、百、大、様、市、送、付、切、紙、及、音、事、一、切、紙、是、


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在英特命全權大使加藤高明

明治四十四年九月十日

2-0010



JULY 18, 1911

420604

Opinion and the Anglo-Japanese Treaty.

Great Britain and Japan have good reason to be satisfied with the reception generally given to the renewal of their alliance. It is an assurance of peace, as we remarked when it was published, to a large part of civilized mankind, and they are showing that they prize it accordingly. It appears to have come upon the public in many capitals as something of a surprise—a circumstance which would seem to indicate that the leading newspapers of the cities in question do not always read this journal with due diligence and discrimination, and even that they do not invariably know how to draw necessary conclusions from premises which are obvious. We pointed out beforehand that some such modifications of the Agreement of 1905 were inevitable if successful negotiations for a general Arbitration Treaty with the United States were not to involve us in an absurdity. Englishmen are not possessed by the passion for logic in all political matters which troubles some peoples, but we have a rooted objection to engaging ourselves in obligations that are flatly contradictory. Had we been more widely credited with this modest measure of regard for consistency, we should now hear less than we do of the surprise occasioned by what on second thoughts is admitted not to be surprising. The surprise, however, is generally pleasurable, and that is the important point. Here at home amongst all parties and all classes the satisfaction caused both by the renewal of the alliance and by the changes in the instrument which embodies it has been as general and as deep as we felt certain that it would be. It extends, as we have said, to all, but it is greatest amongst those whose views of our Imperial interests are broadest and most provident. We must wait some little time, of course, for the arrival in this country of the Dominion newspapers which comment upon the event, but the telegraphic summaries of their views which have reached us show a widespread recognition of the merits of the new Agreement. The provision which excepts from its operation countries with which either signatory may make general Arbitration Treaties is of course particularly agreeable to them. Japanese statesmen are well aware of the extent and the intensity of the feeling which the existence of the old Treaty aroused in the masses of their populations—a feeling so general and so strong that it must necessarily have deprived the Treaty of a great part of its value had the contingency which those popula-

tions contemplated as possible ever come by an inconceivable calamity within, or even near the limits of practical politics. That bugbear has now been banished from the imagination of the Dominions. In Canada, we are told its disappearance removes the only objection to the alliance, which now enjoys there the hearty approval it deserves.

The prejudice against the alliance as it has hitherto existed was notoriously more bitter in Australia than in any other State of the Empire. Probably indeed the reckless and often indefensible expression which this sentiment found there was a chief ground for the belief cherished, or affected, in some "well-informed" circles in Germany that England would be compelled to denounce the Treaty at the earliest possible moment. That supposition, like a good many others to our disadvantage held in the same quarters, has now proved to be erroneous. The renewal of the Treaty in its present shape has been welcomed in the Commonwealth, and welcomed as a substantial guarantee of peace. It is indeed the case that some of the rather ingenuous comments made upon that renewal reveal the survival of the prejudice with a *naïveté* that shows how imperfectly their authors are as yet acquainted with the fundamental principles of our world-policy or with the requirements of diplomacy. We look forward, however, to a great change in such Australian opinion as they reflect, now that the statesmen of the Dominions are on their way home in possession of the facts and motives that guide our conduct of foreign affairs. Other Australian organs of opinion take the occasion of the conclusion of the Treaty to urge upon their countrymen the duty of considering "the real basis of their white policy." That is a subject on which they cannot meditate too often or too deeply. Intelligent and sober-minded Japanese thinkers are not less alive than Australians to the reality and the depth of the differences between their countrymen and the inhabitants of the Dominions, or less concerned about the possible ill-effects upon the minds and characters of their fellow-subjects of a premature contact with the civilization of another race. We do not believe, whatever demagogues may say, that our allies have any desire to see their poorer countrymen emigrating in large numbers to lands where, as experience has shown, they might lose some of the most characteristic virtues of their race. Fear seems to have been expressed in some quarters lest the extension of the alliance might be used as a pro-

text by the representatives of certain shortsighted views in Australia to defer the further development of an immigration policy. That, indeed, would be a fatal result, which we trust that all good Australians will exert themselves to avert. The small numbers of the population who hold this vast and rich inheritance and the slow rate of their increase are the real danger, and we believe the only real danger that threatens the Commonwealth. It is a danger which the Australians themselves can defeat, and which they only can defeat. It is for them to provide against it and to provide against it soon.

America shares our gratification at the removal of an obstacle to our General Arbitration Treaty with her, and at the fact that Japan has actively helped to remove it, while, after some doubts and hesitations before the real character of the changes was understood, the Japanese Press is recognizing more and more the advantages it confers on both signatories alike. Of the European Powers France is naturally gratified by a step which strengthens the hands of her British friends, and which tends to make those Asiatic conflicts impossible, from which her interests in Europe have often suffered, and have seldom derived advantage. An article in the *Novos Vremya* takes credit to M. Isvorsky's action in negotiating the Russian Agreement with Japan, for facilitating the amendment of our alliance with her by the omission of the article referring to the countries adjacent to the Indian frontier. That omission is, indeed one of the most welcome features in the new Agreement, as the changes in the situation which have led to it are one of the most welcome features in the present position of world-politics. The article was always viewed with disfavour by a large and weighty section of Anglo-Indian opinion. That it was subject to misinterpretation of a character very hurtful to us is shown in the friendly remarks of the *Novos Vremya* itself, which seems to suppose that it was originally inserted because we believed that the North-West Frontier was in danger, and that it has now been struck out because that danger has disappeared. It never was designed, we need hardly say, with a view to the defence of our Indian frontiers. That, we are all agreed, and ever have been agreed, we can, and must, hold by our own strength alone.

JULY 18, 1911

Anglo-Japanese Treaty and the
World's Peace.

Comments that are being made in various quarters on the new Anglo-Japanese treaty are bringing out in a remarkable way the bearing of that agreement upon international politics. Perhaps the most significant criticism comes from Australia, where Sydney newspapers accept the conclusion of the treaty as giving Australia ten years' breathing space in which to strengthen her defensive position. The idea behind this opinion is that, but for the treaty, serious controversy might arise between Australia and Japan in regard to the immigration of the Japanese into some of the Australian colonies. The great desire of Australians is to retain their territory for a white population only, and they are aware that, while their vast spaces are sparsely populated, the enterprising and energetic Japanese may seek to gain a footing there, as they are already endeavouring to gain a footing, not without success, in British Columbia and on the Pacific Coast of the United States. The Anglo-Japanese alliance gives assurance to Australians that peaceful relations will be maintained between Japan and all British dominions. None the less, they feel compelled to set their house in order in view of future developments. Their weak place—so long, at all events, as they are within the British Empire—is not their defensive forces, which they are already strengthening, but their paucity of population and their failure to attract to Australia a sufficient number of immigrants to populate their unoccupied lands. Ten years is not a long period in which to double or treble their population, and, unfortunately, they have not yet discovered, as Canada has done, a method by which emigration to Australia may be popularised, though some authorities say that the attractions of Australia are really superior to those of Canada.

As to Canadian opinion, it also is generally favourable to the new treaty, and gratification is felt that it removes the possibility that existed under the old treaty of Great Britain, as Japan's ally, becoming involved in war with the United States because of some quarrel between that Power and Japan in the Far East. For the same reason the new treaty is warmly welcomed in the United States. The "New York Times" remarks that the

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modification of the treaty "not only evinces a desire on the part of Great Britain to correct an egregious blunder on the part of the Balfour Government, but also a general acceptance of the principle of the proposed treaty of arbitration with this country in advance of its ratification." The same journal recognises that by assenting to the change Japan also gives evidence of her entire friendliness to the United States, and rebukes the agitators, both in the States and in Japan, who have continually asserted that war between the two countries was coming. The "New York Evening Post" also welcomes the relief that is given from a Japanese scare, and says that diplomacy in future "will have to make all its calculations on the axiom that among the three Powers, Great Britain, the United States, and Japan, or any two of them, an armed conflict is out of the question."

This is a much more wholesome and rational view of the relations that are likely to exist between the United States and Japan than has been finding expression recently in American newspapers. The Tokio correspondent of the "Times" says that the leading Japanese journals insist that Japan's desire for peace with America is as great as England's, and consider that the zone of tranquillity will be extended by the new arrangement. There is every reason to believe that both in Japan and in the United States, the desire is for the maintenance of peace and amity, and it is not impossible that an arbitration treaty between those two Powers, as well as between the United States and France, may be concluded on lines similar to that embodied in the Anglo-American treaty now virtually concluded. The British understanding with Russia has resulted in the exclusion from the new treaty with Japan of all reference to the Indian frontier, and now the "Novoe Vremya" of St. Petersburg welcomes this as a proof of a remarkable change in British public opinion, which renders it possible for Russia to conclude with Great Britain a treaty of arbitration as America has done. "We have no reason," says the "Novoe Vremya," "for armed conflict with Great Britain, and there is even no possibility of an encounter." Both Japan and Great Britain have since the Russo-Japanese war entered closely into friendly relations with Russia, and the ensurance of pacific relations between

France, Russia, the United States, Japan, and Great Britain is brought appreciably nearer by the conclusion of the Anglo-American and the Anglo-Japanese treaties. This appears to be a view of the situation that is not escaping notice in Germany. The "Frankfurter Zeitung" remarks that the Anglo-Japanese treaty would, in the case of war between England and a European Continental Power, say, Germany, acquire very real importance, "and it is only the thought that such a war is, happily, in the highest degree impossible, and that a new Russo-Japanese war need not be feared for a long time to come, which reduces the alliance of the two naval Powers to an empty form."

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15 JUL 1911

A New Anglo-Japanese Agreement.

The Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1905 is come to an end, four years before it should naturally have expired by effluxion of time, and it has been replaced by another, the full text of which was issued last night. The fact that such a document was in course of preparation can hardly be said to have been entirely unknown, for it was reported in Tokio some days ago. The secret, however, had been well kept in this country, and we imagine that its sudden and unexpected divulgence will affect many minds forcibly and rather disagreeably. Treaties, alliances, offensive and defensive agreements—these are at least as momentous as most of the matters concerning which legislators wrangle, debate interminably, and contest for votes; and this illustration of the manner in which statesmen, while in office, can abrogate, modify, and renew international engagements of the gravest character, without even the pretence of consultation with the people whose will they are presumed to interpret, will be accepted as a striking reminder of the limitations of "popular" and "democratic" government. However, we merely throw out that observation in passing. We must not be taken to dispute the propriety, or even the necessity, of such limitations. There are things which a Government must do quietly, carefully, and at leisure, wholly and solely upon its own responsibility; and there are others which must be effected rapidly and with secrecy upon the same terms. The machinery by which the popular will is supposed to make itself known is not applicable to all sets of circumstances. And in the case of this Anglo-Japanese treaty revision the changes that have been made will be found, we believe, to commend themselves to general approval. There are not many of them. The new Treaty consists of six Articles, as against eight in the original; but two in the document of 1905—those relating to the status of Japan in Korea and to the continuance of British neutrality during the Russo-Japanese war—have lost all point and meaning. A third Article in the 1905 Treaty which does not appear in that of 1911 concerns the defence of India. By it Japan "recognised" the right of this country "to take such measures in the proximity of" the Indian frontier "as she may find necessary in safeguarding her Indian possessions"; and the disappearance of this acknowledgment may be noted, perhaps, with a certain measure of regret. Yet its actual value in any foreseeable contingency could hardly have been large. It was formal rather than politically significant; it added little or nothing to the practical effects of the original

agreement; and we may assume that, like the others mentioned, it drops out because it is now deemed superfluous. The omissions from the new agreement are of small moment in comparison with the fresh material it embodies. Its *font et origo*, the real reason for negotiating it at all, must be sought in Article 4, which provides that, "should either high contracting party conclude a treaty of general arbitration with a third Power . . . nothing in this agreement shall entail upon such contracting party an obligation to go to war with the Power with whom such treaty of arbitration is in force." In plain language, provision is made for the altered circumstances to be brought about by this country's prompt acceptance of Mr. Taft's momentous offer. Assuming the Taft programme of arbitration duly carried out, nothing in the Anglo-Japanese agreement shall compel this country to undertake hostilities against the United States, even though the States should make an "unprovoked attack" upon Japan. We have, therefore, a swift and decisive comment on the suggestion, made in America and elsewhere, that the existing alliance would necessarily be incompatible with the projected arbitration treaty. In theory it would; that can hardly be denied. The treaty of alliance is, therefore, modified so as to bring it into harmony with the new conditions established since it was first negotiated; but we may judge from the apparent ease and the indubitable promptness with which the modification has been arranged that the Tokio Government fear no ill consequences to themselves from its adoption, and are sincerely confident of the pacific intentions of the States. There is further definite evidence pointing to the same conclusion. As we have indicated, the original alliance would have terminated in 1915, or, rather, it might have been then brought to an end by either party. The new one, on the other hand, lasts for at least ten years from now. Japanese statesmen are very thoroughly alive to their own national interests. They would not thus easily have undertaken to prolong their partnership with Great Britain had they considered its value to themselves impaired by British international engagements in other quarters. As a matter of fact, we believe that the tranquillity of the Far East, the integrity of Japanese and British territories there, and the principle of the open door in an independent China are as effectively guaranteed by the new treaty as by that it has supplanted. There is the more reason for holding that conviction since one is inclined to suppose the new treaty arranged with the concurrence not merely of the British Government, but with that also of the representatives of the

Dominions, who were conferring so recently with Sir Edward Grey upon matters of foreign policy. The modification—and still more the prolongation—of the Japanese alliance must needs have been among the topics discussed; and, having regard to the statements since made by General Botha and others, we seem bound to conclude that the Dominion representatives approved of what they heard. There has been reason to believe that the policy embodied in the 1905 Treaty was not wholly agreeable to the sentiments of everybody in the Dominions, and it is good to be able to believe to-day that its continuance has been recognised by their own leading statesmen, after full and frank deliberation with the head of the Foreign Office, as conducive to the peace of the world and the interests of the Empire as a whole.

There will be general satisfaction in this country that the new Anglo-Japanese Treaty has been ratified, but the document appears to be meeting with a hostile reception in Japan. This is due to the major alteration made in Lord Lansdowne's Treaty, which is to the effect that should either party make a Treaty of General Arbitration with a third Power, such party shall not be bound by the Treaty of Alliance to go to war with such third Power. The British-American prospective Treaty of Arbitration is, of course, contemplated in this provision, and it is perhaps not surprising, considering the recent relations of Japan and the United States, that the Japanese are annoyed. It is stated that, while the terms of the new Treaty have given great pleasure to Mr. Taft and the members of the United States Government, and are likely to be approved of by public opinion in that country, the most influential organs in Tokio unite in an outburst of fierce criticism of the Treaty, and declare that Great Britain is an unreliable ally, not to be depended upon in a time of stress. It is undoubtedly the case that the conclusion of a General Arbitration Treaty between Great Britain and the United States would render the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of less value and advantage to Japan inasmuch as it would tie the hands of Britain in the case of an outbreak of hostilities between America and Japan. While this may be the popular feeling in Japan, it is evidently not shared by the statesman of the Mikado, who have assented to the alteration. In framing such a Treaty this country had to consider not only its possible future relations with the United States, but also the views of its own Colonies. Some of the Colonies feared that the first Treaty might lead us into difficulties with the United States. Happily this fear was not confirmed by actual experience, but it is as well that the danger has now been definitely provided against. The fact may give offence to popular sentiment in Japan, but it may have a beneficial effect in causing that country to be careful about maintaining its good relations with the United States. It may be assumed that the new Treaty has the

approval of the Colonies, and other representatives of the Dominion. The Treaty has also the approval of both parties in this country. When the original Treaty was negotiated by Lord Lansdowne it was not hailed with universal approval by the Radical party, who alleged that we had entered into an alliance with a military and provocative Eastern Power. That objection has also been falsified, and all parties at home and in the Colonies unite in welcoming the new Treaty as being calculated, as it states, to contribute to "the general stability and repose." Great Britain may be, in the view of the bellicose Japanese press, a poor and unreliable ally, but the new Treaty, with its wise and necessary modification with regard to the United States, will be regarded as a great source of strength to the cause of the peace throughout the world.

From YORKSHIRE POST,

JULY 15, 1911.

420600

With the exception of Article 4, there is nothing in the new Anglo-Japanese Treaty which was not in the previous one—that of August, 1905—but certain somewhat important articles of the 1905 Agreement are omitted. Article 4 provides that if one of the parties to the new Anglo-Japanese Treaty falls at war with a Power with whom the other party has a general treaty of arbitration, this other party shall not be obliged to take up arms in breach of the treaty of arbitration. This exception is, no doubt, made in view of the forthcoming arbitration treaty between Great Britain and the United States of America, and will be taken in that country as supporting the considerable section of expert opinion in America which expects that the next big fight will be between the United States and Japan. At the same time, it is to be noticed that the new Agreement, like that of 1905 and that of January 1902, is only concerned with the status quo in Eastern Asia and India; so that the possibility of our being drawn into conflict with America by this treaty is, in any case, and apart from our making an arbitration treaty with America, remote. The same applies to Germany. Two articles of the 1905 Agreement are omitted from the new one. The first is that which recognised Japan's right to a free hand in Corea, "provided always that such measures [as Japan may take] are not contrary to the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations." Whilst the absence of these words is to be regretted—for it cannot be supposed that the same idea is covered by Section (b) of the preamble—their omission only recognises what has been allowed to become the accomplished fact. Another article not without importance is also dropped—that whereby Japan recognised the right of Great Britain "to take such measures in the proximity of that [Indian] frontier as she may find necessary for safeguarding her Indian possessions." The only other change, except for such matters as dates and signatures, is the disappearance of the Article referring to "the present war between Japan and Russia," and binding Great Britain to preserve strict neutrality unless some other Power came to Russia's aid. The net result, therefore, is that we give up two Articles of some considerable value, in return for the ability to abstain from fighting the United States of America in certain conditions. But, as we think, such a possibility was unlikely under the old agreement, and the gain on this point is consequently small, whilst as a whole the document signed by Lord Lansdowne was more favourable to this country than that signed by Sir Edward Grey.

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From SHEFFIELD DAILY INDEPENDENT
21, Fargate, Sheffield.

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Sheffield Independent
18 JULY 1911.

THE OUTLOOK.

AN ARBITRATION GAIN.

The new form of the Anglo-Japanese defensive treaty removes the chief stumbling-block to the Anglo-American Arbitration Agreement. It also removes one of the most doubtful features of the treaty concluded in 1905, and generally throws open the door for international peace understandings. The significance of the change is found in the clause that

"should either high contracting party conclude a Treaty of General Arbitration with a third party, it is agreed that nothing in this agreement shall entail upon such contracting party an obligation to go to war with the Power with whom such Treaty of Arbitration is in force."

The position of the United States with a seaboard open to the Japanese Navy, and with difficulties arising from the influx of Japanese immigrants and American interests in the Far East, sufficiently explains the wisdom of this important modification in our alliance with Japan.

It is in the interests of all the Powers, as well as of England and Japan, to preserve the "status quo" for trade and commerce in the Far East, and that involves the territorial "status quo." The action of Japan in Korea created some misgiving, but on the whole there has been no justification for some of the fears which were expressed when the treaty was first signed. Japan has maintained an attitude of correctitude. As the Power on the spot there might be a temptation for her to stretch her authority. So long as she honestly continues to use her influence as a first-rate World Power to police the Far East in her own and our special interests, the renewed agreement must make for peace. Having given proof of her good faith, the Government may have been well justified in extending the alliance with the modification in question. That modification was necessary, however, to give full scope to the proposed Anglo-American Arbitration Treaty. For there are slumbering possibilities outside the scope of mutual

Japanese and English interests of friction between the United States and Japan. Under the new clause there will be no danger of our being dragged as a third party into such a conflict.

That is an immense gain in itself, and it is not the only gain. Should the area of international arbitration treaties be extended on the Anglo-American model, there will be a similar safeguard. Our statesmen are now free to make approaches to the European Powers who may have had reason to be jealous of the old agreement with Japan. This development follows, it is important to notice, the meeting of the Imperial Conference, when for the first time the nation's foreign policy was laid frankly and fully before the Dominion Prime Ministers. It is to be assumed that the delegates assented to the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty on the new terms, and that Australia, for example, was satisfied that her interests were in no way prejudiced. The ratification of the treaty under these favourable conditions must give it a far greater moral sanction than the first draft possessed. Critics of Liberal Imperialism must note that here is a concrete instance of consulting the Colonies on behalf of the Empire as a whole.

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15/7/11

420598

The Revised Anglo-Japanese Treaty.

We commented earlier in this week on the reports that the new Arbitration Treaty between England and the United States would lead to a revision of our Treaty of Alliance with Japan. These reports are now confirmed in the text of the new treaty that is made public to-day. The operative clause of the old treaty bound either Power to make common cause with its ally if "by reason of unprovoked attack or aggressive action wherever arising on the part of any other Power or Powers" it should be involved in war in defence of its territorial rights or of the common objects of policy as defined in the preamble. The new treaty changes none of the words in this clause but tacks on a new sentence:—

Should either contracting party conclude a treaty of arbitration with a third Power, it is agreed that nothing in this agreement shall entail upon such contracting party an obligation to go to war with the Power with whom such treaty of arbitration is in force.

In effect, what the new treaty does is to permit either England or Japan to contract out of the warlike obligations of the treaty in favour of a Power with whom it has a treaty of arbitration. The change is reasonable and even necessary, and we are glad that our Government has looked ahead and made provision betimes. It is a common objection to treaties of arbitration that they impose restrictions on a nation's freedom of action. So, indeed, they do; but so, too, do all treaties, and especially treaties like this with Japan binding two Powers to make common cause in a war that comes upon either. The question that our Government had to decide was which restriction on its liberty of action it would prefer—a restriction binding it to arbitrate or one that bound it to go to war. It has rightly decided in favour of the first restriction. Where a treaty of arbitration conflicts with the treaty of Alliance with Japan, it is now understood that the Treaty of Arbitration is to have the higher power and to override the obligation to go to war.

It will come as a shock to many to realise that until yesterday, when the new treaty was signed, we were under formal obligations that might have driven us to go to war with the United States of America. As it happened, the United States have been more faithful to the objects of this treaty than

Japan herself, but it is not difficult to imagine circumstances under which we might have been drawn into a war that we hated. The obligation upon us to join Japan in her wars is limited by two sets of conditions. The first is that she should have been involved in war "by reason of unprovoked attack or aggressive action wherever arising on the part of any other Power or Powers." But the word "unprovoked" is almost meaningless in this connection. Every attack ever made is provoked or unprovoked according to the point of view that is taken, and it would need a long inquiry to decide which view corresponded more accurately with the facts. Would it, for example, have been an "unprovoked attack" on Japan if the United States had made a naval demonstration off Chemulpo after the recent annexation by Japan? The other conditions of our making common cause are that the war should have arisen in defence of certain "common objects" or "special interests" of policy, of territorial rights, or of the principle of the "open door." But what if a war came about in which one party appealed to some of these objects and the other party to other objects—if the United States of America, for example, had said that she was fighting for the "open door" and Japan pleaded that she was defending her territorial rights or some of her "special interests"? It is true that the treaty provides for consultation between the two Powers "on all questions of mutual interest," but neither could have the right of veto on the action of the other, nor would the fact that one disapproved of itself give it the right to withdraw from its obligations under the treaty. The truth is that we stand to gain very little by these treaties of military and naval alliance, while the risk we run is enormous. Two nations can always, if they wish, make common cause in war in defence of a policy; and formed provisions binding them beforehand to do so are really a sign not of amity but of mutual distrust of each other's sincerity. We are glad that the dangers of the treaty have now been restricted; we should have been more pleased had the provisions for making common cause in war been abrogated altogether.

There are one or two other changes in the scope of the old treaty. The old article 3, which recognised the paramountcy of Japan

in Corea, has now dropped out, as well it might seeing that Japan has annexed the country. Article 4, recognising that we must have a free hand in measures for the defence of the Indian frontier, has also, we are thankful to see, disappeared with it. It ought to have gone without saying that we should not consult Japan in any measures that we took for the protection of India; and if this was the price that had to be paid for Japanese assistance in India, it was much too high. If this country cannot keep India without the assistance of Japanese troops it deserves to lose it; and we are very sorry that the references to India, which gave legitimate offence to pride, have not all been dropped out of the new revised version. One more change has been made in the treaty. The old treaty was made binding for ten years; in the new version there is no mention of any time, and it can be revised or abrogated at will. That is a great improvement. In all our recent foreign policy there has been no scandal quite so great as the conclusion of this Japanese Alliance by a discredited and divided Tory Government on the very eve of its final dissolution. The new Liberal Government under the circumstances would have been quite justified in denouncing it as soon as it came into power. It has in fact contented itself with modifying its provisions five years before the term fixed for its expiration. Our only regret is that the revision has not been much more thoroughgoing. The terms even of the revised treaty do not correspond with the actual political conditions of our time, and expose us to serious dangers for which it gives us no compensatory security.

From **MORNING ADVERTISER,**
Fleet Street, E.C.

17 JUL 1911

420597

ENGLAND AND JAPAN.

The Treaty between Great Britain and Japan, which ought to have expired in August, 1915, has been renewed for another ten years from now. The alliance is thus prolonged for a further six years. The reasons for the Treaty remain the same. These are to keep the peace in the Far East, to preserve the open door for all nations in China, and to maintain the rights and interests of Great Britain and Japan in Eastern Asia and India. Two of the special articles in the original Treaty now disappear, and one wholly new article is added. The two which are now left out bound this country to allow Japan to take such measures in Korea as were thought proper and necessary to defend her interests there, provided equal opportunities were afforded to all nations in that country. On the other hand, Japan recognised our right to take such measures in the neighbourhood of our Indian frontier as we might find necessary. Both provisions were really unnecessary. Since 1905 Japan has become responsible for so much of the administration of Korea that the provision is now superfluous, and that concerning India is doubtless omitted for the sake of symmetry. The essence of the Treaty is however, modified in one important particular, and in one only. Hitherto Great Britain and Japan have mutually agreed, in the case of an unprovoked attack or aggressive action by any Power upon one of them that the other should come to its assistance. Neither contracting party was to enter into agreements with any other Power on matters affecting the Treaty without consulting the other. A new article now provides that, should either of the contracting parties have entered into a treaty of general arbitration with another Power, it should not be bound to go to war with that Power in defence of the other party if attacked. This clause is obviously meant to meet the case of our General Arbitration Treaty with the United States, and shows that we must have consulted Japan with regard to it. In certain quarters it is argued that we ought to insist that Japan shall become a party to all our treaties of general arbitration. But that is not necessary, and perhaps not feasible.

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THE CUTTING ATTACHED IS FROM

The Daily Telegraph.

No. 15,450.]

LONDON.

[ONE PENNY.]

420596

17 JUL 1911

WHEN Sir EDWARD GRAY, a few months ago, made his famous pronouncement in the House of Commons as to the readiness of the Government to accept President TARR's suggestion of a general Arbitration Treaty between Great Britain and the United States, few, in all probability, of those who listened and applauded ~~for any one of its most important results.~~ We allude, of course, to the new Anglo-Japanese Treaty which was signed and sealed on Thursday last, and the text of which was published in our columns on Saturday. Yet that new international instrument is, of course, the direct outcome of the negotiations which have recently been carried on at Washington, with every appearance of ultimate acceptance by the two great British-speaking communities. It was, indeed, soon observed that it would be quite impossible—without glaring contradiction—for Great Britain to conclude an all-embracing Treaty of Arbitration with the United States, while she was pledged by the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1905 to make common cause with Japan in certain clearly-defined contingencies. And while it was always improbable in the highest degree that Japan and the United States should be engaged in hostilities, no one could say that the contingency was impossible, because it is notorious that situations requiring very delicate handling have arisen between the two countries, and may do so again. Diplomacy contrives to overcome even the most awkward contradictions when it has a mind to do so, but everyone must be glad that the British Foreign Secretary and the British Government have taken the more candid course of meeting the difficulty boldly, and of persuading the Japanese Government to consent to an alteration of the existing treaty. They have not only succeeded in doing that, but they have also arranged with Japan for the amended Treaty to continue in force until the year 1921. In the normal way the old Treaty would have expired in 1915, so that the most obvious gain that has been achieved is that Great Britain and Japan will remain allies for six years longer than had been previously arranged. We, in common with all those who regard the Anglo-Japanese Treaty as having been the most potent instrument of recent times for safeguarding the peace of the world, welcome this prolongation of the alliance with the utmost satisfaction. Already the question as to what would happen in two or three years' time, when the moment would be approaching for the statesmen of the two countries to decide whether they should denounce or continue the Treaty, had begun to be mooted, especially in

view of the fact that that period promised to coincide with the completion of certain shipbuilding programmes in European waters. It is all to the good, therefore, that the question should be satisfactorily settled now, so long before the expiration of the old Treaty, and before the troublers of the peace—in whatever quarter—should have begun seriously to agitate men's minds by the usual crop of mischievous alarms.

In all but one respect the new Treaty is practically the same as the old one. The common aims of the two countries, as set forth in the preamble, are unaltered. One or two clauses, which the march of events has rendered out of date and unnecessary, are dropped. A single new article has been inserted. That is the fourth, which runs as follows: "Should either high contracting party conclude a treaty of general arbitration with a third Power, it is agreed that nothing in this agreement shall entail upon such contracting party an obligation to go to war with the Power with whom such treaty of arbitration is in force." No one will wish to underestimate the importance of this reservation. From the Japanese point of view it obviously detracts materially from the value of the Treaty, inasmuch as it would detach Great Britain from the side of Japan in the event—the most unlikely event, we repeat—of hostilities between Japan and the United States. That being so, it will not be at all unnatural if some sharp criticism is uttered by those Japanese newspapers which are prone to take a somewhat Chauvinistic attitude towards the United States. They may even accuse Great Britain of seeking to rid herself of binding obligations in order to secure a general treaty of arbitration with the United States. But the fact that the change has been sanctioned by the statesmen of Japan shows that they at least take a far broader view of the situation, and willingly make full allowance for the eager desire of this country to take a great step forward, in company with the United States, in the direction approved by their common conscience. Our Japanese allies are men of affairs—none more so; they appreciate at its full value what the British alliance has been worth to them, as well as what it has been worth to us; they are convinced of the sincerity of our friendship, and that they can depend upon us as "good allies" in the technical sense of the term. Nor do we doubt that they also realise how extraordinarily difficult it would have been for any British Government to carry out its treaty obligations to Japan if such performance had involved hostilities with the United States. The removal

of that remote possibility, with the full consent of Japan, is a happy circumstance, which will be equally gratifying on both sides of the Atlantic. And it is to be observed that when, in 1905, the Anglo-Japanese Treaty was first concluded, the question of Asiatic immigration into the Western seaboard of the American continent had not arisen in any acute form, and the sympathies of the United States in the Russo-Japanese War were wholly with the Island Empire across the Pacific.

It is, of course, fully open to Japan to conclude a similar treaty of general arbitration, if she so desires it, with any Power in either hemisphere with whom she thinks there may be any danger of her becoming embroiled through such Power's antagonism to Great Britain. That would be a form of re-insurance thoroughly well known to European diplomatists. But while allowance must be made for such a contingency in balancing the disadvantages of the new Treaty against its advantages, there is no use in conjuring up such chimeras in order to dwell upon them; and, after all, it is hard to conceive of any Power wishing to attack Great Britain in the Far East under circumstances where the interest of Japan would lie in the defeat or humiliation of this country. In any case, it will be time enough to discuss such dangers when they take visible shape. There is another aspect of this new Treaty to which allusion must be made, and it is one of incalculable importance from the point of view of Great Britain. We refer, of course, to the fact that the alteration in the terms of the Treaty has clearly been made with the full cognisance of the Dominion Governments. It now becomes evident what was the main reason of the unbounded gratification recently expressed by the Dominion Premiers at their admission into the most guarded chambers of the Foreign Office, when at one of their private sessions Sir EDWARD GRAY laid bare before them the innermost secrets of Empire. No one can doubt that he consulted them upon the revision of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, in which two Dominions at least are most deeply interested. The problem of the relations of Australia and Canada towards Japan—so far as the most critical subject, that of Asiatic immigration, is concerned—is much the same as that of the United States, and it is freely admitted by the Commonwealth statesmen that it was the rise of the Island Empire of the Pacific to greatness, after her war with Russia, which first really roused the Australian people to the problem of national self defence. That epoch-making struggle stimulated great racial and national movements in Australia, as

in China, India, and America. But while the Treaty of 1905 was the work of the two Governments of Great Britain and Japan alone, the Treaty of 1911 has behind it on the British side the sanction of all the Governments of the Empire. That is a profound difference, which will lend additional authority to the instrument, and encourage the hope that its practical and moral effects will be as signal as those of the old, which was the fruitful source of friendly understandings that spread to other nations besides the two Signatory Powers.

20010

0:15:

THE CUTTING ATTACHED IS FROM:



420595

**RENEWAL OF THE
ANGLO-JAPANESE
TREATY.**

As was only to be expected, the cables show that the new treaty of alliance between Britain and Japan has met with the approval of the English-speaking world. This approval covers both the one fresh feature of the treaty and the circumstances attending its negotiation. We have made it clear that the impossibility of war between the English-speaking peoples is one of those "imponderabilia"—we borrow the word from the Germans—which transcend any merely diplomatic obligation. There is nothing new about this doctrine. It has repeatedly been affirmed by statesmen on both sides of the Atlantic. Still, there is a real advance in the fact that the sentiment has now become so established as to admit of definite expression. But the advance made in the manner of negotiation is even more substantial. Here we have to do not with the statement of an accepted fact, but with the establishment of a new precedent. Fourteen years ago, at what was destined to become the first of a series of conferences, Mr. Chamberlain revealed to us the ideal of a united Empire acting as such in its external relations. Subsequent years have shown some of the difficulties attending the realisation of this ideal. Many of the best Imperialists among us were reluctantly forced to the conclusion that any plans for Imperial union must wait until the Dominions themselves were clearer as to the character and limits of their autonomy. And now, quite suddenly, all these difficulties have been overcome. The development came about quietly and naturally, as great things do. The Government found itself in a position to negotiate a general arbitration treaty with the United States. The provisions of such a treaty might conflict with the obligations of the British alliance with Japan. A modification of the Japanese treaty was thus desirable. It so chanced that this question arose at the time that the Imperial Conference was meeting in London. The proposal that the Dominion Premiers should be admitted

into the secrets of foreign policy followed logically from the Defence Conference of 1909. The secrets were revealed, and among them was the new Japanese treaty. So it has come about that the whole Empire has been associated in the conclusion of the arrangement upon which our Asiatic policy depends. This time, then, there will be none of the misgivings which were raised both in Australasia and in Canada at the renewal of the treaty six years ago. There is an end also to the apprehensions recently expressed as to the consequences of renewing the treaty in 1915, just before the next Conference meets. Above all, there is an end to all doubts as to the possibility of the States of an Empire scattered over five continents co-operating in the execution of a common foreign policy.

Such auspices would go far towards justifying a bad treaty. But the new alliance needs no external support. It contemplates the conclusion of a whole series of general arbitration treaties, and its pacific object is thus brought out more clearly than ever. The two greatest Powers in Asia are now agreed, first that arbitration shall be used whenever possible, and secondly, that when arbitration fails, aggression shall be repelled by their joint force. The double provision is an improvement on the terms of the treaty of 1905, which necessarily regarded force as the one guarantee of peace. Equally satisfactory is the arrangement whereby the alliance is prolonged until 1921. It gives us every reasonable certainty that for six more years after 1915 there will be peace "in the regions of Eastern Asia and India." In this connection great importance attaches to a point to which no reference is made in the treaty, but which is nevertheless implicit in its terms. The fourth article speaks vaguely of "a general arbitration treaty with a third Power." We all know, however, that this article applies specifically to a general arbitration treaty between Britain and the United States. Now it is idle to deny that the relations between Japan and the United States have not

been quite satisfactory of recent years. That fact has not been lost upon a great European Power which is never averse from fishing in troubled waters. A very serious issue thus presented itself to the Japanese Government. It would have been possible to meet Sir Edward Grey's request for modification with a refusal, and to have opened up negotiations with Germany for an alternative alliance. Such an alliance would have been definitely bellicose, and the Tokio Government has shown the greatest wisdom in declining to entertain the idea. Instead, we know that the United States and Japan will for the next ten years face their differences for themselves, with no mutual friend on the make to embarrass both parties with advice to stand firm.

In view of these facts, it is not surprising that the treaty has been derided by certain Pan-German newspapers. According to their view, the alliance has really been dissolved, and the new arrangement is nothing more than an attempt to "save face." This fallacious reasoning springs from the German tendency to think in terms of war. To those who think, as we do, in terms of peace the alliance is real enough. In this connection we would once more emphasise the fact that the treaty represents the views of the whole Empire. Its conclusion will, we trust, demonstrate the falsity of the monstrous syllogism that closer Imperial union would endanger the peace of the world because such union is aimed at by Jingoism, and Jingoism want war. We have ourselves never met a Jingo, and we believe that the creature exists only in the Radical imagination. Still, the bogey has been exploited on the Continent, and it is all to the good that the true character of Imperial foreign policy should have been so decisively revealed. Incidentally, too, the treaty demolishes another argument by which it has been sought to weaken the effect of the alliance. This argument lays stress on the fact that the alliance was both made and renewed under a Unionist Administration, and that it is accordingly a mere party document, which a Radical Ministry would disavow at the critical moment. Even the most mis-

chievous of foreign critics would not suggest that Sir Edward Grey is likely to disavow his own signature, and it is thus made explicit to the whole world that, as every intelligent man knew already, the alliance is binding on the British Government whatever party complexion that Government may wear. On all grounds, then, we are able to tender to Sir Edward Grey our heartiest congratulations. He has shown that, despite the changes of the last six years, the alliance remains one of the cardinal points of British policy; he has secured peace in the Far East for ten years to come; he has proclaimed in dramatic fashion the far-reaching effects of general arbitration treaties; and in all these things he has associated with himself the Prime Ministers of the British communities overseas. It must have been with feelings of profound thankfulness that the Foreign Secretary went down to his Office on Thursday last to put his signature to a treaty which, besides re-asserting familiar facts, gave reality to aspirations hitherto thought impossible of attainment.

2-0010

0:52

76 JUL 1911

THE NEW TREATY.

The remarkable form in which the Anglo-Japanese Treaty has been renewed for ten years shows that in foreign, as in domestic, politics we have passed into a wholly new world. Some weighty reflections are suggested by the revised version. We agree that it presents, on the whole, an undoubted balance of advantage, but the fact of a certain amount of loss must be faced before the net balance can be calculated. Apart from minor modifications, the main point about this unique instrument is that it is certain to carry with it the universal approval of Great Britain and the United States. Sir Edward Grey's private statement on the subject was evidently what excited the enthusiasm of the Dominion Premiers when they were taken into the confidence of the Foreign Office. Yesterday's telegrams remarked that Mr. Taft is much pleased. When the original alliance was renewed and extended after the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905, no one in this country could have imagined that it would become a cause of apprehension and ill-feeling in the United States. Public opinion across the Atlantic was still in the "first fine careless rapture" of its admiration for Japan. That feeling cooled rapidly and passed into a revulsion. The effect upon the relations of the two English-speaking Powers was even worse than has been admitted, and largely for that reason Australia was bitterly hostile to the alliance. President Taft pointed the way out of the chief difficulty, and Sir Edward Grey has found the exit. We could not conclude an arbitration treaty with Washington without consulting Tokyo. The Japanese are realistic, and with admirable composure and intelligence they have recognised our complex conditions. It is, therefore, agreed that the two contracting Powers are not bound to support each other against any other Power with whom either of them may have signed an arbitration treaty. Were Japan involved in war—of which there is now no likelihood—with the Great Power on the other side of the Pacific, we could not be involved in hostilities with the United States. This is a psychological gain of immense importance at the outset. It will be an equal practical gain to us if the Anglo-American arbitration treaty, though it is not quite so strong as we had hoped to see it, proves strong enough to hold. Australia and Canada are frankly delighted. The

British Empire, divided upon the superseded treaty, is a solid unit for the new one. That is again an Imperial advantage not easy to over-estimate.

Upon the other hand, we much doubt, in spite of all reassurances, whether the effect on Japanese national opinion will be good or whether our allies will leave the situation as it stands. The Washington cablegrams, reporting bitter resentment in Tokyo, are evidently exaggerated, but they probably reflect at the same time a considerable measure of the truth. Rightly or wrongly, our allies will feel that they are practically isolated in the Pacific. On the other hand, their special agreement with Russia secures them absolutely on land. If the Japanese concluded a general treaty of arbitration with Germany we should not have the slightest cause under the terms of the new treaty for surprise or complaint. That any sequel of this kind is probable just now we may not believe, but if it came within a few years no experienced politician would be astonished. This, however, is eminently a case for taking the advice of Sir George Cornwall Lewis and contenting ourselves with "short views." The alliance in its revised form may be an entirely novel and experimental episode in diplomacy, but it secures peace between the British Empire and Japan for ten years. Long before the end of that time much will have happened that no man can now foresee. Our allies know well that behind the revised version there is genuine and deep goodwill towards them on this side, and we trust that the very flexibility of the new arrangements between England and Japan may ensure the long continuance of their friendship.

THE CUTTING ATTACHED IS FROM:

SPECIAL EDV

Evening Standard
800
St. James's Gazette

LONDON, FRIDAY, DECEMBER 8, 1900. ONE PENNY.

<p>DUNLOP QUALITY IN NON-SKIDS.</p> <p>PROLOGATION. THE HOUSE SPEECH TO THE PARLIAMENT.</p> <p>RUDEY REFERENCE.</p>	<p>Old Bushmills Whiskey.</p> <p>SCENE IN THE LORDS. MANY LADIES WITNESS THE CEREMONY.</p>	<p>CHANCELLOR'S REPLY. WAR DECLARED ON HOUSE OF COMMONS.</p> <p>LIBERALS' FUTURE POLICY.</p>
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157/11

420593

The New Treaty.

The flaw in the old treaty with Japan is repaired in the new treaty just signed and published. There is now a clause which provides that, should either high contracting party conclude a treaty of general arbitration with a third Power, nothing in the agreement shall entail on such party an obligation to go to war with the Power with whom such arbitration treaty is in force. Previously there was something almost comical in the situation at which we might have arrived. To be obliged by one treaty to fight a Power bound to us in peace by another treaty would have been a most ironical example of men's best-laid schemes going astray. But if the complication had affected our relations with America—or if the Japanese treaty had prevented us from concluding the arbitration agreement with America—we should have been confronted by a tragical dilemma in which no sane Englishman could have perceived anything but horror. At the time the first treaty was made this possibility was so remote as to seem non-existent. But events have moved since then. We hope that war between America and Japan is still remote. It cannot be denied, however, that there is sufficient threat in the prospect to render the change in the treaty a vital necessity. What would have happened if treaty obligations had brought us to the verge of war with America is too cruelly puzzling to contemplate. It is inconceivable that we should fight the Americans; it is equally inconceivable that we could have disregarded our obligations. Happily, our thoughts need no longer dwell on such horrors. The new treaty has rescued us.

在英領日本領事館

2-0010

0:164

YEARS OF RESPITE.

THE revision of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance which is announced to-day is a necessary accompaniment to the Arbitration Treaty in which we are about to join the United States. It is obvious that we cannot be at the same time pledged to refer all disputes with a certain Power to arbitration and also pledged to take the field against her under certain conditions. The old agreement with Japan would have ranged us as antagonists of the United States in what were doubtless improbable but by no means impossible circumstances: the stipulations of the new instrument dispose altogether of that contingency. To-day's intimation from the Foreign Office constitutes an assurance that the negotiations between Sir EDWARD GREY and Mr. TART have been successful, and that the bond of general arbitration between the two English-speaking communities will shortly be disclosed as a reality. On that account alone it would receive a cordial welcome from public opinion in this country. But there are more self-contained aspects in which the renewal of the Alliance at this time gives particular ground for satisfaction. The prolongation of the present arrangements until 1921 will afford considerable relief to the anxieties which would have attended its lapse in 1915—the date at which the contingencies of naval competition would have begun to press upon us with critical severity. The key-fact to be borne in mind is that the menace of the German Navy has compelled us practically to withdraw the White Ensign from Far Eastern waters, leaving our vast commercial and other interests unsupported by the tokens of physical strength. The Japanese Alliance has supplied the missing buttress, and enabled us to concentrate our maritime power on the defensive necessities of the North Sea. As time goes on, the development of the new Pacific Navy on a broad Imperial basis will restore the equilibrium of our position, but 1915 is much too early a date for that prospect to be realised. We were faced, therefore, with the emergency of having our Far Eastern interests left *en prise* at the very moment when the consummation of Germany's challenge threatened to put the last strain upon our naval security at home. The prolongation of the Alliance gives us a six-years' respite from these dangers, and allows time for the co-operation of the Dominions in naval armament to be brought to fruition. At the same time the presumption that the present step has gained the approval of the Dominion Premiers in their recent consultations with Sir EDWARD GREY will serve the purpose of what may be called a moral sedative in Pacific politics generally, and will have a steady influence

on public opinion in the United States as well as in Canada and Australia. Racial competition or antagonism is a cosmic force which is not in the last resort subject to the fetters of human diplomacy. But it is reassuring to the world at large to find that the energies of statesmanship are devoted to its restraint and not to its fomentation, and on that ground the renewed Alliance will be the best prophylactic against all that is alarmist and detrimental in the emotions investing the intercourse of East and West.

JULY 15, 1911.

420591

ANGLO-JAPANESE TREATY.

The modification of the treaty of alliance between England and Japan, necessitated by the Arbitration Treaty with the United States, which we recently foreshadowed, is now an accomplished fact. Yesterday Sir Edward Grey and the Japanese Ambassador affixed their signatures to the revised and renewed treaty, on behalf of their respective Governments, and for at least another ten years this instrument will regulate our relations with Japan, and, indirectly, with all other Eastern Powers. With an Administration like the present in England, which seems bent upon removing every ancient landmark, and running counter to the policy of its predecessors in almost every particular, it is something, at any rate, to the good that it has renewed the Treaty with Japan which Lord Lansdowne concluded in 1905, and which took the place of that of 1902, which the same distinguished Foreign Secretary also was the first to negotiate. The Treaty which, with certain modifications, was yesterday renewed, continues the present alliance till the year 1921, but now exempts us from the necessity of going to the assistance of Japan in a war with any third Power with which we have a General Arbitration Treaty. Japan, of course, can claim a similar exemption in regard to a Power with which we might be at war, but with which she, on her part, had concluded an Arbitration Treaty. This is the main modification in the renewed and revised Japanese Treaty. Some minor alterations have been made, wholly as a result of altered circumstances, since the original instrument was signed. Thus the special reference to the Indian frontier and to Corea is omitted, the latter State having no longer any independent existence, being practically absorbed in the Japanese Empire. As regards India, the special recognition of our sole right to guard its frontier, which was in the old Treaty, now disappears, it being thought, we presume, unnecessary to recite the obvious fact that what we hold we shall guard and keep. Our only misgiving in the matter is the possibility of misapprehension by Russia, with whom no Arbitration Treaty has been made, and who may, therefore, feel that the Treaty rather tends to her isolation and consequent disadvantage, in the event of war with Japan, in which we could not, even if we would, stand aside.

The general objects of the Treaty remain,

of course, the same, and they are summarised in its preamble. The maintenance and consolidation of the general peace in Eastern Asia and India is put in the forefront, and scarcely less essential is the recognition by both Governments of the importance of preserving the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire with equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in that vast country. Last, but not least, the Treaty sets forth the necessity of maintaining the territorial rights of the British and Japanese Empires in the regions of Eastern Asia and India and the joint defence of these rights and interests. The need for some such arrangement between the two Island Empires of the West and East, who have so much in common in regard to their Eastern possessions, is perhaps stronger now than when the Alliance was first made. The ambitions of at least one great European State have certainly not grown less during the past ten years, while its powers of offence have vastly increased. Without suggesting that unprovoked or high-handed action is contemplated in any quarter in regard to our Eastern Empire, or that of our ally, it must be owned that the international situation is not particularly reassuring at the present moment. Hence England and Japan have done well to re-seal, and extend the period of the alliance which Lord Lansdowne negotiated when he was at the Foreign Office. So far as its main objects are concerned, the Japanese Treaty has always been understood and appreciated in this country. Criticism, wherever it has existed in regard to our allies, has had reference to their fiscal policy with which the Treaty is not concerned. The Government of the Mikado would gladly negotiate a commercial treaty as well with this country, but, as its representatives at Tokio have already pointed out, we have, under the fetish of free imports, nothing to bargain with, and hence under the present Government we cannot strengthen our political alliance with the bands of commercial reciprocity.

Alliances and arbitration treaties possess little permanent value unless they are founded upon common interests and do not run counter to national honour. As, so far as can be seen, the policy of neither America or Japan is likely to clash with that of the general interests of the British Empire, the mutual arrangements to which we are parties with both these countries are likely to be durable and to the common advantage. Whether they would stand the test of a con-

lict of interests or of honour is, we think, judging from the nature and history of mankind, extremely doubtful. It is not a little curious that the most clamorous and almost hysterical advocates of universal arbitration, and of peace-at-any-price in regard to external affairs, are the most rigid opponents of compromise and conciliation in any form to their political adversaries at home. These must be humiliated and crushed at any cost, conciliation being reserved only for the foreigner who has the power to make himself disagreeable, if not placated. However, we must be thankful that, at any rate in the conduct of our foreign affairs the principle of continuity is observed, and that the Powers may rely upon successive British Governments maintaining a consistent line of policy. The Japanese will certainly be relieved to find that the Treaty has been renewed with such slight modification, and they will be grateful to Sir Edward Grey, no less than to their own Government, for this fresh guarantee of security and peace for at least another decade.

JULY 15, 1911

420590

THE RENEWAL OF THE TREATY.

It is with the heartiest satisfaction that we welcome this morning the official announcement that a new Anglo-Japanese Treaty has been signed by Sir EDWARD GREY and Mr. KATO, prolonging the existing alliance between the two Powers until 1921, and adding the provision that, should either party make a Treaty of General Arbitration with a third Power, such party shall not be bound by the Treaty of Alliance to go to war with the Power with whom the Treaty of Arbitration is in force. With this exception and subject to the omission of one or two other provisions which have been rendered obsolete or superfluous by the course of events in the last six years, the Treaty of 1911 has the same aims and objects as the Treaty of 1905, and will, we hope and believe, have the same pacific results. The two Powers undertake to support each other in the maintenance of their rights and interests "in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India," to assist each other in "case of unprovoked attack or aggressive action," to preserve the "common interests of all Powers in China by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China." When the original Treaty first appeared there was a disposition to scoff at this last provision as a piece of embroidery designed to cover the selfish intentions of the contracting parties, but it is of real importance, and we are glad to see it in the forefront of the new Treaty. Much casuistry might be expended upon the relation of the position of Japan in Manchuria or that of European Powers in other parts of China to the "independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire," but the fact remains that the keen rivalry of the Powers to put pressure on China or to take slices out of China has been abated in the last six years, and that the usefulness of this Treaty still depends very largely on keeping it in check. European Powers have no motive for seeking territory in the Far East or risking quarrels with each other in that process, if they can be assured the open door and equality of opportunity for their commerce. Japan has natural advantages through her geographical position which other nations cannot challenge, and she has also secured for herself a sphere of influence which is generally acknowledged. But her peace and that of all the Powers will be best secured by such moderate use of these advantages as gives China no cause for complaint and leaves other Powers with no serious grievance. The Treaty is, in this respect, the renewal of a pledge to the world as well as an engagement between the contracting parties.

Events have moved rapidly since this Treaty was first concluded by Lord LANSDOWNE, but the policy it embodied has

been well justified. We may take for granted that the renewal of the Treaty was carefully considered in the Imperial Conference, and that it has the hearty assent of the Dominion Governments. This is no slight addition to the forces behind it; for we need not conceal the fact that, when it was first concluded, there were doubts and hesitations in Australia and even in Canada about the policy which allied the mother-country with a Power which was conceived to be a "peril" to some of the Dominions. In the subsequent years a much more moderate view has come to be taken on this subject. Japan has outlets for her population which will not soon be exhausted; and she has industrial problems which are likely to absorb all her energies for many years to come. It would, of course, be absurd to claim that the question of Japanese immigration has been finally settled by this Treaty; it is a question which depends on opinions, sentiments, circumstances which the wisest man in the world cannot predict, and which may not exist or exist in an entirely different form a few years hence. All that statesmen can do is to prevent its arising in an acute form in their own time, and here we have been able to rely on the good sense of the Japanese Government, which also, let us remember, has its racial pride. The renewal of the Treaty is, again, a substantial guarantee that this question will be wisely and carefully handled by the contracting parties.

But the most important new aspect of the Agreement of 1911 is the clause which provides that nothing in this agreement shall entail upon either contracting party an obligation to go to war with a Power with whom it has concluded a Treaty of General Arbitration. Apart from this, such a Treaty could not have been concluded between this country and the United States, for the obligation to arbitrate would have been broken by the exception which compelled it to go to war in defence of Japan. It is possible to argue that the exception seriously weakens the value of the agreement, since a third Power which proposed to attack either of the allies would only have to make a Treaty of General Arbitration with the other ally to prevent its joining. If Germany, that is to say, wished or were in a position to attack us in the Far East, she would only have to make a Treaty of Arbitration with Japan to make the alliance of no avail; and similarly, when our agreement with the United States is concluded, Japan will not be able to look to us for assistance in any possible or conceivable war with that country. To this we make answer that good-faith in the parties is an underlying assumption of any Treaty, and that if either went behind the back of the other, to neutralise its engagements in the manner suggested, it would be proof that the Treaty had ceased to correspond to the realities of the case. In such a case the Treaty would be useless, with or without this loophole. In the present case

we have not gone behind the back of our ally. We are negotiating our Arbitration Treaty with her knowledge, and the fact that she renews her agreement with a special provision for it is proof that we have her consent. We do not wish to draw any unauthorised conclusion from this fact, but it certainly has great significance, and, without being too sanguine, it enables us to look forward to an understanding on policy in the Far East which shall embrace the United States as well as Great Britain and Japan.

2-0010

0:57

From **MORNING LEADER,**
Stonecutter Street, E.C.

15 JUL 1911

420589

**ALLIANCES AND
ARBITRATION.**

It was obvious that the Anglo-American Arbitration Treaty might easily prove inconsistent with the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, signed by Lord Lansdowne and Count Hayashi in 1902. That instrument covered, with other points, the maintenance of the "territorial rights and special interests in Eastern Asia and India" of the contracting parties. It bound them to come to each other's assistance if one of them was threatened "by reason of unprovoked attack or aggressive action" on the part of another Power. At the time when the Treaty was framed it would not have been hard to imagine a situation in which we should have expected Japan to assist us in repelling an "unprovoked" attack by Russia on India. But if Japan had a treaty with Russia, obliging her to arbitrate before fighting with her, the two would conflict; and we should be equally in a dilemma if the United States took action against Japan which could be reasonably considered aggressive or unprovoked. This last misfortune of being entangled through Japan in a quarrel with the United States has always been the special danger which rendered the alliance peculiarly unacceptable to many students of foreign policy, and they would have been relieved by the expiration of its original term in 1915. The danger, so far as it relates to America, is eliminated by the insertion of a new clause which removes the obligation to go to war from either of the contracting parties where a treaty of general arbitration exists, while, with this modification, the ten years' term of the Alliance is post-dated so as to start from Thursday. The exception thus made is a very weighty one, and it seems fairly certain to be balanced by some similar arrangement of almost equal importance on the part of Japan, which will still further reduce the operative effect of the new Treaty. As arbitration agreements become general their negative effect upon alliances will be increasingly far-reaching and complex. Already they have touched one of the capital agreements by which the world is divided into armed camps. It is not likely to be long before they touch the rest.

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On Thursday the Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain and Japan was renewed for a period of ten years. The alliance took definite shape in the Agreement of August 12, 1905, which was to remain in force until August 12, 1915. The new Agreement is to remain in force for ten years, that is, until July 13, 1921. Its first effect, therefore, is to prolong the alliance for six years beyond the term originally fixed. That is a matter of congratulation for both countries and for the friends of peace and of law. The text of the new Agreement is identical with that of the original as regards the operative clauses. To begin with, the preamble reciting the object of the Treaty is maintained. That object is, first, the maintenance of the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India; secondly, the preservation of the common interests of all Powers in China by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire, and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China; and, thirdly, the maintenance of the territorial rights and the defence of the special interests of Great Britain and Japan in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India. We attach comparatively little importance to these recitals. History hardly throws a favourable light on arrangements by two Powers to maintain the independence and territorial integrity of a third, and equality of opportunity for all nations is a phrase to which it is not easy to give practical effect. It perhaps means that any commercial opportunities granted by China in Treaties with Great Britain or Japan shall be granted equally to all other countries. The essence of the preamble is the territorial rights and special interests of Great Britain and of Japan which are to be read into the articles of the Treaty. The first article stipulates that concerning these rights and interests the two Governments will communicate frankly with one another, and consider in common any necessary measures. The third article binds them not to make separate arrangements with other Powers. The second article is the essence of the Treaty, and binds each Power, in case the other should be involved in war in defence of the rights or interests described in the preamble, to come to the other's assistance, to conduct the war in common with the other, and make peace in agreement with it. Three articles of the original Treaty are omitted from the new version. One of them concerned the war between Japan and Russia, which was not ended at the date of the Treaty; the other two provided that Japan in Korea and Great Britain in regard to the Indian frontier might make their own arrangements—a superfluous stipulation. The

new article provides that if either Power should make a Treaty of general arbitration with a third Power it shall not be bound under the Treaty to go to war with that third Power. We may attempt to ascertain how this new article affects the Treaty of which it forms part, and at the same time to discuss some other aspects of the Treaty, of which, be it said in advance, the general purpose appears to us to accord with the aims and interests of Great Britain.

Two Powers, having agreed that they have certain common interests, as well as each of them certain territorial rights and special interests, agree that if by reason of unprovoked attack or aggressive action by a third Power either of them should be involved in war for the defence of the rights or interests described, the other will come to its assistance. That is the ideal of a defensive alliance. The new article, however, modifies its effect, and makes it: the other will come to its assistance unless it happens to have made a Treaty of general arbitration with the aggressive third Power. Evidently, then, when a third Power proposes to attack either of the allies its first step will be to make a Treaty of general arbitration with the other ally. Equally, if either of the allies wished to evade its obligation it would, in case it foresaw the probability of an attack on its ally, proceed to make a Treaty of general arbitration with the possible aggressor. Equally evident, in either case, the Treaty of general arbitration, made in these conditions, would be an act of bad faith. From which it follows that the value of all Treaties depends upon the character of the Governments that make them. These general remarks may be applied to the conditions of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement. There has been occasional vague talk of a possible war between Japan and the United States. We have never taken this talk very seriously, though it may be freely admitted that there are difficulties attendant upon the wholesale immigration into any country of men of a race widely different in race, religion, customs, and ideals from the population of that country, and that such difficulties have arisen in the United States. We expect that the friction arising from these difficulties will be overcome without war. Next it may be observed that the idea of such a war as a practical possibility did not exist in 1905, the year of the original Anglo-Japanese Agreement, now renewed. Lastly, the proposal for a general Treaty of arbitration between Great Britain and the United States has arisen in consequence of the great popularity in both countries of the idea of arbitration, as well as of the belief in both countries that their vital interests are not, and

are not likely to be, incompatible with one another. The conception of bad faith may, therefore, be excluded altogether from the consideration both of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement and from that of the proposed Treaty of general arbitration with the United States. But the formal difficulty inherent in the new article remains, and the question therefore arises as to the right way of meeting it. We venture to suggest that it ought to have been considered in the form of the Agreement. Had that been the case the fourth article of the new Agreement would have been moulded on the third, and would have been to the effect that neither contracting party would conclude with any third Power a Treaty of general arbitration to which its ally was not also a party. That would evidently be unobjectionable in form and would have led to a thorough investigation of the nature and meaning both of Alliances and of Treaties of general arbitration. We hold that a Treaty of general arbitration is possible only between two nations that are unconscious of any immanent opposition between their policies. A nation can submit to arbitration about anything but its existence. But no Government can accept arbitration about a matter upon which depends its power to fulfil its purpose, the maintenance of its laws and of the conditions of the social life of its people. If it did it would lose the loyalty of its own people, to whom the State which it represented would cease to be intelligible or useful. Arbitration is possible because the conditions of the existence of two States are seldom, if ever, really incompatible. Even when they seem to be so a compromise can usually be found. The British State and the United States can quite well get on together, and can even be industrial and commercial rivals without any serious quarrel. That is the explanation of the proposed general Treaty of arbitration, which will be likely to be kept if it is not made too absolute in its terms. Nor is the existence of the Japanese State in the least likely to be incompatible with that of the United States, and a Treaty of general arbitration might therefore be negotiated between those two Powers also, with advantage to the stability of peace.

The terms of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement as originally negotiated and as now renewed are theoretically by no means perfect. The Agreement has a unilateral character, which seems to show that its first negotiator had not thought it out as fully as was desirable. Each party gives a guarantee without limit to the other, for each pledges itself in a certain hypothesis to go

to war in common with the other, so that it undertakes in the given event risks and exertions without limit. But the things guaranteed are not really the same. They are territorial rights and special interests in the regions of Eastern Asia and India. The whole Japanese Empire and all its territorial rights and special interests are contained in Eastern Asia. Accordingly Great Britain by the Treaty guarantees them all. But of British rights and interests only a fraction are contained in Eastern Asia and India, and Japan guarantees only that fraction. Yet Japan is a Great Power, in a situation strikingly analogous to that of Great Britain. It is an open question whether a better Treaty would not have consisted in the omission of the preamble and in an exchange of the obligation that if either Power were, by unprovoked attack or aggressive action, involved in war the other would come to its assistance. The difficulty would then have been geographical. No doubt that difficulty will always exist in any co-operation in war between two States so remote from one another as Great Britain and Japan. The moral is that the importance of Treaties lies rather in the spirit than the letter, in the character of the Governments and peoples than in the precision of the stipulations. A Treaty is the expression of common aims or common interests. The mere fact of an attempt to express them implies that men are conscious of them. Yet that consciousness is rarely fully analysed by the statesmen who have to express it. The common interests of two nations are not easily put into exact words, yet the attempt to give them precise expression is the best exercise that can be devised for the elucidation and formulation of a national policy.

From **DAILY GRAPHIC.**
Milford House, Milford Lane, Strand, W.C.

15 JUL 1911

420587

TOPICS OF THE DAY.

THE JAPANESE ALLIANCE.

We have not had long to wait for the text of the renewed and revised Treaty of Alliance with Japan, for which we ventured to ask yesterday. Although it was only signed by Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Kato on Thursday, it was published with commendable despatch in the "Treaty Series" yesterday. The changes made in the text of 1905 are precisely in accordance with popular expectation. The article relating to Korea is blotted out, to correspond with the blotting-out of the Hermit Kingdom itself from the list of independent nations. The part played by Great Britain in this transformation of political geography, as illustrated by the texts of the three

Treaties of Alliance, will, we are afraid, not count to her for righteousness. With this article disappears the corresponding article by which Japan recognised our "special interest" in "the proximity of the Indian frontier." This will give satisfaction in military circles in India, where the unfortunate terms of the deleted article were deeply resented. Its effect, however, is retained in the preamble. The chief feature of the new Treaty is, of course, the article by which each of the High Contracting Powers reserves to itself not to fight a Power with whom it has concluded a general Arbitration Treaty. This will enable us to escape the distasteful obligation imposed upon us by the 1905 Treaty of joining Japan in levying war on the United States. For this relief we owe Sir Edward Grey unstinted thanks. The way in which it has been reached is a little circuitous, but it is undeniably clever. Whatever the shortcomings of our Arbitration Treaty with the United States, they will be readily overlooked and forgiven in consideration of its effect on our alliance with Japan. The final result ought to be—and no doubt will be—to give a strong impetus to the negotiation of general arbitration treaties. Even the hardened cynic who derides their idealism will not fail to appreciate their practical value as safety-valves in the matter of the inconvenient incidence of Treaties of Alliance.

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From **DAILY EXPRESS,**
St. Bride Street, E.C.

15 JUL 1911

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MATTERS OF MOMENT.

The Islanders.

There will be only one opinion as to the wisdom with which his Majesty's Government have acted in renewing for a further term of ten years the Anglo-Japanese alliance. In the past that agreement has been the means of averting much bloodshed, and it has served very efficiently not only the immediate interests of the high contracting parties, but also the interests of peace and human progress. To have brought it to an end would have imposed heavy obligations and warlike preparations on the allies, and would have jeopardised the stability of the peace of the world. But conditions of world policy have been changed since we made this alliance with Japan, and there has been of late years a point of danger in manifestations of ill-will between America and Japan. Under the terms of the old agreement Great Britain might in certain contingencies have been called upon to come to Japan's assistance in case of a Japanese-American war. It may be that the knowledge of this obligation made smoother the path of peace when relations were most strained between Japan and the United States. We could not afford to run any further risk of a fratricidal conflict for the sake of honour, however slight the risk may have become. That obligation has accordingly disappeared. Clause 4 now expressly excepts from the terms of the alliance any such possibility.

The alliance thus becomes a far-reaching and vital instrument of peace free from any reproach or peril. Everything is gained and nothing is lost. Our influence still stands strong for peace, and we may confidently hope that the Anglo-Japanese alliance, combined with an Anglo-American arbitration treaty, will establish and ensure relations of real friendliness between mutual friends. "The friends of our friends are our friends"—that is the excellent formula which has force in diplomacy as in human relationships. Nothing now stands in the way of that Anglo-American arbitration treaty which will be so fruitful in the cause of peace. Japan formally gives willing adherence to it, and the world

will follow, we hope, a great example. For the rest, we put on record once more the principles of the maintenance of existing conditions in Eastern Asia, India, and China. We guarantee with Japan each other and the rights of man. The integrity of the Chinese Empire and the policy of the open door are reaffirmed, and the two island Powers become surer-ties for them. The new Anglo-Japanese alliance is an excellent agreement.

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JULY 15. 1911.

THE NEW ENGLISH-JAPANESE ALLIANCE.

Yesterday the Foreign Office published the text of a new Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which was concluded in London on Thursday. This treaty will come as a great surprise. There were rumours that as a result of the negotiations for an unlimited arbitration treaty with the United States, the Anglo-Japanese agreement was to be revised, but not many persons suspected that the revision was being carried out so quickly or so thoroughly. The Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1905 was made while the Russo-Japanese war was still in progress, and while Russia was still regarded by both contracting parties as the arch-enemy. Hostility to Russia may be said to have given its general character, and some of its provisions registered the unsettled state of things in the Far East. In the six years which have elapsed much has happened to make the treaty rather old-fashioned. We have concluded an agreement with Russia, and Japan has not only made peace with Russia but made a later treaty for co-operation in the Far East. Again, Korea, which even at the conclusion of peace was only a Japanese protectorate, has now been annexed. And third, perhaps most important of all, we are in process of making a general arbitration treaty which is to eliminate the possibility of war with the United States. Under our alliance of 1905 with Japan we were bound to conduct war in common with Japan in the event "of unprovoked attack or aggressive action" on her by any other Power. Such an obligation is obviously not consistent with an unlimited arbitration treaty with the United States. We all hope that there never will be a war between Japan and the United States, but it is at least a theoretical possibility, involving therefore a theoretical possibility under the 1905 alliance of this country being bound to go to war with the United States.

The new treaty takes satisfactory account of all these changes. Because Korea is now a part of Japan Clause III. of the 1905 Treaty, under which this country recognised Japan's paramount political, military, and economic interests in Korea, disappears. Clause IV. of

the 1905 Treaty also disappears, and the reason for that is not quite so plain. By this clause Japan recognised Great Britain's right to take such measures as she might find necessary in the proximity of the Indian frontier for the safeguarding of her Indian possessions. It was a provision whose meaning never was plain. It pointed pretty straight at Russia, and it might be read in India as expressing this country's apprehension or uncertainty as to its own power or right to defend India. Its moral effect upon Russia and upon our Indian subjects could not be good, and it offered no obvious counterbalancing gain. We cannot, therefore, regret the disappearance of Clause IV. If two old clauses go a new one takes their place. It is now agreed that "should either High Contracting Power conclude a treaty of general arbitration with a third Power, it is agreed that nothing in this agreement shall entail upon such contracting party an obligation to go to war with the Power with whom such treaty of arbitration is in force." In other words, we are free to eliminate war from our relations with the United States, or, indeed, any other Power, and Japan enjoys the same freedom. An alliance which admits such exceptions is without any precedent in the history of diplomacy; but then, of course, so is a treaty of unlimited arbitration. Sir Edward Grey is to be congratulated on having secured a solution of the most difficult problem created by our negotiations with America.

He has had to pay a price for this concession. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1905 would have run out in 1915. The new Alliance gives it a lease of life until 1921. If anybody had prophesied a year ago that the Japanese Alliance would be renewed he would have found little credit. The enthusiasm for it of the English people evaporated early. English business men came to dislike a rival upon whom, they alleged, the pledge to preserve "equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China" sat lightly. Englishmen without threatened commercial interests disliked what appeared to be a conspiracy between Russia and Japan to grind Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria to powder.

As a result the Alliance had ceased to have any popular force behind it in this country, and if it had proved an impassable obstacle to a general arbitration treaty with the United States there would have been an insistent demand for its abrogation at the earliest opportunity. In its amended form it might conceivably recover something of its early popularity; but that will depend upon the fidelity with which it is observed in the spirit as well as in the letter. The alliance binds Japan and Great Britain to consider in common measures necessary for the preservation of the integrity and independence of China, and for the maintenance of the open door. These are objects in the highest degree admirable, and in the sincere pursuit of them we need fear no conflict of policy with the United States or Germany. But they were just as much objects under the alliance of 1905 as they are under the alliance of 1911; yet no candid judge would admit that they had been loyally pursued by the contracting Powers. This country and Japan have in late years repeatedly taken different views of the right course in Chinese affairs—the fall of Yuan Shih Kai is a case in point. Again, Japan's administration of the South Manchurian Railway and the ports in the leased peninsula and her conduct towards the Chinese Government in Manchuria have not helped the open door or assisted the integrity and independence of China. In all these cases we have submitted to a Japanese policy which we cannot have liked. It has been bad for our interests in China, and what is worse, it has put us on the opposite side to the United States in Far Eastern disputes. If both this country and Japan were to observe full loyalty to the spirit and the letter of their pledges in the renewed alliance, it might indeed prove a great bulwark to the peace and the welfare of the world.

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SATURDAY, JULY 15, 1911.

THE JAPANESE TREATY
RENEWED.

An International Agreement of the first importance was signed in London on Thursday. It is a renewal, on partly altered terms, of the Alliance between this country and Japan. The renewal and the alteration are of equal moment, and each will give complete satisfaction to the various States of the British Empire. We say advisedly "the British Empire," and not this country alone. For there is another respect, though it does not appear in the text, in which this great international instrument is memorable. This Agreement, done at London on July 13, 1911, is satisfactory, for three reasons:

First, because, by renewing the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, it assures the peace of the East for a further span of years;

Secondly, because, by an alteration in its terms, it paves the way for the Anglo-American Treaty of Arbitration; and

Thirdly, because it has been signed by the Ministers of the King in this country after full and frank counsel between them and the Ministers of the King in the Dominions.

The Agreement deserves careful study in each of these aspects. First, then, it is a renewal of the existing Alliance. Certain articles in the Treaty of 1905 were of temporary significance—referring to the rights of Japan in Corea (with a balancing article about India), and to the Russo-Japanese War; and these are now omitted. With these exceptions, the terms of the Treaty of 1905 are verbally repeated. It may be well to recall what these terms are. Its objects are defined as the maintenance of peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India; the preservation of the independence and integrity of China, and the maintenance of the commercial "open door" therein; and, thirdly, the maintenance of the territorial rights of Great Britain and Japan respectively in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India, and the defence of their special interests therein. In pursuance of these objects, the two Powers agree to communicate frankly and to concert measures in common; to make war in common, in the event of either Power being attacked; to enter into no separate agreements with other Powers,

to the prejudice of the objects above defined; and, in the case of need, to concert naval and military plans. The Agreement is to last for ten years at least.

The renewal of the Treaty proves that it has been found equally beneficial to both countries, and it is cause for great satisfaction that their interests are still felt to be completely in harmony. They are thus in harmony because neither country harbours aggressive designs, and both desire peace. Nations do not enter into binding alliances of this kind, involving serious obligations, either for sentiment alone, or for light reasons. Such alliances are the expression of enlightened self-interest on each side. We shall perceive more clearly how this motive works, if we consider what the practical effect of the Alliance has been and is. Great Britain and Japan in alliance command the waters of Eastern and Southern Asia. So long as the Alliance remains, no other Power or combination of Powers could hope to challenge them. Therefore, the Alliance secures the peace in those regions. The value of this state of things to Japan is obvious. The necessary condition of recuperation and expansion after war is secure peace, and this is what the Alliance with Great Britain has given her. The advantage to our own country is equally great. The security of India is strengthened, and Great Britain is able to make that concentration of naval strength in home waters which the rise of a new and formidable naval rival close to her doors has rendered necessary.

This state of things, mutually beneficial to the two Powers, is now renewed for ten years; and renewed under altered conditions which add considerably to its strength. It has always been said by critics of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance that the position of each Power vis-a-vis the United States constituted a source of danger. Japan, it was suggested, might become embroiled with America, and Great Britain would have to leave her ally in the lurch or endanger her friendship with the United States. This source of danger is now removed. A Treaty of General Arbitration between Great Britain and the United States is about to be signed; and our Japanese ally has agreed to the insertion of the following new Article in the Treaty:

Should either contracting party conclude a treaty of general arbitration with a third Power, it is agreed that nothing in this Agreement shall entail upon such contracting party an obligation to go to war with a Power with whom such Treaty of arbitration is in force.

The insertion of this Article is of the happiest possible augury. It shows that Great Britain and the United States are on the eve of concluding a treaty of general arbitration. It means that a possible cause of weakness or misunderstanding is removed from the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. We can hardly be wrong in seeing yet a third cause for satisfaction in the new Article. It signifies that the Japanese Government sees no reason for contemplating anything but the maintenance of its traditionally friendly relations with the United States.

The renewal of the Japanese Treaty is still more satisfactory when the third factor, enumerated at the head of this column, is taken into account. It had been feared that Japanese immigration might become a more pressing question, and that the position of Great Britain as the ally of Japan might lead her to forget, or even to overlook, the feelings and interests of the Dominions. The renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty thus receives now significance, and a further element of strength, from the fact that it has followed immediately upon the meeting of the Dominions' Premiers. For the first time the Premiers of the Dominions were admitted frankly and fully into the arena of the Empire; for the first time the King's Ministers from all the self-governing States met in council to discuss matters which hitherto had been reserved to the Ministers of the United Kingdom. The new Anglo-Japanese Alliance thus represents a policy which has been unfolded in all its bearings to the Ministers of the Dominions, and which, as there is good ground for believing, has their full concurrence. This factor in the case is, again, a source of additional strength to British policy. What the future may bring forth, we need not inquire. For the present, and for the period covered by the renewed Treaty, it is clear that the Dominions accept the Japanese Alliance as best for the common interests of the Empire.

From every point of view, then, Sir Edward Grey and the Japanese statesmen, who have negotiated the instrument with him, are to be congratulated on a piece of policy which again cements the friendship between the two island Empires, and which provides renewed, and as we have seen increased, guarantees for the maintenance, in a large sphere, of the peace of the world.

420583

*The Times.
17 July 1911*

retention of its Treaty rights, gave an undertaking to Canada to restrict the emigration of its subjects to Canada to 400 per year, and this engagement has been loyally carried out. The satisfaction in this arrangement has no doubt been mutual, since the Japanese authorities are very unlikely to approve the influence of the Western atmosphere upon those of its subjects who return to Japan from the Pacific coast.

A GUARANTEE OF PEACE.

It will always be a source of pride to British statesmanship that the Treaty of 1894 was signed some days before the outbreak of the war with China, when the coming greatness of Japan was still almost unperceived. Its natural sequence in the Alliance of 1902 left Japan free to vindicate her predominant position in the Far East without fear of attack by a combination of Powers. The renewal of the Alliance in a still more definite form in 1905 had no other object than to limit the range of the hostilities then unfortunately being carried on and to safeguard peace as soon as it should be restored. An even greater influence may be hoped for the newest form of the Agreement, since it represents the joint opinion of all the self-governing Dominions of the British Crown as well as of the Government of these islands. If in the past the relations between one or other of the Dominions and Japan has seemed to impair the strength of popular feeling behind the Alliance, no such weakness need be feared in the support which the new Agreement will command, since in its later form it removes once and for all the apprehension, never seriously justified but often dimly felt, of a fundamental division in the sentiment of the English-speaking world. If the strength of the friendship between Great Britain and Japan has been of the utmost service to Japan, it has also given the British Empire, and the whole world, the surest possible guarantee that in the East peace will still prevail. The central purpose of the older Agreement, that paramount consideration remains the central purpose of the new.

JAPAN AND THE NEW AGREEMENT.

GREAT PUBLIC EXCITEMENT.

(FROM OUR CORRESPONDENT.)

TOKYO, JULY 14.

The leading article in *The Times* on the Anglo-Japanese Alliance has caused great excitement in Japan. The Press believes that a radical change is foreshadowed in the character of the Alliance, and declares that Japan will profoundly regret it, but will never doubt England's friendship, and must accept the incident as an incentive to increased effort.

JAPAN AND THE AMERICAN TREATY.


(FROM OUR CORRESPONDENT.)

TOKYO, JULY 18.

The leading Japanese journals welcome the Arbitration Treaty. They insist that Japan's desire for peace with America is as great as England's, and consider that the zone of tranquillity will be extended by the new arrangement.

*The Times
18 July 1911*

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GREAT BRITAIN AND JAPAN.

THEIR RELATIONS OUTLINED.

It will be 53 years next month since the first Treaty between Great Britain and Japan was formally signed at Yedo. Four years previously Admiral Stirling had negotiated a provisional and preliminary convention at Nagasaki; but the history of Anglo-Japanese relations, with all their momentous influence upon Far Eastern politics, begins in reality with the Treaty of Yedo, negotiated by Lord Elgin on August 26, 1858.

OLD JAPAN.

At that time Japan was still a land of mystery, a remote and legendary Atlantis set in the Eastern Seas. For years afterwards the history of her relations with the outer world was a history of hatred and distrust, often darkened by violence on both sides. To the questioning and resentful eyes of her people the Western intruders, with their strange manners and stranger ships, were but the formidable emissaries of a world which Japan desired to shun; if their demands were ever conceded, it was because denial would not be brooked. Yet the coming of the foreigners was in reality the cause of that amazing sequence of events which at last has seen Japan admitted, armed and self-reliant, into the circle of the Great Powers. Failure to respect the provisions of the European treaties, coupled with many violent attacks on foreigners resident in Japan, led to those swift and ruthless displays of the might of Western armaments which impelled the rising generation in Japan to the creation of her present military and naval strength. They also brought about the downfall of the enfeebled Shogunate, and the emergence of the almost legendary Emperor, whose ancestors had lived in seclusion for 700 years. Ten years after the conclusion of Lord Elgin's Treaty his Majesty signified his willingness to receive in audience the representatives of the foreign Powers, and though that historic reception was marked by one last outburst of fanatical violence on the part of the *Samurai*, it may be said that from that moment dates the acquiescence of the Japanese people in the policy of intercourse with the outside world.

THE WINNING OF AUTONOMY.

The present Emperor had succeeded, at the early age of 15, in the previous year. The next two decades witnessed a perpetual struggle, marked by constant internal discord, for the recovery of the judicial and fiscal autonomy which had been surrendered under the first Treaties to foreign States. The rigorous limitations which they imposed stung the nation into strenuous efforts to regenerate the system of administration. Japan set herself to prepare new Codes, to assimilate the principles of Western law, to establish Courts, and to train a competent judiciary. For some little time

the foreign communities stubbornly opposed the surrender of treaty rights, since the new Courts were at first undoubtedly conducted by men with inadequate qualifications for their task. But at last, on July 16, 1894, Great Britain led the way by concluding a treaty in London which restored judicial autonomy to Japan after five years, and tariff autonomy after 12 years. The other Powers quickly followed the British lead, but it is only in the present year that Japan has entered into the enjoyment of complete commercial autonomy. The recently expired arrangements were naturally regarded in Japan as a part of the old order of things, since under them she was bound by various limitations in the tariff, not adopted in her own interest, but reluctantly conceded as the price of her judicial autonomy. In this spring, however, she entered into all the privileges, commercial as well as judicial, of a self-reliant and self-directing Power.

THE ALLIANCE.

Nine days after the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1894 the sinking of the transport *Kowshing* marked the outbreak of the war between Japan and China. The Treaty had already been received with intense gratification in Japan, and it was followed by the growth of great cordiality in her relations with Great Britain. But the really momentous turning point in the relations of the two countries did not come until the close of the war with China, when Japan was compelled to abandon the fruits of her victory to three onlooking Powers. The Treaty of Shimonoseki ceded the Liao-tung Peninsula to her, but the joint protest of Russia, Germany, and France rendered its provisions null. For the moment the Japanese yielded to superior force, but the nation burned with secret indignation, which grew stronger when, within three years, it saw the Russian eagles flying over Port Arthur and Germany established at Kiaochau.

Great Britain had resolutely refused, against very strong pressure, to join the confederation which had thus humiliated Japan and endangered her security, and her action strengthened Japanese cordiality into lasting friendship. As a first proof of this understanding, Japan before long handed over Wei-hai-wei to British control. In due course that event was followed by the conclusion of the first Treaty of Alliance between the two nations, on February 11, 1902. Two years later Japan was in the midst of her war with Russia, and during the course of that war—on August 12, 1905—the Alliance was renewed for ten years in the still more definite form, which is superseded by the compact published to-day. From its very inception, therefore, the Alliance has made for the objects declared in its preamble, the chief of which is the consolidation and maintenance of peace in the Far East. It did not avert, for nothing could have averted, the struggle between Japan and Russia, but it served to localize the struggle and to remove the menace of a general conflagration. It has, moreover, paved the way for the important Agreement between Japan and France, and the

Convention between Japan and Russia, concluded in 1907, both of which are valuable additional guarantees of the peace of Asia. And, more important still, it has made possible the understanding between Great Britain and Russia, the natural complement of the Entente Cordiale, which has contributed so greatly to maintain the balance of power in Europe and the *status quo* in the Middle East.

JAPAN AND INDIA.

Cordial as have been the relations between Great Britain and Japan, that cordiality has not always been extended to the Japanese people by all parts of the British Empire. She has come into intimate contact in one way or another with three of the greatest Dominions, Canada, Australia, and India, and in each of these cases with far-reaching results. Indian students have long been going to Japan in very considerable numbers, and her victories over Russia aroused intense excitement in India. Particularly strong was this excitement among the educated classes in Bengal, and it undoubtedly contributed in some degree to the unrest which has ensued. The Hindu agitation against British rule in India has never, however, received the slightest encouragement in Japan, for although the Japanese people and the manifold peoples of India have some common ground in the slow emergence of the Pan-Asiatic idea, they are divided by fundamental differences of character and mind. The conclusion, moreover, that because the British Government has been strongly actuated in making the Alliance by considerations of Indian defence, British rule in India is tending to become dependent upon the support of an Eastern Power, is likely to command less and less credence even in Bengal. The preamble to the Alliance of 1905, which has been reproduced in all essentials in the preamble of the new instrument, shows, indeed, that the Japanese Alliance is an integral part of the international balance by which we aim at maintaining the peace of Central Asia and of the Far East; but the disappearance of the clause in the 1905 Treaty relating to the Indian frontier, which many critics from the beginning considered gratuitous, may be taken to show that Great Britain has never for a moment regarded the government of India as dependent on anything but her own power.

JAPAN AND AUSTRALASIA.

Until the war with Russia Australia took very little thought of Japanese development, but the emergence of a first-class naval and military Power in the Northern Pacific produced a gradually increasing sense of uneasiness throughout the Commonwealth. Owing partly to the activity of certain not over-reputable journals, and partly to the sudden realization of their own defencelessness, the Australian people were for a considerable period definitely hostile to the Alliance; but since the success of the movement for compulsory military training and the definite embarking

of the Commonwealth Government on the creation of an Australian Fleet, feeling has greatly changed. There can be no question that Australia, apart from her participation in the additional security which the Alliance has given for peace, has benefited not inconsiderably by the influence of Japan. Japanese prowess has done more than any other factor to establish the sense of national responsibility for Australian ideals, particularly in regard to the policy of a White Australia. On the other hand, the people of the Commonwealth have lost their apprehension that the cordiality of Anglo-Japanese relations implied any disregard on the part of British statesmen for that policy, which is for Australia an article of faith passionately held. With this has passed the popular suspicion of the aims of the Japanese Government, which in this as in other similar cases has always shown a complete understanding of the motives underlying exclusive legislation and a willingness to meet it halfway. In New Zealand, where the principle of compulsory military training has been adopted under the same stimulus, public sentiment in regard to Japan has followed a similar course, though a burst of panic-mongering is occasionally observable—the last instance related to Japanese designs in New Caledonia—in one or two organs of the Press.

JAPAN AND CANADA.

With Australia and also with Canada Japan has long been developing a considerable volume of trade, and with the latter the growth of commercial relations was for long unattended by any serious cause of difference. In 1908, however, the position became for a short time one of serious strain. Two years previously the Dominion Government had, with the consent of Japan, passed a somewhat belated Act availing itself of the Anglo-Japanese Commercial Treaty of 1894, Clause V. of which, relating to most-favoured-nation treatment, has now been prolonged by mutual consent, beyond the period of the Treaty itself, for another two years. That Treaty conferred upon the subjects of both nations the mutual right to enter, travel, or reside in each other's dominions. The Canadian Act was hardly passed when Japanese emigrants began to pour into British Columbia in a mighty stream, attracted by the fame of the Pacific province and urged by emigration companies, which had no countenance from the Japanese Government. Disturbances, fomented by labour organizations, soon broke out in Vancouver, and were specially directed against the Japanese. The Federal Government was compelled to disallow an Immigration Act passed by the Provincial Government because it contravened Treaty rights, and with commendable calmness suggested the despatch of M. Lemieux, then Minister of Labour, to Tokyo to discuss some settlement. With the help of the British Embassy and the ready co-operation of the Japanese Government, M. Lemieux was soon able to achieve his task. The Japanese Government, while insisting on the formal

New Anglo-Japanese Treaty.

SIR EDWARD GREY and MR. KATO signed on Thursday a new Anglo-Japanese Treaty, the full text of which we publish this morning. It prolongs the subsisting Alliance until July, 1921, and it provides that, should either party make a Treaty of General Arbitration with a third Power, such party shall not be bound by the Treaty of Alliance to go to war with such third Power. These are the most important of the new provisions it contains and those about which general interest will chiefly centre. The object which it has in view is, of course, the same as that contemplated by the Treaty of 1905, as the first sentence of the preamble explicitly declares. Towards that object and towards the principles which underlie it there is no shadow of change in the attitude of the signatories. They have merely recognized, as we anticipated that they must recognize, the formal incompatibility of their obligations under the Treaty of 1905 with those involved in any General Arbitration Treaty which either might desire to conclude, and the wisdom and expediency of such a general revision of the Treaty of Alliance as would respond to "the important changes" which have taken place in the situation since it was made. They have effected this revision in the belief that it will "contribute to general stability and repose," and we are convinced that it will materially further this end. We are satisfied that the step they have taken will be approved and welcomed by the peoples of the Empire, the people of Japan, and the people of the United States. Here and there an inconsiderable body of Chauvinists may look upon it with disfavour, but the mass of these populations who love and seek peace will rejoice that the chief bulwark of peace in the Far East has been confirmed, strengthened, and extended. It is not often that the signature of any Treaty brings assurance of peace to so large a part of civilized mankind. On the desirableness of the chief innovation in the new Agreement we need not again dwell. We have more than once pointed out that to sign a General Arbitration Treaty, such as that which we are negotiating with the United States, while the Treaty of 1905 with Japan remained unaltered, would be to involve ourselves in obligations which might conflict. The flow in the logic of our diplomatic arrangements was manifest, as was the expediency of obviating it. The other modifications made in the new Treaty are not less clearly dictated by the "important changes" in the situation to which the preamble refers. The old Treaty would have been determinable at a time

when new factors affecting that situation will be coming into active operation, and it is clearly judicious to arrange beforehand for the maintenance at that time of the guarantee of "general stability and repose" which has proved itself to be so strong and so efficient. The Articles affirming and recognizing the special interests of the signatories in Korea and on the Indian frontier respectively disappear as a matter of course, together with the temporary provision relating to the Russo-Japanese War. Equally, of course, the statement of the object of the Alliance, and the Articles for ensuring its attainment which contain the gist of the old Treaty, are preserved intact in the new.

We have reason to congratulate ourselves not only upon the conclusion of the new Treaty, but also upon the conditions in which it has been effected. When the first unofficial report that it had been accomplished reached us from New York we drew attention to its significance in relation to the new Imperial foreign policy happily inaugurated at the Imperial Conference. It is indeed gratifying that within a few brief weeks of its adoption this policy should afford us, and should afford the world, so signal a proof of the fresh strength it has added to our diplomacy. It is gratifying, we may perhaps say, above all to those who, like ourselves, have long insisted without visible response on the wisdom and on the necessity of the new departure taken by Mr. ASQUITH and SIR EDWARD GREY. They must know better than most of us that, had they not taken it, the prolongation of the Japanese Treaty would almost certainly have given rise to discontent and to misgivings in the Dominions which need not now be apprehended. By admitting to the Prime Ministers of the Dominions to complete confidence, and by submitting to them the general foreign policy of the Empire, the Government will have overcome many prejudices, soothed many susceptibilities, and conjured many phantoms. It is notorious, to name but one of these phantoms, that large sections of opinion in the Dominions have looked askance at the Japanese Alliance, because they were haunted by the fear that one day it might entangle us in a contest with the United States. The renewed Alliance is the best answer to such fears. It has been approved, we have no doubt, by the most trusted statesmen of the Dominions. On the face of it it shows that the Japanese themselves have helped us towards the conclusion of our Treaty with the United States. That cogent proof of Japan's friendship for the two

great English-speaking nations and of her readiness to see the bonds that unite them multiplied and strengthened speaks for itself, while the Dominion Ministers can assure their fellow-citizens of their own personal knowledge, derived directly from the FOREIGN SECRETARY and from the Defence Committee, how invaluable that Alliance has been, and is likely to be, to the cause of the world's peace. The real strength of Alliances in these days lies above all in the support which they receive from the nations whose Governments have made them. The new Japanese Alliance will have behind it not merely the support of the British people at home, but also the support of all the British peoples of the Empire. It is of good augury for them and for the world that their first entrance into the field of Imperial foreign policy has been marked by so considerable an achievement in the cause of "general stability and repose" as the renewal of our Alliance with the island Empire of the Eastern Pacific.

That achievement illustrates and justifies a principle which we have long upheld and without which the new Imperial foreign policy must speedily fade and languish. It is a consequence and a confirmation of that continuity in the conduct of foreign affairs which the sagacity and the patriotism of both the great parties in the State have accepted for the first time within the last few decades. To LORD ROSEBERY and the Liberals belongs the credit of the first Treaty which acknowledged that Japan had won her place amongst the nations, and which by that acknowledgment gained for us the friendship of her people. LORD LANSDOWNE negotiated the first Treaty of Alliance in 1902, and the more comprehensive Treaty of 1905, with the approbation of responsible Liberal opinion, and now SIR EDWARD GREY has confirmed and prolonged that Treaty with the modifications that circumstances demand. In the presence of facts like this the day has gone by when foreign statesmen could allege with any semblance of plausibility that our party system rendered Alliances with England too insecure to be practicable or advisable. In other parts of the world than the Far East we have given proofs that arrangements and understandings with us are at least as stable as those concluded with any of our critics. They are stable because they are based upon the settled judgment of the nation, which is quite unaffected by party fluctuations. They will be, and must be, more stable than ever now that this base has been broadened by the admission of the Dominions to the consideration with us of our foreign affairs. It is an admission which lifts this department of our Imperial life,

as we trust and believe that it will tend to lift the conduct of our naval and military defence, high above all sectional differences and squabbles. Did it fail to do this, were the Dominion statesmen hereafter to discover that the principles submitted to them as the foundations of our Imperial system in foreign affairs vacillated with the changes of Government at home, they would soon relinquish their hopes and relax their efforts for its consolidation and development. The Government have made such vacillation almost impossible for themselves and for all their successors, because they have made it manifestly disastrous. In the future, as in the past, the principles will have to be applied to new facts. But they will be applied as they have been applied in this new Treaty. We welcome it in itself; we welcome it as a condition of the Arbitration Treaty; we welcome it because it is the common work of the responsible statesmen of the Empire; we welcome it, not least, because it is a gauge of continuity for the future as it is an example of continuity in the past—because it discloses, to all eyes that can see, an additional element of permanence in our foreign affairs.

The Imperial Conference and Foreign Policy.

The Tokyo telegram to the Associated Press, which we reproduced in a New York message yesterday, must arouse deep interest in all who watch with intelligence and with hope the development of our Imperial policy. It states that the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Alliance is to be modified in the sense which we indicated as desirable the other day. The British Government, it alleges, have proposed that the Article providing for mutual assistance in war in the cases described in the Treaty shall be so altered as not to apply when either of the allies is at war with a nation with which the other has made an Arbitration Treaty; and it adds that Japan is said to have agreed to this proposal. It does not purport to give more than the substance of the proposal; but, if it gives this with approximate correctness, we do not hesitate to welcome in the result attained the first fruits of the new departure in the conduct of our foreign affairs happily inaugurated by the recent Imperial Conference. We have already pointed out that the conclusion of a general Arbitration Treaty by any country which is already bound by an alliance such as ours with Japan is something more than incongruous. Theoretically and logically it might expose such a country to the possibility of being confronted by conflicting obligations. For the reasons we have stated that possibility is too remote and too improbable, in the case of our treaty with Japan upon the one side, and of our pending Arbitration Treaty with the United States upon the other, to be of practical concern. Still it is desirable in International politics, as in other matters of business, to have the written rights and duties of the parties to a compact clearly defined in accordance with the actual facts of the position. The Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1905, as we show elsewhere, is no longer in correspondence with those facts in several respects. It seems highly improbable that, if the two Governments have made the agreement which the Associated Press says that they have made, they have not also agreed to revise other articles of the Treaty with a view to its prolongation. Whatever action the Government have taken, or may be about to take, in this matter has been decided upon, we may be confident, after consultation with the responsible Ministers of the Dominions lately assembled in the capital of the Empire. The Government laid the general principles of our foreign policy fully and plainly before their colleagues from overseas in the confidential sittings with the Defence Committee.

There was a free interchange of views upon these high matters, amongst which the Japanese Alliance stands prominent, at these sittings; and it is clear that, when the Dominion Ministers had heard the statements and the explanations made to them, they were satisfied that this policy is the best that could be devised in the lasting interests of the Empire as a whole and of each of its constituent units. Any new arrangement now made with Japan, or any modification of our present arrangement with her, will be made with the new authority and the new moral force given to it by the previous assent of all the self-governing Dominions.

Mr. FISHER, the Australian Prime Minister, emphasized afresh in his parting words at Victoria yesterday the importance of this great departure in the work of the Imperial Conference. "We have been able," he said, "to discuss important and far-reaching questions in regard to International action," and he declared his belief that in consequence "the foundations of the Imperial Conference have been broadened in a manner which will have a permanent effect on future deliberations between the statesmen representing the component parts of the Empire." That is undoubtedly the case, and for that result the first thanks are due to the PRIME MINISTER and to SIR EDWARD GREY. Mr. ASQUITH told the Conference at its last meeting that he esteemed it "as great a privilege as had fallen to his lot" since he became Prime Minister, that he should have been the first Prime Minister of the United Kingdom to preside at an Imperial Conference. The honour is indeed great, and Mr. ASQUITH not merely appreciated but earned it. A weaker sense of perspective might have led him, like his predecessor in office, to decide that the duties of a British Prime Minister to the heads of His MAJESTY'S other Governments might be painlessly discharged by the delivery of a courteous speech of welcome and the provision of an official meal. If anything could have condoned such a decision, it would have been the more than commonly arduous nature of the PRIME MINISTER'S position during the present year. Mr. ASQUITH, moreover, is the leader of a party whose enthusiasm for the Imperial cause which unites us all has always been of a somewhat abstract, passive, and platonic kind, and few of his followers would have seen anything to lament in his attitude towards the Conference, had he merely followed the tradition of kindly indifference bequeathed him by SIR HENRY CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN. Happily, his vision

has been wider. He has seen that no press of other duties could possibly absolve a British Prime Minister from a responsibility to the Conference greater even than that of its other Prime Ministers, now that its status is definitely established as that of a Conference of "Governments with Governments," and by that step alone he has inaugurated a significant and memorable change.

Consonant with Mr. ASQUITH'S decision, and even more important, was the new step taken by SIR EDWARD GREY. When the importance of foreign relations in the present state of Imperial development was first pointed out in these columns, there seemed to be little appreciation of the justice of our view amongst those responsible for the conduct of foreign affairs. Strongly as we urged in the weeks preceding the Conference the necessity of taking its members completely into the confidence of the British Government, and ably as the same course was afterwards pressed in the House of Commons, the replies of Government spokesmen held out little hope of that course being urged with success. All the more welcome, therefore, was the announcement, made almost as the Conference met, that SIR EDWARD GREY would lay before it a complete exposition of the existing situation in foreign affairs and of the aims of British statesmanship. These are matters, as Mr. ASQUITH very properly said, in which the members of the Conference cannot take the world or even their own fellow subjects entirely into their confidence; but those who are inclined to question the value of the Conference, because its output in published and practical resolutions has admittedly been small, will do well to withhold their criticism, at any rate of this side of its work, until time enough has passed to test its effect. GENERAL BOTHA and Mr. FISHER have both testified in striking terms to their appreciation of SIR EDWARD GREY'S action and of the manner in which he acquitted himself of his task. When the full report of the proceedings of the Conference is published—it is promised for this week—it will of course contain no report of the joint proceedings with the Committee of Defence. It is all the more fitting therefore that we should remember the tribute paid to SIR EDWARD GREY'S statement by Mr. ASQUITH himself. "I do not suppose there is one of us," he said, with the general approval of the Conference, "who did not feel, when that exposition of our foreign relations had been concluded, that we realized in a much more intimate and comprehensive sense than we had ever done before the International

position and its bearing upon the problems of government in the different parts of the Empire itself." It is highly encouraging to reflect that the course which we recommended has done so much, not only for the Conference, but for the head of our own Government. It will be more encouraging still should the first outcome of the new principle laid down in this Coronation year, that no general measure of foreign policy would be adopted in future without full consultation of all the Governments of the Empire, be the modification and the prolongation of our alliance with Japan on terms which will facilitate the conclusion of our General Arbitration Treaty with the United States. It is becoming that the daughter nations should contribute to this great advance in the cause of peace, as it is becoming that the two great English-speaking Powers should be the first to make it.

THE JAPANESE ALLIANCE.

EFFECT OF THE ARBITRATION TREATY.

NEW YORK, July 11.

The Associated Press has received the following telegram from Tokyo:—

"The revision of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance is regarded as an inevitable outcome of the projected Anglo-American Arbitration Treaty. Great Britain has proposed a modification of the clause providing for mutual assistance in war making it not apply when either of the allies is fighting a nation with which the other has concluded an arbitration treaty. Japan is stated to have agreed to this proposal."—Reuter.

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The Arbitration Treaty.

The text of the proposed Anglo-American General Arbitration Treaty has been under the consideration of the two Governments since the end of May, and the time has now come when we may expect to hear the result of their discussions. Mr. TART, speaking at Atlantic City on Friday night, was able to predict with confidence the conclusion of a satisfactory arrangement. The statesmen and the nations on both sides of the Atlantic are at one in their desire that the advance in the cause of the world's peace marked by such a Treaty should be speedily made, and that the two chief English-speaking communities should be the first to make it. The gratification with which Mr. TART's policy and the proposals of the State Department have been received by British opinion has been manifest from the beginning. We cannot remember any occasion when the suggestions of another State were so warmly and so generally adopted as their own by the English people. Our American telegrams have shown that American opinion is not less favourable than ours to the ideals of the PRESIDENT and to his proposals for carrying them out. It has, indeed, refrained from the extravagances which have disfigured some of the less responsible manifestations in support of them here, but, despite the rhetorical efforts made in certain quarters to mislead it, it has continued its firm support of general arbitration. Mr. TART is unmoved by the attacks made upon his proposal to include questions of national honour amongst those which peaceful arbitration may honourably settle. He sees no reason, he repeated in a recent speech, why great nations should not have moral courage enough to submit such questions to an arbitral tribunal and await its judgment. Their impulses may tempt them to decide controversies on questions of the kind by other means, but the very essence of Mr. TART's policy is to prevent impulse from plunging the nations into war. The American people have wisely imposed checks upon their own action in domestic matters by the Constitution. They recognize that its provisions for this purpose do not derogate from their dignity or from their rightful power. Impulse is to the full as likely to warp judgment in foreign as in internal controversies, and to establish in advance restraints upon its baneful influence is as worthy of civilized communities with the highest sense of their own honour in the one case as in the other.

In the speech in which the SECRETARY OF STATE for FOREIGN AFFAIRS welcomed the ideas expressed by Mr. TART he was careful to point out that, while we should be delighted to have

formal proposals based upon those ideas laid before us, any project of the kind would demand full consideration. It would, he observed, of necessity involve great risks, and its possible consequences would be so momentous and so far-reaching that it would require the deliberate and decided sanction of Parliament. The State Department when they issued their official summary of the draft treaty were not less careful to show that they too regarded thorough consideration upon our part, and an interchange of views between the two Governments, as eminently reasonable and desirable. What may be the outcome of the discussion we cannot, of course, say until the negotiations have been concluded; but the telegrams of our Correspondent in Washington indicate that the draft as finally settled is not likely to differ in matters of substance from that prepared by Mr. KNOX, and described in the summary of the State Department. Mr. KNOX's draft, we need hardly repeat, consists of two principal provisions. By the first all controversies whatsoever which the two Governments agree in regarding as within the competence of an International Court are to be remitted to The Hague Arbitration Court, or to some other arbitral tribunal created by the parties in each case. By the second all these controversies, and also all other controversies between them, are to be referred, on the application of either side, to a commission of inquiry. The commission are to inquire and report and to make recommendations, which, however, are not to have the character of an award. But in cases which one party regards as proper for arbitration and the other party does not, the commission are apparently to decide between the litigants, and this decision is to be binding and conclusive. Our Correspondent assures us that throughout the negotiations care has been taken to save the treaty-making rights of the Senate; and doubtless a like care has been exercised on our part to secure for the Dominions a voice in the settlement of questions affecting their interests. Nothing has been disclosed in the progress of the negotiations to affect our first opinion of the scheme. It appears to be admirably adapted for the settlement of differences between the United States and ourselves, as it would be for the settlement of differences between any two nations standing to each other in similar relations. But the doubt which we at first expressed as to whether it could be adjusted so as to take effect as regards States between which war is not already a moral impossibility has not been lessened by reflection. The adoption of such a scheme demands a degree of mutual friendship and of mutual confidence between the signatories

which very rarely exists. Nothing but the confirmed good will of the peoples affected could overcome the objections, diplomatic and constitutional, which every project of the kind must present. Even in our own case, where this good will abounds, there is at least one difficulty in the way which might prove insuperable in other circumstances, and which affords a good practical illustration of the embarrassments which must hamper many other Powers in the negotiation of general arbitration arrangements. Our subsisting alliance with Japan binds us to come to her assistance in the cases defined, and it remains in force until 1916. Any such alliance manifestly conflicts with any general arbitration treaty with a third Power. The difficulty would never be likely to arise in practice, for, in spite of the occasional wild talk of Chauvinists, responsible statesmen on both sides of the Pacific are unanimous in regarding as inconceivable any development in which our obligations under the alliance would conflict with those under the proposed Arbitration Treaty. We all know that our Japanese allies are as anxious as we are to live on friendly terms with the United States and to see us on friendly terms with them; and we have no doubt that the successful conclusion of the present negotiations will be sincerely welcomed in Japan. Nevertheless the formal contradiction between the two treaties is not to be gainsaid. Happily our relations with Japan are such that, should it be thought desirable, there would be no difficulty in agreeing upon some modification in the wording of the Treaty of Alliance that would do away with the incongruity. Of course, if this question were discussed between the two Governments it would probably raise the infinitely more important questions of the revision and prolongation of the alliance. We are not sure that this would not be an opportune moment for such negotiations, as our Government, after the recent confidential discussions in the Defence Committee, not only are in full possession of the views of the Dominions, but have, we may presume, secured their approbation of the general principles of our foreign policy, among which our alliance with Japan holds a prominent place. Whatever means are adopted to remove the logical contradiction to which we have called attention, or even if it is allowed to stand, there will be no reason to apprehend any difficulties either with Japan or with America. But suppose we stood in the position of the States that are bound, not by one alliance, but by a system of insurances and re-insurances with many Powers whose interests conflict with each

other, how could we then sign a General Arbitration Treaty? The difficulty, which can be easily solved in our present case, would then be so multiplied and so complicated as to be unconquerable. There are few of the Great Powers of the Old World whose foreign policy does not largely rest upon a network of such engagements. That is one of the facts which must tend, we fear, greatly to narrow the sphere of general arbitration for the present.

LIST OF CUTTINGS ON THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE.

1911.	Paper	Title.
July 10th.....	The Times.....	The Arbitration Treaty.
" 12th.....	The Times.....	The Japanese Alliance (Telegram).
" 13th.....	The Times.....	The Imperial Conference and Foreign Policy.
" 15th.....	The Times.....	New Anglo-Japanese Treaty.
" 15th.....	The Times.....	Great Britain and Japan.
" 15th.....	The Times.....	Japan and the New Agreement (telegram).
" 17th.....	The Times.....	Japan and the American Treaty (telegram).
" 15th.....	Daily Chronicle.....	The Japanese Treaty Renewed.
" 15th.....	The Daily News.....	The New English-Japanese Alliance.
" 15th.....	Daily Express.....	The Islanders.
" 15th.....	Daily Graphic.....	The Japanese Alliance.
" 15th.....	Morning Post.....	
" 15th.....	Morning Leader.....	Alliances and Arbitration.
" 15th.....	The Westminster Gazette.....	The Renewal of the Treaty.
" 15th.....	The Globe.....	Anglo-Japanese Treaty.
" 15th.....	Pall Mall Gazette.....	Years of Respite.
" 15th.....	Evening Standard.....	The New Treaty.
" 16th.....	Observer.....	The New Treaty.
" 17th.....	The Standard.....	Renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty.
" 17th.....	Daily Telegraph.....	
" 17th.....	Morning Advertiser.....	England and Japan.
" 15th.....	Manchester Guardian.....	The Revised Anglo-Japanese Treaty.
" 15th.....	Sheffield Independent.....	An Arbitration Gain.

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LIST OF CUTTINGS ON THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE (Contd).

Date	Paper.	Title.
JULY 15th.....	Daily Express.....	The Xsaxaxa.
" 15th.....	Yorkshire Post.....	
" 15th.....	Yorkshire Herald.....	
" 15th.....	Birmingham Daily Post.....	A New Anglo-Japanese Agreement.
" 18th.....	Liverpool Daily Post.....	Anglo-Japanese Treaty and the World's Peace.
" 18th.....	The Times.....	Opinion and the Anglo-Japanese Treaty.

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外務大臣佐藤小村封太郎殿

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
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THE TIMES, FRIDAY, JULY 21, 1911.

ANGLO-JAPANESE AGREEMENT.

In reply to Mr. MacNEILL (Donegal, S. Nat.), who asked on what grounds the recently-concluded Anglo-Japanese Agreement had been kept from the knowledge of Parliament and concluded without its sanction,

SIR E. GREY (Northumberland, Berwick), said,—I can add nothing to the very exhaustive answers given to the hon. and learned member on May 11, and what I have previously said this Session about the Constitutional practice in concluding Treaties. We have observed Constitutional practice; the hon. member desires that we should depart from it.

Mr. MAC NEILL.—Is the right hon. gentleman aware that this Constitutional practice of keeping the House of Commons in the dark with regard to Treaties is of comparatively very recent origin indeed?

SIR E. GREY.—It has obtained as long as I have been in the House of Commons.

Mr. MAC NEILL.—Oh, yes, and as long as I have been in the House of Commons. But it was not so in Mr. Gladstone's early days, and he protested against it.

Mr. KING (Somerset, N. Min.).—Might it not be modified from time to time?

Mr. MAC NEILL.—May I ask the right hon. gentleman how can he reconcile the fact that this House is going to have, as it ought to have, free power of discussion over the Anglo-American Agreement when we have no power over the other?

The SPEAKER.—That is an argumentative question.

Mr. MAC NEILL.—I am afraid it is, Sir. (Laughter.)

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THE TIMES
JULY 21st, 1911.

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THE DOMINIONS AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE TREATY.

VISCOUNT WOLMER (Newton, Opp.) asked the Secretary for Foreign Affairs whether the draft of the recent Anglo-Japanese Treaty was shown to the Prime Ministers of the Oversea Dominions at the Imperial Conference; whether they approved of it; whether the Dominions were thereby committed to the Treaty in a greater degree than merely as parts of His Majesty's Empire; and whether the Japanese Government were informed as to what course of action would be pursued by the Dominions should Great Britain be involved in a war under Article 2 of the Treaty.

SIR E. GREY.—I must refer the noble lord to the reply given by the Colonial Secretary to a question on this subject yesterday. The action to be taken by the Dominions in any war in which His Majesty's Government may be engaged is a matter to be considered by His Majesty's Government in consultation with the Dominions, and is not one for discussion with any foreign Government.

VISCOUNT WOLMER.—May I ask whether the Anglo-Japanese Treaty represents the foreign policy of the Dominions?

SIR E. GREY.—The Colonial Secretary said yesterday—I have not got his exact words by me—that the question of the Treaty had been discussed with the representatives of the Dominions and they had unanimously agreed to it. That is the case.

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From THE TIMES,
Printing House Square, E.C.

20 JUL 1911

THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE.
3.0 In reply to Mr. HUNT (Shropshire,
Ludlow, Opp.),
Mr. HARCOURT (Lancs, N.E., Rossendale) said
the Prime Ministers of the self-governing Dominions
were consulted before the Alliance was renewed
and unanimously approved of the renewal.

在英國日本大使館

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第3

逓信局

公信第ニ二八號

明治四十四年八月五日

在上海

總領事代理 淳田 柳次

外務大臣侯爵 小村 嘉太郎 殿

新聞切取送附之件

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The
North-China Daily News

IMPARTIAL NOT NEUTRAL

SHANGHAI, AUGUST 5, 1911.

JAPAN AND HER NEIGHBOURS.

SUFFICIENT time has now elapsed since the signing of the revised Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain and Japan for a fairly comprehensive view to be obtained of the attitude taken up concerning it by the Press and public of both countries, not to say by public opinion in the various sections of the British Empire and in other countries seriously, if less directly, interested. At Home the surprise occasioned by the sudden and unexpected nature of so great a triumph of practical statesmanship has done little to lessen the chorus of approval with which the agreement has been welcomed. The most extensive commentary on the subject at present available is that of "The Times", which emphasizes the probable effects of the alliance upon the general trend of international relations. It is certainly a most significant fact, as our London correspondent pointed out, that the history of the relations between Great Britain and Japan has been a striking demonstration of the satisfactory working of a theory not long since established, namely, that continuity of foreign policy is not incompatible with a lively and vigorous party system of Government. That the new Alliance should have followed immediately upon the admission of the Dominion Premiers into the inner councils of the British Foreign Office, will be regarded as strong evidence of an invaluable homogeneity of policy and of purpose on the part of all

confidence, as regards the future, in a policy which has for a number of years played a great part in the preservation of the world's peace, and that they assign a definite, and, we trust, considerable, value to Great Britain's friendship in the councils of the nations.

No slight importance attaches to the reference made by Mr. Fisher, just before his leaving England, to the "importance of this great departure in the work of the Imperial Conference", because Australia, of which he is Prime Minister, has a very close and particular interest in the position of Japan. Thus, also, the comments of the Australian papers prove specially welcome. The "Sydney Morning Herald" definitely states that "as the Treaty now stands, there can be no doubt that, in expressing approval of it, the Ministers of the Dominions have faithfully represented their constituents." Similar in tone are the comments of the "Sydney Daily Telegraph" which, however, remarks that "the situation for Australia is clearly defined; she may count on a breathing space for ten years, during which she may develop her defences and encourage the influx of immigrants." It is unnecessary to pretend not to understand the allusion. But sympathetic as Great Britain must naturally be towards the ideal of a "white Australia" many, we feel assured, will express the hope that the question which, for the next ten years, is to retire into the background, may, long before the period has expired, find therein a permanent and abiding resting-place. In the United States, it need hardly be said, the agreement has been received with every sign of very real appreciation. Not only is it a proof of Japan's friendly feeling towards both great branches of the Anglo-Saxon race, but it is deliberately framed so as

to clear the way for a great comprehensive movement in the cause of peace. Suspicion of Japanese designs might possibly be explained as a natural, if unreasonable, jealousy on the part of old-established Powers of Western civilization against the rapid progress and success of a newcomer. Thus the latest demonstration of her sincerity in the profession of peaceful intentions should serve at once to allay suspicion and to increase the respect in which she is held.

Considered historically, as a further stage in the development of half a century of intercourse between Great Britain and Japan, the alliance demonstrates its importance by the magnitude of the changes with which it is, and has been, concerned. Regarded geographically, it must excite respect by reason of the enormous portion of the world's surface over which its influence may be said to extend. The Treaty of Yedo, negotiated by Lord Elgin in 1858, marked the official acquiescence of Japan in the scheme set before her of outside intercourse with the Western world, though it was not until some years later that this policy gained any sort of popular approval. The next treaty, that of 1894, paved the way for general acknowledgement of Japan as a great and autonomous Power, and was concluded only a few days before the war with China showed the promise of her future. Then, in 1902, came the first Treaty of Alliance. That alliance, it is true, did not prevent the war with Russia; but it did prevent a general conflagration, and led indirectly to the agreements made with Japan by France and Russia, both of which are valuable additional guarantees of the peace of Asia. Whatever may have been the case in 1902, it would be impossible to maintain to-day that

the influence of the alliance and of the conditions arising from it is limited to the Far East. In regard to China and India its function is definite; but it can also be shown to have more than a casual connexion with the understanding between Great Britain and Russia, which is a powerful piece on the political chess-board of the Middle East. Throughout the Pacific its influence, as we have shown, extends, alike to Australia, to Canada, and to the United States. That, it may be said, is a vast area for the two Powers of the Alliance to preserve in that state of peace upon which they are determined. But great ends have always demanded corresponding efforts, and the indications afforded by the comments of the Press suggest that in those efforts Great Britain and Japan will not lack support.

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明治四十四年七月十九日

公信第四十八号

在星

特命全權公使吉田作

外務大臣侯爵小村壽太郎殿

抄
日英協約評論切技送付件

今日調印
於ケル一盤谷タムス及カイナムオウカールバーノ新
聞紙ハ各々別紙ノ如ク評論ヲ掲載候付テハ
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The Siam Observer.

SATURDAY, JULY 15, 1911.

It would be im-possible to overes-timate the importance of the new clause in the revised addition of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty, which we quote in full in our cables to-day. It is to the effect that if either of the High Contracting Parties concludes a general arbitration treaty with a third Power that Party is not bound under the Agreement to go to war with that Power to assist the other Party. The object of the Treaty was: (a) the consolidation of peace in the East; (b) the preservation of the common interests of the parties in China; and (c) "the maintenance of the territorial rights of the Parties and the defence of their special interests in the said regions, to do which the two Governments will act in common in the event of unprovoked attack or aggressive action by any other Power or Powers." The first two sections are comprised in the third, which it would seem is now completely nullified by the new clause in the revised Treaty. Japan can, and the trend of modern politics suggests that she will, conclude a general arbitration treaty not only with one but with every great Power. She has already treaties with France, Russia and the United States, and while these serve the same ends in the Far East as the British treaty, there is no reason to suppose that they preclude the possibility of an arbitration treaty being made. Where then is the value of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty as regards the important point of outside attack on British dominions in the East? It would appear to have completely vanished. Furthermore the new Agreement binds Great Britain to her Far Eastern ally—who can cease to become an active ally by the simple expedient of signing an arbitration treaty—for a further term of six years, the original treaty lapsing in 1915. One would like to be behind the scenes of this political move, but as it is we can only "wait and see."

420611

THE BANGKOK TIMES.

SATURDAY, 15TH JULY, 1911.

The treaty of alliance between Great Britain and Japan was first entered into on the 30th January 1902. It was renewed for ten years on the 12th August 1905; another revision has now been made and will bind the two Powers for a further period of ten years from the present date. Certain writers have prophesied that the alliance would come to an end in 1915, but it continues to serve a useful purpose, and there was no likelihood of its being dropped. The revision was undertaken in view of the treaty of general arbitration which Britain is about to conclude with the United States. Japan no doubt feels confident that there is no danger of war with America, and may herself enter into a similar treaty, but there always will be a certain amount of war talk at intervals, and in view of that fact the new form of the treaty will make a much wider appeal in England at least, while its value cannot be said to be impaired. As Korea is now a part of the Japanese Empire, the article referring to her paramount interests there has of course been omitted. One may safely assume that the policy of the alliance was fully explained to the Imperial Conference, and that the revision secured the approval of the Premiers of the British Dominions.

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在ポトランド帝領事館

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在ポトランド帝領事館

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明治四拾四年八月拾八日發

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公第七八号

明治四拾四年七月二十日

在ポトランド

帝領事館事務代理大山卯次郎

外務大臣候會討小村壽太郎殿

日英同盟条約改訂ノ對スル当地ノ
意向ニ關スル件

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PROGRESSING TOWARD WORLD PEACE.

ENGLAND AND JAPAN have negotiated their new treaty of alliance which, as the diplomatists tell us, and as it appears clearly enough to the lay mind, clears the way for the final effecting of the much talked-of arbitration treaty between the United States and Great Britain. This is good news for the world in more senses than one. It signifies that the Japanese have taken cognizance of the proposed relations between the two great English speaking races; and that the possibility of the international conduct of the world without war is admitted.

There is no assurance, as a matter of course, that such recognition will prevent war, or that we may expect fighting among some of the chief nations of the earth to be entirely a thing of the past. But we are a step nearer that realization than we were; and with the Anglo-American arbitration treaty the fact the influence for permanent peace should be powerful indeed.

Speaking of that influence and assuming that it may be effective to the realization of the world's highest hopes, here is something which appeared in a recent issue of the Atlanta Constitution, as a prophecy of practical and beneficial results, that is worthy of quotation. That paper said:

"World peace would turn into fruitful instead of destructive channels billions of dollars annually. Taxes would decrease; the cost of living diminish; religion appreciate; savagery be tamed; the under dog be given more of an even chance. Peace is on the threshold. Courage will be required to materialize it. Compromise between nations will be the keynote of arbitration. Temporary backsets are to be expected. But clear and salient above all else appears the fact that several of the strongest nations in creation now debate permanent peace. Should they agree the effect would be world wide."

七月二十一日イヴニングテレグラムの社説

...the world's...
...Treaty of permanent arbitration...
...now under way between the United States and the powers of Western Europe and among those powers themselves would after all serve only to make definite and perpetual a condition of peace which has existed for 40 years. The United States, Great Britain, France and Germany are the powers concerned.

The United States in that time had had the Spanish war, which is the only war in which any of the four nations named has fought with any European power and Great Britain has had the Boer war, which was the subjugation of a rebellious colony, and several minor colonial wars. France and Germany have had some fighting of the same kind in their various colonies and France has made some expeditions into Morocco. But these powers have been at peace with one another and though there has been occasional friction and ill feeling, there has been no serious danger of war.

The most threatening war-cloud has been that between France and Germany regarding Morocco, but in that no blood was spilt, only ink and a few hard words. The political issues were settled at Algiers, but the Casablanca incident forbade worse consequences, for it might be called a question of national honor. Yet even that yielded to reason and gave proof that a slap in the face may be atoned for without another slap. Little Greece has foolishly fought her semi-barbarous neighbor, Turkey, and Japan has barred the way to the encroachments of nearly as barbarous Russia. Wars of aggression have been confined to the semi-barbarous nations, while the civilized powers have kept peace among themselves and proved that as the world progresses, peace becomes more firmly established without formal treaties.

Yet treaties have helped the work. The triple alliance led to the Russo-French alliance and the two have kept five great nations at peace for 40 years. The Anglo-French alliance has checked any tendency of Germany to aggression. The Russo-Japanese war proved the effectiveness of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in blocking Russia's advance on China and was an aid to bringing Russia and Britain to an understanding in Russia. Any threat of war contained in this alliance is removed by the insertion in the treaty renewing it of an agreement that neither party shall be required to make war on a nation with which it has made an arbitration treaty.

This concession of Japan was evidently made in view of the approaching conclusion of an arbitration treaty between the United States and Great Britain. It is evidence that Japan expects no quarrel with this country which may lead to hostilities and ought to silence the noisy few who have been prophesying war with Japan.

The treaties of alliance have kept the peace by inspiring wholesome fear of the consequences of war. Old causes of quarrel have grown stale and died and now quarrels have been settled by diplomacy until the habit of such settlement has grown up. The natural sequence is to make permanent this mode of settlement, and where it fails, to provide other means than war, namely, arbitration. Thus the Anglo-American treaty promises to be the first of a series. Others will be between the United States and France

and Germany. Then may come treaties between each two of these three European powers. The early admission of Austria, Italy and the Scandinavian countries may be expected and in case of this league of peace, Russia will be isolated in her barbarism. A few years ago this forecast would have been deemed the dream of a visionary; now it is in immediate prospect. The glory of the United States consists in having taken the first definite step to realize it and to President Taft is due the credit of having caused that step to be taken.

七月二十一日イヴニングテレグラムの社説

420614

報告

第3門

明治四拾四年八月拾八日接奉

公第五四號

主務政務局

附屬書類添附

第三課

受第20348

明治四十四年七月二十日

在東京

總務手中村親

外務大臣後藤對英事大臣殿

新日英同盟協約ニ對スル新

聞論并如後送付ノ件

本件論評ノ概要ハ往電第五八

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The Globe, Toronto.
(July 17, 1911)

There never was any danger of Canadians fighting for Japan against the United States, arbitration treaty or no arbitration treaty.

The new Japanese treaty excludes the United States from the list of Britain's possible enemies, and is another move in the direction of establishing the peace of nations.

社説
政府
短評
新聞

420616

The Citizen, Ottawa.
(July 18th, 1911.)

EXTENDING THE PEACE PACT.
The new Anglo-Japanese treaty marks another step in advance towards the prevention of war. Under the peace pact between Britain and the United States, these two great nations bind themselves not to go to war without first exhausting the possibilities of arbitration, and each will assist the other in inducing any aggressive power to refrain from declaring war without a similar preliminary. Under the new Anglo-Japanese treaty neither party to that compact is to be called upon to take the field against a nation with which it has concluded a general treaty of arbitration. The effect of this is that Japan could only declare war against the United States at the risk of alienating her powerful ally, Great Britain. More than that, should a complication arise between Japan and the United States, not only would the former not have the backing of Great Britain as it had in the war with Russia, but Great Britain would be obliged to use every effort to induce Japan to submit the difficulty to arbitration. It can easily be seen what a strong factor this three-cornered arrangement will be in keeping the three nations out of difficulty in the future. While it does not exactly amount to an alliance of the three nations in the cause of peace, the peace pact between the United States and Great Britain brings the moral support of the former nation to bear in warding off a war by any European nation against Britain; while the treaty between Britain and Japan practically excludes the possibility of a declaration of war against the United States.

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The Montreal Herald.
(July 17th, 1911.)

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BRITAIN AND THE YELLOW PERIL

Australians, and those Canadians who feel that the destiny of the leading European races is threatened by any extensive influx of Orientals into "white" countries, should take heart of grace from the proviso attached to the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese treaty, and convince themselves that they can safely remain in the British Empire for a while without thereby becoming agents and accessories of the Yellow Peril. By eliminating the possibility of either of the contracting parties being called upon to take the field against a nation with which it has concluded a general treaty of arbitration, the new proviso removes the contingency of British support against the United States into the limbo of things which cannot be. The Japanese do not appear in the slightest degree disappointed; and it is a fair conclusion that they never envisaged such a possibility even under the old treaty—as it is certainly safe to say that the people of Great Britain did not. We have therefore the reassuring conclusion that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance is not intended by either party to be used as a means of forcing the free acceptance of Oriental immigrants upon the United States.

That which Great Britain will not undertake to force upon the United States, it is tolerably reasonable to conclude she will not force upon her own autonomous fellow-dominions. In fact the free admission of Orientals into Canada would be almost as annoying to the United States, owing to geographical situation and the difficulty of effective frontier barriers, as their free admission into American territory. There is, moreover, no logical ground for a recognition of the right to citizenship of the Japanese which would not include the United States. In a word, Japan accepting the Anglo-Japanese Alliance as subject to the limitations of the agreement with the United States accepts it as subject to limitations which will forever prevent its being used as an engine for opening the world's doors to yellow immigration. It is one more evidence of the fact that the Japanese when in contact with the profound convictions of their neighbors are extremely reasonable in recognizing them.

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The Ottawa Free Press.
(July 17th, 1911)

If the chorus of approval which has met the announcement of the new Anglo-Japanese treaty is, as seems likely, the fruit of Laurier's demand that the self-governing dominions should be consulted concerning treaties in which they are interested, Canada will have more reason than ever of being proud of her Premier and his broad policy which embraces both Canada and Britain in its operations.

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手紙

第3門

明治四拾四年八月廿一日接受

善政務局

公才一〇一號

明治四十四年七月十九日

外務省

附屬

20487

英 村命全權大臣加藤吉明


外務大臣佐野小一郎宛

改訂日英口盟協約第四條ノ解釈ニ関スル
他事一切後送存付

本月初七日書至下段ニ於テ別紙申付ニ関
在英瀾日本大使館

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2-0010



THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE.

VISCOUNT WOLMER (Lancs, S.W., Newton, Opp.) asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs how, in the event of an attack upon either party to the Anglo-Japanese alliance by two or more allied Powers with whom one of the contracting parties had concluded an arbitration treaty, the terms of the alliance would apply.

Mr. McKINNON WOOD.—The terms of Article IV. of the Treaty clearly show that in no case is either of the contracting parties obliged to go to war with a third Power with whom either of them may have concluded a Treaty of general arbitration.

在英
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2-0010

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明治四拾四年八月廿四日接受

警政事務局

七八

明治四十四年七月二十六日

受第20869

第一課

カルカッタ

総領事代理 平田知史

外務大臣 尾崎 山田 壽太郎 殿

振込簿

420619

及新日英同盟協約ニ對スル新聞論調
ニ付シテ

改訂日英同盟協約成立ノ報傳ハルヤ諸君ニ
ナリ新聞紙ニ存シモ之ニ對スル評論ヲ発表
致ス其論調大畧本月二十四日付往電
第八號ヲカテ報告シテ直一版ニ之ヲ載

在カルカッタ日本帝國總領事館

最モ重要ナル事トシテ其ノ保障ガ更ニ十年内確立
セラルルヲ欲シ居候者其ノタイムスホフイン
ハアラハハツトハイオニア及ラキーン
ル、アンド、ミリタリー、ガセツトト
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ハアラハハツトハイオニア及ラキーン
ル、アンド、ミリタリー、ガセツトト

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 ミリチカガセトハ本月十八日ノ俄上ニ於テ旧
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 シテ今後互ニ一團トナラシメ太平洋ノ平和ヲ
 確保スルニ至ラシムルモノト歎慕歎歎云々
 固新ニ加ヘラシムル算回信ノ規定ハ洋論ノ中心
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 在カルカッタ日本帝國總領事館


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<p>莫里文ト其ノ居ル由ヲ考テ世ニ傳ス 莫里文</p>		
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在カルカッタ日本帝國總領事館

2-0010



改訂日英同盟協約に對する新聞
論調

- 一、タイムズオブインディア (孟買)
- 二、パイオニア (アラバット)
- 三、ジグンアドミニストレーターガゼット (シホー)
- 四、イングリッシュマン (カルカッタ)
- 五、同紙
- 六、マドラスメール (マドラス)

一、タイムズオブインディア (孟買)

同紙、本月十九日「重砲重二年の懸念」は既に述べた通り
失つた英同盟、更新せし今後更に十年内継
続スレバ至リえん、予は此商中ノ最重事奉ヤト

在カルカッタ日本帝國總領事館

この事、是れ此更新が移民問題に因りて日
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更新ナカバ、十年、之ヲ改訂後スレニ至ル事情
懸念、同紙、西洋諸國ノ上ニ懸念スレシ、結果、同
紙、今日、改訂、同紙、日本ノ通商上ニ後
氣、結果、更新、同紙、之ヲ改訂、同紙、之ヲ改訂




事いさしこつた、移兵問題が日東内、内係、紛糾
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上ケレリツクヨク首領總領事官



years' respite secured to Australia may not be utilised to put the Commonwealth in a proper state of defence, and to secure the closer settlement of the unoccupied lands. If the kernel of this Alliance, "Fight one fight both" is to be sound, then there must be equal power in both partners to wage war, if forced upon them, effectively by land and sea.

the Southern Cross of immense undeveloped territories awaiting settlement. Now if the Alliance of 1905 was open to criticism, it was on the grounds that it might embroil Great Britain with the United States. The danger was more apparent than real. Japan, standing in need of nothing so much as recuperation after the Titanic struggle with Russia, had no intention of going to war with the United States, nor had the Federal Government of the States any desire to make difficulties. Nevertheless there was the possibility, and the existence of this contingency, in view of the prospective general treaty of arbitration between Great Britain and the United States, rendered the Alliance open to attack, and, combined with the chilly sentiment toward it in the Far East, prejudiced the chances of renewal in 1915. It is a striking testimony to the statesmanship of those who control the destinies of Japan that they have recognised these changes, and agreed to their incorporation in advance in a revised Treaty whose duration is fixed for a decade. The fresh Alliance differs in only one respect from that it supersedes, namely in the provision which makes it inapplicable to any Power with which either of the partners has concluded a general arbitration treaty. Narrowed down to essentials, this change means nothing more than that the United States is excluded from its purview. In every other respect, the new Alliance is just as binding, just as secure a guarantee for the peace of Asia as its predecessor. It ranges on the side of the preservation of the status quo in Asia the united naval and military forces of Great Britain and Japan. That is a guarantee no Power will attempt to impugn. But the Alliance, coming in this completed form at such a time, goes a good deal farther. It is a proclamation to the world that Japan is not seriously dissatisfied with the position of her emigrants on the Pacific Slope of the United States and Canada, nor has she any ambitions for a larger right of settlement in the Northern Territories of Australia for a decade at least. Indeed if we have any fears of the Treaty, it is because it is too complete. There is danger lest this Alliance should blind us, especially in India, to the fact that treaties are valuable only as long as there is power to enforce them, and that peace in Asia means greater concentration on commercial policy; also that the ten

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flect was at the bottom of the sea. Britain was no less vulnerable on the Frontier of India. The first end of the policy of both Powers was then to safeguard themselves. This they accomplished by tightening the Alliance to a point when an attack on either was an attack on both. The preamble of the 1905 Alliance set forth that the object of the agreement was the maintenance of the territorial rights of the contracting parties in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India. It recognised the paramount interests of Japan in Korea and of Britain on the Indian Frontier, and in a sentence proclaimed that those who waged a war of aggrandisement against one would have to fight both. Never was an international instrument more conspicuously justified by results. This consolidated Alliance is proof to the world that the finest guarantee of peace is readiness for war. The Russian Chauvinists had to realise that a war of revenge was impossible. They might have contemplated a resumption of the land war against Japan, or a campaign on the North-West Frontier of India, but they could not face the possibility of simultaneous action on the plains of Manchuria and in the basin of the Helmund, whilst the Baltic and the Black Sea were blockaded and the Russian littoral in Europe opened to land attack. The impracticability of war ensured peace. The strengthened alliance of 1905 was the precursor of the Anglo-Russian Agreement and the Treaty between Russia and Japan, and paved the way for the improved relations that now unite the three Empires. By making revenge chimerical, it rendered friendship practicable. It has proved perhaps the greatest peace instrument the world has ever known. (But as the menace of war, which was very real in 1905, passed away, the Alliance waned in prestige. The almost desperate commercial campaign pursued by Japan, particularly in Manchuria, in order to recoup herself for the tremendous expenses of the war, alienated British subjects in the Far East, and induced the opinion that the advantages of the Alliance were wholly one-sided. Then an entirely fresh crop of problems sprang up. The emigration of Japanese to California threatened to embroil the United States with Japan, and in Australia and New Zealand anxious eyes were cast at the expansive tendencies of Japan, conscious as are our kinsmen under

tory over China. It is an open secret now that Japan realised she had only two courses before her, an alliance with Britain, or an agreement with Russia. She came to Britain first and the Alliance of 1902 was concluded. It was limited to the protection of the special interest both partners had in the independence of China and the particular interests of Japan in Korea, but its real purpose was to localise the imminent war between Russia and Japan. In that it was completely successful. Japan settled her account with Russia secure in the knowledge that the British Navy kept a ring fence round the combatants. It had larger effects, which could not then be foreseen, for the temporary eclipse of Russia was a prime factor in inflating the power of Germany and upsetting the balance of power in Europe. But we are here concerned with its influence on Asiatic polity, and there it fully attained its purpose.

But when the war was drawing to an end and negotiations were opened at Portsmouth, the situation was no less menacing. In the loose thinking which so often takes the place of a serious study of foreign affairs, it was concluded that Russia had been beaten by Japan. Paradoxical as it may seem, in view of the unbroken successes of Japan both on land and on sea, Russia was not defeated after the battle of Mukden. She had then a million of armed men east of Lake Balkal, united under a stubborn soldier whose prestige was undimmed by defeat, and ready and eager to assume the offensive. Japan had reached a point where she could not advance farther without unobtainable reinforcements; the situation was tersely described in the telegram attributed to General Kodama, the brilliant Chief of Staff to Marshal Oyama, when asked to summarise the military position prior to the sailing of the Japanese plenipotentiaries for the United States "A hundred thousand men or peace." From the military and financial standpoints, Russia was much better able to prolong the war than Japan: she was defeated not by Japanese arms but by internal revolution. When therefore peace was in sight, the chief concern of Britain and Japan was to secure themselves against the war of revenge which Russia was well able to wage. Japan has become a continental power, and was therefore vulnerable to attack, even though the Russian

Time *19-7-11*
The revision of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and its confirmation for another ten years, is an international agreement of the first importance. It prolongs the Alliance between the two Empires until 1921, and as it is the natural corollary of the Alliance of 1902, it is to extend over twenty-one years, which is a considerable period in the life of nations. It comes at a time when some differences of opinion between Japan and the Anglo-Saxon peoples on the subject of emigration have developed, and consequently is a proclamation to the world that this question is not, for another decade at any rate, calculated to disturb the relations between the two races. Then it has been reached by a Liberal Government. The Alliance of 1902, and its development three years later, were the work of the Unionist Party, and were subjected to some criticism by the then Opposition. But that Opposition is now the Government, and it has placed the seal of approval on the action of its predecessors, which thus becomes an expression of national policy, accepted to the full by both Parties in the State. Fully to appreciate the importance of this step we must hark back a little and trace the progress of agreement between Britain and Japan, and its influence on the politics of Europe and Asia. The Alliance opened with the modest agreement of 1902. That was a very critical period in the history of Asia. Russia was fully launched on her career of pacific conquest, which had given her an immense preponderance in Manchuria and at the Court of Peking, and France and Germany had secured valuable pickings out of the confusion caused by the larger depredations of the predominant Power. It was apparent that the appetite of Russia was not satiated by her special position in Manchuria and lease of the Liaotung Peninsula, and that she was preparing for a further advance in Korea, whilst other Powers were ready to snap up unconsidered trifles in the Centre and South as the price of acquiescence in Russian aggrandisement. China was helpless, the prestige of Britain had been brought to a low ebb by the tame withdrawal of her men-of-war from Port Arthur, and Japan, whilst prepared for a combat single-handed against Russia, could not face a European coalition such as that which wrested from her the fruits of her vic-

二、パイオニア

(アラバッド)


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 信賴スルニ足ルベキノ勢力ニ充テシテト説キ
 一役形勢ニ表遷殊ニ英米間ニ仲裁條約ヲ締
 結セシムル事情ハ速ニ本協約ノ改訂ヲ促シ新
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 約成ル日本カ米又ハ露ノ攻撃ニ適シテ英ノ
 救援ヲ乞フカ多ク又日本ト第三國ト間ニ仲裁

在カルカッタ日本帝國總領事館

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 救援ヲ乞フ得ルコトナク而モ力ヲ加ヘ協
 同一方カ救援ノ義務ヲ免ルルハ全ク無關係トナ
 ス況ニアルトシテ次如ク之ヲ云セリ
 新條項ハ軍ノ救援ノ義務ヲ去ルニ止ルコトヲ
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 ク其自由ト云フベシ例セバ露國カ英王ト仲裁條
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 之カタメニ自己ノ利益カ威嚇サレタトナスコト
 ナク右等議ヲ仲裁ノ附セシメテ求メ得ルカカクテ
 間接ニ其同盟國ノ助力ヲ與フンヲ得ルベキナリ
 同族ハ之ヨリ新條約ノ前文並ニ條約ノ骨子並ニ
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 片皮柳ノ見ニ違キカト吟評セリ
 同族ノ更ニ本懐ヲ成之カニ依リ的仲成ノ差違
 激劇シクモトシテ一般平和ノシノモキカフキト共ニ
 殊ニ英ニ不利益ナル所ハコトヨリ極東並ニ太平洋
 ニおカシ現狀ハ少クトシ今後十年間確保セヨムン
 アトシ英ニ海軍力及ボス影響ヲ説キテ日ク
 若シ本懐約ニ更ニ新セシサリトモ極東ニ於テ
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 海軍現狀ノ微弱ヲ以テ不ヨク得ムハ一ニ日本
 在カルカツタ日本帝國總領事館
 卜同協約係存セカクシテ今ヤ幸ニテ
 現政策ヲ變更スルノ必要ニ依リテ我海軍ノ
 主力ヲ歐洲ノ海洋ニ集中シ以テ益増大シテ
 又三ニ同協約ノ海軍力ヲ拮抗スル得ヤ
 同族ノ存亡ニカクテ得テ十年間同安符ハ英ニ
 準備ノ時期ヨクシムル此等ノ海陸ニ於テ帝國防
 備ノ拮据ニ完成シ期ヲ待テ過及ハ幸ニ内ノ姉
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 結果ハ此世終ニ向テ動激スルニ
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 孰ノ声級カ如ク喧シカクモ今同協約ニ接シテ



一齊に怒る同く其の言を付へん、力如き帝國の大
 計、有眼と之を結果、外々をわたりて最良に本協約
 の功果、固く次言ラテテ算る收ノ多ク
 旧協約、其便便ノ偉大ナリと、拘るは我協外、
 領土並に合衆子、對し少力な、困厄に釀し、
 然るに現協約、旧協約、利益を聊を減損し、
 又日本とシテ海外領土、贊同ヲ得、又合衆子、
 對し不安ノ原因ヲ掃、又之を得、之は何時、本
 協約、日本、平和の意思、充ち、表れ、
 之ヲ固く、地を世間、彼ら、
 固く、誤解、根本、打破、
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should Russia enter into a general Arbitration Treaty with Great Britain, the obligation of the latter to support Japan in the event of a Russian attack on her would cease, and, similarly, any Power concluding such a treaty with Japan would not have to fear her hostility in the event of subsequent hostilities with Great Britain. At the same time it may be noted that the new clause only denounces the obligation to assist, and it would, therefore, remain open to the Ally of the party involved to take such action as, it thought fit. For instance, should Russia, say, having concluded an Arbitration Treaty with Great Britain, attack Japan, Great Britain might reasonably, if she thought her own interests menaced thereby, claim an appeal to arbitration and thus, indirectly, afford assistance to her Ally.

As the Treaty now stands it consists of a preamble of three clauses setting forth the objects of the Treaty, and six articles. The former are precisely the same as in the original Treaty, but as the German papers evince a disposition to try and make out that the Alliance has become practically worthless, it may be of use to recall them. These articles have for their object (a) The consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India; (b) the preservation of the common interest of all powers in China by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China; (c) the maintenance of the territorial rights of the high contracting parties in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India and the defence of their special interest in the said regions. The old Treaty consisted of eight articles, the new one consists of six only. The article dealing with Japanese interests in Korea has been dropped, being no longer necessary now that Korea has been formally annexed by Japan. Similarly the article relating to the defence of the Indian Frontier has been omitted, no doubt in recognition of the agreement lately arrived at with Russia. The article defining Britain's attitude in the Russo-Japanese War had naturally become superfluous and so disappears. The five

THE ANGLO-JAPANESE TREATY.

The renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1905, on a modified basis, is a distinct triumph for Sir Edward Grey, and furnishes yet another proof that British diplomacy is still a power to be reckoned with. The course of events since the conclusion of the original treaty, which was designed to maintain the status quo established in the Far East by the results of the Russo-Japanese War and to safeguard the possessions of Great Britain and Japan against unprovoked attacks, had rendered some of the provisions of the agreement unnecessary, and, what was still more important had raised the question as to how the obligations entailed by the Treaty could be carried out in view of the Arbitration Treaties that were in course of a negotiation between one of the contracting parties and other Powers. Great Britain, for instance, was anxious to conclude a most comprehensive Arbitration Treaty with America under which no subject of dispute would be excepted from the award of the Court of Arbitration, and the question naturally arose as to how the necessity of submitting disputes to arbitration could be reconciled with the duty of it, once coming to the assistance of our Ally should the latter be attacked by the other party to the Arbitration Treaty. In fact, so long as this objection remained, it is difficult to see how the Anglo-American Arbitration Treaty could ever become an accomplished fact. This obstacle has now been surmounted by the simple expedient of inserting a new clause into the Anglo-Japanese Treaty to the effect that should either party to the Agreement conclude a treaty of general arbitration with a third Power it is agreed that nothing in the Treaty shall entail upon such party any obligation to go to war with the Power with which such Treaty is in force. Thus, when the Arbitration Treaty with Great Britain is concluded, that Power will not be compelled to go to war with the United States should the latter declare war on Japan over, say, the question of Japanese immigration into the western States. Again,

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												<p style="writing-mode: vertical-rl; text-orientation: upright;">在 カ ル カ ツ タ 日 本 帝 國 總 領 事 館</p>	<p>we shall be able to continue the present policy of concentrating the great bulk of our naval strength in European waters, and thus offering an effectual counterpoise to the ever-growing naval strength of the Triple Alliance. These ten years should, however, be regarded as a period of preparation, as a breathing space to be employed in developing our system of Imperial Defence by the raising of mobile land forces in the Dominions and by the evolution of the Dominion defence squadrons into sea-going units of a truly Imperial Navy. At the end of ten years the British Empire could, and would, be in a position to discard all Alliances outside its own group of sister nations and to rely entirely on its own resources. The recent Imperial Conference has, no doubt, given an impetus in this direction, and the information regarding foreign politics imparted to the delegates from the Oversea Dominions has, we may be sure, opened their eyes to many points of view that were previously hidden from them. Thus the value of the Alliance with Japan of which they were formerly extremely sceptical has evidently now been recognised by them; as it is unthinkable that after all that passed at the Conference, it could have been renewed without the cordial assent of the Dominions. The original Treaty with Japan, valuable though it has proved, did undoubtedly cause a good deal of annoyance both to the Oversea Britain and to the United States. The present Treaty has without in any way sacrificing the advantages obtained from the old one, won the cordial consent of the Dominions and at the same time avoided all cause of uneasiness to the United States. It is at the same time an eloquent testimony to the pacific intentions of Japan, and must serve as a complete refutation of the ambitious designs of further conquest that have been attributed to her from time to time. With affairs taking such a threatening appearance in Europe it is satisfactory to know that in the Far East, at any rate, we have no present cause for anxiety and can afford to concentrate our strength for the protection of our interests nearer home.</p>	<p>remaining articles stand unaltered and the inclusion of the article referring to the arbitration treaties brings up the number in the present document to six. The most important of these is undoubtedly the second, which provides that "if by reason of unprovoked attack or aggressive action wherever arising on the part of any other Power or Powers either contracting party should be involved in war, in defence of its territorial rights or special interests mentioned in the preamble of this agreement, the other contracting party will at once come to the assistance of its Ally and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it." This article is, as we have already pointed out, modified as regards Powers with whom either of the contracting parties have formed a general Arbitration Treaty, by the new article introduced into the Treaty, but this modification by no means detracts from the general scope and the particular intention of the Treaty. The <i>Vossische Zeitung</i>, it is true, remarks that "the friendship remains, but the obligation to render help has been pierced through and through," but that journal has evidently either neglected to study the new Treaty sufficiently carefully, or has failed to appreciate its true significance.</p> <p>The European and American Press regard the Treaty as likely to give a great impetus to the cause of Arbitration, and this is quite possible as nations may seek, in this way, to avert the possible danger of having some day to meet an Anglo-Japanese combination. That, however, will all act in the interests of peace and so tend towards the general good. As regards the more personal interest of the British Empire it is obvious that the renewal of the Treaty in its modified form will assure the maintenance of the <i>status quo</i> in the Far East, and in the Pacific for the next ten years at any rate. Had the Treaty not been renewed the question of our naval position in the Far East would have had to be seriously reconsidered, for it is only on account of our alliance with Japan that it is possible to justify our naval weakness in those regions. Now, fortunately,</p>
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to war with the Power with whom such treaty is in force." The other alterations are merely a natural revision of the treaty in view of changed conditions. As Japan has annexed Korea, there is no need for the old clause III which recognised her supreme interests there. Also, as the Russo-Japanese war is over and as England has made an agreement with Russia concerning the countries on the Indian frontier, the old article IV, which dealt with the Indian frontiers, and the old article VI, which was concerned with the Manchurian war, have naturally been dropped. Otherwise the treaty remains the same. Despite its modification the Treaty remains an international agreement of the highest importance, and it will be most cordially welcomed throughout the British Empire.

The renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance is a welcome event which removes much anxiety as regards the future in the Pacific. There have not been wanting Jeremiahs who declared that Japan made friends with England in the days of her weakness and her trials, but when she had grown strong under cover of British friendship she would become our most formidable rival in the Pacific. By entering this alliance England was held by some to have made a distant and shadowy "yellow peril" into a real and imminent danger. All these sentiments were greatly in evidence when the United States fleet made its famous cruise through the Pacific, and was welcomed with rapture in Australia and New Zealand. Apparently the Australian view was that Japan ought to have been crushed while she was weak, and that to encourage her rise imperilled the northern territories of the Commonwealth. British diplomacy has dissipated these misgivings. Sir Edward Grey has initiated the Colonial Premiers into the mysteries of British foreign policy, and they have admitted that their eyes were opened in a surprising manner by his disclosures. America too has laid aside her suspicions and enters into the circle of friendly Pacific Powers. The new clause in the Anglo-Japanese treaty signifies Japan's cordial approval of the Arbitration Treaty between England and the States, and America must feel grateful for this friendly act on the part of Japan. In fact the signing of the new treaty means that England and her Australasian Colonies, Japan, and the United States, form a friendly group which guarantees peace in the Pacific up to the year 1921. The German press is naturally disappointed, and points out that the new clause renders the treaty far less stringent than before. That is true, but there is not the least reason to anticipate danger to British interests from the new clause IV, which runs as follows:—"Should either party conclude a treaty of general arbitration with a third Power, it is agreed that nothing in this agreement shall entail upon such party any obligation to go

在カルカッタ日本帝國總領事館

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 在カルカッタ日本帝國總領事館



四、イングリッシュマン (カルカッタ)

同紙、政府の行状、概中発表、先ず政府の意向に
ノ、報道、下り、本月十三日、紙上、大守の如き
意味、は、復、措、い、ま、る、

本同盟、概、約、の、政、行、の、莫、東、仲、裁、待、待、の、成、立、を、待、つ、
必、然、の、結、果、と、認、め、ら、れ、る、旨、の、概、約、の、同、盟、を、一、方、か
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在カルカッタ日本帝國總領事館

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露、兵、の、攻、撃、に、及、び、る、危、機、に、備、へ、る、こ、と、を、モ、



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the Alliance, making the clause about mutual assistance inapplicable when one of the Powers concerned is fighting a nation with which the other has concluded an Arbitration Treaty.

Obviously Japan has everything to lose and nothing to gain by agreeing to such a modification. All those who have made a special study of the problems of the Pacific are united in asserting that the factors at work are such as to make a collision between the United States and Japan almost inevitable unless unexpected developments intervene. And yet to-day's telegrams indicate that Japan has agreed to the modification that renders it impossible, Alliance or no Alliance, for Great Britain to assist her in case she is obliged to fight the United States and Russia at the same time. The only possible explanation of Japan's surrender of her undoubted rights is to be found in the theory that she herself contemplates entering into an Arbitration Treaty with the States. It has always been the desire of the present generation of the Japanese to rank amongst the foremost of the civilized peoples. They have proved that so far as making war is concerned they have nothing to learn from Europe, but it would be a grave mistake to suppose that only the martial virtues are admired in Japan, or that territorial ambitions are the only ambitions that excite her statesmen. The very adaptability of the people makes them quick to seize on any current phase of European feeling. In these days the talk is all of Arbitration and Peace, amongst the Powers with which she comes most in contact, and it would be unlike the Japanese not to wish to be also included amongst the people who desire to induce a new era in the world.

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ALLIANCE AND ARBITRATION.

A revision of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance is, of course, the inevitable outcome of the Anglo-American Arbitration Treaty. There is a clause in the Treaty of Alliance which renders it obligatory for the two contracting Powers to help each other, if either of them are attacked by more than one Power. From the British point of view the Alliance with Japan was justified on the ground that it would give us a valuable ally in case Russia attacked India at a time when Great Britain was at war with Germany. In fact the Treaty contains clauses which render it incumbent on Japan to lend India military aid, if called upon to do so at a time when Great Britain is engaged with a third Power. But while our statesmen were congratulating themselves on having made very fine provision for the future, the Japanese turned the Alliance to immediate use. It gave them a clear field in which to fight Russia. And they fought Russia and beat her. The question arose in Japan after the Russian war whether it was worth while renewing the Alliance, and when the Japanese agreed to renew it, people, attempting to view the matter from the Japanese point of view, said that it must be on account of the possibility of a war with the United States. If Japan were engaged with America on the sea, an opportunity would offer to Russia to recover her lost possessions in the Far East, and it would be natural for her to attempt to take advantage of it, provided she could do so without embroiling the British. But now comes our Arbitration Treaty with the United States, and if on the one hand we are bound to Japan, we are equally bound not to fight with the United States on any consideration whatsoever. The only way out of the difficulty was to induce Japan to agree to a modification in the terms of

トシニモニアスサカサキカ、
一歩も揺るがず、
仲好む白人の國內に入

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五、同紙

改訂協約調印表表せん、ヤ同紙ハ本月十七日、
 成上、行方再之ヲ論じ、数日あり、奇、噂、上り、
 之、既、不、真、トシテ、現、ハ、先、願、外、ナリトシ
 新協約中、要兵、同、件、裁、條、約、同、定、
 之、之、行、テ、永、行、慥、シ、安、チ、英、米、向、件、裁
 條、約、也、無、新、成、立、ス、行、心、更、新、協、約、
 同、定、今、後、十、年、間、維、持、ス、ト、ナ、ル、云、ハ、
 此、國、條、約、重、大、ノ、影、響、有、ル、及、ボ、ス、ト、ナ、ル、ト、テ、次、
 如、ク、論、じ、
 旧協約ハ十九年五年、締結せしむ、以テ来、
 十九年十五年、以テ終了スル、命、令、ナ、リ、
 年、多、ク、識、者、有、ル、吾、皇、ノ、歴、史、上、最、モ、重、
 要、ト、シ、テ、ト、親、交、セ、ス、モ、モ、本、國、
 片、ク、加、入、シ、独、逸、ノ、海、軍、擴、張、計、畫、ハ、此、年
 以、テ、完、了、ス、バ、ハ、ナ、マ、運、何、モ、亦、此、年、以、テ、
 通、ス、ベ、キ、ナ、リ、此、事、大、事、業、カ、偶、也、同、一、年、ニ、
 又、計、畫、ナ、リ、或、ハ、多、ク、外、強、國、條、約、大、變、
 若、起、ト、大、戰、争、ヲ、起、ス、ト、至、
 妙、カ、ラ、ザ、ル、也、然、レ、モ、幸、ニ、テ、大、事、業、一、見、本、國
 監、終、了、シ、高、敷、キ、同、期、
 今日、同、監、ノ、更、新、ハ、少、ク、ト、モ、一、事、
 加、入、ス、ト、是、
 同、紙、ハ、之、ヨリ、日、本、が、今、回、改、訂、
 同、紙、ノ、數、日、前、推、定、
 舞、不、怒、友、ヲ、
 同、紙、ノ、數、日、前、推、定、
 舞、不、怒、友、ヲ、

在カルカッタ日本帝國總領事館

同紙ハ之ヨリ日本が今回改訂と同意と云ふ初稿ニ
 同紙ノ數日前推定う及覆と更、日本近年、舞
 舞不怒友ヲ詳とテ次、如ク云ヘリ



Japan for another ten years removes what was considered to be one of the chief reasons for fearing trouble in 1915, and, if for that reason alone, the present Government is to be congratulated on the renewal, which, there is reason to believe, was discussed with the Dominion Premiers when they were in England and approved of by them.

At the same time, as we pointed out the other day, the Alliance is on the surface all in favour of the British and one wonders why the Japanese who gain nothing and lose a great deal should have signed it unless in a spirit of self-sacrifice and self-denial in the cause of peace, which we do not see displayed by great Powers in their intercourse with others. Is it that these astonishing people, who showed the West how to make war, now intend to devote themselves to the arts of peace, and again prove an example to Europe? It is worth noticing that, somewhat after the manner of France, the Japanese have recently withdrawn themselves from active participation in the game of world-politics. We hardly hear of them even at Peking that great centre of international rivalry, where one would naturally expect that Japanese interests would be vigorously represented. Can it be possible that the Japanese withdrawal from the field of what is styled "foreign policy," is not due, as was at one time thought, to the reaction after a great war, but to a deliberate abstention from what in many cases is a very profitless and sometimes a dangerous activity. Japan has no traditional foreign policy, and her statesmen do not consider themselves bound by precedents. However, whether there is an ulterior motive or not behind Japanese action in the matter of the Alliance, the fact remains that, with the possibility of our being dragged into war with the United States removed, the Alliance has been received with a chorus of approval from people of all shades of opinion in the British Empire.

MONDAY, JULY 17, 1911.

BRITAIN AND JAPAN.

The report that the Treaty of Alliance between Britain and Japan was to be revised in view of the new political situation created by the discussions for an Anglo-American Arbitration Treaty has now been confirmed. Indeed, it is somewhat startling to learn that the revised Agreement has already been signed. The chief feature of the new agreement is, as was suspected, a clause which runs as follows: "Should either Party conclude a treaty of Arbitration with a third Power it is agreed that nothing in this Agreement shall entail upon such Party any obligation to go to war with the Power with whom such Treaty is in force." In other words the clause removes one of the difficulties which had been encountered in framing the Anglo-American Arbitration Treaty, for obviously we could not enter into any engagements with the United States, while we were under an obligation to help Japan if she were attacked by two Powers, one of whom might possibly be the United States. The new Treaty with Japan is to continue for another ten years. This is the other significant point in the agreement. The original Treaty, it may be remembered, came to an end in 1905. It was renewed for another ten years, and would therefore, have come to an end in 1915. That year was regarded by many publicists as likely to prove a very important one in the history of the world for three reasons, because it would see the end of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, because the German Naval programme would be completed, and because the Panama Canal would be open to traffic. There were those who found in these three eventualities a very sinister combination and prophesied all kinds of terrible things, including the breaking out of great wars. The renewal, now, of our alliance with

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 べきことヲ現列不競争ノ廟甚クハ世界に於テ
 一般に日本利益を充分代表セシムルアリト推測
 スル物云々之ノ関シテ多ク言及シテ幸テオチ如
 シ日本が新盟約を交シ再行セリ予ヲ引キ入ル
 或ハ大戦後ノ互動的現象オトナスモノトモ
 獲テ所少クシテ危険ヲ踏ラコト多ク活劇方面ヲ
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 ノアトシヤ否ハハカ同盟トシテ定メ南英日米
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 ラ其改訂スルモハコト莫ク所ハヤキコトアザン

六、ワドラスメール

(ワドラス)

同我ハ本月十七日我上ニ於テ本條約ノ論ハ今固ノ
 改訂ノ旨ト未キ日本ノ輿論ニ接スルニ其英米ニ
 於テト同トシテ是ハ近ニ入ルニ疑ハズ條約ノ内
 容旧ト比シテ多少ノ異同アルモ現行無用ノ屬スル規
 定ヲ削除シテ且ト一重要事項ヲ除ク外事ノ定上
 全ク旧ト異ハコトナリ而シテ所謂重要事項トハ仲裁
 條約ト關スル規定トシテ他迄ノ新事等相互救援
 ニ我邦ノ利益ニ懸格ニ對シテ其力ヲナド譯セシ
 寧ニ譯者ノ希望ヲ陳ベシト過キヤルベク其條約守
 同條下ニ本條約ノ條文ハ毫モ減損セシコトナ
 コト決シテ如ク立論ス

夫レ日英何レカト同ノ仲裁條約ヲ締結スルニ

在カルカッタ日本帝國總領事館

アリトモコシ必スヤ直ニ平和ヲ希望スルニ限ル
 ベシ隨テカクノ如ク國ハ何レノ場合ニ於テモ他ノ對
 テ挑発ヲ政敵手ヲ又ハ侵略的行動ト出シルコト
 ナレバキリ明カナリ而シテ同條ノ效力ヲ生カシテ新
 旧條約何レノ如クモ軍ニ力ヲ如ク政敵又ハ行
 動ヲナスコト、場合ニ限ルニカ故ニ今回ノ文ニ於テ
 仲裁條約締結者ニ過リテスルヲ除外スルニ至ル
 モ實際上一致ナリ行約ナラシムルコトナラズ

同我ハ更ニ右仲裁條約ノ固スル條項ノ如クモ
 其英米ノ親交ニ對スル障礙ヲ除クコト得又日本ニ
 之ノヨリテ毫モ害ヲ及ボス同條ノ以テ米子ノ政學ニ備
 スルコトハ思ハルニ政敵手アリ得ヤリトモ思ハズ

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Japan herself does not lose. She could have counted on British help only in the event of American aggression, and such aggression there would not have been, though the treatment of the Japanese in California might have embittered relations. To look at matters from a wider point of view, the introduction of the Clause, by facilitating the conclusion of Arbitration Treaties by both parties, has given an impetus to the movement towards the conservation of the world's peace. Whether the Agreement be regarded from the points of view only of Great Britain and Japan or as an instrument for the maintenance of general tranquillity, it must be heartily welcomed.

Medan Mail 17-7-11
THE ANGLO-JAPANESE TREATY.

THE CONCLUSION OF THE REVISED AGREEMENT between Great Britain and Japan has been made the occasion for much criticism, laudatory and otherwise, which Reuter to-day summarises. The opinions of the Japanese Press have not yet been received, but there is no reason to doubt that in Japan the revised Agreement will be received with as much satisfaction as in Great Britain. Except at one point, the revised Agreement does not differ in any matter of practical importance from the original compact. Nothing is now said of Japan's position in Korea, because that country is now part of the Japanese Empire. Nothing is said of the right of Great Britain to take necessary measures for safeguarding the Indian frontier, because reference to so obvious a right would be superfluous. A Clause relating to British policy during the Russo-Japanese War, which was in progress when the original Agreement was concluded, naturally disappears. The one point of importance at which the revised Agreement differs from the original is the reference to General Arbitration Treaties. On this point certain German journals appear to have seized gleefully. Thus the *Vossische Zeitung* asserts that, while friendship remains, "the obligation to render help has been pierced through and through." The wish is no doubt in this case father to the thought. As a matter of fact, the value of the Agreement as a defensive compact is not appreciably impaired by the Clause referring to General Arbitration Treaties. Only those countries that seriously desire peace will conclude General Arbitration Treaties with Great Britain or Japan. Such countries are not in the least likely to make an unprovoked attack on either or adopt an aggressive policy towards either. Since the Agreement, both in its original and its revised form, provides for co-operation only in those circumstances, the exemption of the contracting parties from joining in war, in contravention to a General Arbitration Treaty, cannot be regarded as weakening the Agreement. On the other hand, the introduction of this exempting Clause will improve Anglo-American relations, for if Great Britain and the United States conclude the proposed Treaty for general arbitration, it will not be possible for the enemies of Anglo-American friendship to insinuate that in the event of war between the United States and Japan Great Britain would side with the latter.

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庶平見地は概して右新規定は両国分他ト
仲成條約ノ締結ニ資スルモノト見ルニシテ世界ノ平
和維持ノ業ニ一刺激ヲ與ヘタルモノトシテ日英兩國
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