

2

(一) 英モロコシ主義研究

B-1 1 1 1

0133

(赤
枠
紙)

倫敦
本省

四月五日前着

松井大使

田中外務大臣

第四八號

往電第四五號ニ關シ

(分類B 10 3. 0. 1-3.)
三日本使暇乞ヲ兼ネ「チエンバレン」ヲ訪ヒ支那問題ノ外軍縮及不
戰條約問題等ニ付談話ノ次第左ノ通何等御參考迄
ヘ支那問題ニ關シ本使ヨリ支那時局ノ對策ニ付テハ何等的確ノ見据
ヲ付ケ難キモ豫テ屢々述ヘタル通り日英米間一致ノ行動ヲ必要ト
スル旨ヲ語リタルニ「チ」ハ日英米間ノ一致ハ時ニ困難ノ場合ア

外
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(赤
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紙)

リタルモ自分モ其必要ヲ痛感シ居リ又南京事件ニ付米支間交渉安
結ノ旨ハ昨夜電報ニ接シタルカ英支間ニ於テモ砲撃ニ付正式ニ遺
憾ノ意ヲ表スルコトハ出來難キモ米支間ノ如キ様式ニテ何等カノ
話合ヲ著ケ得ヘキカト思考シ居リ條約改正ニ付テハ一昨年ノ覺書
ノ通り支那ノ正當ナル希望ハ充分認ムル意嚮ナレハ何トカ妥結ヲ
見得ヘシト思ハル尤モ右ハ既ニ在支公使ヨリ貴國公使ニ披露済ナ
ルヘシト述ヘタルニ付本使ハ支那ノ條約改正ニ付テハ各國トモ寬
大ノ態度ヲ表明シ居ルモ具體的問題ニ付テハ容易ニ解決ヲ見サル
カ如シト云ヘルニ對シ「チ」ハ英國トテモ大體米國同様支那ノ政
府ノ確立シタル後初メテ前記覺書ノ通交渉ヲ開始シ得ヘシト考ヘ
居ル譯ナリト述ヘ次テ本使ヨリ關稅問題ニ關シ往電第四五號「ウ」

外
務
省

(赤 梓 紙)

ニ對スルト同様ノ質問ヲナシタルニ對シ「チ」ハ全然同感ニシテ殊ニ不法課税ハ困ツタ問題ナルカ之カ廢止方保障取付ケ様無シ要スルニ鑑ニ駐日大使ヨリ報告アリタルカ支那問題ニ付テハ容易ニ纏メ難ク充分ノ忍耐ヲ要ストノ貴國政府ノ意嚮ニハ同感ナルカ議會ノ質問ニ對シ常ニ同一ノ言明ヲ繰返ス譯ニモ行カスト述ヘ前顯「ウ」ノ言フ處ニ比シ幾分ノ開キアル様認メラル右ハ外相自身ノ立場ト政治上ノ關係ヲ顧慮スルカ爲ナリト察セラル

ニ對露關係ニ付テハ「チ」ハ過般壽府ニ於テ「リトウイノフ」ト接洽シタルモ何等ノ結果ヲ得ス露ハ佛國ニ於テモ英國ニ於ケルト同様ノ行動ニ出テ居ル由ニテ今ノ處何等局面展開ノ望ミナシト述ヘニ次テ不戰條約問題ニ言及シタルニ「チ」ハ本問題ニ付テハ單ニ米

外 務 省

(赤 梓 紙)

佛間往復文書ノ寫ヲ送付シ居ルノミニテ何等態度ヲ決メ居ラサルモ米國トシテハ三國會議不成功ノ結果大規模ノ海軍擴張案出テ之ニ平和論擡頭シ大擴張ヲ緩和セント努メ居ル事情ナレハ不戰條約ニ依リ平和論者ノ意ヲ迎ヘテ總選舉ニ備ヘントスル意嚮モアルヘク米佛交渉成立ノ上ハ我方ニモ提議シ來ルヘキ様思ハルルカ右條約ハ戰爭廢止ニ關スル各國ノ希望ヲ表明スルニ過キサルモノナル故之ニ應シテ可ナリト思ハル尤モ米ハ「モンロウ」主義ニ反スル第三國ノ行動ヲ默視シ得サルト同様英ハ埃及問題モアリ或ハ「ロカルノ」條約ノ違反ヲ默視シ難キ次第ナレハ右ノ諒解ヲ付ケル要アリト思フト述ヘ

四 終リニ軍縮問題ニ關シ「チ」ハ本問題ハ日英々米等二國間ノ話ト

外 務 省

(赤 枠 紙)

セハ比較的容易ナランモ同時ニ三國間ノ話合トセハ頗ル困難トナル況ンヤ「ゼネバ」準備委員會ノ如キ多數國ノ會議ニテハ成功困難ナリ現ニ英佛間ニ於テハ海陸空ノ各問題ニ付意見ヲ異ニシ居ルニ付二日「ブリアン」ニ面會ノ際何トカ話合ヲ付クル事必要ナリト語リタルニ「ブ」モ同感ニテ自ラ之ヲ考慮スヘシト答ヘタル後未タ何等具體的進捗ヲ見スト述ヘタリ本使ハ米國「ジョウンス」提督過般來「ゼネバ」ニ出張シタルカ海軍軍縮ニ付公式非公式ト謂ハス何等カノ話合アリタルヤト尋ネタルニ何等話合ナシト答ヘタルニ付一九三一年ニハ華盛頓會議ニ依ル會議アル筈ナルカ打合セナシニ開クモ成功覺束ナカルヘキ旨ヲ指摘シタルニ「チ」ハ會議前話合ヒノ必要アルコト勿論ナルカ米國ノ總選舉アリ今年ハ困

外
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(赤 枠 紙)

難ナラムト述ヘタリ

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編者附言
本館ハB103.0.1-3
戦争放棄ニ関スル際
合議及条約ヲ保存
不戦条約ヲ破ラズ
干渉ニテ

寫

(分類 B 10 3.0.1-3.)

昭和3 六一六四 平 倫敦 五月二十日前着 歐二

田中外務大臣 佐分利代理大使

第九六號

不戦條約案ニ關スル英國政府ノ回答ハ十九日當地米國大使ニ手交セラレタリ
右「テキスト」ハ二十日ノ新聞ニ發表

外務省

寫

(分類 B 10 3.0.1-3.)

昭和3 六一八六 平 倫敦 五月二十日後着 歐、條

田中外務大臣 佐分利臨時代理大使

第九八號ノ一

往電第九六號英國回答ハ「フルスカップ」七頁ニシテ十三項ヨリ成ル各項ノ「テキスト」電報ノ要アラハ御來示ヲ請フ
一 米、佛、獨ノ本件ニ關スル提案回答等ヲ考慮シタリ
二 不戦條約締結ノ件ハ英國極力支持ス
三 米、佛兩案ヲ研究スルニ兩者ノ間ニ重要ナル差異ナシ右ハ「ケロツグ」ノ演說ニ依リテ一層明ナリ米國政府ノ目的トスル處ハ戦争ヲ政策ト具トシテ使用セサルコトノ原則ヲ定メムトスルニ在リ英

外務省

B-1111

0137

は(イ)
國政府ハ全然之ト同意見ナリ佛國ハ一國カ此ノ原則ヲ破リタル場
合ニ付提案スル處アリ英國政府ハ之ニ對シ慎重ナル考慮ヲ加ヘタ
リ

四 英國政府ハ米案第一條ヲ以テ自衛權ノ行使ヲ妨クルモノニ非スト
解ス右ハ「ケロツグ」ノ演說ニ明ナリ故ニ此ノ點ニ付テハ原案ニ
等追加スルノ要ナシ

五 第二條ニ付テハ米、佛兩案ノ間ニハ左シタル差異ヲ認メス「締約
國間ノ爭議」ナル字句カ二締約國間ノ爭議ヲモ包括スルカ如キ廣
キ意義ヲ有スルモノトセハ米案ヲ受諾シテ可ナリ

六 佛國ハ一國カ條約ニ反シタル場合ノ爲一條項ヲ附加セムコトヲ提
議ス本條約丈ケヲ考フレハ斯ル條項ヲ附加スルコト無用ナリトハ

外務省

7.6

は(イ)

言ヒ得サルモ「ケロツグ」ノ演說ハ一國ノ條約違反ノ場合他ノ國
ハ違反國ニ對シ條約上ノ義務ヲ免ルヘキコトヲ示セリ

七 右ノ原則ハ特ニ本條約ニノミ適用セラル兩國ニ意見ノ一致ヲ見ハ
英國政府ハ之ニ満足シ何等修正ヲ求ムルノ意ナシ而シテ此ノ點ニ
關スル諒解ヲ適當ノ方法ニ依リ記錄ニ止ムルコト困難ナラサルヘ
シ

7.6

外務省

昭和3 六一九七 平

倫敦 本省

五月二十日後着

歐、條

田中外務大臣

佐分利代理大使

第九八號ノ二

ハ此點ハ英國カ既ニ有スル條約上ノ義務ニ影響スルヲ以テ之ヲ重大視セサルヲ得ス聯盟規約及「ロカルノ」條約ハ單ニ戰爭ヲ否認スルノミナラス進テ違反ノ場合ノ制裁ヲ規定ス從テ或條約國ニ對シ戰爭行爲ニ出テタリ締盟國ノ關スル限リ條約ノ效力ヲ停止スルトノ諒解存スルニアラサレハ本條約ハ既存條約ト抵觸スルノ虞アリ

ハ英政府カ聯盟規約及「ロカルノ」條約ヲ尊重セント欲スルコト

外務省

7.6

は(イ)

ハ獨逸ト異ナル所ナク歐洲平和ノ基礎タル此等ノ約束ヲ弱メ又ハ覆ヘスカ如キ如何ナル新條約ヲモ受諾スルコトヲ得ス故ニ英國トシテハ寧ロ佛案第四條ノ如キ規定ヲ欲ス此點ニ關シテハ何等異義ナカルヘキコトト諒解ス現ニ「ケロツグ」ハ其演說中ニ於テ新條約ト聯盟規約及「ロカルノ」條約トカ抵觸セサルコトニ言及シ居レリ

十、政策ノ具トシテ戰爭ヲ否認スル第一條ノ用語ニ顧ミ英國政府ハ世界ノ或地域ニ於テ其幸福及保全カ英國ノ爲特別且緊切ノ利害關係アルコトニ注意ヲ喚起セントス英國ハ過去ニ於テ之等ノ地域ニ對スル干涉ハ容認スルヲ得サルコトヲ明瞭ナラシムル爲努力シ來レリ之等ノ地域ノ攻撃ニ對シテ防護スルコトハ英國ニ

外務省

7.6

B-1111

0139

取りテハ自衛手段ナリ英國政府ハ此點ニ於ケル行動ノ自由ヲ害
セスト云フ明瞭ナル諒解ノ下ニ新條約ヲ受諾セントスルモノナ
ルコトヲ明ニスルヲ要ス米國政府ハ之ト比スヘキ利害關係ヲ有
シ他國ノ之ヲ無視スルコトヲ以テ非友誼的行爲トスヘシト宣言
シタルコトアリ從テ英國政府ノ其ノ立場ヲ明ニスルニ當リ米國
政府ノ見解ヲ表示シツツアルモノト信ス

十、英國政府ハ世界ノ總テノ國家カ條約ニ加盟スル意思表示スル
迄條約ノ效力ヲ差控フルノ必要ナシト認ム然レトモ他方加入ノ
提議ヲ受ケタル國ト既ニ密接ナル條約關係ニアル歐洲ノ或國家
カ加盟國ニ包含セラレサルコトハ厄介ノ事態ヲ生スヘシ英國政
府ハ固ヨリ之等ノ國家カ欣ンテ條約ノ條項ヲ受諾スルコトヲ疑

外務省

7.6

は(イ)

ハス末タ各國ヨリ政府ノ承認ヲ受ケサル國家及自己領域内ノ秩
序及安寧ヲ維持スルゴトヲ得スト認メラルル國家ノ存スル以上
世界各國ノ加入ハ實現困難ニシテ且却テ不都合ナルベシ之等國
家ノ加入條件ハ將來更ニ考究スルコト便宜ナルヘキモソハ當面
ノヨリ重要ナル目的ノ到着ニ比スレハ輕微ナル問題ナリ

十二、提案ノ條項及之ニ關聯シテ生スル諸點ノ審議ノ後英國政府ハ
平和ノ基礎ヲ強固ニセントスル新ナル運動ニ衷心協力スルコト
ヲ妨クヘキ何等現存ノ支障ヲ認メサルコトヲ知ルヘシ英國政府
ハ提案セラレタルカ如キ條約ノ締結ニ欣然協力シ且關係諸政府
ト共ニ此目的ノ爲必要ナル商議ニ入ル用意アリ

十三、以上ハ英國政府ノ見解ヲ表示セルモノナリ米國提案ハ自治領

7.6

外務省

分類 B.103.0.1-3.

發電 昭和三年五月二十二日

不戰條約問題英國回答ニ關スル件

在英 佐分利代理大使

田中大臣

第五七號

貴電第九八號ニ關シ

第四項（自衛權）及第十項（特殊地域ノ防護ニ關スル留保）ノ「テ
キスト」至急電報アリ度シ

英子
（赤）
紙
係

外務省

4.3

B-1 1 1 1

0141

寫 本主ハ B.10.3.0.1-2.
編者附言 戦争地帯-國々國際會議及
条約干係-一件.
不附条約補充文干係
=P7.

分類 B.10.3.0.1-2)

6387
Plain

London,
Received, 23rd, May a.m. 1928.

Gaimudaijin, Tokio.

No. 100.

(4) After studying the wording of Article 1. of the United States' draft, His Majesty's Government do not think that its terms exclude action which a state may be forced to take in self-defence, for Kellogg has made it clear in the speech to which I have referred above that he regards the right of self-defence as inalienable, and His Majesty's Government are disposed to think that on this question no addition to the text is necessary.

(10). The language of Article 1. as to the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy renders it desirable that I should remind Your Excellency that there are certain regions of the world, the welfare and integrity of which constitute a special and vital interest for our peace and safety. His Majesty's Government have been at pains to make it clear in the past that interference with these regions cannot be suffered. Their protection against attack is to the British Empire a measure of self-defence. It must be clearly understood that His Majesty's Government in Great Britain accept the new treaty upon the distinct understanding

that

- 2 -

that it does not prejudice their freedom of action in this respect. The Government of the United States have comparable interests, any disregard of which by a foreign Power they have declared that they would regard as an unfriendly act. His Majesty's Government believe therefore that in defining their position, they are expressing the intention and meaning of the United States' Government.

Saburi.

B-1 1 1 1

0142

編者附書

原書ハ

B10.3.0.1-12

戦争批准書
議及条約
不戦条約
(拒請 参照 全)

寫

(分類 B10.3.0.1-3)

記録件

は(1)

昭和3 六五四七 平

倫敦 本省

五月廿五日前着 發

歐二

田中外務大臣

佐分利代理大使

第一〇二號

不戰條約ニ關シ廿三日上院ニ於テ「セシル」聊ヨリ英國回答第十
項ハ英帝國外ノ或國ニ對スル攻撃ヲ英帝國其ノモノニ對スルト同
様ニ取扱フ權利ヲ留保スル趣旨ナリヤ斯ノ如キ國ハ何レナリヤ及
第十項ハ他ノ意義ヲ有スルヤトノ質問アリ政府側「クツシェンダ
ン」卿ハ英回答ハ目卿米國ニ於テ考慮中ナルノミナラス適當ノ機
會ニ英政府ニ於テ説明ヲ與フルコトアルヘキニ鑑ミ政府ノ一般的
陳述ニ説明ヲ附加スルコトニ依リテ問題ヲ紛糾スルノ危險ヲ犯ス

外務省

7.6

ハ望マシカラストノ趣旨ヲ答辯セリ

同日下院ニ於テ外相ト労働黨議員トノ間ニ同様ノ問答アリタリ
米、佛、獨、伊、聯盟ニ郵送セリ

は(1)

外務省

7.6

B-1111

0143

編者附書

原書ハ

B. 10. 3. 0. 1-12

戦争地帯ニ在ル國際會議及条約關係件
不戰条約擴充交渉關係
(招請參加者合々)

寫

(分類B. 10. 3. 0. 1-3)

昭和3 六六四四 平

倫敦 本省

五月廿六日前着

歐二

田中外務大臣

佐分利代理大使

第一〇四號

米國ノ英國自治領ニ對スル不戰條約參加招請ニ關シ

二十五日「テレグラフ」社説ハ之ニ依リ米案ハ歐洲以外ニ於テ人氣アルニ至レルノミナラス調印國ノ寡少ナル事等ニ關スル佛國側ノ反對意見モ緩和セラレタリ英國ノ立場ヨリセハ自治領及印度政府カ此ノ重要ナル問題ニ付本國政府ト商議スルコトハ特ニ望マシキ事ニシテ彼等ハ「特定區域ニ於ケル特殊且緊密ナル利害」ノ意味ヲ明確ニ了解シ居リ濠洲、新西蘭及印度ハ均シク埃及及蘇士運

外務省

7.6

河ニ對スル如何ナル干涉ニモ反對スルモノナリト論シ

「マンチエスター、ガーディアン」社説ハ英國ノ「モンロー」主義ナル一寄書ヲ引用シ外相ハ特殊緊密ナル利害ヲ有スル地域中ニ埃及ノミナラス「アフガニスタン」ノ如キ國ヲモ包含セシメ居ルラシク英國ニ付「モンロー」主義ニ相當スルモノヲ提言スルモノト解セラルル所英國力之ヲ承認スヘキヤ又從來米國自身ノ政策ニ基クニ過キサリシ「モンロー」主義ヲ正式ニ承認セムトスルモノナリヤ此ノ種問題カ外交上ノ重大問題トナリタルカ「ケロツグ」ノ漠然タル意見ヲ(脱)シメムトシタル外相ノ努力ノ不幸ナル結果ナリ「ケロツグ」ハ自衛權ヲ承認シタルモ爭議解決ノ方法トシテノ戰爭ヲ嚴密ニ否認スルノ效果ヲ害セムコトハ之ヲ欲セサリシ

外務省

7.6

B-1111

0144

ナリ提案セラレタル條約ニ對シ外相ノ提議セルカ如キ留保ヲ附ス
ルコトハ其ノ道德的置値ヲ減殺スルモノナリト論セリ

米、佛、獨、伊へ郵送セリ

は(1)

外
務
省

7.6

B-1 1 1 1

0145

記録係
松平 大 使
五月二十五日前着
英宛貴電第五八號ニ關シ

華盛頓
本省
五月二十五日前着

田中外務大臣

松平大使

第一七八號

英宛貴電第五八號ニ關シ

昨二十三日「キヤツスル」ニ面會ノ際英國回答遲延スルハ英國側ニ於テ何等承諾ヲ躊躇スル理由アル次第ナリヤト尋ネタル處「キ」ハ單ニ自治領及印度ト協議ノ要アル由ニテ故障アリトハ聞キタル事ナシト述ヘタルカ二十四日他用ヲ以テ英國大使ニ面會ノ際本件ニ付尋ネタル處同大使ハ一、二ノ點ニ付尙自治領及印度ト研究ヲ要スル爲遅レ居ル旨答ヘタルニ付問題ト爲レル點ヲ質シタルニ本條約中「モ

秘

分類 10.3.6.1-3)

外務省

(赤 梓 紙)

ンロー」主義ニ付明記シアルカ該文字ヲ使用スル事ハ「ベルサイユ」條約ノ際ハ別トシ英米間ノミノ條約ニ於テハ今回カ初メテナル處南中米諸國ノ内政ニ干渉セサルヘキ事ハ英國ノ今日迄承認セル處ニシテ漠然「モンロー」主義ヲ認メ居レルモ今回之ヲ條約中ニ挿入スルニハ其ノ意義ヲ明カニスル必要アルニ付右提議ニ關シ自治領及印度ト研究中ナリ其ノ他ノ點ニ付テハ自分ハ失念セリト申居タリ御參考迄

外務省

B-1111

0146

(赤 梓 紙)

倫敦 本省 六月二日前着

田中外務大臣

佐分利代理大使

第一一二號

貴電第五八號ニ關シ

數日前「ウエルズレー」ニ質問シタルニ本件ハ主トシテ法律問題ニ係リ尙篤ト研究スル筈ナルヲ以テ今直ニ英國側ノ意圖ヲ「ハリー」スル事ハ躊躇セサルヲ得スト言ヘリ依ツテ五月三十一日「ハースト」ト談話中本件ニ言及シタルニ同氏ハ本件ハ「ドミニオン」ト協議ヲ要スルカ故ニ準備ニ時ヲ要スル次第ナルカ偶々不戰條約ノ研究ヲ前ニスルノ必要ニ迫ラレタル爲メ本件ノ研究遲レ遂ニ現行條約終了迄

13.10.3.0.1-3.)

外 務 省

(赤 梓 紙)

ニ改訂ノ運ニ至ラサル事トナリタル次第ナリト言ヘリ同氏ノ談話中御參考トナルヘキ點左ノ通

「英國トシテハ不戰條約ニ於ケルト同シク仲裁裁判ニ就テモ特種地域ニ關スル留保ヲ爲スノ必要アリト思考ス「モンロー」主義ハ時代ニ依リ含蓄ヲ異ニシ之ニ關スル除外ヲ設クル事ハ好マシカラサルモ米國ハ到底之ヲ拋棄セサルヘク之ニ付一九〇七年旧林平和會議ニ於テ國際紛爭平和的處理法調印ノ際米國ハ「モンロー」主義ニ關スル一ノ宣言ヲ爲シタル次第アリテ各國モ此ノ點ニ付「コンミット」シ居ル譯ナリ米國カ各ノ除外ヲ爲ス以上英國カ埃及ニ付除外ヲ主張スルモ米國トシテ異議ヲ唱ヘ得サルヘシ
「米國ハ各事件ニ付作製スヘキ仲裁條約ニ一々上院ノ同意ヲ要スル

3.3.

外 務 省

B-1111

0147

(赤 梓 紙)

事ヲ主張スルモ右ハ他ノ國ニハ適用無キヲ以テ片面的規定ナルノ
ミナラス仲裁裁判條約ソノモノヲ空文ニ終ラシムル憂アリ就テハ
此ノ點ニ付何トカ適當ノ調節ヲ案出スルノ必要アリ(佛國ハ米國
ト仲裁裁判條約ノ談判中仲裁契約ノ纏ラサル場合ハ海牙裁判所ヲ
シテ之ヲ起草セシムル趣旨ノ案ヲ出シタルモ遂ニ米國ノ同意ヲ得
サリシ趣「フロマジヨウ」ヨリ「ハースト」ヘ内話アリタリトノ
事ナリ)尙不戰條約對米回答ニ用ヒラレタル特種地域ナル字句ハ
埃及以外ノ國ヲ包含シ居レリヤト質問シタル處右ハ埃及ノミヲ指
スモノニシテ以前ハ波斯ノ一部モ同様ノ關係ト看做サレタル事ア
ルモ今日ハ然ラスト答ヘタリ

米ニ轉電シ佛、獨、伊ニ暗送セリ

外 務 省

編者附言
昭和十三年八月廿四日
不我条約協定ニ係
合議及条約ニ係
不我条約協定ニ係
ミアリ

(分類 B. 10. 3. 0. 1-3.)

昭和十三年 一一四一八 暗 巴里 廿三日後發 歐二
本省 八月廿四日前着

田中外務大臣 佐藤局長

第一三四號

往電第一三〇號「ドラモンド」杉村公使會談中不戰條約ニ關シ「
ド」ハ

「本條約ハ實施ノ上ハ先年壽府議定書ト同様ノ效果ヲ生スヘク是
ニ依リ現約第一五號ノ缺陷ハ消滅セルモノト云フヘシ議定書モ
若シ當時米國カ主張セシナラハ各國是ヲ承認シタリシナラン
「英國ノ對米回答ニ所謂特殊地域トハ埃及及波斯灣ニシテ右ハ二
十年前ノ英國聲明ニ言及セルモノニ過キス此ノ點米國政府ニハ

外務省

7.6

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説明セルモ他國ニハ事態ヲ面倒ナラシメサル爲説明セサリシナ
リ

「英國政府ノ有スル情報ニ依レハ本條約ニ對スル米國上院ノ形勢
不利ナルヲ以テ聯盟總會又ハ理事會ニ於テ事件ノ論議ハ此ノ際
可成之ヲ避ケ米國上院批准後ニ譲リ度キ意嚮ナリト述ヘタル趣
ナリ何等御參考迄

右英、米大使ニ轉電シ佛、獨、伊、白各大使ニ暗送セリ

外務省

7.6

B-1111

0149

在英日國大使館

月二十九日「マンチエスター、ガーデアン」ハ「埃及トモンロー主義」ト題スル論文ヲ掲ケ英國政府ハ不戰條約ノ受諾ニ際シ埃及ニ「モンロー主義ヲ適用セントスル留保ヲ爲シタルカ抑モ「モンロー」主義ハ歐洲帝國主義ノ「ラテン、アメリカ」ニ侵入セントスルニ反對セル一方の宣言ニシテ之ヲ埃及ノ如キ特殊地域ニ於ケル利益ノ保護ノ爲ニ適用セントスルハ誤レリトナシ茲ニ米國ノ聯盟ニ對スル氣受ヲヨカラシメンカ爲ニ聯盟規約中ニ之ヲ認ムル條項ヲ挿入シ元來一方の宣言ナリシモノヲ變シテ普遍的ノモノト爲シタル爲「ラテン、アメリカ」諸國ノ聯盟加入ヲ困難ナラシメタリトシ「コスタリカ」カ國際聯盟理事會議長宛書翰ニ於テ規約第二十一條ニ用ヒラレタル「モンロー」主義ト云フ句ノ意味ニ付有權的解釋力與ヘラレサル限リ聯盟國トナリ得サルコトヲ宣言スルニ至リタルコト等ヲ舉ケ規約中ニ「モンロー」主義ヲ入レタルコトハ矢錯ナリシ力之ヲ不戰條約ニ關聯シテ爲セル英國ノ留保中ニ入レタルニ至リテハ更ニ大ナル失錯ナリトシ英國ノ埃及ニ於ケル利益ハ米國ノ「パナマ」及「

情報部

分類 B 10.30.1-2)

在英日國大使館

普通第四二一號


昭和三年九月八日

在英

臨時代理大使 佐分利貞男

外務大臣男爵 田中義一殿

義一殿



不戰條約ト米國ノ傳統的態度竝ニ「モンロー」

主義ニ關スル言說報告ノ件

八月二十七日不戰條約調印ノ後爲セル「ステートメント」ニ於テ英國全權外相代理「クヱンシエンダン」卿ハ米國ノ不戰條約ニ對スル態度ニ言及シ不戰條約ノ發議及完成ニ關聯シ「ケロッグ」ノ爲セル又ハ述ヘタル所ノモノハ歐羅巴ノ錯節超然タラントスル亞米利加ノ傳統ニ何等ノ變更ヲ來スモノニアラサルコトヲ了解スルコト緊要ナリト述ヘタル趣ナリ又ハ

歡米局

昭和三年九月八日 授受

記

館使大本日國英在

ニカラガ」ニ於ケル利益ト同様性質ノ特殊且緊切ノモノニシテ「モンロー」主義トハ全然關係ナク「モンロー」主義ナキモ何等ノ變更ヲ受ケス永存スヘキモノナリ然ルニ英國政府ハ埃及ニ於ケル特殊利益ヲ蓋ハンカ爲ニ該主義ヲ誤ツテ使用シ其結果各方面ニ惡影響ヲ及シ不戰條約ハ其ノ力ヲ弱メラレ北米合衆國ハ斷シセラレ「ラテン、アメリカ」ハ不戰ニ關シ猶疑心ヲ抱キ埃及ハ舊世界ニ適用アル「モンロー」主義存在ストノ假定ニ挑戰スルニ至レリト爲シ「ナハス、パシヤ」カ幾ニ埃及ハ主權國ニシテ其ノ不知ノ間ニ商品ノ如ク賣買セラルルコト能ハストノ電報ヲ舉ケタルコト亞米利加ヨリ好意アル回答ヲ與ヘタルコト然ルニ埃及國立憲內閣力弱サレタル爲何等ノ結果ヲ齎スコトナクシテ終リタルコト等ヲ述ヘ右埃及ノ抗議ハ何等ノ效果ヲ得スシテ終レリト雖モ埃及カ政治的不安ノ源泉ナルコト及埃及ニ英國「モンロー」主義ノ存在シ得サルコトヲ強調スルモノナリトシ埃及ノ如キ特殊問題ヲ處理スルニ最モ適當ナル方法ハ之ヲ能フ限り國際聯盟ノ管轄下ニ置クニアリト論セリ

右何等御參考迄關係新聞切抜相添ヘ報告申進ス

本信寫送付迄

米國 軍艦山

29 AUG 1923

MANCHESTER GUARDIAN

Egypt and the Monroe Doctrine.

The Suez Canal is to the British Empire exactly what the Panama Canal is and the Nicaragua Canal will be to the U.S.A. Nevertheless, the U.S.A., in signing the Pact for the Outlawry of War, have not found it necessary to make reservations on behalf of their special interests in Panama and in Nicaragua. But the British Government has made reservations on behalf of its special interests in Egypt. Not that Egypt has been specifically mentioned, but it is understood, and has not been denied, that Egypt is the region, or one of the regions, covered by the reservations made in the British reply to Mr. Kellogg's Note. Sir Austen Chamberlain also compared the British reservations with the Monroe Doctrine. If the Monroe Doctrine applied only to Panama and Nicaragua this comparison would be valid. But the Monroe Doctrine is something quite different. It is a unilateral declaration of policy against European imperialist penetration into Latin America. The effect of this Doctrine has been that the South American Republics have been able to develop freely and without interference from outside. None of these Republics would deny the beneficent protective power of the Monroe Doctrine in the past, although some of them do not accept it now that they are in no danger from interference by any European Power. The Doctrine is peculiar to the New World, and it is also growing obsolete, having almost fulfilled its great historic purpose. If it were to be abrogated formally by the U.S.A. there would be little or no change in the political status of Latin America. No European Power would proceed to annex Brazil or the Argentine. But in case there should be any doubt on this score it is just as well that the Doctrine should be upheld. It can be left to become superfluous as a thing that has achieved its own object. Formal abrogation is unnecessary.

But if it is to remain there should be no confusion with regard to its meaning. Such confusion there is in plenty. In the hope, presumably, that the League Covenant should appear palatable to the U.S.A., a reservation in favour of the Monroe Doctrine is embodied in the text of the Covenant itself. Thus what was a unilateral declaration has been universalised. The result is that several of the American States have felt compelled to remain outside the League. Thus Costa Rica, in a recent letter to the President of the League Council, has declared its inability to become a member of the League unless the meaning of the term Monroe Doctrine as used in article 21

of the Covenant is authoritative and interpreted. But an authoritative interpretation of a doctrine proclaimed by one Power only is clearly impossible except by that Power. The U.S.A. alone have the authority to say what they mean by this Doctrine—they have, as a matter of fact, said so often enough. The League is therefore in a predicament from which there is at present no escape. All the Council could do would be to say that it understands the Monroe Doctrine as the U.S.A. understand it. This could hardly satisfy Costa Rica and several other Latin American Republics, which therefore cannot but remain estranged from the League. This is unfortunate, for, as the Pan-American Congress at Havana showed, there is no real Pan-American solidarity; indeed, some of the Latin American Republics are more closely bound to Europe than to the U.S.A., and would prefer to see their international problems settled either by local conferences or by the League rather than by any Pan-American Congress.

Thus the mistake made in dragging the Monroe Doctrine into the Covenant is being paid for heavily. But an even graver mistake was made in dragging this same Doctrine into the reservations accompanying the British acceptance of the Pact for the Outlawry of War. This mistake is more dangerous than its predecessor. It is based on a complete misapplication of the Monroe Doctrine. The interests of the U.S.A. in Panama and Nicaragua, which have nothing to do with this Doctrine, are, like British interests in Egypt, of a special and vital kind. They would persist unmodified even if there were no Monroe Doctrine at all. Nevertheless, the British Government has misused the Doctrine to cover its special interests in Egypt. The result has been unfortunate in several ways. The Pact for the Outlawry of War has been lamentably weakened. The U.S.A. have been perceptibly estranged. Latin America, so it would seem, according to a message from our New York correspondent, has been made suspicious of outlawry. In addition to this, Egypt has had to challenge the assumption that there is a Monroe Doctrine with validity in the Old World. If this assumption were explicitly accepted by the U.S.A. Egypt would be justified in viewing the Pact with the same suspicion as Costa Rica views the League of Nations. When Egypt was still under a constitutional Government her Premier, Nahas Pasha, telegraphed to Washington pointing out that Egypt was a sovereign State, and could not "be bought or sold unknown to herself like merchandise." If these were actually the words used by the Egyptian Premier they are excessively drastic. Nevertheless, there would be some truth in them, for to include Egypt in

a reservation to the Pact without consulting her is consistent neither with her dignity nor her sovereignty. It seems that the reply sent by the U.S.A. was not unfavourable, but with the suppression of constitutional government in Egypt the matter has come to nothing. But it does nevertheless emphasise two things—that the present status of Egypt is, as Mr. W. H. Dawson pointed out in our columns recently, "a constant source of political and social unsettlement" and that there can be no British Monroe Doctrine. The real and the only Monroe Doctrine is an exclusively American affair. What the Old World needs to cover special cases like Egypt is to bring them to the utmost extent possible under the jurisdiction of the League of Nations. That is the best ultimate guarantee in the present case, alike for our own larger interests and for the lesser interests of the other Powers, and the most statesmanlike part of Sir Austen Chamberlain's own recent proposals to Egypt was that opening the door, though but a little way, to a League solution.

President Wilson, had already brought to the work of peace such a high confidence of the mission of his country. Mr. Kellogg could look back with pride on the progress made in so short a time for peace. The day they both Kellogg and himself began to examine the means of carrying out that extensive diplomatic undertaking. Optimistic as Mr. Kellogg was, he had got the better of the sceptics. His entire fairness and good faith, and the readiness with which he satisfied legitimate queries by clear and definite explanations, had given him the confidence of all his partners. And, lastly, it was his clear vision that had shown him what could be expected of Governments inspired by the deep yearnings of nations.

GERMANY'S EXAMPLE.

What more exalted lesson, M. Briand continued, could be offered to the civilized world than the sight of an assembly in which, for the signing of a pact against war, Germany, of her own free will, stepped in on a level with all, and took her seat among the other signatories, her former enemies? The example was still more striking when an opportunity was thus given for the first time for more than half a century for a representative of France to receive a German Foreign Minister on French soil. He was particularly glad to pay homage to the distinguished mind and the courage of Herr Stresemann, the eminent statesman who had not hesitated to assume for more than three years full responsibility in the work of European cooperation for the maintenance of peace.

Since he had been mentioning names, he wanted personally to evoke among them a brotherly remembrance for Sir Austen Chamberlain, to whom he addressed all their wishes for a speedy and complete return to health. When he thought of the unwearied devotion that the cause of peace had always aroused in Sir Austen's noble soul, he could not help imagining the joy he would have felt at the sight of that meeting. As for themselves, they must believe he was still with them, whether invisible or in the flesh, at any manifestation of peace.

It would be, he hoped, no exaggeration to say that that day's event marked a new date in the history of mankind. For the first time, on a general plane accessible to all the nations of the universe, a concrete political peace imposed by the results of war. For the first time a treaty was truly devoted to the very establishment of peace, initiating a new law and freed from all political contingencies. Such a treaty was a beginning and not an end unto itself. The Pact of Paris, born of peace, could and must be a regular treaty of concord. That, no doubt, was why Mr. Kellogg had told the French Ambassador it seemed to him quite fitting that the neighbourhood of the Place de la Concorde should be chosen for signing the Pact.

ESSENCE OF THE PACT.

The Treaties of Locarno had already borne witness to that new spirit which now had full expression. All the signatories of the Locarno Treaties were familiar with the idea of the renunciation of war, but practical agreements creating a political guarantee of peace could not assume that universal character from which the general Pact derived all its value. The League of Nations had issued a declaration designed to secure the same result, but, apart from the fact that the United States had no share in it, the formula and the methods of the

League could not be equivalent to those of the new Pact. The League was a kind of general renunciation, those of the Treaty might justly feel that they were offering the League a precious token of their attachment and loyalty.

The essential feature of the Pact was that, for the first time, in the face of the whole world and through a solemn Covenant involving the honour of great nations, who all had behind them a heavy record of political conflicts, war in its most specific and dreaded form; selfish and wilful war; which had been regarded of old as springing from divine right and had remained in international offices as an attribute of sovereignty, became at last juridically devoid of what constituted its most serious danger—its legitimacy. Freed from the old bondage, the nations that had signed the new contract would gradually forsake the habit of associating the ideas of national prestige and national interest with the idea of force.

It had been said that this was not realism, that sanctions were lacking. In effect, however, the State which acted so as to incur the reprobation of all its partners would run the risk of seeing all of them gradually and voluntarily gathered against it. Where was the country, signatory to the Pact, whose leaders would, on their own responsibility, expose it to such a danger? The modern law of interdependence between the nations made it incumbent upon every statesman to apply for himself the memorable words of President Coolidge: "An act of war in any part of the world is an act that injures the interests of my country."

M. Briand referred to the importance of "extending the scope of this wide ring of international solidarity." The intentions expressed by many Governments enabled them, even then, to consider the spiritual community of nations that were morally represented at the first signature as much wider than it appeared to the onlookers. All those peoples whose delegates had not been able to sit among them must feel sure, in that hour of complete union, of their unanimous regret that for purely technical reasons it was found imperative to adopt the procedure best calculated to ensure and expedite, for the benefit of all, the success of the great undertaking. Thus the mind's eye extended that solemn assembly beyond the walls of the conference chamber, beyond all frontiers on land or on sea. They would have noticed that the Government of the Republic had purposely ordered the flags of all the nations to be hoisted over the Quai d'Orsay.

In a moment the awakening of a great hope would be signalled to the world. Peace was proclaimed. It was well. It was much. But it was still necessary to organize peace, and in the solution of difficulties right, and not might, must prevail. That was to be the work of tomorrow. As there was no one of the nations represented that had not shed the blood of her children on the battle-fields of the last War, he proposed that they should dedicate to all the dead of the Great War the event that they were going to consecrate by their signatures.

Enthusiastic applause greeted the conclusion of M. Briand's speech, and this was repeated when M. Camerlinck finished translating his words into English.

THE TREATY SIGNED.

M. Briand again rose and read the text of the Pact and the names of the countries whose plenipotentiaries were about to sign it. M. Camerlinck then read the English translation of the text, and the

first part of the ceremony, which had lasted about 40 minutes, was concluded. Then Herr Stresemann slowly rose from his place, and, walking round the conference table, sat down at the small table between the arms of the horseshoe on which lay the text of the Pact. One of the secretaries of the Protocol handed to Mr. Kellogg by the people of Havre, and he affixed his signature in the name of the German Republic. After Herr Stresemann had returned to his seat Mr. Kellogg advanced and signed on behalf of the United States.

The plenipotentiaries then followed in the alphabetical order of the countries they represented—M. Briand, on behalf of France, and Lord Cushendun, on behalf of Great Britain, followed immediately by the representatives of the Dominions. The same procedure was adopted in each case, the pen being handed to and taken back from each plenipotentiary by one of the three secretaries of the Protocol, who were at the table upon which the text lay, and on each occasion the act of signing was greeted by loud applause from the body of the room. During all this time the reflectors were ablaze, and, as the eyes got used to this unaccustomed glare, it was possible to study the expressions of the statesmen. M. Briand and Mr. Kellogg showed evident delight as they talked to each other and to the other plenipotentiaries that the scheme, of which they were the original inspirers, should have been brought successfully to fruition. Herr Stresemann was evidently conscious of the historic significance of his presence in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and of the nature of the mission which had brought him there. An air of optimistic contentment was, indeed, common to all the statesmen sitting at the great table as of men who were conscious of being instrumental in the conclusion of a treaty whose object was not merely national but aimed at ensuring the welfare and prosperity of humankind in general.

When the last signature had been affixed, M. Briand turned to the other plenipotentiaries with the gesture of one asking whether they had anything further to add, and, receiving no affirmative reply, rose and declared the proceedings closed. The whole ceremony took exactly an hour. Upon leaving the Ministry the plenipotentiaries were once more the objects of friendly demonstrations from the crowd.

To-night the plenipotentiaries, together with members of the Government and the Diplomatic Corps, were entertained at a State banquet at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and afterwards attended a reception which for the eminence of the guests cannot have been equalled in Paris since the conclusion of the Treaty of Versailles.

LORD CUSHENDUN'S VIEW.

In a statement made after the ceremony of signing the Treaty, Lord Cushendun expressed the view that the Pact would suffer only if it were burdened with extravagant interpretations. Nobody, he said, imagined that by the signing of this Treaty war would be finally abolished, and if this were borne in mind people would not be subject to terrible disappointment on the first occasion on which some little minor war broke out. But the very signing of the Pact was the most significant and impressive demonstration that had ever been made of the world's earnest desire to maintain peace and avoid war. It was a recognition of the fact that by now we ought to have reached a stage in the world's history in which we could do without war either as an instrument

of national policy or in the settlement of disputes. Referring to the attitude of Great Britain, which had been somewhat wrongly represented in many quarters, Lord Cushendun said the British Government had been in favour of the Pact from the very first, but it desired to be quite certain as to the exact meaning of what it was asked to sign. In this respect it had received full satisfaction in the correspondence exchanged.

Discussing the ceremony, Lord Cushendun said that the presence of Herr Stresemann at the Quai d'Orsay, seated next to the French Foreign Minister, and signing the Pact with his former antagonists only ten years after the greatest war in history, had a significance which could not be lost upon the world. It was a twofold act of courage. Not only was Herr Stresemann actuated by the highest motives of statesmanship and political courage, but in view of the state of his health it was an act of physical courage also.

Discussing the attitude of the United States towards the Pact, Lord Cushendun declared that it was important that people should realize that nothing Mr. Kellogg had done or said in connexion with the initiation and completion of the Pact could be taken to imply any modification of the traditional American aloofness from European complications. The extent to which the United States participated in European affairs was a matter for themselves, and this was in no way modified by the provisions or circumstances of the Pact. M. Briand in his speech had made the point that the Pact was dedicated to the memory of the men who fell in the War. Lord Cushendun pointed out that alone of the signatories he had twice put his name to the Pact, once in his capacity as representative of the King of Great Britain and the Dominions which were not self-governing and again as representative of the King in his capacity of Emperor of India. In signing thus he had been reminded of the great contribution made by our Indian fellow-subjects, who in the War had borne their full share of sacrifice and casualties. No people, he declared, stood to benefit from the Pact more than the people of India, whose country in the past had so often been subjected to devastation.

Earlier in the day M. Poincaré received the delegates, including Lord Cushendun, Count Uchida, M. Hymans, and Herr Stresemann, who remained with M. Poincaré for over an hour.

M. COOLIDGE'S MESSAGE.

In celebration of the signing of the pact telegrams were exchanged between the President of the French Republic and the President of the United States. Mr. Coolidge expresses his confidence that the plain clauses of the treaty would be accepted by all the nations and describes it as a great step forward in the preservation of peaceful relations, and as such a document of capital importance in the history of civilization. It had been the privilege of the United States to contribute to the success of the movement.

M. Doumergue, in his reply, thanked Mr. Coolidge for using him as an intermediary to convey to the representatives of the nations assembled at Paris a message so appreciative of the importance attached to the occasion. The fact that the ceremony took place in Paris was due to a desire to recognize the initiative taken by the French Government and its Minister of Foreign Affairs in the realization of this great project.

Other news of the Peace Pact will be found on pages 11 and 14.

THE PACT SIGNED GREAT CEREMONY IN PARIS.

M. BRIAND'S APPEAL.

A DEDICATION TO THE WAR DEAD.

(FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT.)

PARIS, AUG. 27.

The Pact for the renunciation of war as an instrument of policy was signed by the plenipotentiaries of the fifteen original signatories at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Quai d'Orsay this afternoon. Short and simple as were the proceedings, the ceremony was most impressive, and those who were present in the Salle de l'Horloge will not easily forget the occasion when the plenipotentiaries of the greatest Powers of the modern world "solemnly declared, in the names of their respective peoples, that they condemned recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounced it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another."

The ceremony was timed to begin at 3 o'clock, and by half-past 2 crowds had collected along the quai opposite the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to watch the arrival of the plenipotentiaries and to cheer them as they passed. The long and dignified *façade* of the Ministry had been lavishly decorated with the colours of the signatory Powers, and on the roof fluttered as many standards of other nations as the place would accommodate. Particularly noticeable were the black and white of Afghanistan and the red of Soviet Russia.

If weather conditions can be of good or evil presage, the birth of the Pact was most happy. The heat of August was tempered by a fresh breeze, which sent white clouds scudding across a clear sky to throw picturesque shadows upon the dancing waters of the Seine. The approach to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs presented, in fact, a scene of gaiety combined with dignity such as Paris, of all cities, knows best how to evoke, and which could not have been more suitable to the occasion of to-day. The interior of the Ministry carried on this happy impression, and the gilded antechambers (hung with tapestries which still bear the cipher of the Kings of France) were filled with a crowd of men and women who were certainly alive to the happy and solemn implications of the occasion.

A FILM OF THE SCENE.

Early in the afternoon the guests who had been invited to witness the ceremony of the signature began to arrive and take their places in the Salle de l'Horloge. Among the first comers were Mr. Myron T. Herrick, the United States Ambassador, who, accompanied by Mrs. Kellogg, took his place in the front row of chairs, facing

the plenipotentiaries who were to sign the Pact. Mr. Kellogg, the United States Ambassador, arrived, and one by one the front seats were occupied by the members of the French Government, the diplomatic *chefs de mission*, and their wives. At 2.55 M. Poincaré came in, and was warmly greeted by his colleagues and friends. The scene was now ready for the entrance of the leading characters.

As the clock began to strike three a hush fell on the assembled company, and the plenipotentiaries entered the room and took their seats round the table. Immediately the eight enormous reflectors which had been installed—four opposite the plenipotentiaries and one in each window along the side of the room—flashed into action, and the room was illuminated by an almost blinding glare. For a moment nothing was to be heard but the whirr of the cinematograph and "movietone" apparatus and the click of innumerable cameras.

M. Briand sat in the middle of the table, his back to the monumental chimney-piece surmounted by a vast clock and a marble figure, presumably of Truth, bearing a torch in her hand; on his right sat Herr Stresemann, on his left Mr. Kellogg. To the right of Herr Stresemann came M. Hymans (Belgium), Count Manzoni (Italy), Count Uchida (Japan), M. Zaleski (Poland), and M. Benesh (Czechoslovakia). To the left of Mr. Kellogg were Lord Cushendun (representing Great Britain, Northern Ireland, and those parts of the British Empire which are not represented at the League of Nations), Mr. Mackenzie King (Canada), Mr. McLachlan (Australia), Sir James Parr (New Zealand), Mr. J. S. Smuts (South Africa), and Mr. Cosgrave (Irish Free State). As soon as sufficient time had been allowed for the scene to be photographed the reflectors were extinguished, and only a spot light was left turned on to M. Briand, who then rose to speak.

M. BRIAND'S SPEECH.

"NEW DATE IN HISTORY OF MANKIND."

M. Briand said he was fully conscious that silence would best befit such a solemn occasion, and he would have liked, without any further words, to let each plenipotentiary simply rise and affix his signature to the greatest act born of peace. But he would be failing in his duty to his own country if he did not tell them how deeply France felt the honour of welcoming the first signatories of the general pact for the renunciation of war. If that honour had been left to France as an acknowledgment of the moral standing she enjoyed, thanks to her constant efforts in the cause of peace, he expressed the gratification of a whole people, happy that the inmost recesses of their national psychology should at last be understood by the world. He rejoiced to see gathered there, save for those who were unavoidably prevented from coming, all those statesmen who had taken a personal share in the conception, preparation, and drafting of the Pact. Special thanks were due to those who had undergone the fatigue of a long journey.

All would join with him in the same grateful feeling to Mr. Kellogg, who had not hesitated to come himself and assert there, with the full moral authority attaching to his name and great country, his steady faith in the importance and scope of the deed which they were about to sign. Sitting among them in that very hall, where his illustrious forerunner,

編者附言

系ハB.10.30
戦争放棄と関係
際会議及系約
一作
系約批准及かん
係ニアリ

寫

機密公第三九八號

昭和四年六月八日

在米

特命全權大使 出淵 勝次

外務大臣 男爵田中 義一 殿

戦争放棄條約批准問題ニ付「シヨットウエル」
博士談話ノ件

在紐育「コロンビヤ」大學「シヨットウエル」教授ハ富國知名ノ政
治學者ニテ殊ニ這回戦争放棄條約成立ノ裏面ニ在リ多大ノ貢獻ヲナ
シタル人物ナルカ本年秋京都ニ於テ開催セラルヘキ太平洋關係調査

外務省

(赤井氏ナ)

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(赤井氏ナ)

學會ニ米國側委員トシテ出席スルコトニ決定シタル趣ヲ以テ六月五
日本使來訪ノ際日本側ニ於テ戦争放棄條約批准未了ノ爲同條約ノ效
力發生ニ至ラサルヲ遺憾トスル旨申述ヘタルニ付本使ヨリ我國内政
上ノ理由ニ依リ御批准遅延シ居ル事情ヲ篤ト説示シタル處氏ハ右事
情ハ自分モ大体承知シ居リ實ハ日本側ノ立場ニ同情スル余リ種々研
究シタル次第ナルカ結局御批准書中ニ嘗テ「ウイルソン」大統領カ
「ヴェルサイユ」條約署名ノ際用ヒタル *acting in my own name and*
by my own authority 云々ト云フカ如キ辭句ヲ挿入スルコトニ依リ日本憲
法上ノ困難ヲ一掃シ得ヘキカト思考スト述ヘ居リタルカ歸米後六日
附書翰ヲ以テ敍上談話ノ趣旨ニ依ル我方御批准書議案ナルモノ並ニ
西班牙國王ノ本條約加入批准書寫ヲ送付シ來レリ右ハ今日ニ於テハ

外務省

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最早ヤ別段御參考トナラサルヘシトハ思考スルモ爲念該書翰及附屬
書類寫各一部送付ス

(赤神紙)ナ

外務省

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編者附言

原典ハ、B. 10. 3. 0 1-3. 1
戦争放棄ニ関スル
合衆国条約ニ係リ
聖諭ニ於テ漏用
ニ付

公第一五五號

昭和三年六月十二日

在アレキサンドリヤ
帝國總領事 横山正幸

外務大臣男爵田中義一殿

埃及ト不戰條約案ニ對スル英國ノ留保ニ關スル件

在「カイロ」發行埃及語新聞「シャツサ」紙ハ今般其ノ社説ニ於テ

本件ニ關シテ左ノ通り述ヘタ

英國ハ米國ノ不戰條約提案ニ大体賛成シタカ條約締結ノ細目協議
ニ入ルニ先チ次ノ二事項ノ保留ヲ列國カ承認センコトヲ求メタ
即チ第一ハ該條約案カ英國ノ各殖民地政府ニモ提示センコトヲ要

外務省

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望スルモノテアリ第二ハ英國ハ或ル一定地域ニ對シテハ本條約ニ
拘束サレス任意ノ行動ヲ採ルトノ趣旨テアル

右ノ内第二ノ留保ニ所謂英國カ自由行動ヲ取り得ヘキ一定ノ地域
カ何處ヲ指スモノテアルカ明言ハシテキナイカ實ハ英國ノ極リ文
句テアル「印度ニ到ル途上」換言スレハ「英帝國交通線上」ニ存
在スル埃及及近東ノ或ル諸國ヲ意味シテキルコトカ容易ニ觀取サ
レル

先頃埃及ハ「ロカル」ノ會議後ノ世界ノ平和の大勢ニ順應シテ同
會議ニ於テ決定サレタ諸原則ニ準據シテ英國ト圓滿ナ協定ニ到達
セムコトヲ希望シテキタノテアルカ英國カ埃及ニ於テ自由行動ヲ
取ラント欲シタノテ埃及側ノ右希望モ水泡ニ歸シタスル英國ノ態

外務省

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度ハ英埃關係ヲ國際問題トスルヲ好マス或ハ之ヲ永久不問ニ附ス
ルコト今回ノ如クナルカ又ハ埃及ニ對シ自國ノ見解ヲ強要シ之ヲ
容認セシムルカノ二途ノ何レカヲ目的トスルモノテアル
二十世紀ノ今日埃及カ特典タル一切ノ紛争ヲ調定ニ依テ解決スル
ノ權利ヲ均霑セムトスルヲ妨ケムトスル英國ノ右ノ態度ハ不可解
テアル如此事情ノ爲メニ埃及ハ「アビシニヤ」「ペルー」「キー
バ」「エクアドル」波斯、支那等ノ聯盟加入國或ハ英國殖民地
ニスラ及ハナイ劣等ノ地位ニ置カレテキル而シテ「ヘヂヤス」及
「アラビヤ」半島ノ諸邦モ今ヤ同様ノ權利ヲ得ントシテキル處埃
及ノミハ英埃關係カ未決ノ儘トナツテ居ル以上又英國軍艦ノ脅威
ニ依テ其ノ見解ニ同意セナイ以上コノ人道的權利ヲ享有スルコト

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カ出來ナイ加之埃及ニ關スル英國今回ノ主張カ通レハ埃及ハ英國
ノ委任統治領ヨリモ劣等ノ地位ニ立タネハナラナイカラ埃及國民
ハ英國ノ不可解ナ態度ヲ注意シ此ノ際最善ノ方策ヲ考究シ以テ國
際政策ノ變動ニ際シ得ル處アルヨウニ努力シナケレハナラヌ、
云々。

右何等御參考迄ニ報告ス

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