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三國干渉ニ對スル各國
新聞論綱

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REEL No. 1-0332

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modification provided always
it is prepared to face all
consequence. As to ourselves
we should have been perhaps
better pleased if the respect-
ive positions of China and
Japan had remained as
before, but that is past
praying, for we must
make the best of the new
situation. As no
British interests are so
menaced seriously or
directly menaced as to
justify our interference
at the risk of making
irreconcilable enemies of
the Japanese, permanent
result of the war which
is most serious for Eng

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land, rise of a great
naval power, whether
it be friendly or hostile
in the matter of far east,
can not be altered
by any change in the
terms of peace imposed
upon China. We are
decidedly of opinion
therefore that the govern-
ment have acted wisely
in refraining from
participation in any
pressure upon the
Japanese.

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S20810

Petersburg 24/4/95 4 pm
 Recd 25/4/95 9:20 pm
 To From
 Amster 本英公使
 94. "Times" 四月二十三日 says:
 It is not surprising, much
 excitement should be
 created by the terms of
 peace, because political
 and commercial interest
 of European countries
 may be seriously affect-
 ed by the new arrange-
 ments; diplomatic his-
 tory of Europe, however,
 does not bear out pre-
 tension that European
 countries have a right
 to step in. In congress of

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即夜在籍子外務大臣(轉)西(濟)

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Vienna great powers which
 entered into agreement
 had previously taken part
 in risks and charges of
 the struggle; in negotiations
 which followed Crimean
 War interference of powers
 was strictly limited by
 their treaty rights, and
 the same may be said
 of European interposition
 when treaty of San Ste-
 fano was concluded, but
 in all these cases, circum-
 stances were exceptional.
 Any state which may
 think its own interests
 injuriously affected by
 Japanese conditions is en-
 titled to demand their

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of Russian and German papers are greatly annoyed with seeming indifference of British ^{Government} and taunt England with grave responsibility if she will hold aloof. English papers have inserted those telegrams in full but so far made little comment except that they seem to be rather amused at this sudden outbreak on the part of continental press. I am almost constrained ^{to think} that if ever British Government join in alleged ~~cont~~ contemplated action it will be more from the desire not to appear to sever

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themselves from European concert than that they think their own interests jeopardized by the terms of peace. They will neither put themselves prominently forward nor will they take ostentatious lead. Even "Standard" which has been invariably hostile to Japan write in the above sense 1911 11 20

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Remit by telegraph 500
pounds sterling for tele-
graph expenses. Figure
code being double in
charges, besides important
telegram more safe via
Eastern

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MT 14113 419

Petersburg 23/4/95 5.10 pm
Received 25/4/95 9-50 am
To: From
Muten 在英公使
" "
93. Telegrams from Russia
Germany and France
tend to show, those countries regard
terms of peace with great
disfavour, degree of opposition
in respective countries be-
ing in the order named.
If those newspapers state-
ments are to be believed,
it looks probable that some
diplomatic action may be
in contemplation and on
point of being agreed
upon between three powers
named if not already
has been agreed to. Some

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印日總理外務西大臣轉電

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Petersburg 25/4/95 3.36 pm
Rec'd 25/4/95 7.45 pm
To
Menton
From
在英公使

電受第二六九號

g6. "Standard" published the following report of its Versailles correspondent:

Russia may go as far as naval and military demonstration for the intimidation of China rather than Japan and also as practical test of the existence of supposed secret alliance between China and Japan but it is not believed that Russia will commence bad acts hostilities the attitude of France simply

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 高ノ在英公使子大臣(轉電ヤリ)

MT 14113 421

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that of a squire to a Knight - although it would probably be considerably modified if Russia became involved in war for which French navy is no more prepared than are its finances, the policy of Germany which is puzzling Europe Alkoran can be explained by the desire of the Emperor of Germany to show himself friendly to the Czar and also to fall in line with France but her assistance can at best be only diplomatic and even that would be withdrawn in the event of conflict.

MT 14113 420

Kioto, April 30th 95 3.20 PM.

Rec'd " " 9.15 PM

Nagasaki, from Mutou,
Tokio Kioto.

Ko to telegraphed Petersburg April
28 2.35 AM.

在英公使 98. "Daily News" 四月廿日
semi-officially announces the decision of
British Government and says in
comment European interference might
have stopped war but European inter-
ference to pluck from Japan much of the
fruit of her striking and complete success
is not in which England
can take any share. Three powers
may succeed in coercing Japan, but
at least there is risk of the final settle-
ment being delayed. There is
nothing to be gained which is worth
even remote risk of the war and we

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trust it is not policy of any of powers
to do so more than to endeavour to
persuade. "Times" 四月廿日 says attitude
of Russia is intelligible but that of
France obscure while that of Germany
is simply inconceivable. If all parties
are really in earnest Russia has gained
signal diplomatic Turkey. On the other
hand one or the other or even both the
two powers who have acted so far with
her may be secretly resolved not to go
any further. Success or failure of game
depends upon the results which
will be determined by conclusion she
arrives as to real intentions of the three
powers. Probably wise course for Japan
would be to yield as consequences of a
mistake may prove very grave.
Mutou.

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Japan?

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在米國日本公使館

一九〇八年五月廿七日記錄受

宣統三年四月二十日

主官 政務局

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甲公才

第 四 三 三 五 號

一 兩 路 佛 獨 三 正 子 海 二 兵 元 吉 正 兵 務

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宣統三年四月廿七日

特 命 全 權 公 使 栗 野 慎 一

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N. Y. Times # 26 April '95

THE POWERS AND JAPAN.
 The Journal des Débats rather surprisingly appears as an advocate of armed intervention to prevent the enforcement of the terms of peace agreed upon between China and Japan. It is true that Russia is the only potential ally of France in Europe, and that it is worth something to France to strengthen that "entente" of which the validity has grown very doubtful with the accession of the new Czar. But France would do herself a wrong, and would do civilization a wrong, by being induced, in the interest of a Russian alliance in Europe, to "promote" Russian designs in Asia which are neither to the interest of France nor to the interest of civilization. Even more surprising is it to be informed that an identical note has been sent to the Japanese Foreign Office from the legations at Tokio of France, Germany, and Russia, "protesting in a friendly but energetic manner against the terms of peace." We can understand that Russia feels herself aggrieved. We can understand, also, that France may be moved to act against her own interests in the East, which the treaty promotes, in order to propitiate Russia and secure an ally in Europe. But that Germany, which has not been in any way injured by the treaty, should endeavor to annul it, and should consent to put pressure upon Japan in order to cement a Franco-Russian alliance against herself in Europe, is an entirely inexplicable procedure. It is the more inexplicable because of the attitude that Germany has consistently held throughout the war, and that she took even when Lord Rosebery was helping the Chinese to agitate the foreign offices of the Western world in behalf of China. That was that the spoils belonged to the victor, and that there was no justification for intervention until European interests were assailed or endangered. That has not been done, and the admirable proclamation of the Mikado, counseling moderation, is another expression of the same spirit that dictated the terms of peace. The interest of France in the East is, indeed, the same as that of Germany or of Great Britain. It is almost entirely a commercial interest, and as such it will be powerfully promoted, as we have shown, by the acceptance of the treaty. So far as it is a political interest, and proceeds from the French ownership of Indo-China, it will not be injured by the acceptance of the treaty. Indeed, the French colonies will pretty clearly

be worth more to France with the liberal conditions of trade which Japan has obtained for her now than they have been under the Chinese policy of exclusion. If France joins Russia in an intervention, it will be because the French sense of the value of a Russian alliance is keener than the French sense either of French interests in the East or of the demands of civilization.

N. Y. Tribune 27 April '95

JAPAN'S VAGUE.
 How noble is the attitude assumed just now by the new Triple Alliance of Europe (Limited: For Plunder Only)! How brave it is, how dignified, how eminently worthy of great Christian Powers! Here is a nation in the Far East, which they have all along regarded as vastly their inferior. A nation scarcely emerged from barbarism, they thought, which must be kept under their tutelage and tuition. A nation little if any bigger, in simple numbers, than the smallest of them, and not one-fourth the size of the three combined. This nation is forced into a war with another ten times as big as itself. It makes one of the most splendid exhibitions of energy, patriotism and valor in the history of the world. And, though not only its colossal antagonist but the influence, diplomatic intrigues, and more or less open menaces of nearly all the Powers of Europe are arrayed against it, it wins a magnificent victory, vanquishes its foe, and concludes "peace with honor."
 And now these three great, chivalric, Christian Powers come prowling around the scene of strife, licking their hungry chops, and whining and snarling for a few mouthfuls of the prey. Not one of them would have ventured to strike down the Imperial quarry and help itself. But now that another has done it, without their aid, and in defiance of their threats, they want a share of the spoils. Japan has played the lion's part. Germany, France and Russia seem content to play the part of jackals.
 It is a refreshing and inspiring sight to see that Japan refuses their base demands. She did not wage a war of conquest or of plunder, not even for her own gain. Assuredly, then, she does not propose, now that the war is ending, to turn its close into an orgy of loot for the benefit of others. If Russia had a right to part of Corea or of China, why did she not take it long ago? If she had no such right then, how does she have it now? By virtue of Japan's victory? Just because Japan has thrashed China is Russia entitled to make a grab? That may be Russian morals and logic. It is not Japanese. And in that difference between them, as well as in more than one other, Japan is by far the better of the two. The lion is a nobler brute than the jackal.

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N. Y. Times 27 April '95

"ENTANGLING ALLIANCES."
 The suggestion that what seems to be the alliance formed by Russia, France, and Germany for the purpose of putting pressure upon Japan should be met by a counter-alliance of Great Britain, the United States, and Japan herself has appeared almost simultaneously in several quarters. It seems to have been first made by an English member of Parliament in a letter published in London on Thursday. It was enforced by the newspaper to which it was addressed and by press dispatches from London. Yesterday the Japanese Minister at Washington, while he was careful to explain that he was uttering his personal opinion and not speaking for his Government, expressed the belief that the commercial relations of the United States with the far East, and particularly with Japan, were so much more important than those of Germany or France that it would be proper for this country to take part in offsetting any alliance that might be formed, including those powers or either of them.
 It is not likely that this suggestion will take much hold of sober people in this country. The alliance of the three powers, if it has been formed, is an alliance on the part of two of them for European purposes. Russia demands that Japan, having secured and guaranteed the independence of Corea, shall violate it for the purpose of giving Russia a harbor on the North Pacific not liable to be obstructed by ice in winter. Neither France nor Germany, as we have shown, has any interest of its own in urging this demand. Their relations with the far East, whether more or less extensive than ours, are identical with ours, and, like ours, have been promoted by the treaty. But these powers have an interest in propitiating Russia, though their interests here are opposite. France has an interest in attaching Russia more closely to herself. Germany has an interest in detaching Russia from France. One or the other of them, it seems, must be deceived in deciding to take joint action with Russia.
 But that does not concern us. What does concern us is the question whether our interests engage us to do anything in the way of "offsetting" the efforts of these powers. Undoubtedly Japan has done much for us, as she has done much for all civilized and commercial nations, in securing freer trade with China. But that part of the treaty is not in question.

We have not interfered to prevent Japan from aggrandizing herself at the expense of China. Should we now interfere to prevent Russia from aggrandizing herself at the expense directly of Corea and perhaps ultimately of Japan?
 Fortunately there comes to our aid here one of our most rooted traditions, a tradition that we owe to the precepts, as we owe another to the example, of Washington. That is the tradition against "entangling alliances." Although this phrase is Jefferson's, we owe the origin and the formulation of the tradition to Washington's farewell address. It is not out of place to repeat one of its most impressive warnings:
 "It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world. . . . Harmony and a liberal intercourse with all nations are recommended by policy, humanity, and interest. But even our commercial policy should hold an equal and impartial hand; neither seeking nor granting exclusive favors or preferences; . . . constantly keeping in view that it is folly in one nation to look for disinterested favors from another; that it must pay, with a portion of its independence, for whatever it may accept under that character; that by such acceptance it may place itself in the condition of having given equivalents for nominal favors, and yet of being reproached with ingratitude for not giving more. There can be no greater error than to expect, or calculate upon, real favors from nation to nation. It is an illusion which experience must cure, which a just pride ought to discard."
 Thus far during the war in the East we have acted in the spirit of these maxims. Our neutrality has been so unchallenged that the good offices of our representatives in arranging for a convention were accepted by both combatants. It is no more probable than it is proper that we shall depart from this straight course. The sympathies of the American people have been with the Japanese throughout the war. They are with the Japanese now. The indulgence and the expression of these sympathies constitute the one influence that we can rightfully bring to bear upon the present situation. It is no small force, for civilization would be a mockery if civilized powers could lightly incur the condemnation of neutral nations.

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N. Y. Times 25 April '95

JAPAN AND RUSSIA.

It is easy to be seen why Russia re- sents the terms of peace arrived at be- tween China and Japan. Her disappoint- ment is freely expressed in the Russian journals. Some of these journals suggest that Russia shall seize Manchuria, as far as the mountains, and part of Corea with Port Lazareff, "as compensation for the gains of Japan." Others suggest a Euro- pean conference to compel the modera- tion of the Japanese terms.

It is not in the least likely that any ac- tion will be taken to redress the Russian grievances. The Japanese negotiators took pains to conciliate Europe, except- ing Russia, in the terms of peace, and they did not take pains to conciliate Rus- sia because they did not think it worth while. The clauses of the treaty that open China to foreign trade have entirely appeased the commercial nations of Eu- rope. There is not one of them that can afford to neglect the opportunity of doing business with three or four hundred mil- lions of new customers or is disposed to quarrel with an arrangement that gives them that opportunity. The London Spectator calls these clauses "commen- cial bribes," even while arguing that it costs Japan nothing to make them. The designation is accurate.

Great Britain, of course, as the first commercial power and the first naval power, was the power which it was chief- ly desirable for the Japanese to propitiate, and Great Britain has been pro- pitiated. There is not the least chance that she will take part in any interna- tional conference to upset a settlement with which she is so well pleased. If there were, Russia is the last power the invitation of which to an amicable con- ference on any Eastern question it would be for the interest or in the disposition of Great Britain to accept. Neither could Russia reckon upon the support of France. The "commercial bribes" of the treaty are less tempting to France than to Great Britain, only because she does less business with China than Great Britain. But she does some, and she will hope, under the new arrangement, to do much more. Moreover, the value and the commercial importance of her Asiatic colonies cannot fail to be in- creased by a more liberal commercial policy on the part of China. So France

also must regard Japan as a missionary of civilization, and agree that she herself has no grievance. As for Germany, such interests as she has are equally well cared for; and besides, Germany some time ago indicated that she would not interfere. An international conference called by Russia upon the Eastern ques- tion would therefore be no more impor- tant nor likely to be any more effective than an international conference upon bimetallicism called in deference to the mine owners and Populists of this coun- try.

Russia has a grievance, but it is not shared by any other nation. Whatever she proposes to do in the way of redress

she must do by herself. She wants a port on the North Pacific which shall be accessible at all seasons, in place of a port which, although at the southern ex- tremity of her Asiatic possessions, is closed four months in the year. Japan does not mean that Russia shall have this at her expense, or at that of Corea, which henceforth will be the same thing. Doubtless Japan is right in not wishing for Russia as a nearer neighbor. When Russian journals talk about seizing part of Corea, however, it seems that they are talking rather wildly. Until the comple- tion of the trans-Siberian railway, at least, such talk will be premature. She simply cannot until then wage an aggres- sive war upon the Island empire. Even if the railway were completed to Vlad- vostock, she would be grievously ham- pered in her operations for the lack of the very harbor to obtain which would be the chief object of the war. It is, of course, not conceivable that she would fit out in Europe an expedition to invade Japan and send it around Asia and Africa. She must dispatch her invading force overland across Asia, and attack Japan under very serious disadvantages, or else she must acquiesce in the treaty between China and Japan, for the pres- ent, at least, and until she is in a more favorable position for exercising coercion upon the victor. It seems to be quite certain that, whatever she does, she must do it without the hope of an ally, since no other nation has a common interest with her.

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N. Y. Tribune 25 April '95

NO INTERVENTION

The blustering menaces of Russia and the curious "new triple alliance" of Germany, Russia and France against Japan contain slight cause for real uneasiness. They are entirely too reminiscent of Old Tarlton's ditty about the King of France who went up a hill with 20,000 men. The fact is that the Japanese have shown themselves as wise in peace as they were brave in war, and have thus put themselves in a substantially impregnable position. Their treaty of peace with China is above legitimate criticism. The two features of it as at first reported which most set the Jingoos of Europe a-howling were nothing but products of the notorious canard-hatchery at Shanghai. As we surmised, there was no truth in the story of an alliance between Japan and China. It would have been madness for the victors, with power to dictate terms, to grant such a favor to the vanquished, from which the former would have had everything to lose and the latter everything to gain. Equally baseless was the report that Japan was to have special commercial advantages. China, indeed, is to be opened to the merchants of Japan; but also, on equal terms, to those of every other nation, Japan being content with the natural advantages of geographical position.

With these canards flown away, and the objections inspired by them disposed of, what becomes of the cry for revision of the treaty by European Powers? It is mere sound and fury, signifying nothing. On grounds of principle there is no room for intervention. Japan has kept well within bounds of international law and practice. Instead of the savage greed of conquest she has displayed a statesmanlike moderation and clemency which European Powers could do well to imitate. But suppose those Powers, as is not unusual, ignore all question of principle, and go in for selfish policy alone, what then? On such ground there seems no more likelihood of intervention. The dominant fact in the case is this, as expressed by "The London Standard" the other day, that except in a commercial sense the European Powers have no common interest in the East. Hence, they will not enter upon joint action. England knows full well that the present treaty means incalculable commercial gain to her. Therefore she declines to interfere. To suppose that she will exert herself to help Russia gain more land and a strategic position on the coast is to be madder than a March hare. And whatever notes may issue from the Quai d'Orsay, we have no notion that France is going to war to extend German trade or that Germany will raise a hand to help French schemes in Indo-China. European diplomats may be plunderers; they are not fools.

In the absence of a European Power, intervention by a single Power is probably impossible. We should say it is most improbable. It is not to be conceived that the others would permit it. If any one of the four should take a single step in that direction it would have at least two, if not all three of the others, upon it in full cry. And to have any chance of success in a war with Japan, any European Power would have to send thither so great an armament as to leave itself at home dangerously weak and unprotected. England with her gigantic fleet could do it best. But she has made it clear that she will not do so, but is even inclined to become the champion and defender, if need be, of Japan. And what other nation will send a fleet to fight the victors of Yaloo and Wei-Hai-Wei, in waters where those victors are at home and their assailants thousands of miles from any available dockyard, arsenal or base of supplies? There is no possible chance of gaining anything that would repay so great a cost and so appalling a risk.

Russia, of course, has by far the most at stake, and is most truculent in tone. It has been her dream of centuries to secure a port on each great ocean that shall be open all the year. In building her great trans-Siberian railroad she has had fully in view the conquest of Corea and the establishment of a great terminal port at Chemulpo or Port Lazareff; and has even contemplated the possibility of invading China and seizing Port Arthur. If the present treaty stands, all those plans and hopes come to naught, and she is confined, on the Pacific, to the ice-blockaded harbor of Vladivostock. No wonder that she rages. But what is she to do? Even if England and Germany should give their assent to it, would she venture on a war with Japan? In such a contest on land she would be victor. But at sea the chances would be fearfully against her. Her ships would get thither from the Baltic to find their only harbor and base of operations already blockaded or captured by the foe, and no other open to them within a thousand leagues. And if she dared to weaken her European picket line, and marched her legions overland to the conquest of Corea, she would fare little better. In such disadvantageous circumstances she would have a hard job to drive out the Japanese; and after she had done so she would have the land and nothing more. Every harbor and the whole coast would be at the mercy of the Japanese fleet. With all her blustering and menaces Russia is fully aware of these facts, and they will doubtless restrain her from anything more than bluster and menace. Bitter as is the dose, she will have to swallow it. Japan and China must settle their affairs by themselves, without Russian or any European intervention.

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政務局

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外務大臣 林董 殿

在東港日本領事館

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REEL No. 1-0332

0264

JAPAN AND RUSSIA.
 Russia has no special grievance against Japan, but she does want to acquire a seaport in Corea which, unlike Vladivostock, will not be closed by ice in the winter. She wants a place where her Pacific fleet can rendezvous, and where she can establish arsenals, dry docks, repair shops and everything that is necessary to the maintenance and protection of a modern fleet of war ships.
 It is for this reason, and this only, that she is pretending so much indignation against Japan. Russia knows that hereafter Chinese influence in Corea will be zero, and that Japanese advice and counsel will be paramount. No matter what the terms of peace may be, the suzerainty of Corea is bound to pass from China to Japan, and Corea will not dare to alienate a foot of her territory without the consent of the Japanese Government.
 According to recent dispatches Japan has only until next Tuesday to give her final answer to Russia. But suppose she remains silent and makes no answer whatever, what will happen? Will Russia declare war against Japan and begin active operations by a blockade of the Japanese ports? We doubt it very strenuously. The minute this should occur Great Britain would come to the rescue of Japan, not that she loves Japan more, but Russia less, and there might ensue a general European war, which no great power in Europe wants.
 Russia is making a bluff, and all Japan has to do is to remain quiet, maintain her position and ask Russia what she intends to do about it. As a matter of fact, Russia has no more to do with the settlement of the war between Japan and China than she has with a contested election for constable in some township in the United States. She has been an ally of neither of the combatants, she has no agreement under which she is to derive any advantage from the victory of either, and she has no claim to territorial rights which she can maintain against either. If she declares war against Japan she will find herself in the worst dilemma she ever got into, for she will have no friends or supporters in such an unjust quarrel.

日露ノ關係
 九月三日發行

在東港日本領事館

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REEL No. 1-0332

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means loss in circulation.

JAPAN'S PREDICAMENT.

The pressure of the Franco-Russian combination on Japan grows stronger. Germany hardly counts, and Spain, which is said to have joined the partnership, will be a nonentity in any proceedings that may be taken, but the French and Russian fleets are gathering, and it is said that a blockade of the Japanese coasts is threatened.

Of course, if things come to extremities, Germany will speedily drop out. She has no interest in rowing in the same galley with France and Russia. The affair is a purely Russian one at bottom. It is to her interest to have a weak neighbor instead of a strong one in the far East. The interest of France is obvious. It is to put Russia under obligations wherever the opportunity offers, in the hope that the debt will be repaid in Europe. If France and Russia begin to act as allies it will be easy, when occasion warrants, to settle the remote troubles and continue joint action nearer home.

It is a pity that plucky Japan must be involved in these complications of European politics. However, the general opinion in Europe is that if Japan will only hold out the allies will not proceed to actual hostilities. They would be so manifestly in the wrong if they did that the public opinion of the whole world would condemn them. There is probably not a single Power in Europe that would have been as moderate in the hour of complete victory as Japan has been. Certainly the history of Russia, France, Germany and Spain does not point out those countries as especially called to administer lessons in such a matter.

It is a pity that the policy of the United States does not permit us to offer more than moral support to Japan in this controversy. But the price we pay for complete supremacy in the New World is abstention from forcible interference in the affairs of the Old. We should be glad, however, if England, whose traditions permit her to interfere wherever she has a chance, would indulge her proclivities in that direction by coming to the relief of the Japanese. There would be an opening for activity, not only more creditable, but more profitable, than rummaging through empty custom-house safes at Corinto.

日本ノ状況

五月一日後刊
工三十一新聞論議

在東港日本領事館

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REEL No. 1-0332

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MT

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820820

THE FUTURE OF CHINA.

The rumors from diplomatic circles in the far East indicate a possibility that the troubles in that quarter, so far from being over, have just begun. The main problem is the future of China. It was suggested on the opening of the struggle with Japan that the result would be the making or the destruction of the monarchy. It would either rouse the most ancient of kingdoms from the stupor of centuries or bring about its disintegration.

The statements that come from well-informed diplomats indicate that the shock of war has been too much for the decayed and senile power and that a break-up is imminent.

There is little doubt that it was the fear of such a result that stayed the Japanese march on Peking. If the Japanese troops had entered the capital it would have been incumbent on the Emperor to kill himself and the transfer of the loose bonds of authority would have been attended with such difficulties that there was likelihood that the Japanese would find no central authority with which to treat and no government to hold responsible for the terms of a treaty, if one could be made.

The war has demonstrated that there is neither public spirit nor honesty in the military or civil service of the Empire, nor patriotism among the people. The commanders of the armies have been incompetent, the soldiers have run away, the administrative officers have stolen the funds that should have provided the munitions of war, and the people have shown no disposition to take up arms to save the country from invasion. Compared with the history of similar invasions in Europe the story of the supineness of the Chinese in the national crisis reveals an entire lack of national or patriotic spirit.

Doubtless it is to the immediate interest of the treaty powers to keep life in the senile body of the Chinese Government. Yet if the break-up begins it may be expected that a scramble for the spoils will follow that will be not less greedy and probably more spectacular than that over the partition of Africa. The natural course of events without outside interference on the collapse of the present government of China would be to split the empire into a number of moderate-sized States. But with Japan holding the northern fortresses and claiming the territory about the gulf, with Russia ready to seize Manchuria and as much of the seaboard as she can get, with France on the southern border looking to enlarge her conquests of ten years ago, and England anxious to extend her "sphere of influence" by seizing the treaty ports and making of central China another India, the situation would be exceedingly interesting. The settlement could hardly be made without bringing one or more of the freebooting powers into collision over its share of the spoils.

But if there is life enough left in the empire to pass the present crisis there may be a change in the situation that will astonish the Western world. The Emperor is young and has had a lesson that he is not likely to forget. It has taken Japan, under an intelligent and progressive ruler, but thirty years to acquire Western civilization. Perhaps the same work could be done for China had she but a man of independence and genius at her head.

在來港日本領事館

支那の将来

新編 支那の将来

REEL No. 1-0332

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號七第

館使公本日國伊在

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REEL No. 1-0332

0269

Le développement du commerce dans les régions asiatiques. Aussi donc nous croyons plus que jamais que tout s'arrangera par des discussions diplomatiques et sans effusion de sang.

Mais dans le cas où une guerre serait inévitable, et que le Japon la préférerait au danger de perdre le fruit de ses victoires, nous espérons que notre gouvernement ne se laissera jamais entraîner dans une coalition qui témoignerait d'une opposition quelconque à l'Empire japonais.

L'Italie n'a jamais eu à se plaindre de cette nation et de ses souverains. Au contraire, elle en a reçu toujours les plus vives marques de sympathie. Nos compatriotes ont été reçus toujours avec le plus grand empressement à la Cour du Mikado. Tout dernièrement encore, notre ministre des affaires étrangères a pu signer avec le ministre japonais un traité de commerce qui n'attend plus que l'approbation du Parlement.

D'ailleurs, nous ne pouvons et nous ne devons pas oublier que dans la guerre avec la Chine, c'est bien le Japon qui représentait le progrès et la civilisation, même vis-à-vis des rapports entre l'Europe et l'Asie. Si le Japon est resté victorieux, il n'y a pas lieu de s'en plaindre, mais de s'en réjouir.

L'Italie n'a aucun intérêt à se mêler de trop près dans une question qui ne la regarde pas directement. Elle peut et elle doit aider ceux qui travaillent pour la paix, parce que c'est là sa mission dans le monde; mais si, malgré elle, la guerre éclatait, ce qui lui convient davantage est de rester en dehors de toute coalition qui pourrait se former entre les puissances. Nous ne doutons pas que le ministère, malgré certain esprit d'aventure qui de temps en temps le domine, aura la sagesse de ne pas se fourrer, sous aucun prétexte, dans les complications qui pourraient surgir du traité de paix en Chine et

le Japon, et de la mauvaise humeur qu'il inspire à quelques-unes des grandes puissances européennes.

LA PAIX ENTRE LA CHINE ET LE JAPON

Le mouvement de la presse européenne pour amener les puissances à intervenir dans les nouveaux rapports entre la Chine et le Japon, se dessine de plus en plus nettement. D'un côté, on demande une union de l'Allemagne, de la Russie et de la France pour protester contre les conquêtes territoriales que le Japon vient de s'assurer par ses victoires sur l'Empire Céleste; de l'autre, la presse anglaise, qui dans le premier moment paraissait très émue, commence à reconnaître qu'il n'y a pas une raison au monde de chercher querelle au Japon par le seul motif qu'il a infligé une punition méritée à son antagoniste en Asie.

A côté du mouvement de la presse, il y a, à ce qu'il paraît, un vrai mouvement de soldats et de navires de guerre.

La Russie, d'après les dernières dépêches, aurait massé à sa frontière sibérienne 20,000 soldats, prêts à envahir la Mandchourie septentrionale. En outre, une flotte nombreuse serait déjà réunie à Wladivostock, prête elle aussi à se présenter devant quelques ports de la Corée, avec le but évident de s'en emparer et d'y hisser le drapeau du tsar.

Ceci est bien plus grave que les articles des journaux. Cependant nous croyons encore qu'une seconde guerre sera évitée, et que l'empereur de Russie préférera assurer à ses peuples les immenses bienfaits de la paix.

La parole sage et calme adressée par l'empereur du Japon à ses peuples, les conseils de modération qu'il lui donne, les garanties qu'il assure à l'Europe sont faits pour calmer les appréhensions, nées de l'accroissement subit de la puissance du Japon dans l'Asie. Ce pays, qui a déjà prouvé qu'il possède des diplomates aussi habiles que ses guerriers, ne manquera pas, nous en sommes sûrs, de donner aux États européens les gages qu'on pourra lui demander contre tout préjudice probable de la liberté et du

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在米國日本公使館

廿八年六月十日 駐米公使館 主官 政務局

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特命全權使

栗野浩一郎



外務大臣
子爵陸奥宗光

MT 14113

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REEL No. 1-0332

0271

New York Times, May 13, 1895

ENGLAND AND THE EAST.

Nothing is more curious, in the curious story of the intervention of France and Germany in the affairs of the East, than the access of Anglophobia which it has developed. One of the Russian journals declares that "Russia's diplomatic triumph is a great defeat for Great Britain." A French journal declares that France will be the dupe of Russia unless Russia repays on the banks of the Nile the service France has done her—that is to say, unless she helps France turn England out of Egypt. Another French journal says that Japan had the moral support of England, and that the nullification of one of the clauses of the treaty of peace under an implied threat from the new and singular Dreihund is the greatest check which the English policy in the far East has ever undergone.

All this talk is absolutely without any basis in fact or reason. We have pointed out that the powers, or, rather, the nations, for the United States does not count as a "power," which had the greatest interests in the far East were Great Britain and the United States. It is probably fair to say that the stake of the two nations which have held aloof in the peace and prosperity of China and Japan is three times as great as that of the three powers which have interfered. While the war was going on it seemed to the British Foreign Office that British interests were endangered, and a tentative suggestion toward a "European concert" accordingly emanated from that office. But this failed, and when Japan announced her terms Great Britain and the United States found that not only was there nothing in them perilous to commercial interests, but that those interests were directly and powerfully promoted. Thereupon they minded their own business. But Russia detected a menace to her interests as an Asiatic power in the occupation of continental territory by Japan, and Germany and France, eager to conciliate Russia, made the false pretense that their little interests were threatened and joined with her.

Thereupon the French press began to berate England for not joining also and taking the fourth fiddle in a European concert under the baton of Russia. They accused her of "selfish isolation," as if that were some kind of crime; and so temperate a newspaper as the Journal des Débats warned England that she was incurring a "heavy responsibility."

This talk is all so wide of the mark that the only question it raises is why anybody should indulge in it. It is so very clear that a nation incurs a heavier responsibility by mixing in quarrels that do not concern it than by staying out of them that the motive of such appeals is not at first sight apparent. It seems, however, to be merely that which the tailless fox in the fable had for advising the other foxes to decapitate themselves. To vary the zoological trope, it is not dignified for a great nation to allow itself to be used as a cat's-paw by a monkey or by a bear. The nations which take up that undignified attitude are naturally resentful of the nation which declines to take it. It is quite absurd to say that Japan had the moral support of Great Britain as against these powers. The sympathy of the British people she undoubtedly had, just as she had the sympathy of the American people. But neither British nor American interests were so involved in the issue that either Government would have been warranted in taking sides, and neither Government did take sides. Neither Government has been in any way humiliated by the Japanese renunciation of claims which neither Government advised Japan to advance and which neither Government in any way supported or was asked to support. The only nations that are humiliated are those which stooped to bully Japan in order to toady Russia.

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S20825

New York Herald, May 13, 1895

ENGLAND'S CARE OF JAPAN

A Reserve in the Submission to the Trio of Great Powers.

FINANCIAL ASPECT OF THE AFFAIR

How France's Government May Try to Avert Resentment for Its Alliance with Germany.

HUNGARIAN CRISIS AND PAPAL SUCCESSION

Britain's Stagnation in Politics, Apathy About Tariffs, and Bad Agriculture—Current Gossip.

By Commercial Cable from Our Own Correspondent.

LONDON, May 11.—[Copyright, 1895, by The New-York Times.]—The assumption that trouble is at an end in the far East is said here to be premature. The prompt submission of Japan took English public opinion greatly by surprise, but there is reason to doubt if it equally astonished the British Foreign Office. In other words, it was a submission with a string tied to it, and it is permitted to suspect that Downing Street had a finger in fastening that particular knot. It is too early yet to attempt to arrange events in their proper sequence or safely distinguish cause from effect in every case, but it will turn out, I am assured, that Japan has by no means submitted to the extent that is supposed, and that the intervening trio of powers have still considerable work cut out for them before they can call their job a complete success.

Just for the moment the financial aspect of the new situation is receiving more attention than any other. It is said in Paris that Japan is to be allowed to raise the indemnity exacted from China to the total of \$550,000,000, and it is un-

derstood that China, to pay this and pull itself together, will be obliged to raise a loan of not less than \$900,000,000. It occurs to the French that it would be a magnificent idea to try to secure a dominant voice in the raising and placing of this vast loan, and the French Minister of Foreign Affairs to-day is holding a meeting of eminent Parisian financiers to consult on the possibilities of doing so. It is understood that he has, further, a scheme for insisting that China shall adopt the monetary system and nomenclature of France to facilitate this great project. This, it is felt in Paris, will be a tremendous blow to the commercial prestige in the far East of the English, whose pounds, shillings, and pence, along with the American dollar, monopolize the ledgers of Asia. Not an atom of nervousness is felt in London over any aspect of these soaring French ambitions. It would be interesting, indeed, to see such a colossal loan arranged without coming to England for help, and it would be still more remarkable if the guarantees for it can be found in China without laying violent hands upon vested British rights which England will not hesitate to defend.

It is not impossible, however, that the French Foreign Office has thrown this alluring financial bubble into the air to divert attention at home from more tangible and contentious matters. It is plain now that when the Chamber of Deputies meets, there will be a stormy protest against France having been put, without the consent of Parliament, into the astonishing position of an ally of Germany. Each day one hears new evidence of the unpleasant impression that this has produced in France, and it would not be surprising if, when the debate comes, the Government should find itself in an extremely awkward fix. Its only resource is to try to raise an anti-English clamor loud enough to drown the murmurs against Germany as a yoke-fellow, and to be able to convince the critics that France is to get large and important benefits from this new adventure. This consideration leads people here to suspect that France will endeavor to secure the Pescadores Islands for herself, and there are even reports that she is putting obstacles in the way of Japan's annexing Formosa.

To recapitulate, it is believed here that Japan has a reservation up her sleeve, on one side, and that France will be forced by fear of her own Chauvinists to make claims, on the other side, which will throw the whole question again into the melting-pot.

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REEL No. 1-0332

0272

New York Times, May 7, 1895

JAPAN'S WITHDRAWAL.

There seems to be no doubt left that Japan has agreed, in deference to the remonstrance of Russia, Germany, and France, to abandon all claim to a continued occupancy of any part of Manchuria, including Port Arthur.

This is a result that cannot be said to reflect any credit upon the two civilized powers concerned, that is to say, Germany and France. Indeed, Western civilization appears to more advantage in this business in the Oriental copy than in the European original. The interests of France and Germany in Japan are exclusively commercial, except for the French possession of Indo-China and Cochinchina, and are the same as those of other civilized nations. They are the same in kind, though much less in degree, as those of Great Britain and the United States. We ourselves are Japan's best customer, buying from her nearly as much as all the rest of the world together, and selling to her about as much as Germany and half as much again as France and Russia together. The imports of Japan from Great Britain and the United States together are to those of Russia, France, and Germany about as 259 to 107; the exports as 436 to 194. As for China, excepting that great part of her foreign commerce, nearly one-half, which passes through Hongkong and is not further separated, and taking her direct trade with the various foreign countries, it appears that her total trade with Great Britain and the United States is to her total trade with all Europe, including Russia, as 55 to 29.

These figures are worth giving because they effectually explode the hypocritical pretense, put forward by the official press of Germany and France, that they have been actuated by commercial considerations in their endeavors to nullify the treaty. The two nations which do so much more business with Japan and

China than the three powers that are interfering are satisfied with the treaty, and have abstained from taking part in the plot to disturb it. The motive of that plot is plainly recognizable as the emulous desire of France and Germany to conciliate their great and good friend the Czar, with a view to the balance of power in Europe, and not with the least reference to any interest that either of them actually has in the East. This is rather too unrepresentable a motive to produce, and hence it has been concealed by means of the humbug that we have just exposed.

Here is another point. Japan needed the possession of the strong places on the Chinese mainland mainly as a guarantee that China would fulfill the treaty, both as to the payment of the indemnity and as to the enormously valuable commercial concessions which she obtained, not only for herself but for all mankind, and which the nations that do the greater part of the Oriental trade gratefully recognize. The good faith of China cannot be trusted. Nobody doubts that she will shirk the fulfillment of the treaty if she can. France and Germany have interfered in the interest of Russia to deprive Japan of the power of coercing China into fulfilling her obligations. It seems that since they have weakened the power of Japan to enforce the execution of the treaty, they should in decency guarantee the payment of the indemnity and the fulfillment of the commercial concessions.

In any case, we have by no means seen the last of this matter. The interference of France and Germany in a business which was none of theirs will be, as it should be, deeply and long resented by Japan, and it is not to be expected that they will permanently profit by it. In fact, on the face of the matter, both cannot succeed in the attempt which each has made to conciliate Russia at the expense immediately of Japan and ultimately of the other. One or the other of them has been tricked and deceived in this "triumph of Russian diplomacy."

S20824

New York Sun, May 9, 1895

Japan's Concessions.

The Mikado has proved himself to be a sagacious and far-sighted sovereign by consenting to modify the terms of his treaty with China, in accordance with the Czar's earnest wish, in which Germany and France concurred.

No doubt the Japanese navy would have made a gallant fight against the Russian, French, and German war fleets, although these collectively would soon have represented a greatly preponderant weight of armament. It also seems probable that the Japanese armies on the Asiatic mainland could have held their own for a considerable period against any forces which their combined opponents would have been able to array against them. But the disproportion of resources is too vast, and in the end Japan must have succumbed from sheer exhaustion; unless, indeed, from the outset she could have secured the active coöperation of England. But the Tokio Government soon learned that no substantial aid could be expected from that quarter. It is only the unspeakable Turk on whose behalf Englishmen have deemed it worth while to strike a blow during the last eighty years.

It will be remembered that under the agreement made by the Chinese plenipotentiary, and since ratified by the Yamen at Peking and signed by the Emperor, China ceded in perpetuity to Japan all that part of the extra-mural province of Liau-Tung which lies east of the Liau River. Now, according to a telegram from Tokio, when, on Wednesday, the ratifications of the treaty were exchanged at Chifu, the representatives of the Mikado were instructed to offer, in return for an additional indemnity of 100,000,000 taels, to restore to China Port Arthur and the western part of the ceded territory, only the extreme eastern and border section of Liau-Tung being reserved for incorporation with Corea, the purpose obviously being, as a glance at the map will show, to give the Hermit Kingdom a more defensible frontier. Of course, if Japan renounces even the temporary possession of Port Arthur, Wei-hai-wei, and the other places now occupied by her forces on the Chinese mainland, she surrenders just such guarantees for the punctual payment of the promised indemnity as Germany exacted from France in 1871 without encountering any protest on the part of Russia. It would seem, therefore, to be the plain duty of the three European powers whose interposition has deprived Japan of territorial pledges for the fulfillment of treaty engagements, to see to it that China pays her debt, and even to lend her their credit to that end.

The war party in Japan may grumble for a while, but they must ultimately recognize that the treaty, even as modified, constitutes a gratifying outcome of their country's sacrifices and successes. The pecuniary indemnity, if augmented according to the plan now proposed, will not only reimburse the Tokio Government for its outlay, but should leave a large surplus applicable to public works and to the increase of the navy, already materially enlarged by the addition of the captured Chinese war ships. Then the populous and fertile island of Formosa,

lying as it does in the track of commerce, must for both strategical and industrial reasons be regarded as a splendid prize of war. Finally, in Corea, which in the course of their history the Japanese have several times essayed in vain to conquer, they have now acquired a position of ascendancy that will virtually amount to a protectorate. Nor should it be deemed a matter of small moment to the future of Japan that she has avoided arousing the implacable enmity of the Czar and made it possible to gain his cordial friendship. That Japan will ultimately possess the strongest naval force in the far East seems not more certain than that Russia, when, some three years hence, the Trans-Siberian Railway shall have been completed, will be by far the mightiest military power upon the Asiatic continent.

As for Americans, they are glad to hear that Japan and Russia have come to an understanding, for they would have viewed with keen regret a contest between two countries for both of which they have a lively sympathy. *N. Y. Sun.*

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REEL No. 1-0332

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在露國日本公使館

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在露國日本公使館

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明治廿八年五月十日

持家権云使西德之印

外務大臣子爵陸奥宗光

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REEL No. 1-0332

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En tête de notre Bulletin, télégraphique d'hier (1), nous avons placé une nouvelle qui aura dissipé toutes les appréhensions se rattachant à l'état des choses en Extrême-Orient. Le Japon, sur les conseils amicaux de la Russie, de la France et de l'Allemagne, a renoncé à s'annexer la presqu'île de Feng-Tien (nom japonais du Liao-Toung). Les motifs de la démarche des trois puissances ont été, tout récemment exposés, ici même. Nous nous abstenons donc d'y revenir. Bornons-nous à constater, conformément à ce que nous disions il y a quelques jours, que la sage résolution prise par le vainqueur ne fait qu'assurer la situation qu'il doit à ses succès. Cette résolution lui concilie l'estime des nations civilisées, qui espèrent voir le Japon, gêné des plaies qu'occasionne une guerre même victorieuse, reprendre bientôt l'œuvre d'organisation et de travail grâce à laquelle ce pays apporte un appoint de plus en plus considérable au progrès universel.

(1) Ce bulletin, distribué hier à nos abonnés de St-Petersbourg, contenait l'information suivante :
Le gouvernement impérial du Japon, sur les conseils amicaux de la Russie, de la France et de l'Allemagne, s'engage à renoncer à la possession définitive de la presqu'île de Feng-Tien.

NOUVELLES DE L'EXTÉRIEUR.

Dès l'origine de la guerre sino-japonaise, le Journal de St-Petersbourg, parlant de l'attitude que nous commandaient en cette circonstance les intérêts de la Russie dans l'Extrême-Orient, indiquait le maintien du statu quo territorial sur le continent chinois comme une nécessité politique qu'il nous importait de faire prévaloir, quelle que fût l'issue de la lutte. Depuis ce temps, l'impuissance de la Chine devant les progrès militaires du Japon, les succès écrasants de ce dernier et les visées qu'ils lui ont inspirées, ont donné à la question une gravité que le traité de Simonsaki a fait nettement ressortir.

Il n'a échappé à personne qu'en s'incorporant la partie sud-est de la Mandchourie, le Japon, après avoir enfermé la Corée entre cette nouvelle possession et une mer désormais soumise à sa domination, réduirait à néant l'indépendance rendue fictive de la monarchie coréenne. Bien plus, maître du golfe de Petchili et des positions stratégiques dominant la plaine de Pékin, il tiendrait dans ses mains les clefs de la capitale chinoise. Aussi peut-on affirmer dès à présent que les ambitions japonaises mettent en jeu la question de l'équilibre en Extrême-Orient, dont l'Europe ne saurait se désintéresser.

Les relations de cette partie de l'Asie avec les nations européennes se multiplient de jour en jour. Quelques-unes y ont des établissements fixes. Pour la Russie, que ses possessions sur le Pacifique rapprochent du terrain où la question se débat, le rapprochement qu'accroîtra bientôt la construction du chemin de fer sibérien, pour la France, dont les colonies indo-chinoises sont limitrophes du Céleste-Empire, il est essentiel d'écartier de leurs frontières toute cause permanente d'insécurité et de crises violentes. L'Allemagne, de son côté, a trop à cœur le développement de ses relations commerciales avec ces parages pour les voir, sans alarmes, en proie à un état de trouble qui menacerait sans cesse les intérêts et les établissements naissants de ses nationaux. Et cet état ne tarderait pas à se produire si, au lendemain de leurs triomphes, les Japonais prenaient pied sur le continent chinois, en y apportant un esprit d'invasion et de conquête qui les exposerait à toutes les haines de ses possesseurs actuels.

Il n'entre pas dans l'intention des trois puissances qui ont fait connaître leurs vues à Tokio et sauront les faire respecter de spolier le Japon du fruit de ses victoires. Il ne saurait même leur déplaire de voir cet Etat, qui a ouvert ses portes à la culture européenne, affirmer d'une façon irréfutable la force vivifiante d'une civilisation, à laquelle il doit d'immenses progrès accomplis en si peu de temps. Mais ces progrès, pour remarquables qu'ils soient, n'en seraient pas moins exposés à être détruits tôt ou tard s'ils n'avaient à leur base les principes sur lesquels repose le concert des nations civilisées. Ces principes exigent avant tout que chaque Etat, sans sacrifier ses intérêts légitimes et tout en conservant le droit et le devoir de les défendre, les subordonne dans une juste

mesure à l'intérêt de tous. Garantie de la paix générale, cet esprit s'est développé à mesure que le progrès du travail et des lumières rendait ces intérêts de plus en plus solidaires les uns des autres. La Russie, en son particulier, en a donné des preuves mémorables ayant valu à son dernier Souverain le glorieux nom de Pacificateur. Ferme et résolue à persévérer dans cette voie, elle se sent d'autant plus autorisée à exiger des autres la modération dont elle a, la première, donné l'exemple.

En agissant ainsi, de concert avec la France et l'Allemagne, qui partagent entièrement sa manière de voir, elle ne porte, d'ailleurs, aucune atteinte aux véritables intérêts du Japon, avec lequel elle désire cultiver des relations d'amitié et de bon voisinage. Les premières fumées de la victoire une fois passées, ce pays, dont le souverain vient, dans sa dernière proclamation, de parler un langage si plein de sagesse, ne tardera pas à reconnaître que les puissances qui l'ont arrêté à temps dans une direction où il risquait de compromettre, un jour ou l'autre, sa force et son avenir, lui ont rendu un signalé service.

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内閣通知

廿八年六月十九日接受 主管 政務局

送第 三〇 号

五三三三

多國條約及露佛智三國ノ共同干渉

ノ關係ニ露國法新開ノ意向

為國法新開ハ各日中向即チ多國條約ノ

調印近旨ニ迫レリハノ意向投利者ニモ之ニ應ジ

漢條約ノ關係ニ種々ノ論議ヲ擧ゲルモハノ内カ

ムケテ新開ハ四月十日ノ純上ニ於テ、智國ノ意向上

急用ニシテ其後他カ生シズハ前法國種別指呂

使ガラシド氏大ニ應テ力アリト説起シ同キツキテ

他國ノ事情ニ通曉ナル大家ノ福扱ニ同氏ヨリ

福扱ノ提出シズン報告及共著述中ニ説ケル

ハ歐州ノおメ恐ルニキ他國ノ寧日日本ニ

テ情知ニ非ラズトノ意見ヲ轉報利用ニテ科印

攻智ノ材料トおシ各國共同干渉ノ必要ヲ主張

シ候モ其持論ナル情國多問題ニ端及チ

其後多國條約ノ調印ニ終ラリトノ風評

甚聞テ擧布スルヤ四月十日ノ純上ニ於テ條約ノ

条件ヲ逐叙シ連東事案ノ豫定スルモノ

ヲ除ク、外領ヲ溫和ノ条件ノミナリト謂フコト得

ヘシ現ニ台湾ノ豫定ハ最初ノ到底知ルルモノ

ナルモノニシテ神像ノ重額モ亦別名ニ輕易カ

ナリ且ツ其國宣旨ノおメ及ニ情書ヲシテ出港ヲ

開カシメラルハ露國法同モ一被其利益ニ均露

スルヲナレハ指リ目序カ特利ヲ享有スルノ理ナシ

トテ連東事案ノ豫定ニ對シテハ懸止スルカ

モノアリト露國法同ニ破格ニ得ルモノト非ラサレハ

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REEL No. 1-0332

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見、少時、其、形、シ、テ、既、ケ、リ、レ、續、テ、換、索、約、細、
 印、ノ、確、據、ヲ、捕、取、ス、ル、ヤ、回、新、書、ハ、甲、日、共、同、ノ、社、
 説、ヲ、採、リ、日、本、ニ、書、送、テ、東、洋、各、報、ヲ、別、与、ス、ル、ノ、一、事、
 ハ、絶、東、事、ト、關、係、ヲ、有、ス、ル、歐、海、諸、國、ヲ、取、り、懸、ル、
 重、大、な、一、問、題、ニ、シ、テ、殊、ニ、英、國、ハ、日、地、方、ニ、於、
 ケ、ル、國、有、ノ、利、益、上、に、到底、之、ヲ、等、閑、視、ス、ル、ヲ、得、
 英、佛、モ、亦、之、ト、同、一、ノ、感、情、ヲ、抱、ク、テ、獨、國、ヲ、至、
 モ、直、ニ、年、絶、東、事、ト、巨、額、ノ、債、目、見、カ、ツ、テ、其、利、
 益、上、に、其、日、子、涉、ク、替、成、ク、テ、其、ノ、ハ、必、ス、ヤ、近、
 日、ノ、内、務、國、策、其、他、ノ、印、國、ハ、相、当、ノ、自、限、ヲ、抽、
 引、糖、ナ、カ、ン、ト、シ、云、フ、ト、論、シ、テ、其、ハ、オ、ス、テ、レ、新、書、モ、同、日、
 ノ、條、上、ニ、日、本、カ、一、旦、遠、東、事、ヲ、堅、固、ニ、穩、健、
 口、上、に、有、ス、ル、ニ、對、シ、テ、自、然、報、報、揚、州、ハ、勿、論、
 在、露、蘭、片、本、公、使、館、
 其、亦、亦、ヲ、拒、絶、シ、得、ん、好、地、位、ニ、立、ツ、テ、日、本、ノ、調、停、ハ、甘、ん、
 ヲ、得、ス、是、レ、即、チ、金、濟、島、ヲ、購、得、ケ、テ、日、本、ノ、願、望、
 ニ、一、條、シ、ム、ル、何、ヲ、採、ル、將、來、ノ、情、勢、カ、果、シ、テ、如、
 此、ナ、リ、ト、モ、シ、カ、歐、海、諸、國、ハ、其、利、益、ヲ、損、傷、セ、ル、
 ヲ、恐、ル、大、ニ、以、テ、寸、草、不、生、モ、之、ヲ、等、閑、ニ、付、ス、ハ、カ、
 之、不、利、不、便、ヲ、感、ス、ル、所、以、シ、テ、繼、續、シ、テ、東、洋、各、
 リ、事、關、題、ハ、英、國、ノ、お、も、お、も、思、考、セ、ル、所、ナ、ル、ヲ、以、テ、
 際、他、國、ノ、應、接、ノ、ミ、ニ、強、力、ヲ、用、フ、テ、自、力、抗、辯、ヲ、
 お、ス、ノ、決、心、ナ、カ、ン、ハ、カ、ラ、ズ、ト、論、述、セ、リ、佛、報、亦、其、
 意、圖、ト、協、同、シ、日、本、に、異、議、ヲ、申、出、ス、ル、ト、イ、フ、
 お、お、お、お、お、お、お、お、お、お、お、お、お、お、お、お、
 上、ニ、於、テ、英、國、カ、各、國、ト、協、同、セ、サ、ル、ハ、金、々、首、鼠、

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事端ノ行方ハ外ナク云々ト物ニ取替ヒテ智國
 カ定大統其意向ヲ轉シ我佛ト提携シせんツ
 以テ盟國ナル所置ナリト賛賞也日存ニ世智ニ抗
 漢ニ試ムルノ日必西也せん所以リ純佛又
 ハウオスケレ我佛ハ同日ノ純上ニ日清同盟ヲ論
 シテ回々日清同盟ヲ奨励ス風評ハ全歐傳シテ
 把魯愛ヲ抱カシカランノ觀アレハ是レ決シテ其際
 ニ於テ深ク愛ムルニ是レノ價値ナシ候存リノ日
 清ノ同盟成レリトせんモ之ヲ喜正ノ同盟ト稱ス
 ルヲ得ス少半日存カ清國ヲ脱送シタリト云ハ
 却テ正也ナルハ日清同盟ノ我佛モ亦之ヲ喜正
 ノ我佛ト稱スルヲ得久日存ノ軍兵ハ如何ニモ此
 少ニ抗抵ツタヤク先向シテ新ルキ風靡靡序
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分ニ日本ヲシテ多國ノ提議ニ對シテ多ク其意
 世ニハルニ是レカ故日本ノ為ニ謀ルニ由リ之
 リ所謀ニ我儘ニシテ台港ノ讓及及清國ノ開
 港ヲ以テ清國ニ是レカスルニ由リ其意モ
 新國ハ連日ノ條上ニ於テ存問題ヲ再應答
 案ニ日本ハ暗ニ英國ノ應援ヲ請ヒカスル見
 二レハ英國ハ法ニテ信用ヲ措クニ由リ日本ハ
 三國ノ抗議ヲ受ケテ惟モ國恥ヲ我血敵ヲ踏
 セラレタルモノ、如ク南支那ニ於テ物議
 ヤレハ日本ノおメ生際一歩ヲ讓ルニ由リ其意
 ニシテ好シ生一条件ヲ讓ルニ由リ其意
 債金ニ及テ及及澎湖ノ占有ハ提議ノ條上ト
 二テ充分ナル、如ク日本カレ四ノ提議ニ由リト
 在露國日本公使館
 右ニタリ一大海國ニ名譽ノ地位ハ勿論之
 義者也、保持スルニ由リ其意
 カ三國ノ提議ヲ受ケテ南支那ニ於テ物議
 二ツ約諾ヲトスルニ由リ其意
 聞ハ其日者ノ條上ニ於テ日本カ三國ノ抗議
 從ヒ由ニ是レカスルニ由リ其意
 之ハ其意ニ由リ其意
 時ノ情勢ニ由リ其意
 二ルニ是レカスルニ由リ其意
 出シテ其意ニ由リ其意
 ノ如キ者ハ其意ニ由リ其意
 通ケテ其意ニ由リ其意
 清國ノ提議ニ由リ其意

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埃及ニ於ケル 漢國ノボリスニキレハルツオグニレテ控ケル
 カルキ其例 如クシトモ 若シ果シテ日本ハ時
 ヲ要ス近シセカホメテ時ヲ延ビシテ他國ノ回
 國スル候ツノ策ニ出テケリセハ 和議國ハ未ダ其
 スヘカラスンモノアリ云ト論モハウオエウレシヤレ 亦
 年々之ト殆レト回一七 幸免ツル時アリ 而テ五
 月アルノ日体上ニ 日本ハ既ニ三國ノ勸告ヲ受レ大
 陸ニ別據セシトスルノ事アリ 然レテモ 吾國情勢未
 ダ 戦後ニ至ルノ事アリ 果サン以上ハ日本ノ軍兵
 ハ依然口也ナリ占領スルニシテ 今回ノ事件ニ関
 シ三國ハ亦未ダ 勝利ヲ得ニクモ 決シテ之
 テ 漢國ニ安坐スルキニ非ラス 將來至急ニ 日本
 ノ 勢ヲ弱ク 漢國ニ 領地ヲ成ラセ 一カラス云
 ト 説ケリレ 前記ニ 漢國ノ 外存問題ノ 甚大ニ
 已 際 易ク 激烈ニ 論議ヲ 招ケルハ 莫スコラス
 キヤ、ウエドモスチレ 新書ニシテ 其論各々 大目ナ
 異ナレバ 只ハ 漢國ノ 境土ハ 決ト 奪取スル
 日本ノ 意ニ 違ハズルヲ 許サス 日本 漢國ニ 勸告スル 勢
 カハ 甚大ニ 之ヲ 止メシムカラス 和議ヲ 決スニ
 非ラサレハ 到底 之ヲ 許ラズルヲ 能ハサルニシテ 亦
 ノ 如キ 然レ 漢國 其 領土 其 領土ニ 散見スル
 レヨリ、ウエドモスチレ 新聞ハ 之ニ 依リ 和議ノ
 傾向ヲ 有ニ 申シ 日本ノ 日体上ニ 於テ 日露 和議ノ
 和議ヲ 既ニ 三國ノ 共同ノ 論及シ 其 和議ニ
 至リ 吾國 重要ニ 二種ノ あり 一ハ 吾國 漢國ノ 自
 身ノ 情勢ヲ 急遽ニ 決シ 漢國ノ 行ホ

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ヲ有レ他ノ問題ヲ決スルニヨリ沈思默考
 ン未業ニ起ルニ危機ト現在ニ在リ、其
 一、動シ能ク其ノ照明ニシテ、其ノ下ニ在リ、其
 一、種ノ要國者ニ輕躁ニシテ、其ノ日切ニ是ナク、我
 カク在、其ノ野蠻セシテ、其ノ軍艦ニ十二隻又
 アリ、其ノ舟ヲシテ、其ノ領土ニシテ、其ノ領土
 若シテ、其ノ領土ニシテ、其ノ領土ニシテ、其ノ領土
 存カ、其ノ領土ニシテ、其ノ領土ニシテ、其ノ領土
 ニシテ、其ノ領土ニシテ、其ノ領土ニシテ、其ノ領土
 國者ハ、其ノ領土ニシテ、其ノ領土ニシテ、其ノ領土
 記ノ、其ノ領土ニシテ、其ノ領土ニシテ、其ノ領土
 スルノ、其ノ領土ニシテ、其ノ領土ニシテ、其ノ領土
 減ク、其ノ領土ニシテ、其ノ領土ニシテ、其ノ領土
 陸上ニシテ、其ノ領土ニシテ、其ノ領土ニシテ、其ノ領土
 其ノ、其ノ領土ニシテ、其ノ領土ニシテ、其ノ領土
 カス、其ノ領土ニシテ、其ノ領土ニシテ、其ノ領土
 結、其ノ領土ニシテ、其ノ領土ニシテ、其ノ領土
 記ノ、其ノ領土ニシテ、其ノ領土ニシテ、其ノ領土
 タレ、其ノ領土ニシテ、其ノ領土ニシテ、其ノ領土
 異、其ノ領土ニシテ、其ノ領土ニシテ、其ノ領土
 漢、其ノ領土ニシテ、其ノ領土ニシテ、其ノ領土
 能、其ノ領土ニシテ、其ノ領土ニシテ、其ノ領土
 ハ、其ノ領土ニシテ、其ノ領土ニシテ、其ノ領土
 國、其ノ領土ニシテ、其ノ領土ニシテ、其ノ領土
 一、其ノ領土ニシテ、其ノ領土ニシテ、其ノ領土

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本據發ノ結果ヲ見大ニ嫉妬ノ旨ヲ生シタ
 ルニ起因スルコト實際格ナラズハ、カラス日本ハ
 多ク敢ニモ清國ト稱闘シ其方ニ勝利ヲ
 博シ初ルカ當テ想像ニシテモ恣カサリシ権威ヲ
 ヲ得タリ且初國ハ何故各々ヲ占ムルコト德國
 トノ勝事ヲ思フ如クシカレバハ、少シクも此
 ヲ讓ラズミタルノミナラスハ、一節ヲモ 撤去スル
 法ヲ其港灣ヲ有セト欲スル 権威ヲシテ
 亦ニ海軍ノ振擡ヲ圖ルノ已ムコト得ザルニ至レリ
 故ニ此日ニ於テ我 吾國若連、嫉妬ハ自然
 ノ情緒方ニ出ラ 露國ナキ、非ラストモ其日存ノ
 新地位ハ未タ露國ノ有メ甚ク危險ナリト以
 定スルノ基礎ヲ立シ日本カ過々年智クヘキ長足
 ノ進歩ヲ為シ初知及 德國ニ甚ク勢力カク有
 スルニ至リタルハ是レ自カノ結果ニシテ之ヲ壓抑
 スルノ甚ク難シ況ヤ他事ナラザルニ露國大陸
 軍ノ精力ハ未タ不充分ニテ日本ト亦併ニ必
 勝ヲ期スルノ成難キナキヲ於テ亦初露國ハ地廣
 ク人多ク由治未タ全ク整理セズ國內事甚ナ
 振起リ計ルニキモノ 振興者ニ自選 アラス加フルニ
 聞案初ハ隣境ノ敵自ニ露國ノ精力カク削
 滅シタルモノニシテ 露國ノ有メ或ハ却テ利益ナラ
 レ故ニ此日ノ先ヲ日本ノ強スルニテハ一修他
 事ナリ之ニ提提之 東亞海ヲ於テ大ニ經營セシ
 ヲ為シタル日本ニ 露國ノ有メトシテ、一修他
 事ナリ之ニ提提之 東亞海ヲ於テ大ニ經營セシ

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<p>光緒二十九年五月十日 存子啟</p>	<p>存子啟</p>	<p>存子啟</p>	<p>存子啟</p>	<p>存子啟</p>	<p>在露國日本公使館</p>
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REEL No. 1-0332

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