

上注考
東表面ニマアリ

松岡大蔵 閣下 - 国会記録 第
(二月二十五日)

As regards his statement in the Diet Committee on January 30th, the Minister for Foreign Affairs admitted that he had observed, as a matter of argument, that it could be maintained that the passage of the Lease-Land Bill and action thereunder might constitute an "attack" within the meaning of Article 3 of the Tripartite Pact, but that such an interpretation would, however, require to be very carefully considered before it could be accepted. He added confidentially that he had wished in that way to hint at what he could

REEL No. A-0287

not say publicly, namely, that such
claim on the part of the ~~Axis~~
Axis would undoubtedly be
rejected by the Japanese
Government.

... When one of the three powers
either openly or in a concealed
form be attacked by a power
(openly or covertly)

a power --- commits an act of
aggression against one of the three
contracting P., T. G. T undertake
to declare war on such power
and to assist on another ---

It is needless to say that whether
or not a C. P. has been attacked
within the meaning of the Art. 3
of the Pact shall be determined
upon consultation among the
three C. P.

. 47 45

necessary to synthesize and consolidate the organism of 'internal economic control.' Fundamentally speaking, it is all the more necessary to turn the motive of enterprise from the pursuit of profit to the welfare of our nation. Outside our country we should try to consolidate more the intimate relationship between Japan, Manchukuo and China, and at the same time to perfect measures to bring the southern countries in our economic sphere. As for the temporary adjustment of the relation with the Soviets, we have to make much more effort to promote it.

VI. The reason why the Far Eastern Policy of the "Roosevelt" regime" is supported by the public opinion of America is that the diplomacy of his regime is attaining or carrying out what is intended by America without danger of involving her in a war, and as long as Japan does not get rid of such economic dependence upon America as at present, it is necessarily sure that such a policy as that of "Roosevelt regime" will be preponderant. But if Japan earnestly tries to find out measures to get rid of the economic dependence upon America, especially the dependence of those resources which are now the object of embargo towards Japan, we shall no longer be threatened by the embargo of America towards Japan. We will strive to secure such situation as to give us firm resolution towards America, and when we are able to hold a resolution and the counter-measure to say that the legal or moral embargo against Japan can be taken as the declaration against Japan, not only the business men who have had dealings with Japan but also isolationists and learned people will, for the first time, recognize that such a diplomatic policy as of "Roosevelt regime" may lead America to war, and those will increase people one after another who hope for

"avoidance of war" rather than "isolation of invader." Then the embargo of munition towards Japan will be dissolved entirely by being opposed by the public opinion.

The only problem is the "gasoline" for aviation (crude and refined oil) for which we have been exclusively dependent on America. Concerning this matter, we will accomplish refinery plants of "gasoline" for aviation and study method which enables us to refine "gasoline" for aviation from any kind of crude oil, by devoting all wisdom of science of Japan to it, and at the same time, we will plan to import crude oil of high quality from "Venezuela" and others.

3. Electrolytic Copper.

At present about half of the domestic demands for electrolytic copper is imported from America, and the other half is supplied by domestic production, but, judging from the attitude of Canada, it is almost impossible to import the amount now imported from America from Canada. Therefore, we shall produce electrolytic copper by expanding largely the equipments of manufacturing the copper in Japan, and by importing a large amount of copper ore from Peru, Chile, etc., and for this purpose, we must consider the expansion of electric power and ships.

4. Molybdenum and Vanadium.

These two are necessary for manufacturing 'special steel', but we shall eagerly study to change the method of manufacturing special steel to "tungsten basis" and try to largely decrease demands for "molybdenum" and "vanadium" by using "tungsten" produced in Korea and South China.

5. Concerning machine tools, we have been dependent on America and Germany, but at present, when we cannot expect much of Germany, the

-4-

amount dependent on America will be increased more and more, but taking it into consideration that America will not export them to us in the near future, we must make up our mind to do without America and take measures to gratify internal demands by improving and expanding domestic production.

6. Any other materials than scrap iron, petroleum, electrolytic copper, "molybdenum", "vanadium" and machine tools that may be subject to "embargo". Therefore, regarding the materials highly dependent upon America some suitable measures must be taken by following the examples from (1) to (5).

IV. It is easily imagined that in order to carry out No. 3 which is mentioned above, a great deal of funds (material) is necessary. And so the fund is to be worked out by turning military funds temporarily. Materially speaking, the rationalization of the fund for the China Incident must be considered, and at the same time, the "Expansion Plan for military equipments against the Soviets" must be contented, for the time being, with the equipments not regrettable for the defense against the Soviets. All the fund and material thus spared should exclusively be spent to expand production so as to get rid of the economic condition now dependent on America. Furthermore, the present 'production expansion plan' must fundamentally be revised according to the aforesaid purport. "Real expansion of production is the mother of consolidation of military equipments." Accordingly, it is clear that, by waiting patiently for several years according to the aforesaid principle, the Expansion Plan of the military equipments will be carried out much easier.

V. In order to carry out the above-mentioned policy thoroughly, it is

-5-

The American pressure against Japan, however, will become heavier as long as she realizes the reliance of Japan upon her. By taking advantage of the absence of a treaty, America will probably intensify the pressure by gradually broadening the scope of the embargo or perhaps by showing "gestures" of broadening the scope of embargo on all resources necessary for prosecuting the divine war. As long as Japan doesn't get away from the economic reliance upon America, the insincere determination of Japan against America has no positive effect. Therefore, the most urgent measure which Japan should take is the policy of establishing an economic system not threatened by the attitude of the U. S., by eliminating the extreme reliance upon America as at present. There is no doubt that the establishment of such a system itself, has a great effect in making America reconsider the matter.

III. In case the U. S. imposes a moral or legal embargo of the materials which Japan imports from the U. S., Japan will feel the greatest need of scrap iron, petroleum (especially aviation gasoline), electrical copper, molybdenum, vanadium and machine tools. In regards to these materials, we will do our utmost to plan the elimination of reliance upon the U. S. as soon as possible and take the measures listed in the following paragraphs. Although our country imports a great deal of raw cotton from America, America will not dare to forbid the export of it by considering the situation of the American farmers. Even if

the embargo is carried out, we will not feel too much difficulty because we will be increasing the amount of purchase of raw cotton from Brasil, Peru, Iran, etc.

1. Scrap Iron.

Concerning manufacturing of iron, we will endeavor to perfect at all costs the method of manufacturing iron from ore so as to be independent from scrap iron (annual amount about 2,000,000 tons) imported from America at present. We will manage to supply our demand with about 1,000,000 tons of domestic product and scrap iron imported from the Straits Settlements, India, Australia, China, etc. (about 300,000 tons can be imported).

Note: When America lays embargo, it is hard to import scrap iron by way of a third power. Therefore, we should not expect upon such temporizing measures.

2. Petroleum.

Concerning petroleum, we shall plan on one hand to import it from a third power besides America, and, on the other hand, we will make a plan and carry it out to make rapid expansion in the production of artificial petroleum by reexamining fundamentally the plan of production expansion of artificial petroleum.

Concerning the amount of imported petroleum, we can almost secure the present amount by so negotiating with third powers such as "Mexico," "Arabia," "Iran," "Venezuela," "Netherland Indies," "Rumania," etc.

Top Secret

1383

Economic Policy which should be taken in connection with
Diplomacy towards U. S. A.

March 3, 1940

- I. Ever since the outbreak of the Incident, the attitude of the U. S. has been to maintain the body of the Nine-Power Treaty and basing her Far East policies upon it, and to absolutely repudiate the establishment of the New Order in East Asia. Taking advantage of the abolition of the Commercial and Navigation Treaty, the high-handed attitude of the U. S. seems to be getting stronger. Recently America laid a "moral embargo" on aviation, oil refining machine, aluminum and molybdenum. The drafts of laws (for example, the PITTMAN proposal) regarding the embargo of war materials for Japan, which was under discussion in the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, was reported to be temporarily postponed. We cannot say when it will be discussed again. On the other hand, we cannot ignore the movement of "moral embargo" against Japan among civilian organizations. According to future situations, the above-mentioned draft of embargo law may be passed, or perhaps moral embargo measures may be carried out.
- II. The internal reason why the Japanese Government could not assume a resolute attitude against America was due to the intense reliance of Japan upon America for acquiring resources necessary for carrying out the divine war.

JMT 265

4

48

REEL No. A-0287

アジア歴史資料センター

人事課長

次官

次官

(總5557) 1383

電信課長

外機密 館長符號

松岡 外務大臣

堀切大使

昭和十七年三月三日 前後ロ一マ 發

三月四日 前後本省著

(暗)

子經由岸於方進備ヤリ方里斯本及ノ船ハ
石市書記官ハ友族ノ世中同ノ關係上ハ許可ヲ得未
目下ノ為ニ備員ニテ船隻ノ前拂上ニシテヤルニ
拘ラス五月以後ニアラサレハ為困難ノ實状ニテ

(日本標準規格B5)

IMT 265

225

56

人事課長

次官

次官

大臣

1383

(總4899)

電信課長

外機密 館長符號

松岡 外務大臣

野村大使

昭和十七年二月廿五日 前後 華府 發

二月廿六日 前後本省著

(暗)

新聞紙ハ松岡外相ノ渡歐說ヲ傳フ本使現任在政而ノ
大局的方面ヲ知ル能ハサルモ其方面ヨリ局地的觀望スル所ヲ以
テ率直ニ申サレハ閣下ハ極メテ不利ナリト云ス

(日本標準規格B5)

IMT 265

173

55

大官
次官
長

1383
(總5370)

22

電信課長

昭和十六年三月一日

三月二日 華府 發

外機密 館長符號

松岡 外務大臣

野村 大使

井川 中央金庫理事ニハ本使ヲ奉訪

又(og)トノ關係並ニ米子大統領ト直接ノ連絡ヲ保テ

自來一般會談ヲ先催セントスル工作ニ付詳細陳述スル所

アリタルカ本使今後同人ト接觸スル機会モアランニ付同

(日本標準規格B5)

IMT 265

227

58

9

1383

10

外務省

(日本標準規格B5)

IMT 265

226

57

赴任履歷地ノ外華府五月以後ノ家族同伴米子經由

ハ之他該ナル一ノ方同書地書ハ既ニ海外勤務後之シ

キニ且リ其ラる本邦ノ情報力モ委託セシニ付西比

利運送由ニテ一旦留京者般ノ材持合ヲ了レ

赴任モシムニ標致カク右内詳可ホ内詮議

迄ノ事

23

1383

人々貴方ト如何ニ連絡ヲ有スルヤ又同人等ノ所
 近衛總理並陸海軍各部長ト固守如何ヲ本
 使ハ博シテ内報致ス
 者同人ハ貴方ノ美意ノ事ハ提去セシ
 右等件ハ如何ニ候テ又此等ノ事ハ致ス

外務省

(日本標準規格 B5)

IMT 265

228

59

REEL No. A-0287

外機密

1383

1383 (5)

電信寫

29

1383

29 a

昭和四年六月三十四日 (暗) 華府 三月八日午後
本省 九日午後

松岡外務大臣 野村大使

第一三六號ノ一 (極秘) (局長符號抜)

今八日午前「ハル」國務長官ノ私宅ニ於テ秘密ニ三人限りニテ二
時向餘會談セリ

長官ハ自分ノ政治政策ヲ説明シ極端ナル國家主義ノ經濟ハ戰爭ヲ
誘致スルニ至ルヘク自分ハ中央國內ノ特恩ニスラ反對シ加奈陀ト
特別ニ條約ヲ締結ヒタルコトアル等語リタル上本筋ノ話トナリ日米
關係ハ大統領ハ「デテリオレート」ナル狀態ニ在リト言ハレシカ
若シ萬一最悪ノ場合トナリタリト假定スレハ夫レハ毎十年二十年

ニ繰返サルルコトトナリ兩國ノ不幸此ノ上ナシトノ意見ヲ述ヘタ
ル處彼共鳴セリ依テ本使ヨリ此ノ際双方共冷靜沉着ヲ保チ刺戟ヲ
最少限トナスコト必要ニシテ「エンバールゴ」カ人心ヲ刺戟スル
ノ點ヲ強調シテ警告シタルカ満足ナル答ナカリキ
次ニ彼ハ「ヒットラー」ノ武力制覇ノ大望ハ「ナポレオン」「ア
レクサンダー」等ノ如ク限りナキモノナルカ日本ハ之ニ共鳴シ其
ノ唱フル新秩序ハ武力ヲ以テ太東亞ヲ制覇スルモノト觀ラレツツ
アリト言ヒ支那・佛印。「タイ」國ノ話トナリシヲ以テ本使ハ日
本カ求ムル所ハ汪政府トノ條約ニ依リ明カナル通り Good neighbor
(勿論第三國カ支那ニ軍事施設ヲ有ツコトアラハ日本ノ脅威トナ
ルヲ以テ之ヲ拒否ス) 經濟提議(鐵・石炭等ノ如キ基礎産業ハ重

INT 265

39

INT 265

38

60

REEL No. A-0287

アジア歴史資料センター

外機密

1383

電信寫

30

視スルモ普通ノ貿易ハ第三國ニ對シ干涉スル意ナシ一及防共協定
 (共產黨ハ支那ノ西北部等ニ於テ成功シツツアリ)ノ三點ニ在リ
 テ平等ノ主義ヲ以テ臨ミツツアリ軍カ支那ニ在ル以上其ノ目的ト
 スル所戰勝ニ在リ今日ノ戰ハ經濟戰ヲモ含ミ占領地ノ經濟カ計畫
 的統制的トナルハ免カレ難シト述ヘタル處長官ハ餘リ強ク反對セ
 ス(不明)二百五十ノ抗議ハ其ノ問題ト離レテ解決シ得ヘキモノ
 ナリト言ヒタリ(續ク)

61

IMT 265

40

REEL No. A-0287

アジア歴史資料センター

外機密

1383

昭和9 六一三〇 (晴) 華府 三月八日發
本省 九日發着

松岡外務大臣 野村大使

第一三六號ノ二(館長符號、極密)

本使ヨリ佛印ニ付テハ元來同方面ハ餘リ閉鎖主義ナリシカ日本ハ
世界ノ割據經濟主義ニ對應スル爲ニモ一層門戸ヲ開カシムルノ要
アリ「タイ」國ニ對シテハ之レ又 Good Neighbor ナルヲ欲シ既ニ友
好條約ノ現存スル事ハ御承知ト存ス今度ノ仲裁ニ海軍兵力ヲ用ヒ
タリトノ事ハ自分ハ承知セサルモ或ハ仲裁ノ速カナル成功ノ爲ニ
示威的ニ使用シタル事ハアルヤモ知レヌト話シタルカ一向反感セ
ス

電信寫

31

1383

31a

次ニ長官ハ會談ノ重要點ト思ハルル新嘉坡蘭印進出ハ如何更ニ政
治家ノ言論ヲ引用シ日本ハ大東亞ニ對シ自衛上ニモ武力的征服(ミ
リタリ、コンケスト)ヲ企テツツアルヲ慎ルル様子ナリシカ本
使ハ本使ノ知ル限りニテハ新嘉坡、蘭印ハ事情已ムヲ得サル事ナ
キ限り武力進出スル事ナシ日本ノ蘭印ニ望ム處ハ經濟的ナリト述
レ事情已ムヲ得ス云々ハ先刻米國カーエンパーゴ一ヲ強化スル
ニ於テハ我等ハ何處ヨリカ油ヲ入手セサル可カラズ事ノ成否ハ別
トシ油田獲得論者カ勝ヲ制スル事アル可シト述ヘアリシヲ以テ此
ノ點ヲ質シタル次第ナルカ長官ハ其ノ點ヨリハ寧ロ三國同盟ニ依
リ餘儀ナクサル様考フル如ク見受ケタリ此ノ點大統領モ初會見
ノ時同意味ノ事ヲ言ヒタリ)

IMT 265

42

IMT 265

41

IMT 265

外機密

1383

電信寫

32

尙長官ハ閣下ノ歐洲諸國訪問説ニ付テハ大ナル關心ヲ示セリ
 要スルニ今日ハ話ノ端緒ニ過キサリシカ彼ハ自分ハ大使トノミス
 ル問題ヲ或ハ公式ニ或ハ私人的ニ「オフレコード」ニ話シ得ヘシト
 言ヒ大統領ト自分トハ全く同一ナルカ大統領トノ會見モ自分カ世
 話シテ宜シトテ其ノ際新聞記者ヲ避クル爲大統領官邸ノ裏道ヲモ
 指示シ吳レタリ
 尙今日ハ何レノ「イニシアチブ」トモセス會談シタルコトトナズ
 可シトノ打合モアリ今後モ同様會談ノ筈ニ付本日會見ノ事實モ絶
 對外間ニ發表セラレサル様特ニ御注意ヲ請フ（了）

INT 265

43

63

REEL No. A-0287

外機密

40 383

電信寫

40

1383

40 a

昭和11 六八一九 (暗) 華府 三月十五日 前發
本省 十五日 夜着
野村大使

近衛外務大臣 第一四五號 (極秘、館長符號扱)

大統領ハ近日静養旅行ニ出ル新聞報道アルヲ以テ國務長官ノ世話ニ依リ今十四日午後一時間半ニ亘リ其ノ居間ニ於テ極秘裡ニ會見(國務長官同席筆記シツツアリタリ)セリ

話題ハ各方面ニ亘リシカ本使ハ米國カ更ニ支那ニ對シ積極的援助ヲ行ヒ且「エンバボー」ヲ強化スルニ於テハ我國民ヲ刺戟スルニ至ルヘク兩國親善ノ爲ニハ何トカ善處ノ策アルヘキヲ言ヒタルニ對應シテ大統領カ最モ重キヲ置キント認ムル點ハ三國同盟ニシテ氏ハ同盟

ハ米國民ヲ驚カシメシカ發表ノ文面以上ニ更ニ大イニ發展スルコトアリ得ヘク松岡外相ノ渡歐モアリ獨逸ノ攻勢ニ同調シテ更ニ南進スルノ惧アルヲ言ヒシヲ以テ必スシモ然ラス我外交ハ外相一人ニテ決スルモノニアラス首相ハ素ヨリ陸相海相内相其ノ他閣僚皆參畫スル次第ヲ述ヘタル處首肯シ首相ノ爲人ヲ知り居ル模様ニテ法外ノコトヲナス人ニアラスト推察シ居タリ

長官ハ今日ノ會談ヲ喜ビ當面善處ノ爲日本ヨリ「イニシアテイブ」ヲ執ルヘキヲ勸メ(大統領モ少シ前ニ何等カ方法アラント言ヒタリ)更ニ南進ノ點ヲ確カメ來リシヲ以テ今ノ所其ノ危險ナカルヘシト考フト答ヘタリ

大統領ハ更ニ追加シテ戰後軍備ノ整頓ハ大問題トナル自分ハ海軍ハ

INT 265

178

INT 265

177

64

REEL No. A-0287

アジア歴史資料センター

外機密

1383

電信寫

大好キナルモ（私室ニハ軍艦ノ繪ノミ多數掲ケアリ）太平洋ヲ隔ツ
 ル戦争ノ困難ハ貴使モ御存知ノ通りニシテ日米軍備競争ノ爲ニ國民
 ニ大負擔ヲ懸クルハ賢明ニアラスト言ヒ松岡外相ト「ピットラー」
 ノ活動寫眞カ現ハルルハ旬日ノ後ナルヘク國民ヲ刺戟スル様言フヲ
 以テ本使ヨリ夫レハアリ得ルコト（以下解譯不能照會中。電信課）

INT 265

179

65

REEL No. A-0287

外機密

1383

電信寫

1383-383

42 a

昭和16 六八八一 (暗)

華府 三月十五日發
本省 十六日後着

近衛外務大臣宛

野村大使宛

第一四六號 (極秘) (信長待機)

十四日大統領ト會見ノ詳細左ノ通り

本使ヨリ大統領ニ對シ水兵ノ率直ヲ以テオ話致スカ禮ヲ失スル事有ルヘク其ノ詰ハ御容赦ヲ請フト話シ出セル處君ノ英語ハ大丈夫ナリト笑フ

本使ハ日本ハ米國ト戰フヲ欲セサルモ兩國從來ノ態度ヲ繼續スルニ於テハ太平洋ノ危機ハ前途ニ横ハルト冒頭シ米國ニ正面作戰ノ困難ニ及ビ假ニ日米戰爭ト成ル場合太平洋ノ戰爭ハ米國ニ取ツテ

モ容易ノ事ニ非ス又假ニ米國勝利ヲ得タリトシテモ其ノ結果ハ極東ハ安定勢力ヲ失ヒ從テ「ソヴィエツト」ノ極東勢力ハ蔓延シテ帝政時代ノ南下ヲ繰返スヘシ滿洲ノ如キモ或ハ其ノ勢力下ニ落チ支那ハ赤化シ或ハ極東全體ノ赤化ヲ見ルヘク米國ハ何等得ル所無カルヘシ

一方大西洋ニ於テハ英國ノ大陸封鎖ニ對シ獨逸ハ英國ヲ逆封鎖シ潜水艦及飛行機ヲ以テノ船舶攻撃ハ益々猛烈ト成リ港灣設備ニ對シテモ亦爆撃ヲ行ヒ英ノ反響モ亦愈々活潑ト爲ルヘシ併シ此ノ戰爭ハ速戰即決タルヲ得ス長期ノ消耗戰ト爲ルヘシ戰爭若シ長期ト成ラハ戰勝者モ戰敗者モ等シク社會的影響但シハ社會革命ト爲ル事ハ前大戰ノ實證スル所ナリ(此ノ點大統領ハ同

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0 1

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外機密


1383

電信寫

43

感ヲ表セリ

斯ル時日米協力シテ太平洋ノ平和ヲ維持シ戦争ノ擴大ヲ防止スル
 ハ兩國政府ノ重大ナル責任ナリト信ス
 右ハ日本ノ大體政策ナルカ元來日支ノ紛争ハ日本ニ於テ局地解決
 不擴大ノ方針ナリシガ今日ノ如ク長期ト成リ且擴大シタルハ國民
 政府ノ徹底的抗日主義カ其ノ原因ノ一ナリ日本ノ支那ニ求ムル所
 ハ過日國務長官ニ語リシヲ以テ再説ヲ當クカ唯善隣友好經濟提携
 共同防共ノ三件ニシテ平等主義ナルハ汪政府トノ條約之ヲ證明ス



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67

外機密

1383

昭和16 六八八七 (暗) 華府 三月十五日 後發
本省 十六日 後着

近衛外務大臣

野村大使

第一四六號ノ二(秘、館長符號扱)

東亞ノ新秩序ニ付テハ種々誤解有ルカ如キモ自分モ判然シタ定義ヲ知ラヌ併シ要ハ日本カ近隣諸國ト友好ヲ保チツツ生存ノ爲必要トスル物資ヲ得ルニ在リ各國ノ「ブロック」經濟及經濟壓迫力之ヲ促進シタル次第ナリ再說スレハ近隣諸國ニ經濟的商業的門戸開放ヲ希望シ共榮ヲ計ルモ別ニ領土ヲ求ムルニ非ス實國ノ全米主義若クハ善隣主義ト同シキモノナルモ其ノ遺リ方貴國ノ如ク巧妙ナラサルカ故ニ適々誤解ヲ招キツツアリト言ヒシ處大統領長官ハ頗

電信寫

1383

44a

ヲ見合ハセ笑ヘリ
以上ノ點ニ付テモ余ハ戰爭ニ依ラサレハ解決シ難シト言フ程ノ問題無シト確信ス此ノ際更ニ積極的ニ支那ヲ援助セラルルカ更ニ「エンバゴ」ヲ強化セラルル場合兩國ノ關係ハ一層惡化ヲ來スヘキモ兩國ハ何トカ誠意ヲ以テ解決ノ途ヲ講スヘキモノナリト信スト述ヘタリ
之ニ對シ大統領ノ答ヘタル所左ノ通り
「自分ノ祖父ハ支那ノ各地ニ赴キ商賣ヲ爲セリ「ハイタン」國ノ一港ニ日本商船入港國人ニ一品十錢、十五錢ノ品物ヲ澤山賣却シ向「キューバ」ノ「サンチャゴ」ニ入港載貨ヲ全部賣却シタル事有リ是甚タ可ナリ日本ハ他國ト平等ニテ充分ニ競争スルカ有リ

0 5

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外機密

1383

電信寫

45

1383

45a

昭和16 六八七一 (暗) 華府 三月十五日發

本省 十六日前着

近衛外務大臣

野村大使

第一四六號ノ三(極秘、簡長符號抜)

米ハ例ヘハ墨國ニ對シ武力ヲ以テ之ヲ壓倒スルノ力アルモ夫ハ無益有害ナリ「カリビヤ」海ノ諸島ヲ收得スヘキナリト云フ委員ニ對シ「此ノ事ハ別ニ國家ノ秘密ニアラサルヘント云ヒ」英國ハ二百萬ノ黒人ノ爲ニ二千萬弗ヲ支出シ之等ヲ引受クルコトノ無用ヲ云ヒシコトアリ

日本カ數千年ノ文化ヲ有スル支那ヲ一時ハイサンラス永久ニ統治シ得ヘントハ信スルヲ得サルカ「ピットラー」ノ世界制覇

(長官ヲ顧ミ一語シタル處長官ハ World conquest ヲ繰返シ直ニ同意シタリ)「近東」「イラク」等ニモ及ヒ阿弗利加ハ之ヲ植民地ト

スルニアリ獨逸戰捷ノ上ハ東亞ノ新秩序ト相俟ツテ米國ハ最モ苦境ニ立ツヘキカ故ニ之ハ到底容認シ難シ

尙又今日「ムツソリーニ」ハ「ピットラー」ノ使用人ノ名ヲ得タリ獨逸カ大勝利ノ曉ハ日本ニ取りテモ油斷ノナラサル友邦トナルナラン

ニ支那ハ多年ノ文化ヲ有シ「ラヂオ」ニ依リ言葉ハ漸次統一セラレ軍閥時代ヨリ漸次統一セラルル傾向アリ露國ハ相當近年迄遊牧的人種ニシテ國民ノ大多數ハ無文字ナリ文化ハ過レ「スターリン」一人ノ獨裁政治ナリ支那ハ赤化スルトハ思ハレス第八路軍

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69

外機密

1383

電信寫

46

ニ從軍セル米武官ノ報告ニ依レハ八路軍ノナス所ハ共產的ニア
 ラスシテ「エジュケーションナル」ナリ但シ予カ誤ルカモ知レ
 スト云ヒシヲ以テ本使ヨリ支那西北部方面ニ於ケル共產勢力ノ
 蔓延ヲ説明シ置キタリ
 日支事變モ何時迄モ繼續シテ宜シキ道理ナシト云ヒシヲ以テ汪
 蔣ノ合流カ若クハ類似ノコトアラハ事變解決ニ便ナルヘシト云
 ヒ置キタリ此ノ邊ニ或ハ多少異議アルヤモ知レズト續ク

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70

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