

昭和七年三月二十三日

滿洲事變及上海事件關係發表集(三)

(附、參考文書)

外務省情報部

記録班



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一、滿洲事變ニ關スル帝國政府第三次聲明

滿洲事變ニ關シ帝國政府ハ十二月二十七日左ノ通聲明セリ  
 一、滿蒙ニ於ケル治安ノ維持ハ帝國政府ノ恒ニ最重要視スル所ニシテ政府ニ於テハ從來各般ノ機會ニ同地方ノ康寧ヲ保持シ且之カ軍閥爭亂ノ巷ト化スルヲ防ガムカ爲百方適法ノ手段ヲ講シ來レリ治安ノ保持アリテ始メテ同地方ハ内外人安住ノ地タルヲ得ヘク又秩序ナキ所、門戸開放、機會均等モ結局空名ニ終ルヘシ圖ラヌモ今次事件ハ帝國ニ對シ滿蒙ニ於ケル新ナル責任ヲ加ヘ而テ其ノ活動ノ範圍ハ更ニ廣汎ナルヲ致セリ即チ支那側ノ不當ナル攻撃ニ對シ必要ノ自衛手段ヲ執リタル結果帝國ハ廣大ナル地域ニ互リテ公共ノ安寧ヲ維持シ住民ノ權益ヲ保護スルノ義務ヲ負フノ已ムヲ得ザルニ至レリ當時支那地方官憲ハ法律秩序保持ノ爲何等協力ノ機會ヲ求めス一齊ニ逃亡又ハ辭職セリ斯ル狀況ノ下ニ無辜ノ地方民ノ災害ヲ出來得ル限リ鮮少ナラシムルハ明ニ帝國ノ責務ニシテ之ニ反シ我方ニ於テ右等良民ヲ無政府状態ノ渦中ニ委スルカ如キハ正ニ前記責務ノ懈怠タルヘシ是レ我軍カ多大ノ犠牲ヲ忍ヒ支那官憲ノ機能ヲ失ヘル地方ニ於テ人命財産ノ安全ヲ保持センカ爲全力ヲ盡シ來リタル所以ニシテ畢竟我軍ハ事態自然ノ推移ニヨリテ

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其ノ欲スルト否トニ拘ラス右ノ如キ責務ヲ負フニ至レルモノナリ  
二、右ノ如ク今次事件ノ發生ニ依リ既存諸機關ノ破壞ヲ見タルニ止ラズ滿蒙地方ニ於ケル馬賊其  
ノ他不逞分子ハ自然其ノ跳梁ヲ増スニ至リタルモ我軍ノ所在スル方面ニ於テハ其ノ威力ニ依リ  
漸次治安ノ回復ニ向ヒツツアリタリ然ルニ十一月月上旬前後ヨリ鐵道附屬地接壤地方殊ニ滿鐵本  
線西方ニ於ケル此等不逞分子ノ跳梁俄ニ顯著トナリ來レル處右馬賊等ノ活動ハ錦州軍憲ノ組織  
的策謀ニ基クモノナルニト捕虜ノ供述、押收文書其ノ他各種ノ情報ニ依リ疑ヲ容レサル所ナリ  
錦州方面ニ於ケル第三國武官中支那側ニ於テ何等攻撃ノ準備ヲナシ居ル證左ナシトノ報告ヲナ  
シ居ルモノアル處錦州軍憲カ大體打虎山以西ノ北寧線上及其ノ附近ノ各地ニ互リ巨大ナル兵力  
ヲ擁シ居ルハ明ニシテ我軍ノ周密ナル偵察ニ依レハ此等軍隊カ錦州其ノ他ノ駐屯地ニ於テ着々  
兵備ヲ整ヘ居ル證跡顯著ナルモノアルノミナラス其ノ前衛部隊ヲ錦州ヨリ遼ニ東方ニアル田庄  
臺、臺安、白旗堡等遼河右岸ノ各地ヲ連スル線ニ配置シ居ルコト確實ナリ而テ右事態カ滿鐵沿  
線其ノ他數地ニ分散駐屯セル我在滿部隊ニ對スル不斷ノ脅威タルハ何人モ首肯シ得ヘク殊ニ北  
寧線ヲ利用スルニ於テハ打虎山奉天間及瀋陽子河北間ハ僅々三、四時間内ニ到着シ得ヘキ近距  
離ニアルノ事實ハ該脅威ノ甚ク大ナルヲ示スモノナリ

一、方前記馬賊等ハ近時錦州軍多數將卒ノ改編セラレタルモノヲ含ミ其ノ活動ノ規模急速ニ増大  
シ居リ現ニ滿鐵本線西方ニ於ケル馬賊ハ十一月月上旬約一萬三千ト算定セラレタルカ十二月月上旬  
ノ調査ニ依レハ三萬ヲ超過シ且最近ニ於テハ數百乃至數千ノ員數ト機關銃追撃砲等ノ裝備ヲ有  
シ今ヤ正規軍トノ區別殆ト困難ナル状態ニアリ偶々以テ其ノ背後ニ之ヲ補給シ之ヲ指導スル錦  
州軍憲ノ存スルコト疑ナキヲ知ルヘシ又在奉天日本總領事館ノ調査ニ依レハ鐵道附屬地接壤地  
方馬賊兵匪出沒數ハ十一月一日以降十日間二七八件、十一日以降十日間三四一件、二十二日以  
降十日間四三八件、十二月一日以降十日間四七二件、合計一五二九件ノ多キニ上レリ  
敵上馬賊等不逞分子ノ跳梁ニ對シ我軍ニ於テ必要ノ討伐ヲ行フヤ滿鐵本線西方ノ賊團ハ逸早ク  
遼西方面ニ逃入スルヲ常トシ我軍ヲシテ殆ト奔命ニ疲ラシムルモノアリ而カモ尙我軍ニ於テ遼  
西地方ニ對スル賊團ノ追跡ヲ敢テセザリシハ同地方各地ニ駐屯スル前記錦州軍憲配下ノ支那正  
規兵トノ衝突ヲ避ケムトスル苦衷ニ出テタルモノナリ  
三、然ルニ偶々十一月二十四日顧外交部長ヨリ在支主要列國公使ニ對シ支那側ハ日支兩軍ノ衝突  
ヲ避ケル爲メ支那軍ノ山海關以西撤退ヲ實行スルノ用意アル旨ヲ告ケタリ仍テ帝國政府ハ同月  
二十六日正式ニ右趣旨ノ提議ニ接スルヤ主義上之ヲ受諾スルト共ニ在支帝國公使及在北平帝國

代表者ニ對シ夫々顧外交部長及張學良氏トノ間ニ本件ニ關シ話合ヲ行ハムコトヲ訓令セリ同公使ハ十一月三十日乃至十二月三日數次ニ互リ顧外交部長ト話合ヲ行ヒタルカ同部長ハ中途ヨリ前記申出ヲ翻シテ右話合ニ懸セサルノ態度ヲ示シ又在北平帝國代表者ハ十二月四日以來張學良氏ト直接又ハ其ノ側近者ヲ介シ話合ヲ重ネタルカ同月七日ニ至リ張學良氏ヨリ其ノ自發的措置トシテ錦州方面支那軍ノ撤退ヲ行フヘキ旨ヲ開示シ來リ且爾來幾度トナク右約束ノ急遽實行方ヲ確言セルモ何等撤兵ノ事實ナク却テ同方面ノ兵備ヲ嚴ニシ居ル實情ナリ

四、錦州地方撤兵問題ニ關スル交渉開始セラレタル以來既ニ約一ヶ月ニ及ヘルモ支那側ノ不誠意ナル態度ニ依リ何等ノ效果ヲ擧ケ得ヘキ前途ノ見据付カサル間ニ前記ノ如ク賊團ノ活躍益々猖獗ヲ極メ來リ遂ニハ南滿洲ニ於ケル全般の治安ノ根底ヲ破壞スルノ虞アル事態ヲ現出セルニ依リ最近我軍ハ一齊ニ出動シテ從來ヨリ比較的大規模ノ賊團討伐ニ着手スルノ已ムヲ得ナルニ至レル處我軍ニ於テ賊團討伐ノ徹底ヲ期セムカ爲ニハ其ノ根據地タル遼西方面ニ進出セザルヲ得サルコト前述ノ事情ニ徴シ明ナリ固ヨリ我軍ハ九月三十日及十二月十日理事會決議ノ趣旨ニ反シ好シテ支那正規兵ニ對シ攻撃ヲ加フルカ如キ主動的措置ニ出テ居ルモノニアラサルコト勿論ナルモ他匪賊等ノ討伐ニ至リテハ滿蒙現下ノ特殊狀況ニ顧ミ日本軍ニ於テ引續キ之ヲ

行ハサルヲ得サル所ニシテ右ハ十二月十日理事會決議採擇ノ際我代表ニ於テ明確ニ保留セル所ナリ然ルニ此ノ際支那軍憲ニシテ表面非攻撃的態度ヲ裝ハントスルモ前記ノ如ク裏面ニ於テ我軍及我居留民ヲ目標トスル匪賊擾攘等ノ挑發的行動ニ出テ且右匪賊中ニ錦州軍ノ將卒多數混入シテ正規軍トノ區別困難ナル以上我軍ニ於テ自衛上必要ト認ムル適當ノ措置ニ出ツル場合其ノ結果生スルコトアルヘキ一切ノ責任ハ前記諸般ノ經緯ニ鑑ミ凡テ支那側ニ於テ負擔スヘキモノナリ

五、帝國政府ハ聯盟規約、不戰條約其ノ他各種條約及今次事件ニ關スル理事會兩度ノ決議ヲ忠實ニ遵守セムコトヲ期スルモノニシテ錦州軍憲ノ組織の治安攪亂ニ對スル日本國民ノ憤激甚シキモノアリタルニ拘ラス一ヶ月ノ永キニ互リ帝國軍ニ於テ該方面ニ對スル匪賊討伐ノ自由ヲ抑制シ其ノ間政府ニ於テ凡有ル手段ヲ盡シ右討伐實行ノ際惹起スルコトアルヘキ日支兩軍ノ衝突ヲ豫防スルニ努メタル誠心誠意ト隱忍自重トハ全ク前記諸條約及決議ニ基ク義務ニ忠實ナラムトスル精神ニ出テタルモノナルコト必キヤ世界輿論ノ認識ヲ得ヘキヲ信ス

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Statement of the Japanese Government concerning  
the Manchurian Affairs, Dec. 27, 1931.

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1. The maintenance of peace and order in Manchuria is a matter to which the Government of Japan have always attached the utmost importance. They have on various occasions taken every lawful step in order to secure it, and to prevent Manchuria from becoming the battle-ground of militarist factions. Only if peace and order prevail, can the country be safe either for the Chinese or for the foreigner: in the absence of peace and order it is futile to speak of the Open Door or of equal opportunity for the economic activities of all nations. But the events of September last have, in spite of her wishes, created a new responsibility and a wider sphere of action for Japan. Attacked by Chinese violence, her acts of necessary self-protection resulted, to her considerable embarrassment, in her having to assume the duty of maintaining public order and private rights throughout a wide area. The local authorities might have been expected to co-operate in upholding law and order. But, in fact, they almost unanimously fled or resigned. It was Japan's clear duty to render her steps of self defense as little disturbing as possible to the peaceable inhabitants of the region. It would have been a breach of that duty to have left the

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population a prey to anarchy—deprived of all the apparatus of civilized life. Therefore, the Japanese military have, at considerable sacrifice, expended much time and energy in securing the safety of persons and property in the districts where the native authorities had become ineffective. This is a responsibility which was thrust upon them by events, and one which they had as little desire to assume as to evade.

2. But further than that, not only did the existing machinery of justice and civilized existence break down, but the criminal activities of the bandits who infest the country were naturally stimulated. The prestige and efficiency of the Japanese troops were for some time sufficient to keep them in check, and to maintain order wherever they were stationed. Since the beginning of November, however, a sudden increase in the activities of the bandits has been noted in the vicinity of the South Manchuria Railway Zone, and especially to the west of the Main Line,—and it has been established to demonstration, by the examination of arrested individuals, by documents which have been seized, and from other sources of information, that their depredations are being carried on through the systematic intrigues of the Chinese military authorities.

Reports have, indeed, been made by certain of the foreign military observers suggesting that they found no evidence of any preparations being made by the

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Chinese for an attack. But as a matter of fact the military authorities at Chinchow are maintaining large forces at various points, west of Takushan, on the Peiping-Mukden Railway and in the adjacent territory. Reconnaissances conducted by the Japanese army have not only definitely confirmed the assurance that these forces are engaged in making preparations for war, but have also revealed the fact that their outposts are stationed along a line connecting Tienchuantai, Tai-an, Peichiao, and other points on the right bank of the River Liao, well advanced from Chinchow. It will readily be admitted that such a situation in itself constitutes a constant menace to the Japanese contingents dispersed along the South Manchuria Railway and elsewhere, but the danger is even greater than it seems at first sight, if the further fact is taken into consideration that the Peiping-Mukden Railway places the cities of Mukden, Yinkao and Hopei within a short journey of three or four hours from Takushan and Kuopantsu (which are bases of the Chinese forces).

The bandit forces, (which include a large number of officers and men discharged from the Chinese army), are daily gaining strength. For instance, the number of bandits on the western flank of the main line of the South Manchuria Railway was estimated early in November at 1,300, whereas investigations conducted in early December revealed the fact that they numbered over 30,000. Moreover, they are

banded together in large groups comprising several hundreds, or even thousands, each equipped with machine guns and trench mortars; so that they can no longer be distinguished from regular troops. This points unmistakably to the existence of a state of things in which the so-called bandits are directed and provided with arms by the Chinchow military authorities. According to the statistics compiled in the Japanese Consulate-General at Mukden, the cases of bandit-raid in the vicinity of the Railway Zone numbered 278 during the first ten days of November, 841 during the second ten days, 438 during the final ten days of the month, and 472 during the first ten days of December, thus reaching the astounding total of 1,529 in forty days. It is the usual strategy of these bandit-troops, when attacked by our men, to fly westward, or to take refuge on the right bank of the River Liao; where our army, anxious to avoid any collision with the Chinese Regulars, has made it a point to refrain from further pursuit.

3. On the 24th November, the Foreign Minister of China made an intimation to the Ministers at Nanking of the principal Powers to the effect that the Chinese Government, in order to avoid any collision between Chinese and Japanese forces, were prepared to withdraw their troops to points within the Great Wall. Upon a proposal to that effect being officially made on the 26th, this Government signified their

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readiness to accept it in principle,—at the same time instructing the Japanese Minister at Shanghai, and the Legation at Peiping, to open conversations on the matter with the Chinese Foreign Minister and with Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang respectively.

The Japanese Minister in China had several conferences accordingly with the Chinese Foreign Minister between 30th November and 3rd December. In the midst of these conversations, the latter withdrew the overture, and declined further negotiation. Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, with whom our representative at Peiping carried on negotiations from the 4th December onwards, either directly or through the Marshal's subordinates, expressed on the 7th his willingness to call in his Chinchow forces as a spontaneous move of withdrawal; and he has since given repeated assurances as to the speedy execution of his promise. In point of fact, however, there is no sign of any such withdrawal. On the contrary, the defenses of Chinchow have since been strengthened.

4. Accordingly, at the present moment, now almost a month subsequent to the initiation of these negotiations for the withdrawal of the Chinchow troops, there appears no prospect of obtaining any tangible result, owing entirely to the want of good faith on the Chinese side. At the same time, the increased activity, above described, on the part of marauding bands, threatens to bring about a complete de-

struction of all peace and security throughout the whole extent of South Manchuria. In these circumstances, the Japanese forces have now begun a general movement with a view to a campaign against the bandits on a more extensive scale than hitherto. It is obvious, from what has been said above, that the Japanese army, if it is to achieve anything like adequate success, will have to advance to the points west of the River Liao where the bandits have their base. Certainly, the Japanese forces, in deference to the Resolutions of the League Council adopted on 30th September and 10th December, are not in the field against the Regular Chinese forces; but in the present abnormal conditions prevailing in Manchuria, the necessities of the case compel them to continue their operations against lawless elements. This is a point on which the Representative of Japan at the recent session of the Council of the League held on the 10th December made a definite declaration. So long as the Chinchow military authorities, while simulating an unaggressive attitude, continue to instigate and manipulate the movements of bandit organizations against the Japanese army as well as Japanese and other peaceable inhabitants, and so long as the officers and men of the Chinchow army mingle in large numbers with these bandit groups and so render it impossible to distinguish the latter from Regular troops, so long must the responsibility for the consequences of any action which may



be entailed upon the Japanese Army in self-defence rest entirely with the Chinese.  
5. During the course of the past month, in spite of the indignation aroused throughout the country by the behaviours of the Manchow military authorities, and in accordance with the constant desire of the Japanese Government to abide scrupulously by the resolutions of the League Council, the operations of the Army against the bandits have been restrained within comparatively narrow limits, and the Government have done everything in their power to devise means for forestalling a collision between the forces of the two countries in the course of an eventual anti-bandit campaign. The Japanese Government are confident that their prolonged forbearance and their desire strictly to adhere to the stipulations of international engagements will not fail to command recognition by the public opinion of the world.

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## 二、滿洲ニ關スル日清條約附屬取極

(一月十四日發表)

明治三十八年滿洲ニ關スル條約及同上附屬協定締結ノ際我方ヨリ一定ノ約束事項ヲ條約文中ニ挿入セムコトヲ主張シタル處清國側ニ於テ對内關係上之ヲ條約文トシテ公ニスルコトヲ困難トスル事情アリタルニ依リ日清兩國全權委員ノ記名調印セル日清兩國文ノ會議録中ニ記入スルニ止メ之ヲ公表セザリシモノ合計十六個條アリ尙右會議録所載ノ取極十六個條ノ要領英譯文ハ明治三十九年二月帝國政府ヨリ英米兩國政府ニ對シ極秘トシテ内報セリ然ルニ坊間本件會議録所載ノ取極十六個條ノ存否等ニ付種々誤解ヲ抱クモノアルヤニ認メラルルノミナラス從來支那人等ニシテ明ニ之ヲ否定セルモノ抄ナカラス又最近支那新聞ハ支那外交當局ニ於テ正式ニ本件會議録ノ存在ヲ否認セル旨報シ居ル關係モアルニ付茲ニ右十六個條日本文、支那文及前記英米兩國政府ニ内報セラレタル要領英譯文ヲ公表スルモノナリ

### 第一、日本文

一、長春吉林間鐵道ハ清國自ラ資金ヲ調ヘテ築造スヘク不足ノ額ハ日本國ヨリ借入ルコトヲ承諾

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一、其ノ金額ハ資金ノ約半額ナリトス借款辦法ハ時ニ及テ清國山海關内外鐵道局ト清英組合トノ借款契約ニ仿照シテ參酌商訂スヘク二十五箇年ヲ以テ年賦完済ノ期ト爲ス

二、奉天府新民屯間ニ日本國ノ敷設セル軍用鐵道ハ兩國政府ヨリ委員ヲ派遣シ公平ニ代價ヲ協議シテ清國ニ賣渡スヘシ清國ハ之ヲ改築シテ自營鐵道ト爲シ遼河以東ニ要スル資金ハ日本ノ會社ヨリ其ノ半額ヲ借入レ十八箇年ヲ以テ年賦完済ノ期ト爲シ其ノ借款辦法ハ清國山海關内外鐵道局ト清英組合トノ借款契約ニ仿照シ參酌商訂スヘキコトヲ承諾ス此ノ他各地ニ於ケル軍用鐵道ハ撤兵ノ際總テ取除クヘキモノトス

三、清國政府ハ南滿洲鐵道ノ利益ヲ保護スルノ目的ヲ以テ該鐵道ヲ未タ回收セサル以前ニ於テハ該鐵道附近ニ之ト併行スル幹線又ハ該鐵道ノ利益ヲ害スヘキ枝線ヲ敷設セサルコトヲ承諾ス

四、清國ハ滿洲北部ニ於テ露國カ引續キ所有スル鐵道ニ關シ露國ヲシテ清露條約ニ照シ努メテ遵行セシムルタメ充分ノ措置ヲ執リ若シ露國ニシテ條約ニ違反セル行動ヲナサハ清國ヨリ露國ニ嚴重ニ照會シテ之ヲ匡サシムヘキ精神ナルコトヲ聲明ス

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五、將來日露兩國ニ於テ接續鐵道業務規定ノ爲商議スル時機ニ至ラハ日本國ハ豫メ之ヲ清國ニ通知スヘシ清國ハ其ノ時機ニ至リ委員ヲ派遣シテ該商議ニ加ハラント欲スルノ意ヲ露國ニ通牒ノ上同時ニ該商議ニ參與スヘシ

六、鐵道ニ附屬スル奉天省內ノ礦物ハ既ニ採掘ニ着手シタルト否トニ拘ハラズ公平且詳細ノ章程ヲ取極メ以テ相互遵守ニ便ナラシムヘシ

七、奉天省內ニ於ケル陸上電信線及旅順烟臺間海底電信線ニ關スル接續交渉事務ハ隨時必要ニ從テ兩國協議シテ處置スヘシ

八、開市場設立ニ關スル規則ハ清國ニ於テ自カラ定ムヘシ但シ北京駐在日本公使ト協議スルヲ要ス

九、松花江航行ノ件ニ關シ露國ニ於テ異議ナキトキハ清國ニ於テモ之ヲ商議ノ上承諾スヘキコト

十、清國全權委員ハ滿洲ヨリ日露兩國撤兵ノ後直ニ進シテ該地方ニ於テ其ノ主權ニ依リ完全ナル經營ヲ爲シ以テ治安ヲ期シ且其ノ主權ニヨリ同地方ニ於テ利ヲ興シ弊ヲ除キ着實ニ整頓ヲ行ヒ内外臣民ヲシテ生活及營業ノ安全ヲ得テ等シク清國政府ヨリ完全ノ保護ヲ享ケシムヘキコトヲ聲明ス其ノ整頓ノ方法ニ就テハ總テ清國政府自ラ適宜ノ措置ヲ行フヘキモノトス

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十二、清國ト日本國トハ素ヨリ友誼敦厚ナリ今回日露兩國不幸ニシテ和ヲ失シ清國領土ニ於テ交戦スルニ至リタルモ今ヤ既ニ平和成立シ滿洲ニ於テハ戰爭ナキニ至レリ而テ撤退以前ノ日本軍隊ハ依然占領ノ權アリト雖モ近來日本國臣民カ滿洲ニ在リテ時々清國地方官ノ行政ニ干預シ又ハ清國公私財産ヲ毀損スルコトアル旨ヲ清國政府ニ於テ聲明ス日本國全權委員モ亦若シ果シテ軍事必要以外ニ於テ此ノ如キコトアラハ至當ノ行爲ニアラスト認ムルヲ以テ此ノ聲明ノ意思ヲ日本國政府ニ轉達シテ速ニ相當ノ處置ヲ執リ奉天省ニ在ル日本國臣民ヲ取締リ益々交誼ヲ敦クシ軍事必要以外ニ於テ再ヒ清國ノ行政ニ干預シ又ハ公私ノ財産ヲ毀損スルコトナカラシムヘキ旨ヲ聲明ス

十二、軍費用以外ニ於テ日本國臣民カ故意ニ破壞シ若クハ使用セル清國公私ノ各種財産ニ對シテハ兩國政府ニ於テ夫々調査ノ上公平ニ償還セシムヘシ

十三、清國地方官未タ日本軍隊ノ撤兵ヲ了セサル地方ニ於テ兵ヲ派シ土匪ヲ討伐スルトキハ必ス豫メ其ノ地方駐在日本軍司令官ト協議シ以テ誤解ヲ免レシムヘシ

十四、日本國全權委員ハ長春ヨリ旅順大連租借地境界ニ至ル鐵道守備兵ハ其ノ撤退以前ニ在リテ漫ニ清國地方行政權ニ牽礙セス又擅ニ鐵道區域外ニ出テサルヘキコトヲ聲明ス

十五、營口ニ駐在スヘキ清國地方官ハ日本軍隊該地撤退以前ト雖モ本條約確定ノ後北京駐在日本國公使清國外務部ト協議シテ可成速ニ赴任ノ期日ヲ定メ該地ニ赴キ事務ヲ執ラシムヘシ該地ニハ尙多數ノ日本軍隊アルヲ以テ檢疫及防疫規則ヲ兩國ニ於テ協議制定シ以テ疫病ノ傳染ヲ免レシムヘシ

十六、營口海關收入ハ正金銀行ニ保管シ置キ撤兵ノ時清國地方官ニ交付スルコト營口常關收入及其ノ他各地ノ收税ハ凡テ地方公共ノ費用ニ充テラルルモノニシテ撤兵ノ時其ノ收支計算表ヲ清國地方官ニ交付スルコト

第二、支那文

一、由長春至吉林省城鐵路由中國自行籌款築造不敷之數允向日本國貸借約以半數爲度其借款辦法屆時仿照中國山海關內外鐵路局向中英公司借款合同參酌商訂以二十五年爲分還完畢之期

中國政府在吉林省地方准與別國人造路之權或與別國人合辦造路斷無其事

二、由奉天省城至新民府日本國所築造行軍軌路應由兩國政府派員公平議價售與中國另由中國改爲自造鐵路允在遼河以東所需款項向日本公司貸借一半之數分十八年爲借款還清之期其借款辦法屆

時仿照中國山海關內外鐵路局向中英公司借款合同參酌商訂此外各處軍用軌路俟屆撤兵時應一律撤去

三、中國政府為維持東省鐵路利益起見於未收回該路之前尤於該路附近不築並行幹路及有損於該路利益之枝路

四、中國政府聲明俄國在滿洲北方仍舊經營之鐵路須由中國確切措辦以期務令俄國按照中俄原約實力遵行俄國設有違礙條約之舉動應由中國嚴責駁正為旨

五、俟將來日俄商議聯絡鐵路章程時由日本先行知會中國中國屆期可將欲派員會議之意知會俄國同時與議

六、奉省附屬鐵路之鑛產無論已開未開均應妥訂公允詳細章程以便彼此遵守

七、嗣後凡有關於奉天省陸綫暨旅順海綫交接事件可隨時隨事彼此商定辦法

八、開埠章程應由中國自定但須與駐京日本公使妥商

九、如松花江行船之件俄國無異議則中國亦可商允

十、中國全權大臣聲明自願俟東三省日俄兩國撤兵後即將撤兵地方按自治全權妥籌經理以期治安並按自治全權在東三省地方與利除弊認真整頓使中外民商得安居樂業同享中國政府妥實保護之益至

應如何整頓辦法悉由中國政府自行酌辦

十一、中國政府聲明中國與日本國素敦睦友睦此次日俄不幸失和係在中國疆土構兵現日俄既經修好在東三省已無戰事日本國待撤之兵隊雖仍有佔守通例乃近日日本國臣民在奉天省時有干預中國地方

官吏治暨損壞中國公私產業等情其係並非軍用必需果有此項事件在日本全權大臣亦視為非所應為允將此聲明各意傳達日本政府迅速設法約束在奉天省之日本臣民益加敦睦其係並非軍用必需者勿致再有干預中國吏治暨損壞官民產業各事

十二、凡軍用必需以外所有日本臣民若有有意損壞取用中國官民各項產業應由兩國政府查明乘公分別飭令補還

十三、中國地方官在未撤兵地方派兵勦匪須先商酌日本駐紮武官以免誤會

十四、日本國全權大臣聲明駐留由長春至旅大借地界之鐵路兵隊在未撤以前不至輒行牽礙中國地方治理之權亦不擅出沿鐵路界限以外

十五、向駐營口之地方官雖在日本軍隊由該處撤退以前俟此約一定後應由駐京日本公使會同外務部從速訂立日期俾使原有之中國地方官迅速赴任視事至因該埠日本軍隊尚多務須商同訂立驗疫防疫章程以免傳染

十六、所有營口洋關所徵稅項現歸日本國正金銀行收存應俟屆撤兵時交中國地方官查收至於營口常關所徵稅項以及各地方捐款原係充作地方公共各事之用亦俟屆撤兵時將收支單開交中國地方官備案

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第三、英譯文 (次項英文發表文ニ在リ茲ニハ省略ス)

Supplementary Agreement to the Sino-Japanese Treaty concerning Manchuria of 1905. (Published on January 14th, 1932.)

In 1905, when the Treaty concerning Manchuria and the supplementary agreement to it were concluded, the Japanese Government insisted on the insertion in the text of the Treaty definite engagements on certain matters. Since, however, the Chinese Government found it difficult for internal political reasons to consent to the publication of such engagements, it was agreed that these should be merely recorded in the Minutes of the Conference, which were drawn up both in Japanese and Chinese and signed by the Japanese and Chinese plenipotentiaries. These unpublished under-

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standings totalled sixteen in number. An English version summarising these provisions was submitted, in February, 1906, to the British and the United States Governments in strict confidence by the Japanese Government.

Inasmuch as there seems to be some doubt as to the existence of these understandings in the Minutes of the Conference, and as people even in positions of influence in China have openly denied it, this Government think the present a fit occasion to publish the above-mentioned communication made to the Governments of Great Britain and the United States.

Whereas the protocols of the Conference recently held between the Plenipotentiaries of Japan and China with regard to Manchuria are to be kept strictly secret in deference to the desire of the Chinese Government, only such portions of those Protocols as possess the character of executory agreements are given in the following summary:

1. The railway between Changchun and Kirin will be constructed by China with capital to be raised by herself. She, however, agrees to borrow from Japan the insufficient amount of capital, which amount being about one-half of the total sum required. The contract concerning the loan shall, in due time, be concluded, following *mutatis mutandis*, the loan contract entered into between the board of the

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Imperial Railways of North China and the Anglo-Chinese syndicate. The term of the loan shall be twenty-five years, redeemable in yearly instalments.

2. The military railway constructed by Japan between Mukden and Hsinmin-tun shall be sold to China at a price to be fairly determined in consultation by Commissioners appointed for the purpose by the two Governments. China engages to reconstruct the line, making it her own railway, and to borrow from a Japanese corporation or corporations one half of the capital required for the portion of the line east of Liao-ho for a term of eighteen years repayable in yearly instalments, and a contract shall be concluded, for the purpose following, *mutatis mutandis*, the loan contract entered into between the Board of the Imperial Railways of North China and the Anglo-Chinese Syndicate.

All the other military railways in different localities shall be removed with the evacuation of the regions.

3. The Chinese Government engage, for the purpose of protecting the interest of the South Manchurian Railway, not to construct, prior to the recovery by them of the said railway, any main line in the neighborhood of and parallel to that railway, or any branch line which might be prejudicial to the interest of the above-mentioned railway.

4. China declares that she will adopt sufficient measures for securing Russia's faithful observance of the Russo-Chinese treaties with regard to the railways which Russia continues to possess in the northern part of Manchuria, and that it is her intention, in case Russia acts in contravention of such treaty stipulations, to approach her strongly with a view to have such action fully rectified.

5. When in the future, negotiations are to be opened between Japan and Russia for regulation of the connecting railway services (Article VIII of the Treaty of Peace between Japan and Russia), Japan shall give China previous notice. China shall communicate to Russia her desire to take part in the negotiations through commissioners to be despatched by her on the occasion, and Russia consenting shall participate in such negotiations.

6. With regard to the mines in the Province of Fengtien, appertaining to the railway, whether already worked or not, fair and detailed arrangements shall be agreed upon for mutual observance.

7. The affairs relating to the connecting services as well as those of common concern in respect of the telegraph lines in the Province of Fengtien and the cables between Port Arthur and Yentai shall be arranged from time to time as necessity may arise in consultation between the two countries.



8. The regulations respecting the places to be opened in Manchuria, shall be made by China herself, but the Japanese Minister at Peking must be previously consulted regarding the matter.

9. If no objection be offered on the part of Russia respecting the navigation of the Sungari (by Japanese vessels), China shall consent to such navigation after negotiations.

10. The Chinese Plenipotentiaries declare that immediately after the withdrawal of the Japanese and Russian troops from Manchuria, China will proceed to take, in virtue of her sovereign right, full administrative measures to guarantee peace in that region and endeavor, by the same right, to promote good and remove evil as well as steadily to restore order, so that the residents of that region, natives and foreigners, may equally enjoy the security of life and occupation under the perfect protection of the Chinese Government. As to the means of restoring order, the Chinese Government are to take by themselves all adequate measures.

11. While relations of intimate friendship subsisted as at the present time between China and Japan, Japan and Russia had unfortunately engaged in war and fought in the territory of China. But peace has now been reestablished and hostilities in Manchuria have ceased. And while it is undeniable that Japanese troops, before their withdrawal, have the power of exercising the rights accruing from mili-

tary occupation, the Chinese Government declare that certain Japanese subjects in Manchuria have recently been observed to sometimes interfere with the local Chinese administration and to inflict damage to public and private property of China.

The Japanese Plenipotentiaries, considering that, should such interference and infliction of damage have been carried beyond military necessity, they are not prepared acts, declare that they will communicate the purport of the above declaration of the Chinese Government to the Government of Japan, so that proper steps may be taken for controlling Japanese subjects in the Province of Fengtien and promote the friendly relations between the two nations, and also for preventing them in future, from interfering with the Chinese administration or inflicting damage to public or private property without military necessity.

12. In regard to any public or private property of China which may have been purposely destroyed or used by Japanese subjects without any military necessity, the Governments of the two countries shall respectively make investigations and cause fair reparation to be made.

13. When the Chinese local authorities intend to despatch troops for the purpose of subduing native bandits in the regions not yet completely evacuated by Japanese troops, they shall not fail to previously consult with the Commander of the Japanese troops stationed in those regions so that all misunderstandings may be avoided.

14. The Japanese Plenipotentiaries declare that the Railway Guards stationed between Changchun and the boundary line of the leased territory of Port Arthur and Talien, shall not be allowed, before their withdrawal, to unreasonably interfere with the local administration of China or to proceed without permission beyond the limits of the railway.

15. Chinese local authorities, who are to reside at Inkou, shall be allowed, even before the withdrawal of the Japanese troops, to proceed to that place and transact their official business. The date of their departure is to be determined, as soon as possible after the definite conclusion of this Treaty, by the Japanese Minister to China in consultation with the Waivupu. As there is still in that place a considerable number of Japanese troops, quarantine regulations as well as regulations for the prevention of contagious diseases, shall be established by the authorities of the two countries in consultation with each other so that epidemics may be avoided.

16. The revenue of the Maritime Customs at Yingkou shall be deposited with the Yokohama Specie Bank and delivered to the Chinese local authorities at the time of evacuation. As to the revenue of the native Customs at that place and the taxes and imposts at all other places, which are to be appropriated for local expenditures, a statement of receipts and expenditures shall be delivered to the Chinese local authorities at the time of evacuation.

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三、米國大使通牒（二月八日附）ニ對スル  
帝國外相回答（二月十六日附）

（二月十六日發表）

以書翰致啓上候陳者本月八日附貴翰御來示ノ次第ニ付テハ帝國政府ニ於テ最慎重ナル考慮ヲ相加  
ヘ候  
帝國政府ハ華府諸條約並ニ不戰條約ノ完全ナル履行ヲ確保センコトヲ期スルモノニシテ右帝國政  
府ノ努力ニ對シテハ常ニ米國政府ノ全幅ノ支持アルヘキヲ確信シタリシカ今回改メテ右確信ノ誤  
ラサリシコトヲ確メ得タルハ帝國政府ノ欣幸トスル所ニ有之候  
貴大使ノ特ニ言及セラレタル所謂門戶開放ノ政策ハ曩ニ屢々言明セル如ク帝國政府ニ於テ極東ニ  
關スル政策ノ樞軸ト認ムル所ナリ唯タ俄ムラクハ支那全土ニ亘ル不安定ナル事態ノ爲右政策ノ效  
果著シク減殺セラレ居ル次第ナルモ帝國政府ハ其ノ力ノ及フ限り滿蒙ニ於テモ支那本部ニ於ケル  
ト同様常ニ門戶開放ノ政策ヲ維持セムコトヲ期スルモノニ有之候  
帝國政府ハ貴翰中米國政府乃至米國人民ノ條約上ノ權利ヲ侵害シ若クハ千九百二十八年八月二十

二七

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七日ノ條約ニ違反スル手段ニ基キテ成立セル事項ノ合法性ヲ認ムルコトヲ得ストノ御申出ヲ諒承  
セリ純理ヨリ論スレハ特定ノ場合手段ノ妥當ナラサルコトカ常ニ必然的ニ結果ヲ無効ナラシムル  
ヤ否ヤハ疑問ノ餘地アルヘキモ帝國政府ニ於テハ素ヨリ何等妥當ナラサル手段ニ訴フルノ意思ナ  
キヲ以テ實際上ハ斯ノ如キ問題ハ發生セサル義ト思料致候

二八

唯タ茲ニ一言致度ハ支那ニ關スル諸條約ノ適用ニ付テハ常ニ同國情ノ變化ニ對シテ相當ノ考慮  
ヲ加フルヲ要シ殊ニ現下同國ノ不安紊亂ノ情況ハ華府條約ノ締結ニ際シ當事國ノ曾テ豫想セサリ  
シ所ナル事ニ有之當時ニ於テモ支那ノ國情不満足ナリシハ勿論ナルモ現今ノ如ク不和不統一ヲ暴  
露セサリシ次第ナリ固ヨリ之レカ爲メ關係諸條約ノ拘束力乃至内容ニ何等影響アル次第ニ非ルモ  
條約ノ適用ニ當リテハ必スヤ現實ノ事態ニ即シテ之ヲ行フヲ要スルヲ以テ前記ノ如キ支那ノ國情  
ハ此ノ點ニ關シ深甚ナル斟酌ヲ必要トスヘキヤニ思料セラルル次第ニ有之候

那國民ノミカ他國民ト異リ民族自決ノ權能ヲ缺キ其ノ官憲ハ逃亡ニ際シ自ラ政權ヲ組織シテ秩序  
ノ維持ニ任シ得サルノ理由無キヲ信スルモノニ有之候

帝國政府カ滿蒙ニ對シ何等領土の企圖ヲ有セサルハ改メテ言明ノ必要ナキ處貴大使モ御承知有之  
ヘキ通リ滿蒙ニ於ケル安寧福祉ノ維持並ニ該地方ノ一般通商ニ對スル解放ハ帝國ニ取リ最大ノ關  
心事タルト共ニ至上ノ重要問題ナリ米國政府カ極東問題ノ重要性ヲ看過セラレサルノ態度ハ從來  
モ種々ノ機會ニ於テ之ヲ明カニセラレタル所ナルカ現下帝國ノ存立ニ關スル重大ノ時局ニ際シ同  
政府カ友好的精神ヲ以テ事態ノ正當ナル認識ヲ得ルカ爲メ細心ノ注意ヲ拂ハレツツアルヲ知ルハ  
帝國政府ノ欣快トスル所ニ有之候

以上ノ次第ヲ本國政府ニ御傳達相成様貴大使ニ御依頼申進スルト共ニ茲ニ重テ閣下ニ向ツテ敬  
意ヲ表シ候 昭和七年一月十六日

二九

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The Reply of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the Note  
of the American Ambassador.

January 16, 1932.

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's Note dated the 8th January, which has had the most careful attention of this Government.

The Government of Japan were well aware that the Government of the United States could always be relied on to do everything in their power to support Japan's efforts to secure the full and complete fulfilment in every detail of the Treaties of Washington and the Kellogg Treaty for the Outlawry of War. They are glad to receive this additional assurance of the fact.

As regards the question which Your Excellency specifically mentions of the policy of the so-called "Open Door", the Japanese Government, as has so often been stated, regard that policy as a cardinal feature of the politics of the Far East, and only regret that its effectiveness is so seriously diminished by the unsettled conditions which prevail throughout China. In so far as they can secure it, the policy of the Open Door will always be maintained in Manchuria, as in China Proper.

They take note of the Statement by the Government of the United States that the latter cannot admit the legality of matters which might impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens or which might be brought about by means contrary to the Treaty of 27 August, 1928. It might be the subject of an academic doubt, whether in a given case the impropriety of means necessarily and always avoids the ends secured, but as Japan has no intention of adopting improper means, that question does not practically arise.

It may be added that the Treaties which relate to China must necessarily be applied with due regard to the state of affairs from time to time prevailing in that country, and that the present unsettled and distracted state of China is not what was in the contemplation of the High Contracting Parties at the time of the Treaty of Washington. It was certainly not satisfactory then: but it did not display that disunion and those antagonisms which it does to-day. This cannot affect the binding character or the stipulations of Treaties: but it may in material respects modify their application, since they must necessarily be applied with reference to the state of facts as they exist.

My Government desire further to point out that any replacement which has occurred in the personnel of the administration of Manchuria has been the necessary

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act of the local population. Even in cases of hostile occupation—which this was not—it is customary for the local officials to remain in the exercise of their functions. In the present case they for the most part fled or resigned: it was their own behavior which was calculated to destroy the working of the apparatus of government. The Japanese Government cannot think that the Chinese people, unlike all others, are destitute of the power of self-determination and of organizing themselves in order to secure civilized conditions when deserted by the existing officials.

While it need not be repeated that Japan entertains in Manchuria no territorial aims or ambitions, yet, as Your Excellency knows, the welfare and safety of Manchuria and its accessibility for general trade are matters of the deepest interest and of quite extraordinary importance to the Japanese people. That the American Government are always alive to the exigencies of Far Eastern questions has already been made evident on more than one occasion. At the present juncture, when the very existence of our national polity is involved, it is agreeable to be assured that the American Government are devoting in a friendly spirit such sedulous care to the correct appreciation of the situation.

I shall be obliged if Your Excellency will transmit this communication to your Government, and I avail, etc.

〔参考〕 在京米國大使通牒（一月八日附）内容

錦州方面ニ於ケル最近ノ軍事行動ニ伴ヒ千九百三十一年九月十八日以前存在シタル南滿洲ニ於ケル支那共和國政府ノ最後ニ殘存セル行政的權力ハ破壊セラレタリ米國政府ハ最近國際聯盟ニ依リ權限ヲ附與セラレタル中立委員會ノ事業カ日支間ニ現存スル確執ノ終局的解決ヲ容易ナラシムヘキコトヲ依然確信ス然シテ現下ノ狀態並ニ之ニ含まレタル自ラノ權利義務ニ鑑ミ米國政府ハ茲ニ日本帝國政府及支那共和國政府ノ双方ニ對シ米國政府ハ支那共和國ノ主權、獨立又ハ領土的若クハ行政的保全及一般ニ門戸開放ノ名ニテ知ラルル支那ニ關スル國際的政策ニ關スルモノヲ包含シ米國又ハ其ノ人民ノ支那ニ於ケル條約上ノ權利ヲ侵害スルカ如キ一切ノ事實上ノ狀態ノ合法性ヲ容認シ得サルコト及日支兩國政府若クハ其ノ代理者ノ締結スル一切ノ條約又ハ協定ニシテ前記權利ヲ侵害スルモノハ之ヲ承認スル意思ナキコト並ニ日支兩國及米國カ當事國タル千九百二十八年八月二十七日ノ巴里條約ノ約束及義務ニ違反セル手段ニ依リ成立セシメラルコトアルヘキ一切ノ狀態、條約又ハ協定ヲ承認スルノ意思ナキコトヲ通告スルヲ以テ其ノ責務ト認ムルモノナリ

四、上海事件ニ關スル帝國政府聲明

三四

上海事件ニ關シ帝國政府ハ二月二十九日左ノ通聲明セリ

一、帝國政府ハ國民政府ニ對シ客年十月九日附屬書ヲ以テ支那各地ニ於テ暴威ヲ逞フスル排日運動ハ組織上及實際上國民政府ト其ノ職能ヲ分ツコト困難ナル國民黨黨部ノ直接間接ノ指導下ニ國策遂行ノ手段トシテ行ハルル武力ニ依ラサル敵對行爲ナルコトヲ指摘シ黨部及其ノ指導スル各種排日團體ノ策動ヲ控制スヘキハ勿論其ノ他排日運動ヲ取締リ並ニ本邦人ノ生命財產及利益ヲ保護スルニ必要且有效ナル措置ヲ執ラムコトヲ要求シ尙其ノ以後ニ於テモ幾度トナク支那中及地方官憲ニ對シ右要求ノ趣旨ヲ繰返シ其ノ深甚ナル注意ヲ喚起シ來レリ

二、然ルニ國民政府ニ於テハ彼上帝國政府ノ要求ニ應スルノ誠意ナク甚シキニ至リテハ支那官民ノ帝國及帝國臣民ニ對スル不法行爲ヲ以テ愛國心ノ發露ナリトシ寧ロ之ヲ獎勵スルカ如キ態度ニ出テタル爲メ排日運動ハ愈々深刻執拗ヲ加ヘ殊ニ近時廣東、青島、福州等ニ於テ帝國臣民殺害事件、帝國官吏侮辱事件等ヲ惹起シタルノミナラス支那諸新聞紙ノ我皇室ニ對スル不敬記事事件ヲサヘ發生スルニ至レリ

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三、就中上海ニ於テハ抗日會本部其ノ他各種ノ排日團體ノ跳梁最甚シク殊ニ最近民國日報ノ不敬記事事件及日蓮宗僧侶ニ對スル殺傷事件等ノ發生以來事態益々惡化セルニ依リ在上海帝國總領事ハ同地方支那官憲ニ對シ排日運動ノ取締其ノ他ニ關スル要求ヲ提出シタル處右ハ極メテ公正妥當ナルモノナリシニ拘ラス支那側ニテハ在再回答ヲ遷延スル一方上海ノ周圍ニ軍隊ヲ集中シテ我方ヲ威嚇スルカ如キ態度ヲ示シ爲メニ居留邦人ヲシテ極度ノ危慮ヲ抱カシメタリ

四、尤モ支那側ニテハ二十八日午後三時ニ至リ結局我方ノ要求ヲ容認スルニ至レル處我方ニ於テハ支那側從來ノ道口ニ顧ミ之カ實行ヲ監視スルト共ニ不逞分子ノ策動ニ對スル警戒ヲ怠ラザリシカ一方共同租界工部局ニ於テモ同租界附近ノ支那軍隊等ニシテ不逞ノ行動ニ出ツルモノアリタルニ顧ミ同日午後四時戒嚴令ヲ布告セリ其ノ結果列國駐屯軍ハ協同防備計畫ニ基キ各々配置ニ就クコトトナリ我陸戰隊モ亦其ノ擔任區域タル北四川路兩側ニ對シ二十九日午前零時ヨリ配備ヲ開始セルニ支那正規軍隊ヨリ突如トシテ發砲挑戰セルニ依リ我軍之ニ應戰スルノ已ムナキニ至レバ目下我方ハ支那當局ニ對シ同國軍隊ノ本邦人居留區域附近撤退方ヲ引續キ要求中ナリ

三五

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行動ト均シク全ク居留邦人ノ生命財産其ノ他我方權益ノ擁護ヲ目的トスル外他意ナキト共ニ今  
回ノ派兵ハ從來我方カ英米佛等ノ上海駐屯軍ニ比シ少數ノ陸戰隊ヲ同地ニ駐メ居リタルヲ事態  
ニ應シ増加セルニ過キサル處我方ニ於テハ固ヨリ列國協調ノ方針ヲ持シ現ニ出先帝國官憲ハ關  
係各國領事官、共同租界工部局、各國駐屯軍ト密接ナル聯絡ヲ保チ居レル次第ニシテ我方ニ於  
テ上海地方ニ對シ何等政治的野心ヲ有セサルハ勿論同地方ニ於ケル列國ノ權利利益ヲ侵害スル  
カ如キ意圖ナキコトハ多言ヲ要セサル所ナリ

### 五、上海事件ニ關スル帝國及英米佛國間 往復公文

(1) 上海事件ノ解決方ニ關シ在本邦英大使ヨリ二月二日附テ以テ左記公文(假譯)  
ヲ送付シ來レリ又米國及佛國兩大使ヨリモ略同一内容ノ來翰アリタリ  
以書翰致啓上候陳者本使ハ英國外務大臣ノ訓令ニ基キ閣下ニ對シ上海ニ於テ發生シタル不幸ナル  
事態ノ解決ノ爲ノ左記提案ヲ通報シ且日本帝國政府カ直ニ之ヲ受諾セラレムコトヲ最切實ニ要請  
致候尙本日午後同時刻ヲ期シ支那政府ニ對シテモ同一ノ提案ヲ爲ス次第ニ有之候  
英國政府ノ提案ハ左ノ如クニ有之候  
(一) 左記條件ニ依リ双方一切ノ強力行爲ヲ中止スルコト  
(二) 是以上敵對行爲ノ爲メニスル何等ノ動員又ハ準備ヲ爲ササルコト  
(三) 日支双方ノ交戰者ヲ上海ノ地域内ニ於ケル一切ノ接觸地點ヨリ撤退スルコト  
(四) 交戰者ノ間ヲ隔離スヘキ中立地帯ヲ設クルコトニ依リ共同租界ヲ保護スルコト是等地帯ハ中  
立國人ニ於テ警備スヘク之カ取極ハ領事官憲ニ於テ定ムルコト

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SP. 361 39 0082

三入  
(五) 上記諸條件カ受諾セラルルニ於テハ巴里條約及十二月九日ノ國際聯盟決議ノ精神ニ準據シ豫  
メ要求又ハ留保ヲ爲スコトナク且中立ノ監視者又ハ參加者ノ援助ノ下ニ兩國間ニ現存スル懸  
ノ紛争ヲ解決スル爲メノ交渉ヲ促進スルコト  
右申進旁本使ハ茲ニ重ネテ閣下ニ向テ敬意ヲ表シ候 敬具 一九三二年二月二日

(ロ) 右英米佛各國大使來翰ニ對シ芳澤外相ハ二月四日附ヲ以テ左記返翰ヲ送付セリ  
以書翰致啓上候陳者貴國政府ノ訓令ニ基キ本月二日附貴翰ヲ以テ上海事件ニ關スル提議御通報ニ  
相成リ敬承致候該提議ニ對スル帝國政府ノ所見左ノ通りナルニ付右ニ御承知相成度  
(一) 支那軍ノ挑戰並ニ騷擾的行爲ヲ即時且完全ニ停止セシムルヲ要ス右ニシテ確保セラルルニ於  
テハ帝國軍ニ於テモ戰闘行爲ヲ中止ス  
若シ支那側(正規軍タルト便衣隊タルトヲ問ハス)ニシテ挑戰若クハ騷擾的行動アル場合帝國  
軍ノ取ルヘキ行動ニ付テハ完全ニ其ノ自由ヲ留保ス  
(二) 支那側從來ノ不信ナル行動並ニ現在ノ重大ナル形勢ニ鑑ミ我方トシテハ動員又ハ戰闘ノ準備  
ヲ爲ササルコトハ不可能ナリ

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(三) 日支雙方交戦者ノ離隔及必要ニ應シ閣北附近中立地帯ノ設定ニ關シ領事及軍隊指揮官ヲシテ  
取極ノ交渉ニ當ラシムルニ異存ナシ  
(四) 所謂兩國間ニ現存スル一切ノ紛争中ニハ滿洲事件ヲ含ムモノト解セララルル處同事件ハ上海事  
件トハ全然別個ノ問題ナルノミナラス滿洲事件ニ付テハ客年十二月十日ノ理事會決議モ存シ居  
リ且又同事件ノ解決ニ付第三國監視者又ハ參加者ノ援助ヲ受諾シ得サルハ帝國政府ノ既定方針  
ナルヲ以テ旁本項ハ我方ノ同意シ得サル所ナリ  
右回答旁本大臣ハ茲ニ重ネテ閣下ニ向テ敬意ヲ表シ候 敬具

(Translation)

The Reply of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the British, American  
and French Ambassadors, February 4, 1932.

The Japanese forces will cease hostile acts if it is assured that the Chinese forces  
would immediately and completely stop their menacing and disturbing activities.  
If on the contrary the Chinese (including both regulars and plain clothes soldiers).

三六

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persist in such activities, the Japanese Government must reserve full freedom of action for its military forces.

2) In view of the unreliableness of the Chinese in the past and of the gravity of the present situation, the Japanese Government finds it impossible to renounce mobilization or preparations for hostilities.

3.) The Japanese Government has no objection to their Consul and Commander entering into negotiations for an agreement concerning the separation of respective forces and the establishment if necessary of a neutral zone in the district of Chapoh.

4.) While it is to be presumed that "all outstanding controversies" between Japan and China includes the Manchurian question, the Japanese Government regards this latter as an entirely separate question from the Shanghai affair and moreover it is covered by the resolution of December 10th last. Furthermore it is a settled policy of the Japanese Government not to accept the assistance of neutral observers or participants in the settlement of the question concerning Manchuria. For these reasons the condition in paragraph 5 of the Powers' note is not acceptable to the Japanese Government.

EO

SP. 361 43 0084

## 六、上海事件並ニ陸兵派遣ニ關スル 帝國政府聲明

上海事件並ニ上海方面陸兵派遣ニ關シ帝國政府ハ二月七日左ノ通聲明セリ

一、東洋ノ平和ヲ確保シ世界ノ平和的發達ニ貢獻スルハ帝國政府ノ一貫セル外交方針ナリ不幸ニシテ近年隣邦ニ於ケル排外運動ノ暴威ハ其ノ不統一、不安定ナル政情ト相俟テ列國共通ノ憂ヲ醸スニ至リタルカ國土近接シ利害最錯綜セル帝國ハ列國中最大ノ犠牲的地位ニ立ツニ至レリ而シテ我方ニ於テ世界ノ大勢及善隣ノ關係ニ鑑ミ努メテ友好的態度ニ出ツルヤ支那側ニ於テハ却テ乘スヘシト爲シ頻リニ我權益ヲ蹂躪シ殊ニ國民政府ト殆ト一心同體ナル黨部指導ノ下ニ機會アル毎ニ其ノ惡辣深刻ナル排日運動ヲ擴大シ在留帝國臣民ニ對シ各種ノ暴行迫害ヲ加フルノ實狀ナリ

二、上海事件ハ斯カル情勢ノ下ニ勃發セルモノニシテ是ヨリ先、青島、福州、廣東、厦門等ニ起リタル幾多ノ不敬記事事件乃至暴行事件等ト其ノ揆ヲ一ニス即チ此等ノ事件ヲ通シテ看取シ得ヘキ事實ハ支那官民ノ我國及國民ニ對スル侮辱的態度ト在留邦人ニ對スル暴行ナルカ上海事件

四一

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REEL No. A-0204

アジア歴史資料センター

ハ其ノ最顯著ナルモノニシテ民國日報社ハ去ル一月九日我皇室ニ對スル不敬記事ヲ掲ケ又同月十八日我僧侶等五名ハ何等ノ理由ナクシテ支那暴民ノ爲襲撃ヲ受ケ内三名ハ重傷ヲ負ヒ一名ハ遂ニ死亡スルニ至レリ茲ニ於テ過去長日月ノ間排日ニ苦ミ殊ニ最近其ノ最惡辣ナル情勢ニ對シ隱忍ニ隱忍ヲ重ネ來レル我居留民ノ憤懣ハ其ノ極ニ達シ事態極メテ重大化スルニ至レリ

三、此ノ情況ニ於テ在上海帝國總領事ハ帝國政府ノ訓令ニ基キ右暴行事件ヲ局地的ニ解決シ事態ノ擴大ヲ極力防止スヘキ方針ノ下ニ一月二十一日上海市長ニ對シ反日會ノ解散ヲ初メ四項ノ要求ヲ提出セルカ二十八日午後三時同市長ノ我方ニ對スル回答ハ右要求ヲ容レタルモノナリシヲ以テ我方トシテハ之ニ依リ事態ノ緩和ヲ期待スルト同時ニ支那側約束ノ履行ヲ監視スルノ地位ニ立ツニ至リタリ然ルニ之ヨリ先、盛ニ上海附近ニ集中セラレタル第十九路軍ハ支那内政上ノ關係ヨリシテ必スシモ國民政府ノ命令ヲ奉セサルモノノ如ク前記上海市長ノ我要求應諾ニ拘ラス租界附近ニ於テ戰備ヲ整フル等ノ行動アリタル一方便衣隊其ノ他不逞分子ノ租界潛入モアリ市政府附近ノ形勢亦不穩トナリ流言蜚語甚ク此ノ間關北一帶ノ保安隊モ逃亡シタル爲居留民ヲシテ極度ノ不安ニ陥ラシメタリ共同租界當局ハ右不安狀態ニ顧ミ二十八日午後四時戒嚴令ヲ發シ列國軍ハ豫テ協定セシ受持區域ノ警備ニ就クニ至レル處我陸戰隊ニ於テ其ノ受持區域タル

四二

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開北地方ノ警備ニ就カムトスルヤ支那側ハ我軍ニ向テ發砲シ攻勢的態度ニ出テタルヲ以テ我陸戰隊ハ止ムナク之カ對抗手段ヲ執リ茲ニ日支兩軍ノ衝突トナリ次テ今日ノ事態ヲ致セリ

四、右ニ依リ明ナルカ如ク前記暴行事件ト日支兩軍ノ衝突事件トハ全然別個ノ問題ニシテ衝突事件ニ至リテハ元來我方ノ意思ニ反スルモノナルヲ以テ極力形勢ノ惡化ヲ防止スルニ努メタル結果英米總領事ノ奔走モアリ二十九日日支兩軍間ニ一旦停戰協定ノ成立ヲ見タル次第ナル處翌三十日午前ニ至リ支那側ハ約ニ反シテ再ヒ發砲シ更ニ三十一日午後ノ停戰會議ニ於テ中立地帯ニ關スル協定成立スル迄停戰ヲ約セルニ拘ラス再ヒ攻戰ヲ開始シ其ノ後引續キ攻撃ヲ止メザルノミナラス増援軍ノ上海附近集中ヲ繼續シ我方ニ於テ上海ノ國際都市タルノ地位ニ顧ミ事態不擴大ノ方針ノ下ニ努メテ隱忍ノ態度ニ出ツルヤ支那側ニ於テハ却テ之ヲ以テ我軍ノ敗戦ナルヤニ宣傳シテ益々攻撃的態度ヲ逞ウスル狀況ナリ

五、統制無キ支那ノ現狀ニ顧ミ又過去ニ於ケル幾多ノ事例ニ照シ上海附近ニ集中セル支那ノ大軍ハ無責任ナル政治家等ノ煽動ニ依リ何時如何ナル暴舉ニ出ツルヤモ測リ難キ一方今ヤ我陸戰隊ハ十數倍ノ支那軍ヲ控ヘ不眠不休ノ努力ヲ續ケ居リ我居留民ハ極度ノ不安ニ驅ラレツツアル狀況ナル處海軍兵力ノ陸上派遣ニハ自ラ一定ノ限度アルヲ以テ此ノ際陸軍兵力ノ派遣ニ依リ支那

四三

SP. 361 46 0085

REEL No. A-0204

アジア歴史資料センター

軍ノ脅威ヲ去リ一日モ速ニ上海ノ常態ヲ回復シ列國民ノ不安ヲ除去スルヲ緊要ト認メ茲ニ所要陸兵ヲ上海方面ニ派遣シ以テ從來ノ海軍力ト協力セシメラルルコトナレル次第ナリ

六、要之今次帝國陸軍ノ上海方面派遣ノ目的ハ既往ニ於ケル帝國ノ同方面ニ對スル累次ノ海兵派遣ト等シク多數ノ帝國臣民ト巨億ノ財產保護ノ萬全ヲ期シ併セテ租界防備ニ關スル國際的義務ヲ全ウスルニ存スルヲ以テ其ノ兵力ハ右目的達成ノ爲必要ナル限度ニ止メ且其ノ行動ハ列國共同ノ利益ヲ確保スルノ方針ニ則ルヘク從テ支那側ニシテ敵對行動ヲ終止セサルカ又ハ右我軍ノ目的遂行上ノ行動ニ妨害ヲ加フルニ於テハ之ニ對シ必要ノ對抗手段ヲ行使スヘキモ我方ヨリ進シテ攻勢ニ出ツルカ如キコトナキハ勿論ナリ將又我方ニ於テ上海地方ニ對シ何等政治的野心ヲ有セサルハ固ヨリ同地方ニ於ケル列國ノ權益ヲ侵害スルカ如キ意圖ナキコトハ既ニ聲明セル通リニシテ帝國政府ノ上海地方ニ對シ要望スル所ハ畢竟列國協調及相互扶助ノ精神ニ依リ關係各國ト共ニ同地方ノ安寧ト繁榮ト増進ヲ計リ延テ東洋ノ平和ト福祉トニ貢獻スルニ存ス

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Statement of the Japanese Government concerning the Shanghai Incident  
and the Despatch of Military Forces, February 7, 1932.

It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to ensure by all means in their power the tranquillity of the Far East and to contribute to the peaceful progress of the world. Unfortunately of late years the internal discord and unsettled political conditions prevailing in China, coupled with rampant anti-foreign agitation, have given cause for serious concern to all the other Powers—especially to Japan, which because of her geographical proximity and the vast interests of hers which are involved, has been made to suffer in a far greater degree than any other. While the Japanese Government, in their solicitude for neighborly amity, and international good understanding, have exerted every effort to maintain a conciliatory attitude, China, taking advantage of our moderation, has resorted to frequent infringements of our rights and interests, to various acts of violence towards Japanese residents and to an intensification of the vicious anti-Japanese movement, which is without a parallel elsewhere, as it is under the direct or indirect guidance of the Nationalist Party, which is identified with the Nationalist Government itself.

2. It is in these circumstances that the Shanghai Incident has broken out. It is

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similar to the numerous outrages and insults that had previously been perpetrated at Tsingtao, Foochow, Canton, Amoy and elsewhere, in that they are all characterized by Chinese contempt for Japan and the Japanese and by acts of physical violence. The Shanghai Incident only happens to be the most flagrant case. On the 9th of January last a vernacular journal, the "Minkuo Daily News", published an article, insulting the honor of our Imperial House. Shortly afterwards, on the 18th, a party of Japanese priests and their companions, five persons in all, were the subjects of an unprovoked attack by Chinese desperadoes. As a result, three of the victims were severely wounded and one was killed. The shock of these events was sufficient to explode the longpent-up indignation felt by the Japanese residents in Shanghai, who had suffered for many years past from, and had exercised the utmost restraint in the face of, increasing Chinese atrocities and affronts.

3. Nothing the extreme gravity of the situation, the Japanese Consul General, under the instructions of the government, and in order to do all that was possible to prevent, by a local solution of the question, any aggravation of the case, presented to the Mayor of Shanghai on January 21st a set of four demands including one for the dissolution of anti-Japanese societies. At three o'clock in the afternoon of January 28th, the Mayor's reply acceding to the above demands was received. The

Japanese authorities, hoping that the tension might then relax, decided to wait and watch the performance of their promise on the part of the Chinese. However, soldiers belonging to the 19th Army, then concentrated in the vicinity of Shanghai, began, for reasons connected with internal politics, to display signs of recalcitrance towards the Nanking authorities, and appeared to be making hostile preparations in spite of the Mayor's acceptance of our terms, thus creating a new source of danger. In the meantime Chinese soldiers in civilian costume and various lawless elements had stolen into the International Settlement, creating a source of danger to the quarter in the vicinity of the Municipal Offices. Many alarming rumors were in circulation and the residents were plunged into an agony of terror; the police of the Chapei district having taken flight. Thereupon, on the 28th, at 4 o'clock, the authorities of the Settlement proclaimed a state of siege, and the armed forces of the Powers were ordered out to duty in accordance with a plan that had been previously agreed upon. It was when the Japanese Marines were proceeding to their assigned sector in Chapei that the Chinese opened fire upon them, precipitating a conflict between Chinese and Japanese armed forces, of which the present situation is the outcome.

4. As is clear from what has been said, the incident of the Chinese assault upon



Japanese priests and the Incident of the armed Sino-Japanese conflict were entirely separate affairs. With regard to the armed collision, as it was entirely contrary to every intention of ours, and as the British and American Consuls General offered a tender of their good offices, the Japanese authorities sought to effect a cessation of hostilities, and, in fact, succeeded on the 29th in arriving at an agreement for a truce. But on the following day the Chinese, in contravention of their pledge, opened fire once more. At a conference summoned on the 31st, it was agreed that the opposing forces should cease from all hostile action during the progress of negotiations for the establishment of a neutral zone. However, the Chinese, resuming the offensive, are continuing the concentration of troops in the neighborhood of Shanghai. So far, the Japanese navy, desiring, in view of the international character of Shanghai, not to aggravate the situation has refrained from taking any drastic action, while the Chinese, spreading news of Japanese defeats, are manifesting even greater vehemence in their actions.

5. In the existing state of affairs in China, uncontrolled and uncontrollable, and in view of historical precedents in such cases, we can have no assurance as to the possible behavior of the vast armies congregated in the Shanghai area, should unscrupulous politicians care to incite them. Our marines, opposed to Chinese forces outnumbering them by more than ten to one, are being wearied to exhaustion, while the predicament of the Japanese residents, facing imminent danger as they do, is beyond description. In order to meet the absolute necessity of at once despatching adequate military reinforcements, (as there are obvious limitations to the naval units which can be landed), so as to put an end to the menace of the Chinese armies, to restore Shanghai to normal conditions and to relieve the inhabitants of all nationalities from the strain of fear and disquiet, the decision was taken to order the necessary military forces to Shanghai.

6. It should be stated that this despatch of a military force carries no more significance than the despatch of marines in accordance with the practice on several previous occasions, and that the Japanese Government are prompted by no other motive than that of discharging their international duty and of safe-guarding the large number of Japanese nationals, and the Japanese property worth many hundreds of millions, involved in the affair.

The expeditionary force has been therefore limited to the strength absolutely required for the above purposes, and its action will be guided solely by the policy of protecting the common interests of all the Powers. Unless the Chinese, by continuing hostilities, or by obstructing our army in attaining the above ends, compels