



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
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
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
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


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


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





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
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
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


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THE PRESENT SITUATION IN SHANGHAI

By Kaname Wakasugi Consul General of Japan, at San Francisco

Now after Manchuria comes Shanghai in the limelight of the world's attention. And the public seems to be confused on the situation due to the sensational and distorted reports from China. Since the Manchurian trouble Japan has been constantly accused of the "invasion" of China and even the "violation" of treaties. She has often been presented as an "aggressor," while the world is little informed of the intolerable provocations from which she has had to suffer at the hands of China. Indeed, the American public is blind to the actual conditions in China and to what she has been doing in recent years!

Personally, it is my conviction that Japan and China, as sister nations in the Orient, with their extensive economic and cultural relations, are destined to live in harmony and achieve common prosperity only by mutual understanding and friendly cooperation. We admire the glorious past of China and her cultural achievements to which we Japanese owe our own civilization in no small measure.

However, the trouble is that since the revolution of 1911 China has constantly been in a chaotic condition and turmoil created by chronic civil wars between different factions. In fact, the 400,000,000 peace-loving people have been the victims of a handful of ambitious war lords who control the country solely for their private ends and are quite indifferent to the welfare of the populace. Consequently, there has never existed a stable and responsible government in China, with which foreign Powers have to deal.

Moreover, an outstanding feature of China's foreign policy of recent years has been an intense campaign for the repudiation of the so-called "unequal treaties" from which all foreign nations have suffered. In addition to that, the leaders of the Nationalist Party are engaged in a systematic campaign of fostering the spirit of Nationalism by way of arousing popular feelings of

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antagonism against all foreign nations. In fact, Japan is one of the victims of these campaigns. It happened that the anti-foreign agitation which was once directed against Great Britain is now concentrated upon Japan on account of her position in Manchuria.

With her own experience in safeguarding the independence and securing the abolition of extraterritoriality in the face of Western aggression by her constructive efforts for half a century, Japan is sincerely in sympathy with the national aspirations of the Chinese people, and has on various occasions shown her willingness to extend every possible assistance to attain their aims. But, instead of putting their own house in order and removing the causes of their deplorable condition, the Chinese leaders and student agitators demand the immediate repudiation of those treaties which they call "unequal treaties" and disregard international obligations, either political or financial. Furthermore, it is China's time honored tactics in dealing with foreign nations that she uses one enemy against another, embroiling them in the collision of their interests and benefiting herself by the conflict of others.

The present unfortunate situation in Shanghai is but an outcome of these conditions in China. It appears to be the general impression in this country that the present hostilities between the Japanese and Chinese forces in Shanghai were originated by the former's attack upon the latter for the suppression of the Chinese boycott on Japanese goods. In fact, however, the conflict occurred under the following circumstances and is an incident quite separate from the Japanese demand for certain remedies of Chinese hostile acts toward the Japanese residents, including the suppression of anti-Japanese organizations which instigate and conduct the Chinese boycotts.

For the past several months an extremely tense feeling has existed between the Chinese and Japanese peoples in Shanghai because of the activities of the anti-Japanese organizations in forcibly carrying out the so-called "boycott" by such atrocious means as the illegal confiscation of Japanese goods and the imprisonment of Chinese merchants dealing with them. It may well be pointed out that the so-called Chinese "boycott" is not a spontaneous, voluntary refusal of commercial transactions, but an arbitrary, hostile interference with Japanese trade and industry in China enforced upon Chinese merchants and workers who are willing to deal with Japanese goods, by such organized

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terrorists and agitators under the direction of anti-Japanese organizations identified with the Nationalist Party. Indeed, the Chinese Government, through such organizations, has been encouraging and resorting to it as an instrument of national policy for some time and Japan feels that it is a violation of the freedom of trade which is the essential element of her treaty of Commerce and her friendly intercourse with China.

In the meantime the Chinese press in Shanghai printed articles insulting the honor of the Japanese Imperial House which aroused the indignation of the Japanese residents. On January 18th five Japanese Buddhist priests, without provocation, were attacked and seriously injured on the streets of Shanghai by about fifty Chinese factory workers. Later three of these victims were thrown out on a native farm and tortured and one of them was killed by a mob of three hundred Chinese. Despite repeated protests made by the Japanese authorities the Chinese government has made no effort to suppress these anti-Japanese agitations. In order to settle these incidents, therefore, the Japanese Consul General at Shanghai demanded of the Chinese Mayor of Shanghai the dissolution of the anti-Japanese organizations and the punishment of the assailants and a formal apology of the editor of the Chinese press. After protracted negotiations these demands were accepted by the Mayor on the 28th at 3:00 P. M.

In spite of the Mayor's acceptance of Japanese terms, the Chinese troops of the 19th Route Army continued to concentrate and prepare for military operations around Shanghai and the Chinese police in the Chapei district deserted their post. In view of the menacing situation thus created and accentuated by the assembly of Chinese masses and wild rumors, the Municipal Council of the International Settlement on the 28th at 4:00 p.m. proclaimed a state of siege and in accordance with the usages in that port the foreign troops, including Japanese, were assigned to their respective zones in the general defense plan of the Council agreed upon by the commanders of foreign troops in Shanghai. It was only 9:30 p. m. of the same day that the Japanese commander ordered the sailors to land from the warships in the harbor with strict instructions to limit their necessary measures to the minimum of self-defense and to cooperate with the consular and naval authorities of other powers in consideration of the international character of Shanghai. As the Japanese forces were proceeding to take their post in a zone thus assigned in the international defense plan, a zone which covers

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mostly the Japanese residential quarters, the Chinese regulars who were concentrated along the borders of the zone, suddenly fired, with no provocation, upon the Japanese sailors and there was no alternative for the latter but to return the fire. Thus started the unfortunate clash between the two forces, and the further developments are simply a corollary to this incident. The Japanese actions, therefore, have been defensive measures against the violent attack of the Chinese troops who initiated the trouble. Afterwards a truce was agreed upon by the Japanese commander and the Chinese Mayor of Shanghai through the good offices of the British and American consuls general, but it has been made ineffective by the sudden firing of the undisciplined Chinese artillery.

From the foregoing it is quite evident that the Shanghai affair has no direct connection with the Manchurian situation. It is quite a separate incident, started by the violent attacks of the Chinese regulars upon the Japanese blue-jackets who were proceeding to carry out international duty in accordance with the agreements concluded by the commanders of foreign forces in the International Settlement. There is no alternative for any soldier or sailor but to return the fire when he is attacked. Moreover, in Shanghai there are 25,000 Japanese residents, and their investments amount to approximately \(\frac{1}{2}\)300,000,000. It is the proper duty of a government to protect its nationals and their legitimate interests. It must be clearly understood that the Japanese naval action in Shanghai was purely for the protection not only of the Japanese lives and property but also of international interests, just as other powers had frequently undertaken and are now undertaking a similar action in the same region. It is needless to reiterate that Japan entertains no political ambitions in reference to Shanghai nor has she any intention to contravene the interests of the other powers concerned. Therefore, no question of the violation of the Kellogg Pact or the Nine Power Treaty was involved in this case.

To say that Japan took the incident as a pretext for the occupation of Shanghai or the conquest of China is simply absurd, and it is an insult to the intelligence and pride of the Chinese nation, in view of the proportion of only 1,000 Japanese sailors at the time against the 30,000 Chinese regular troops concentrated around Shanghai. It is also nonsense to talk about Chinese non-resistance, while the Chinese regular troops have incepted hostilities in Shanghai as in Manchuria, and the Japan-

ese are actually suffering a considerable number of casualties at the hands of the Chinese regulars and "snipers." The outside world hardly realizes how dangerous are these plain-clothed soldiers called "snipers" who swarm in buildings and houses even in the International Settlement and fire upon troops and civilians. The reason why the Chinese troops defy the authority of the Mayor of Shanghai and even violate a truce agreed by him must be traced to the complexities of Chinese politics between the Nanking and Canton factions to which they belong respectively.

Furthermore, there are too many misleading reports to call for correction, such as the blockade of Shanghai, the destruction of a church and the bombing of Chinese civilians, and so forth, which are all unfounded. As to the accusation that the Japanese sailors used the International Settlement as a base of their operations it must be pointed out that they were landed there to protect the Japanese residents in their alloted zone in accordance with the Settlement defense plan. As a matter of common sense, how can they act for the duty without being stationed in the assigned position of the Settlement which covers the Japanese residential quarters? This is exactly the same measure that has customarily been adopted by all other foreign troops there under similar circumstances.

However, I hope and trust that the Shanghai incident will be closed as soon as the Chinese forces cease their menacing and disturbing activities and any strained relationship between the two countries caused by it will soon be relieved as a passing phe-

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STATEMENT OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT Dated February 7th, 1932

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It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to ensure by all means in their power the tranquillity of the Far East and to contribute to the peaceful progress of the world. Unfortunately, in late years, the internal discord and unsettled political conditions prevailing in China, coupled with rampant anti-foreign agitation, have given cause for serious concern to all other Powers, especially Japan which, because of her geographical proximity and the vast interests involved, has been made to suffer in a far greater degree than any other. While the Japanese government, in their solicitude for neighborly amity and international good understanding, have exerted every effort to maintain a conciliatory attitude, China, taking advantage of our moderation, has resorted to frequent infringements of our rights and interests, to various acts of violence towards the Japanese residents and to intensifying a vicious anti-Japanese movement which is without parallel elsewhere, as it is under the direct or indirect guidance of the Nationalist Party which is identified with the Nationalist Government itself.

2. It is under these circumstances that the Shanghai incident has broken out. It is similar to numerous outrages and insults that had previously been perpetrated at Tsingtao, Foochow, Canton, Amoy and elsewhere in that they are all characterized by the Chinese contempt for Japan and the Japanese and by acts of physical violence. The Shanghai incident only happened to be the most flagrant case. On the 9th of January last the vernacular journal "Minkuo Daily News" published an article insulting the honor of our Imperial House. Shortly afterwards, on the 18th, a party of Japanese priests and their companions of five persons in all were subjected to an unprovoked attack by Chinese desperadoes. As a result three of the victims were severely wounded and one was killed. The shock of these events was sufficient to explode the long pent-up indignation felt by the Japanese residents in Shanghai who had suffered from it for many years past and had exercised utmost restraint in the face of increasing Chinese atrocities and affronts.

3. Noting the extreme gravity of the situation the Japanese Consul General, under the instructions of the Government and in order to do all that was possible to solve the question locally

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and to prevent further aggravation of the case, presented to the Mayor of Shanghai on January 21st, a set of four demands, including the one for the dissolution of anti-Japanese societies. At three o'clock in the afternoon of January 28th the Mayor's reply acceding to the above demands was received. The Japanese authorities, hoping that tension might then relax, decided to wait and watch the performance of their promise on the part of the Chinese. However, the soldiers belonging to the 19th Army then concentrated in the vicinity of Shanghai began, for reasons connected with internal politics, to display signs of recalcitrance towards the Nanking authorities and appeared to be making hostile preparations in spite of the Mayor's acceptance of our terms, thus creating a new source of danger. In the meantime Chinese soldiers, in civilian costume, and various lawless elements had stolen into the International Settlement, creating a source of danger to the quarter in the vicinity of the municipal offices. Many alarming rumors were in circulation and the residents were plunged into an agony of terror; the police of the Chapei district having taken flight. Thereupon on the 28th at four o'clock the authorities of the Settlement proclaimed a state of siege and the armed forces of the powers were ordered out to duty in accordance with the plan that had been previously agreed upon. It was when the Japanese marines were proceeding to their assigned sector in Chapei that the Chinese opened fire upon them, precipitating the conflict between the Chinese and Japanese armed forces, of which the present situation is the outcome.

4. As is clear from what has been said the incident of the Chinese assault upon the Japanese priests and the incident of the armed Sino-Japanese conflict were entirely separate affairs. With regard to the armed collision, as it was entirely contrary to every intention of ours and as the British and American consuls general offered and tendered their good offices, the Japanese authorities sought to effect the cessation of hostilities and, in fact, succeeded on the 29th in arriving at an agreement for a truce. But, on the following day the Chinese, in contravention of their pledge, opened fire once more. At the conference summoned on the 31st it was agreed that the opposing forces should cease from all hostile action during the progress of negotiations for the establishment of a neutral zone. However, the Chinese resuming the offensive are continuing the concentration of troops in the neighborhood of Shanghai. The Japanese Navy, desiring not to aggravate the situation in view of the interna-

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tional character of Shanghai, has so far refrained from taking any drastic action, while the Chinese are manifesting an even greater vehemence in their actions in spreading news of Japanese defeats.

5. In the existing state of affairs in China and in view of historical precedents in such cases we can have no assurance as to the possible behavior of the vast armies congregated in the Shanghai area, should unscrupulous politicians care to incite them. Our Marines opposed to the Chinese forces outnumbering them by more than ten to one are being wearied to exhaustion, while the predicament of the Japanese residents facing imminent danger as they do is beyond description. In order to meet the absolute necessity of at once despatching adequate military reinforcements (as there are obvious limitations to naval units which can be landed) so as to put an end to the menace of the Chinese armies and to restore Shanghai to normal conditions and to relieve the inhabitants of all nationalities from the strain of fear and disquietude, decision was taken to order necessary military forces to Shanghai.

6. It should be stated that the despatch of military forces carries no more significance than the despatch of marines in accordance with the practice on several previous occasions, and that the Japanese Government are prompted by no other motive than that of discharging their international duty and of safeguarding the large number of Japanese nationals and Japanese property worth many hundreds of millions.

The expeditionary force has therefore been limited to the strength absolutely required for the above purposes and its action will be guided solely by the policy of protecting the common interests of all powers. Unless the Chinese by continuing hostilities or by obstructing our army in attaining the above ends compels it to take necessary action there is of course no intention whatever that it should enter upon an aggressive campaign. The Japanese Government have already declared that they cherish no political ambitions in the region of Shanghai nor any thought of encroaching there upon the rights and interests of any other powers. What they desire is to promote the safety and prosperity of that region by cooperation with other powers and mutual assistance, thus contributing to the peace and well-being of the Far East.


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
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
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





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
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JAPAN'S RIGHTS AND INTERESTS IN MANCHURIA

PREFACE

- Japan has vital interests in Manchuria from the point of view of her national existence and, in her present state of affairs, her national defense. Her interests there are political as well as economic.
- In order to comprehend the real situation in Manchuria, it is fundamentally necessary to grasp the historical background of Manchuria and to understand why Japan became an active protagonist in the affairs of that region. Most of the biased opinion against Japan which is based on quite academical arguments and fallacies has been formed by those who utterly disgrand the historical background. Therefore, I shall briefly refer to this point.

GEOGRAPHY

Manchuria lies in the northeastern extremity of China and comprises three provinces known as Heilungkiang or Amur, Kirin and Fentieng or Liaoning and parts of Russian Siberia and Japanese Korea for its northeastern bounderies.

- Its area, covering about 382,000 square miles, is almost the same as that of Egypt or the aggregate area of Texas and New Mexico. The population of Manchuria in 1929 was variously estimated at from 25 to 30 million including one million Japanese, of which 760,000 are Koreans.
- The area under Japanese jurisdiction in Manchuria is limited to 1400 square miles in total, consisting of the territories including Port Arthur and the Port of Dairen as well as the narrow zone on either side of the South Manchurian Railway, this represents but a fraction of Manchuria, to be precise, the 273rd part of the whole area.

1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Japan did not come politically into direct contact with Manchuria until the war with China broke out in 1894, as the result of a controversy over the question of Korean independence. The Japanese armies occupied the southern portion of Manchuria in their campaign of half a year. After the fall of Port Arthur and Weihaiwei, the Treaty of Peace was signed at Shimonoseki on April 17, 1895. By that Treaty, China, among other things, ceded to Japan in perpetuity all the territory commonly known as the Liaotung Peninsula,

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covering an area of about 10,582 square miles. Russia, seeing in this a check to her own ambitious designs, obtained the cooperation of Germany and France, and the Asiatic squadron of the three Powers were concentrated in the North China waters. The three powers "advised" Japan, "in a spirit of cordial friendship," to restore the Liaotung to China. As the Japanese naval forces, after their struggle with China, were unable to cope with the squadrons of the three Powers, the only practical step was to accept the advice of the allies and surrender the newly acquired territory. Thus the legitimate fruits of war were snatched from Japan by the intervention of the European Powers.

This is why Japan fought with Russia in 1904 and 1905. In the closing years of the 19th century, Russia was audaciously pursuing her imperialistic and aggressive policies in Eastern Asia. As already stated, they had invited France and Germany, and counselled Japan to return to China "in the interest of peace in the Far East," Port Arthur and the adjoining regions that had been ceded to her as a result of the Sino-Japanese War. And within two short years Russia herself leased the region for military purposes. Following the example of Russia, under certain pretexts Germany leased Tsingtao and constructed the Shangtung Railway; France leased Kwangchow Bay and Great Britain leased Weihaiwei. Furthermore in 1896, the famous Li-Lobanoff secret treaty was concluded between China and Russia. It was an offensive and defensive alliance aimed at Japan. It engaged the contracting parties "to support each other reciprocally by all land and sea forces" against Japan. China also permitted Russia to build a strategic railway through Manchuria to Vladiva stok and from Harbin to Port Arthur. Thus, Russia had brought the whole Manchurian area under her sway and was descending upon the borders of Korea, with the obvious aim of menacing the independence of Japan. Japan stood at bay and had to choose between a humiliating inaction leading to the gradual loss of her separate existence and a desperate struggle for her selfpreservation. Japan accepted the Russian challenge and took up arms. She lost 120,000 lives and two billion yen in the war. And Manchuria remained Chinese territory. But for Japan's courage and prowess, Manchuria would long have been lost to China. And there would not be at present a Chinese Manchuria about which China could contend or discuss at all.

2. TREATY RIGHTS

Through the mediation of the President of the United States (Mr. Roosevelt), a peace treaty was finally concluded between Japan and Russia, on September 5, 1905, at Portsmouth, N. H. As already stated, in the Russo Japanese War, Japan lost 120,000 lives and 2,000,000,000 yen. During the negotiations, Japan asked Russia for "reimbursement" of the cost of war, instead of an "indemnity," but this was refused, and only 100,000,000 roubles were paid to

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meet Japan's expenses in caring for Russian prisoners of war. Russia, by the Portsmouth Treaty, transferred to Japan her lease of the Kwantung Province (the region where Dairen and Port Arthur are located) and the railway between Port Arthur and Changchun and branches thereafter known as the South Manchurian Railway, and the coal mines along the railway, as well as various rights appertaining thereto. Had Japan known, before the conclusion of the Portsmouth Treaty, of the existence of the above mentioned secret military alliance between China and Russia, she could have obtained, with the tacit approval of the world, some substantial reparation.

Soon after his return to Japan, Baron (later Marquis) Komura, the Japanese Plenipotentiary at the peace negotiations, proceeded to Peking "to obtain the consent of the Chinese Government." The Treaty of Peking, signed on December 22, 1905, approved the above mentioned transfers to Japan. In this connection, it is interesting to note that when Marquis Komura pointed out to the Chinese representative that the peace and order of Manchuria were intimately bound up with the national safety of Japan and expressed his earnest desire that China would see that peace and order in that region be perfectly maintained, the Chinese representative spread on the minutes of the negotiations a statement recognizing the Japanese point of view. Therefore, by an additional agreement, China gave Japan "the right to maintain and improve the military railway line between Antung and Mukden" which had been built during the war by the Japanese troops, so as to make it fit for the commercial and industrial benefit of all nations. By an appended proctocol to this treaty, Anna pledged herself to Japan "not to construct any main line in the neighborhood of and parallel to the South Manchurian Railway," or "any branch line which might be prejudicial to the interests of the above mentioned rail-

Among the treaty rights which Japan acquired through the negotiation of peace with Russia are: (1) Japan's right regarding the number of troops she is allowed to maintain in Manchuria and (2) the absolute and exclusive right of administration within the Railway Zone. These specific rights have often been the subject for discussion by those who are not quite familiar with the original text of the treaty.

The Additional Article, supplement to the Treaty of Peace between Russia and Japan, signed at Portsmouth, September 5, 1905, provides that "The High Contracting Parties reserve to them the right to maintain guards to protect their respective railway lines in Manchuria. The number of such guards shall not exceed fifteen per kilometer and within that maximum number, the Commanders of the Japanese and Russian Armies shall, by common accord, fix the number of such guards to be employed as stitall as possible having in view the actual requirements," and the said treaty was subsequently confirmed by China. Thus one division of the Japanese Armiy was stationed as the garrison, and eight battalions as railway guards, in the leased Territory and the Railway

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Zone respectively. The Railway guards in late years had been reduced to a smaller number than that allowed by the treaty, so that in case of emergency such as at present, the number can be increased to the maximum (16,500).

As to the latter right, reference should be made to the original text concerning the treaty of Construction and Exploitation of the Far Eastern Chinese Railway concluded between China and Russia. In accordance with Article 6 of the Peace Treaty between Japan and Russia, all rights, privileges and interests which the Chinese Eastern Railway enjoyed in its southern section (from Changchun to Port Arthur) were transferred and assigned to the Japanese Government. By virtue of the original treaty of the Chinese Eastern Railway which provides that "La société aura le droit absolu et exclusif de l'administration de ses terrains," it is legitimate that the Japanese Government will have the absolute and exclusive right of administration of the Railway Zone.

Another treaty right in Manchuria which the Chinese have persistently brought up for controversy is "The Treaties and Exchange of Notes of 1915."

By this treaty, the Chinese Government agreed to extend the term of lease of Port Arthur and Dairen and the term of the South Manchurian Railway and the Antung-Mukden Railway to 99 years, and she also ceded to Japan some other special rights such as to lease land and mining rights, etc., so as to develop the economic interests in Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia. With regard to the extension of the leaseholds in Manchuria, it was natural that Japan should claim the term of 99 years which was granted by China to most of the foreign leaseholders. It was still more to be expected that Japan should ask China for an extension of the term of her railway in South Manchuria, so long as the term of the Chinese Eastern Railway of Russia remained at eighty years. The negotiation of these proposals commenced on January 18, 1915, at Peking, and were duly signed on May 25.

The Washington Conference in 1921-1922 dealt with problems both of armaments and of the Far East, and the Chinese, again, as at the Peace Conference, strongly demanded, inter alia, the withdrawal of foreign troops, annulment of foreign leaseholds, and the cancellation of the Treaties and Notes of 1915 concluded or exchanged with Japan. Mr. Hanihara, a Japanese delegate, replied clearly by stating that while Japan was willing to withdraw her troops from China proper as soon as conditions warranted, it was impossible for Japan "to forego the right, or rather duty, recognized by treaty," and also a to the Chinese demand for the annulment of the foreign leaseholds he promptly answered that "Japan has no intention at present to relinquish the important rights of the leaseholds which she has acquired lawfully and at no small sacrifice." As to the question of the validity of the Treaty or Agreements of 1915, or the change or abrogation thereof which the Chinese delegate urged, the Japanese delegate answered that this question was one to be discussed between Japan and China, if it were to be discussed at all, and not at this Washington Conference. At the meeting of February 2, 1922, Baron Shidehara, a

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Japanese delegate, made a statement in the form of a declaration. The statement observed that the Japanese delegation did not feel at liberty to concur in the procedure taken by China "with a view to cancellation of an international engagement which she entered into as a free sovereign nation." It also stated that "if it should once be recognized that rights solemnly granted by treaty may be revoked at any time on the ground that they were conceded against the spontaneous will of the grantor, an exceedingly dangerous precedent will be established, with far reaching consequences upon the stability of the existing international relations in Asia, in Europe, and everywhere."

Baron Shidehara concluded by saying that "Japan has been guided by a spirit of fairness and moderation, having always in view China's sovereign rights and the principle of equal opportunity."

I am confident that the foregoing explanation is sufficient to elucidate the legitimate and justifiable assertion of Japan's standpoint with regard to her treaty rights in Manchuria.

3. JAPAN'S INTERESTS, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC

Ever since the Russian menace was warded off, Japan has assiduously engaged herself in the economic development of Manchuria. Japan found in that region essential materials for various industries, such as beans, coal, iron, salt and lumber, enough to compensate for the paucity of natural resources in her home land. Her investments to date amount to the huge sum of two billion yen. The potent civilizing agency has been the South Manchurian hailway Co., which has not only carried on the railway business but also built

Bailway Co., which has not only carried on the railway business but also built schools and hospitals, founded flourishing new cities, enforced sanitation, worked and developed mines, manufactured iron, run steamhips, and above all

has greatly helped promote peace and order in Manchuria. The home of ferocious banditry of former years has turned into practically the only stable and prosperous portion of the whole Chinese territory.

Figures are eloquent. Twenty-five years ago, Manchuria had hardly any foreign trade. Now its share of China's external commerce is around 20% of the total, the figures for 1929 standing at 755 million tales. Of this amount, 508 million tales belong to Dairen. That is to say, the trade of Manchuria itself expanded more than sixteen times in the last 23 years, and Dairen's share amounted to more than 66% of Manchuria's total trade. In point of failways, Manchuria has played a most important part in its development, as they do elsewhere. Manchuria, less than 1/10 the area of China, now boasts of nearly 41% of the total mileage of China. More than 3,700 miles of railway have been built in this region since 1897, while little over 5,200 miles have been built in the vast territory of China proper since 1877.

Now, the question arises next, who has contributed the most to this rapid development of railways in Manchuria? Evidently, it is none other than Japan. Of the total mileage of railway lines in Manchuria, China owns more than half, Russia 1,070 miles and Japan about 700 miles. The Chinese railways

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though aggregating a greater mileage than the Japanese or Russian, are mostly financed by Japanese capital except the Manchurian section of the Peking Mukden line which was built with British capital. Thus 39% of the total mileage in this entire area is under the control of Japan, whereas the aggregate percentage of the railway holding of Britain and Russia is 37 and that of Chinese owned 24. In fact, although the S. M. R. operates only 700 miles of railway lines, the company commands the predominant position among all railway lines in Manchuria and Mongolia due to its powerful transportation capacity as well as its up-to-date port facilities at Dairen and Newchang.

Thus, Dairen, the southern terminus of the South Manchurian Railway, now ranks second only to Shanghai of all ports of China in the volume of commerce handled.

Beside the railway management and commercial enterprises, one cannot ignore the fact that a great amount of Japanese capital has been invested in agriculture, mining, forestry, fisheries and various industries such as the manufacture of flour, oil, beet sugar, tobacco, fabrics and ceramics. We will not go into the details of these investments, but I would like to point out that out of some two billion yen of Japanese capital invested in China, about one and one half billion yen, or 75%, is invested in Manchuria and Mongolia, aggregating over 1,687 million yen on March 31, 1930. If the government property aggregating in all 460 million yen be added, the total investment of Japan in Manchuria today amounts to 2,147,000,000 yen. The outstanding enterprise is the South Manchurian Railway and its related industries which represented, as on March, 1931, an investment of over 742 million yen. From the investment viewpoint alone, it is evident that Japan has a paramount interest in Manchuria and Mongolia. The maintenance of peace and order in Manchuria is vitally important, particularly to Japan, not only because our investments in the territory amount to more than two billion yen as stated above, but also because 1,000,000 Japanese subjects, including 760,000 Koreans, have their homes in Manchuria today. Furthermore, the fact that Manchuria has thus been made a safe and prosperous country in contrast to chaotic China proper, has in recent years brought about the conspicuous phenomenon of Chinese from Shantung, Kiangsu and other provinces pouring into Manchuria as immigrants totalling from half million to one million Chinese every year. In former years, these immigrants were seasonal laborers, but owing to the incessant civil war in China the percentage of permanent settlers who bring their wives and children is becoming decidedly higher.

In short, that Manchuria is now the only part of China where one can get steady employment and enjoy life in comparative security, is becoming generally and widely known. There is no disputing the fact that it was Japanese enterprise and industry which created that favorable situation. Japan wishes to prevent any disturbance in Manchuria which would affect the security of Korea and Japan, and ultimately the general peace of the Far East.

Now turning from the economic interests let us briefly refer to our politi-

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Cal interests in Manchuria. It is needless to reiterate here the importance of Manchuria for Japan as the first national defense line from the geographical and strategic standpoint. This is why Japan had to fight with China and Russia to preserve the threatened integrity of Korea. It is obvious that the Chinese political policy regarding Manchuria will directly affect the economic life of Japan. It is highly imperative that China should not adopt such a policy in Manchuria as would jeopardize Japan's interests there. There are about 760,000 Koreans who are mostly engaged in agriculture there, but unfortunately they have been placed under the oppressive measures of the Chinese authorities. The Korean problem will remain the greatest unsettled question in Manchuria for many years to come.

Let us next consider why it is necessary that peace be preserved in Manchuria by Japan. No country would be more seriously affected by disturbances in Manchuria than Japan, because of her geographical and economic relations with that region. It has been a matter of historical knowledge that disturbances in Manchuria encourage unrest among the Koreans living near the Manchurian boundary and give rise to red activities. Manchuria has enjoyed prosperity and progress during the past 25 years, because peace therein has been maintained since the Russo-Japanese War. Japan, in short, is anxious to maintain peace in Manchuria in order to preserve order in Korea, and carry on her economic enterprises there so that she may be enabled to receive the supply of raw materials for her industries at home.

▶ 4. THE STATUS OF THE MANCHURIAN AFFAIR

As it is known throughout the world, the Japanese Government, under the guidance of Baron Shidehara, has been consistently exercising honest endeavors in pursuance of its settled policy to foster the friendly relations between Japan and China, and to promote the common prosperity and well-being of the two countries. Unfortunately, the conduct of officials and individuals in China for some years past has been such that our national sentiments have been frequently irritated. There can be little doubt that the policy of patience and conciliation that has been followed by the Powers with most substantial interests in China has encouraged the Chinese to believe that they could carry to any length their defiance of foreign governments, and their encroachment upon reaty privileges, without fear of effective resistance. It is true as the New York Times wrote that "in their desire to oust foreigners the Chinese are little disposed to live up to formal obligations entered into in good faith and with open eyes by the previous Government in China" and that "the present Chinese rulers will recognize no agreement that is not supported by force" as the Manchester Guardian said. The treaties and agreements which have been either renounced or disregarded by China are too many to enumerate here. Every student of affairs in the Far East is aware that Japan, more than any other country, has suffered from treaty violations and other forms of provocation at the hands of Chinese. In particular unpleasant incidents have taken

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place one after another in diverse regions of Manchuria and Mongolia, in which Japan is interested in a special degree. For instance, there was the capture and murder of Captain Nakamura of the Japanese Army by Chinese soldiers less than three months ago. In the last few years there have been over three hundred cases of China's violating treaties and of her infringing rights acquired by Japan under these treaties. Among them are the construction of railway lines parallel to the South Manchurian Railway; preventing the Japanese from leasing land for business purposes; oppression of Korean settlers, etc. None of these questions have been settled to date due to dilatory tactics by the Chinese authorities. Naturally, impression has gained strength in the minds of the Japanese people that Japan's fair, friendly attitude is not being reciprocated by China in like spirit. There were indications that her patience was becoming exhausted. Amidst such atmosphere, there grew perturbation and anxiety when a detachment of Chinese troops destroyed the tracks of the South Manchuria Railway in the vicinity of Mukden and attacked our railway guards at midnight on September 18th, and a clash between the Japanese and Chinese troops then took place.

The situation became critical, as the number of Japanese guards stationed along the entire railway did not then exceed ten thousand four hundred, while there were in juxtaposition some two hundred twenty thousand Chinese soldiers. Moreover, the lives and property of hundreds of thousands of Japanese residents were placed in jeopardy. In order to forestall imminent disaster, the Japanese army had to act swiftly. It is true that a detachment was dispatched from Changchun to Kirin and quite recently to as far as Tsitsihar in the North, but it was not with a view to military occupation, but only for the purpose of removing a menace to the South Manchuria Railway on the flank, and also for the protection of its feeding line in which Japan has invested a great amount of capital. If General Mah Chan-shan accepts the conciliatory offer of Commander Honjo to withdraw the Chinese troops as requested, we need not take any decisive steps. But General Mah's failure to respond to Japan's demands and his war-like preparations compelled the Japanese to act in selfdefense. As soon as the object, that is, to remove a menace to our interests and the maintenance of order, has been attained a bulk of our detachment will be withdrawn. It may be added that the total number of men in the garrison at present still remains within the limit set by treaty. (According to the treaty stipulation, Japan is entitled to maintain about 16,500 men.)

In order to realize the circumstances and the reason why Japanese troops were compelled to resort to such emergency measures you may well compare the South Manchurian Railway and the railway zone with the Panama Canal and the canal zone, both of which stand much in the same position as a nerve secured to their respective nations by treaty. Suppose a portion of the Panama Canal is destroyed and American lives and property along that zone are en-

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dangered by foreign troops or armed bandits, would the American troops stationed for its protection stand aside with folded arms and wait to see that the case is presented to the World Court or the League of Nations? Did not the United States send 6,000 troops into Nicaragua to protect only 600 Americans and also take similar military measures in Haiti and in Mexico for the same reason as the Japanese troops are now acting on their duties? Numerous examples of a similar character may be found in Europe, too.

As to the movement of the Japanese troops, however, exaggerated news is being circulated and many alarming rumors as well as false reports prevail, such as for example, the report that the Japanese troops have already taken or are going to take possession of every city in Manchuria. Nevertheless, the truth is that the Japanese troops are mostly remaining in the South Manchurian Railway Zone and its vicinity except for the temporary expedition to Tsitsihar to avert the menace to our railway interest, seeing in General Mah's invasion. Due to sensational news stories and to the skilful propaganda coming from China, the purpose of which is to arouse popular interest, it is to be regretted that these exaggerated and unfounded rumors are taken for granted as if they were established facts.

There is often such misunderstanding among Americans as the belief that Japan controls the whole of Manchuria or at least a larger part of its vast region. That is why our present military activities are looked upon as a military occupation of the whole Manchuria. But as a matter of fact, the campaigns of the Japanese troops are mostly along the Railway Zone of the S.M.R. and its vicinity which is only a fraction of Manchuria. Here is the explanation. The area under Japanese jurisdiction in Manchuria is limited to 1,300 square miles of territory known as the Kwantung Province, a part of the Liaotung Peninsula, including Port Arthur and the Port of Dairen, and to a narrow zone on either side of the railway belonging to the South Manchuria Railway Company aggregating about one hundred square miles. The total area under Japanese control, amounting to 1,400 square miles, thus represents but a fraction of Manchuria, to be precise, the 273rd part of the whole area.

As it has been already mentioned the Manchurian affair is nothing but an outcome of a deep-rooted anti-Japanese feeling in China which has taken especially provocative form in the recent challenge to Japanese troops compelling the latter to resort to measures of self-defense. The responsibility for the present situation naturally lies with the Chinese Government.

The Japanese Government has time and again requested the Chinese Government to take proper steps to check the anti-Japanese movement so systematically carried out in various places in China. In spite of our greatest patience and forebearance, unfortunately, this anti-Japanese agitation seems now to be assuming alarming proportions.

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It is learned that the anti-Japanese societies in various ports, cities, and everywhere, have passed resolutions to effect the so-called "severance of economic relations with Japan," which means to enforce the prohibition of handling Japanese goods and the cancellation of every contract with the Japanese. For that purpose, examination of goods and persons; intimidation and violence; and various other means such as severe penalties and threats of capital punishment are being employed. Moreover, cases of expropriation and detention of goods owned by Japanese people and of threats and violence against their lives and property have become so numerous and insistent throughout China that the Japanese have been forced to withdraw, totally or partially, from various localities.

It is to be noted that the anti-Japanese movement in China is conducted as an instrument of the National Policy under the direction of the National Party which, in view of the peculiar political organization of China, is inseparable in its function from the Government. The movement must therefore be clearly distinguished from the one which originates spontaneously amongst the people. It is therefore evident that the present anti-Japanese movement in China not only is in contravention, both in letter and spirit, of the existing treaties between the two countries, but also constitutes a form of hostile acts without resorting to arms, contrary to all standards of justice and friendship. The Chinese Government will be assuming a very serious responsibility if it should fail to take prompt and effective measures to quell that agitation.

5. JAPAN'S POLICY IN REGARD TO MANCHURIA

The question remains: What does Japan want in Manchuria? The answer to that question is simple and clear. Japan wants China to observe the stipulations of the existing treaties. In other words, Japan insists upon the maintenance of the sanctity of treaty rights and other commitments. The preamble to the League Covenant states that the High Contracting Parties of the League of Nations agree to the maintenance of Justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one another. Therefore, not only the League itself is based on the sanctity of treaties, but also the demand of Japan that China recognize the sanctity of treaties and other commitments would have been asking only that which any other nation would have demanded under similar circumstances.

That is the fundamental issue. To be more concrete, the statement of the Japanese Government dated October 26, 1931, will clarify the 5 Basic Principles which they have laid before the League of Nations—viz.:

- (1) Mutual repudiation of the aggressive policy and conduct;
- (2) Respect for China's territorial integrity;
- (3) Complete suppression of all organized movements interfering with the freedom of trade and stirring up international hatred;

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- (4) Effective protection throughout Manchuria of all peaceful pursuits undertaken by the Japanese subjects;
 - (5) Respect for the treaty rights of Japan in Manchuria.

The Japanese Government believes that all of these points being in entire accord with the aim and aspiration of the League of Nations, and embodying the natural basis upon which peace in the Far East must depend, will commit themselves to the approval of the public opinion of the world.

It may be superfluous to repeat that the Japanese Government harbors no territorial designs in Manchuria. All policies of Japan in regard to Manchuria have as their cardinal object: The maintenance of peace and order, and the economic development of the region. It is most essential that in Manchuria the rights and interests legitimately enjoyed by the nations or individuals should be made secure, that their lives and property should be well protected and that safe and peaceful abode should be guaranteed to natives and foreigners.

That is all Japan desires. She has no intention to abridge the Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria nor does she purpose to impede the unification of that country. On the contrary it is the sincere wish of Japan that the whole of China shall be united in peace and order as soon as possible. That would assure the economic progress of that country which will in turn insure Japan's prosperous existence. And Japan wishes to invite economic activities in Manchuria of Chinese, Japanese and other foreigners alike, based upon the principle of the open door and equal opportunity.

As has been repeatedly emphasized, the whole Manchurian affair was occasioned solely by the violent and provocative attack launched by the Chinese army on the railway zone. Certain small contingents of Japanese soldiers still remaining at a few points outside that zone are necessary due to the danger to which the large population of Japanese in that region are exposed both in life and property. The presence of such limited number of troops is quite incapable of being represented as a means of dictating to China, Japan's terms for settlement of the present difficulties. Nothing is farther from the thoughts of Japan than to bring armed pressure to bear upon China in the course of these negotiations.

The Japanese Government has on various occasions given expression to its firm determination to suffer no abridgment or diminution of the rights and interests of Japan which are vital to her national existence, and which are woven into the complex fabric of her political and economic relations with China. As I have already stated, the so-called "recovery of rights" movements in China which have recently attained extravagant developments and antagonistic feelings toward Japan, have been openly encouraged at various schools in China so as to deeply impress the younger generation. In defiance of treaties and regardless of all history, vigorous agitation has been carried on in China with the object of undermining the rights and interests of Japan, even the most

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vital. As things stand at present, the complete withdrawal of Japanese troops to the South Manchurian Railway Zone under mere assurance of the Chinese Government would create an intolerate situation exposing the Japanese subjects to the gravest danger, which is clearly evidenced by past experience.

The Japanese Government realizes as fully as any other signatories of the Pact of Paris of 1928, the responsibility incurred under provisions of that solemn Pact, that I have made it clear that our military measures now taken in Manchuria have been solely by necessity of self-defense. Nothing is farther from the thoughts of the Japanese Government than to have recourse of war for the solution of outstanding differences in China.

It is our settled aim to compose those differences by all pacific means. The Japanese Government has already declared its readiness to enter into negotiations with responsible representatives of China for adjustment of present difficulties. We have no intention whatever of proceeding with any step that might hamper any efforts intended to assure pacific settlement of the conflict between Japan and China.

On the other hand, we have repeatedly called the attention of the Chinese Covernment to the organized hostile agitation against Japan now in progress all over China. It will be manifested that those anti-Japanese activities are acquiesced in by the Chinese Government which cannot be regarded as being in harmony with letter or spirit of the stipulations contained in Article 2 of the Pact of Paris. The Japanese Government true to the established policy is prepared to cooperate with the Chinese Government and to work out such constructive plans as will once and for all eradicate causes for future friction. Their willingness remains unaltered and unabated to open negotiations with the Chinese Government on the subject of the 5 Basic Principles above formulated relating to the normal relations between Japan and China and on the subject of withdrawal of the Japanese troops to the South Manchurian Railway Zone.

This aforesaid avowal will be clearly understood in the light of the underlying principles guiding Japanese diplomacy toward Manchuria that I have tried to outline. It is the determination of Japan to safeguard her rights and interests in Manchuria by maintaining peace and order in that region. To develop Manchuria in peace into a productive and prosperous region will mean nothing but a lasting boom to China, Japan, Eastern Asia and the whole of humanity. Therein lie the aim and policy of the Japanese nation in regard to Manchuria.

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1175 JAPAN'S RIGHTS and INTERESTS **MANCHURIA** ANNOTATED AMPLIFIED FROM A SPEECH BY KIYOSHI UCHIYAMA Japanese Consul, Seattle, Wash. DELIVERED AT THE LUNCHEON OF THE SEATTLE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE DECEMBER 4, 1931 0307

JAPAN'S RIGHTS AND INTERESTS IN MANCHURIA

PREFACE

Japan has vital interests in Manchuria from the point of view of her national existence and, in her present state of affairs, her national defense. Her interests there are political as well as economic.

In order to comprehend the real situation in Manchuria, it is fundamentally necessary to grasp the historical background of Manchuria and to understand why Japan became an active protagonist in the affairs of that region. Most of the biased opinion against Japan which is based on quite academical arguments and fallacies has been formed by those who utterly disregard the historical background. Therefore, I shall briefly refer to this point.

GEOGRAPHY

Manchuria lies in the northeastern extremity of China and comprises three provinces known as Heilungkiang or Amur, Kirin and Fentieng or Liaoning and parts of Russian Siberia and Japanese Korea for, its northeastern boundaries.

Its area, covering about 382,000 square miles, is almost the same as that of Egypt or the aggregate area of Texas and New Mexico. The population of Manchuria in 1929 was variously estimated at from 25 to 30 million including one million Japanese, of which 760,000 are Koreans.

The area under Japanese jurisdiction in Manchuria is limited to 1400 square miles in total, consisting of the territories including Port Arthur and the Port of Dairen as well as the narrow zone on either side of the South Manchurian Railway, this represents but a fraction of Manchuria, to be precise, the 273rd part of the whole area.

1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Japan did not come politically into direct contact with Manchuria until the war with China broke out in 1894, as the result of a controversy over the question of Korean independence. The Japanese armies occupied the southern portion of Manchuria in their campaign of half a year. After the fall of Port Arthur and Weihaiwei, the Treaty of Peace was signed at Shimonoseki on April 17, 1895. By that Treaty, China, among other things, ceded to Japan in perpetuity all the territory commonly known as the Liaotung Peninsula,

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covering an area of about 10,582 square miles. Russia, seeing in this a check to her own ambitious designs, obtained the cooperation of Germany and France, and the Asiatic squadron of the three Powers were concentrated in the North China waters. The three powers "advised" Japan, "in a spirit of cordial friendship," to restore the Liaotung to China. As the Japanese naval forces, after their struggle with China, were unable to cope with the squadrons of the three Powers, the only practical step was to accept the advice of the allies and surrender the newly acquired territory. Thus the legitimate fruits of war were snatched from Japan by the intervention of the European Powers.

This is why Japan fought with Russia in 1904 and 1905. In the closing years of the 19th century, Russia was audaciously pursuing her imperialistic and aggressive policies in Eastern Asia. As already stated, they had invited France and Germany, and counselled Japan to return to China "in the interest of peace in the Far East," Port Arthur and the adjoining regions that had been ceded to her as a result of the Sino-Japanese War. And within two short years Russia herself leased the region for military purposes. Following the example of Russia, under certain pretexts Germany leased Tsingtao and constructed the Shangtung Railway: France leased Kwangchow Bay and Great Britain leased Weihaiwei. Furthermore in 1896, the famous Li-Lobanoff secret treaty was concluded between China and Russia. It was an offensive and defensive alliance aimed at Japan. It engaged the contracting parties "to support each other reciprocally by all land and sea forces" against Japan. China also permitted Russia to build a strategic railway through Manchuria to Vladivo stok and from Harbin to Port Arthur. Thus, Russia had brought the whole Manchurian area under her sway and was descending upon the borders of Korea, with the obvious aim of menacing the independence of Japan. Japan stood at bay and had to choose between a humiliating inaction leading to the gradual loss of her separate existence and a desperate struggle for her selfpreservation. Japan accepted the Russian challenge and took up arms. She lost 120,000 lives and two billion yen in the war. And Manchuria remained Chinese territory. But for Japan's courage and prowess, Manchuria would long have been lost to China. And there would not be at present a Chinese Manchuria about which China could contend or discuss at all.

2. TREATY RIGHTS

Through the mediation of the President of the United States (Mr. Roosevelt), a peace treaty was finally concluded between Japan and Russia, on September 5, 1905, at Portsmouth, N. H. As already stated, in the Russo-Japanese War, Japan lost 120,000 lives and 2,000,000,000 yen. During the negotiations, Japan asked Russia for "reimbursement" of the cost of war, instead of an "indemnity," but this was refused, and only 100,000,000 roubles were paid to

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meet Japan's expenses in caring for Russian prisoners of war. Russia, by the Portsmouth Treaty, transferred to Japan her lease of the Kwantung Province (the region where Dairen and Port Arthur are located) and the railway between Port Arthur and Changchun and branches thereafter known as the South Manchurian Railway, and the coal mines along the railway, as well as various rights appertaining thereto. Had Japan known, before the conclusion of the Portsmouth Treaty, of the existence of the above mentioned secret military alliance between China and Russia, she could have obtained, with the tacit approval of the world, some substantial reparation.

Soon after his return to Japan, Baron (later Marquis) Komura, the Japan nese Plenipotentiary at the peace negotiations, proceeded to Peking "to obtain the consent of the Chinese Government." The Treaty of Peking, signed on December 22, 1905, approved the above mentioned transfers to Japan. In this connection, it is interesting to note that when Marquis Komura pointed out to the Chinese representative that the peace and order of Manchuria were intimately bound up with the national safety of Japan and expressed his earnest desire that China would see that peace and order in that region be perfectly maintained, the Chinese representative spread on the minutes of the negotiations a statement recognizing the Japanese point of view. Therefore, by an additional agreement, China gave Japan "the right to maintain and improve the military railway line between Antung and Mukden" which had been built during the war by the Japanese troops, so as to make it fit for the commercial and industrial benefit of all nations. By an appended proctocol to this treaty, Lhina pledged herself to Japan "not to construct any main line in the neighborhood of and parallel to the South Manchurian Railway," or "any branch line which might be prejudicial to the interests of the above mentioned rail-

Among the treaty rights which Japan acquired through the negotiation of peace with Russia are: (1) Japan's right regarding the number of troops she is allowed to maintain in Manchuria and (2) the absolute and exclusive right of administration within the Railway Zone. These specific rights have often been the subject for discussion by those who are not quite familiar with the original text of the treaty.

The Additional Article, supplement to the Treaty of Peace between Russia and Japan, signed at Portsmouth, September 5, 1905, provides that "The High Contracting Parties reserve to them the right to maintain guards to protect their respective railway lines in Manchuria. The number of such guards shall not exceed fifteen per kilometer and within that maximum number, the Commanders of the Japanese and Russian Armies shall, by common accord, fix the number of such guards to be employed as small as possible having in view the actual requirements," and the said treaty was subsequently confirmed by China. Thus one division of the Japanese Army was stationed as the garrison, and eight battalions as railway guards, in the leased Territory and the Railway

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Zone respectively. The Railway guards in late years had been reduced to a smaller number than that allowed by the treaty, so that in case of emergency such as at present, the number can be increased to the maximum (16,500).

As to the latter right, reference should be made to the original text concerning the treaty of Construction and Exploitation of the Far Eastern Chinese Railway concluded between China and Russia. In accordance with Article 6 of the Peace Treaty between Japan and Russia, all rights, privileges and interests which the Chinese Eastern Railway enjoyed in its southern section (from Changchun to Port Arthur) were transferred and assigned to the Japanese Government. By virtue of the original treaty of the Chinese Eastern Railway which provides that "La société aura le droit absolu et exclusif de l'administration de ses terrains," it is legitimate that the Japanese Government will have the absolute and exclusive right of administration of the Railway Zone.

Another treaty right in Manchuria which the Chinese have persistently brought up for controversy is "The Treaties and Exchange of Notes of 1915."

By this treaty, the Chinese Government agreed to extend the term of lease of Port Arthur and Dairen and the term of the South Manchurian Railway and the Antung-Mukden Railway to 99 years, and she also ceded to Japan some other special rights such as to lease land and mining rights, etc., so as to develop the economic interests in Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia. With regard to the extension of the leaseholds in Manchuria, it was natural that Japan should claim the term of 99 years which was granted by China to most of the foreign leaseholders. It was still more to be expected that Japan should ask China for an extension of the term of her railway in South Manchuria, so long as the term of the Chinese Eastern Railway of Russia remained at eighty years. The negotiation of these proposals commenced on January 18, 1915, at Peking, and were duly signed on May 25.

The Washington Conference in 1921-1922 dealt with problems both of armaments and of the Far East, and the Chinese, again, as at the Peace Conference, strongly demanded, inter alia, the withdrawal of foreign troops, annulment of foreign leaseholds, and the cancellation of the Treaties and Notes of 1915 concluded or exchanged with Japan. Mr. Hanihara, a Japanese delegate, replied clearly by stating that while Japan was willing to withdraw her troops from China proper as soon as conditions warranted, it was impossible for Japan "to forego the right, or rather duty, recognized by treaty," and also as to the Chinese demand for the annulment of the foreign leaseholds he promptly answered that "Japan has no intention at present to relinquish the important rights of the leaseholds which she has acquired lawfully and at no small sacrifice." As to the question of the validity of the Treaty or Agreements of 1915, or the change or abrogation thereof which the Chinese delegate urged, the Japanese delegate answered that this question was one to be discussed between Japan and China, if it were to be discussed at all, and not at this Washington Conference. At the meeting of February 2, 1922, Baron Shidehara, a

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Japanese delegate, made a statement in the form of a declaration. The statement observed that the Japanese delegation did not feel at liberty to concur in the procedure taken by China "with a view to cancellation of an international engagement which she entered into as a free sovereign nation." It also stated that "if it should once be recognized that rights solemnly granted by treaty may be revoked at any time on the ground that they were conceded against the spontaneous will of the grantor, an exceedingly dangerous precedent will be established, with far-reaching consequences upon the stability of the existing international relations in Asia, in Europe, and everywhere."

Baron Shidehara concluded by saying that "Japan has been guided by a spirit of fairness and moderation, having always in view China's sovereign rights and the principle of equal opportunity."

I am confident that the foregoing explanation is sufficient to elucidate the legitimate and justifiable assertion of Japan's standpoint with regard to her treaty rights in Manchuria.

3. JAPAN'S INTERESTS, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC

Ever since the Russian menace was warded off, Japan has assiduously engaged herself in the economic development of Manchuria. Japan found in that region essential materials for various industries, such as beans, coal, iron, salt and lumber, enough to compensate for the paucity of natural resources in her home land. Her investments to date amount to the huge sum of two billion yen. The potent civilizing agency has been the South Manchurian tailway Co., which has not only carried on the railway business but also built schools and hospitals, founded flourishing new cities, enforced sanitation, worked and developed mines, manufactured iron, run steamships, and above all has greatly helped promote peace and order in Manchuria. The home of ferocious banditry of former years has turned into practically the only stable and prosperous portion of the whole Chinese territory.

Figures are eloquent. Twenty-five years ago, Manchuria had hardly any foreign trade. Now its share of China's external commerce is around 20% of the total, the figures for 1929 standing at 755 million tales. Of this amount, 508 million tales belong to Dairen. That is to say, the trade of Manchuria itself expanded more than sixteen times in the last 23 years, and Dairen's share amounted to more than 66% of Manchuria's total trade. In point of railways, Manchuria has played a most important part in its development, as they do elsewhere. Manchuria, less than 1/10 the area of China, now boasts of nearly 41% of the total mileage of China. More than 3,700 miles of railway have been built in this region since 1897, while little over 5,200 miles have been built in the vast territory of China proper since 1877.

Now, the question arises next, who has contributed the most to this rapid development of railways in Manchuria? Evidently, it is none other than Japan. Of the total mileage of railway lines in Manchuria, China owns more than half, Russia 1,070 miles and Japan about 700 miles. The Chinese railways

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though aggregating a greater mileage than the Japanese or Russian, are mostly financed by Japanese capital except the Manchurian section of the Peking Mukden line which was built with British capital. Thus 39% of the total mileage in this entire area is under the control of Japan, whereas the aggregate percentage of the railway holding of Britain and Russia is 37 and that of Chinese owned 24. In fact, although the S. M. R. operates only 700 miles of railway lines, the company commands the predominant position among all railway lines in Manchuria and Mongolia due to its powerful transportation capacity as well as its up-to-date port facilities at Dairen and Newchang.

Thus, Dairen, the southern terminus of the South Manchurian Railway, now ranks second only to Shanghai of all ports of China in the volume of commerce handled.

Beside the railway management and commercial enterprises, one cannot ignore the fact that a great amount of Japanese capital has been invested in agriculture, mining, forestry, fisheries and various industries such as the manufacture of flour, oil, beet sugar, tobacco, fabrics and ceramics. We will not go into the details of these investments, but I would like to point out that out of some two billion yen of Japanese capital invested in China, about one and one: I half billion yen, or 75%, is invested in Manchuria and Mongolia, aggregating over 1,687 million yen on March 31, 1930. If the government property aggregating in all 460 million yen be added, the total investment of Japan in Manchuria today amounts to 2,147,000,000 yen. The outstanding enterprise is the South Manchurian Railway and its related industries which represented, as on March, 1931, an investment of over 742 million yen. From the investment viewpoint alone, it is evident that Japan has a paramount interest in Manchuria and Mongolia. The maintenance of peace and order in Manchuria is vitally important, particularly to Japan, not only because our investments in the territory amount to more than two billion yen as stated above, but also because 1,000,000 Japanese subjects, including 760,000 Koreans, have their homes in Manchuria today. Furthermore, the fact that Manchuria has thus been made a safe and prosperous country in contrast to chaotic China proper, has in recent years brought about the conspicuous phenomenon of Chinese from Shantung, Kiangsu and other provinces pouring into Manchuria as immigrants totalling from half million to one million Chinese every year. In former years, these immigrants were seasonal laborers, but owing to the incessant civil war in China the percentage of permanent settlers who bring their wives and children is becoming decidedly higher.

In short, that Manchuria is now the only part of China where one can get steady employment and enjoy life in comparative security, is becoming generally and widely known. There is no disputing the fact that it was Japanese enterprise and industry which created that favorable situation. Japan wishes to prevent any disturbance in Manchuria which would affect the security of Korea and Japan, and ultimately the general peace of the Far East.

Now turning from the economic interests let us briefly refer to our politi-

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cal interests in Manchuria. It is needless to reiterate here the importance of Manchuria for Japan as the first national defense line from the geographical and strategic standpoint. This is why Japan had to fight with China and Russia to preserve the threatened integrity of Korea. It is obvious that the Chinese political policy regarding Manchuria will directly affect the economic life of Japan. It is highly imperative that China should not adopt such a policy in Manchuria as would jeopardize Japan's interests there. There are about 760,000 Koreans who are mostly engaged in agriculture there, but unfortunately they have been placed under the oppressive measures of the Chinese authorities. The Korean problem will remain the greatest unsettled question in Manchuria for many years to come.

Let us next consider why it is necessary that peace be preserved in Manchuria by Japan. No country would be more seriously affected by disturbances in Manchuria than Japan, because of her geographical and economic relations with that region. It has been a matter of historical knowledge that disturbances in Manchuria encourage unrest among the Koreans living near the Manchurian boundary and give rise to red activities. Manchuria has enjoyed properity and progress during the past 25 years, because peace therein has been maintained since the Russo-Japanese War. Japan, in short, is anxious to maintain peace in Manchuria in order to preserve order in Korea, and carry on her economic enterprises there so that she may be enabled to receive the supply of raw materials for her industries at home.

4. THE STATUS OF THE MANCHURIAN AFFAIR

As it is known throughout the world, the Japanese Government, under the guidance of Baron Shidehara, has been consistently exercising honest endeavors in pursuance of its settled policy to foster the friendly relations between Japan and China, and to promote the common prosperity and well-being of the two countries. Unfortunately, the conduct of officials and individuals in China for some years past has been such that our national sentiments have been frequently irritated. There can be little doubt that the policy of patience and conciliation that has been followed by the Powers with most substantial interests in China has encouraged the Chinese to believe that they could carry to any length their defiance of foreign governments, and their encroachment upon treaty privileges, without fear of effective resistance. It is true as the New York Times wrote that "in their desire to oust foreigners the Chinese are little disposed to live up to formal obligations entered into in good faith and with open eyes by the previous Government in China" and that "the present Chinese rulers will recognize no agreement that is not supported by force" as the Manchester Guardian said. The treaties and agreements which have been either renounced or disregarded by China are too many to enumerate here. Every student of affairs in the Far East is aware that Japan, more than any other country, has suffered from treaty violations and other forms of provocation at the hands of Chinese. In particular unpleasant incidents have taken

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place one after another in diverse regions of Manchuria and Mongolia, in which Japan is interested in a special degree. For instance, there was the capture and murder of Captain Nakamura of the Japanese Army by Chinese soldiers less than three months ago. In the last few years there have been over three hundred cases of China's violating treaties and of her infringing rights acquired by Japan under these treaties. Among them are the construction of railway lines parallel to the South Manchurian Railway; preventing the Japanese from leasing land for business purposes; oppression of Korean settlers, etc. None of these questions have been settled to date due to dilatory tactics by the Chinese authorities. Naturally, impression has gained strength in the minds of the Japanese people that Japan's fair, friendly attitude is not being reciprocated by China in like spirit. There were indications that her patience was becoming exhausted. Amidst such atmosphere, there grew perturbation and anxiety when a detachment of Chinese troops destroyed the tracks of the South Manchuria Railway in the vicinity of Mukden and attacked our railway guards at midnight on September 18th, and a clash between the Japanese and Chinese troops then took place.

The situation became critical, as the number of Japanese guards stationed along the entire railway did not then exceed ten thousand four hundred, while there were in juxtaposition some two hundred twenty thousand Chinese soldiers. Moreover, the lives and property of hundreds of thousands of Japanese residents were placed in jeopardy. In order to forestall imminent disaster, the Japanese army had to act swiftly. It is true that a detachment was dispatched from Changchun to Kirin and quite recently to as far as Tsitsihar in the North, but it was not with a view to military occupation, but only for the purpose of removing a menace to the South Manchuria Railway on the flank, and also for the protection of its feeding line in which Japan has invested a great amount of capital. If General Mah Chan-shan accepts the conciliatory offer of Commander Honjo to withdraw the Chinese troops as requested, we need not take any decisive steps. But General Mah's failure to respond to Japan's demands and his war-like preparations compelled the Japanese to act in selfdefense. As soon as the object, that is, to remove a menace to our interests and the maintenance of order, has been attained a bulk of our detachment will be withdrawn. It may be added that the total number of men in the garrison at present still remains within the limit set by treaty. (According to the treaty) stipulation, Japan is entitled to maintain about 16,500 men.

In order to realize the circumstances and the reason why Japanese troops were compelled to resort to such emergency measures you may well compare the South Manchurian Railway and the railway zone with the Panama Canal and the canal zone, both of which stand much in the same position as a nerve secured to their respective nations by treaty. Suppose a portion of the Panama Canal is destroyed and American lives and property along that zone are en-

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dangered by foreign troops or armed bandits, would the American troops stationed for its protection stand aside with folded arms and wait to see that the case is presented to the World Court or the League of Nations? Did not the United States send 6,000 troops into Nicaragua to protect only 600 Americans and also take similar military measures in Haiti and in Mexico for the same reason as the Japanese troops are now acting on their duties? Numerous examples of a similar character may be found in Europe, too.

As to the movement of the Japanese troops, however, exaggerated news is being circulated and many alarming rumors as well as false reports prevail, such as for example, the report that the Japanese troops have already taken or are going to take possession of every city in Manchuria. Nevertheless, the truth is that the Japanese troops are mostly remaining in the South Manchurian Railway Zone and its vicinity except for the temporary expedition to Tsitsihar to avert the menace to our railway interest, seeing in General Mah's invasion. Due to sensational news stories and to the skilful propaganda coming from China, the purpose of which is to arouse popular interest, it is to be regretted that these exaggerated and unfounded rumors are taken for granted as if they were established facts.

There is often such misunderstanding among Americans as the belief that Japan controls the whole of Manchuria or at least a larger part of its vast region. That is why our present military activities are looked upon as a military occupation of the whole Manchuria. But as a matter of fact, the campaigns of the Japanese troops are mostly along the Railway Zone of the S.M.R. and its vicinity which is only a fraction of Manchuria. Here is the explanation. The area under Japanese jurisdiction in Manchuria is limited to 1,300 square miles of territory known as the Kwantung Province, a part of the Liaotung Peninsula, including Port Arthur and the Port of Dairen, and to a narrow zone on either side of the railway belonging to the South Manchuria Railway Company aggregating about one hundred square miles. The total area under Japanese control, amounting to 1,400 square miles, thus represents but a fraction of Manchuria, to be precise, the 273rd part of the whole area.

As it has been already mentioned the Manchurian affair is nothing but an outcome of a deep-rooted anti-Japanese feeling in China which has taken especially provocative form in the recent challenge to Japanese troops compelling the latter to resort to measures of self-defense. The responsibility for the present situation naturally lies with the Chinese Government.

The Japanese Government has time and again requested the Chinese Government to take proper steps to check the anti-Japanese movement so systematically carried out in various places in China. In spite of our greatest patience and forebearance, unfortunately, this anti-Japanese agitation seems now to be assuming alarming proportions.

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It is learned that the anti-Japanese societies in various ports, cities, and everywhere, have passed resolutions to effect the so-called "severance of economic relations with Japan," which means to enforce the prohibition of handling Japanese goods and the cancellation of every contract with the Japanese. For that purpose, examination of goods and persons; intimidation and violence; and various other means such as severe penalties and threats of capital punishment are being employed. Moreover, cases of expropriation and detention of goods owned by Japanese people and of threats and violence against their lives and property have become so numerous and insistent throughout China that the Japanese have been forced to withdraw, totally or partially, from various localities.

It is to be noted that the anti-Japanese movement in China is conducted as an instrument of the National Policy under the direction of the National Party which, in view of the peculiar political organization of China, is inseparable in its function from the Government. The movement must therefore be clearly distinguished from the one which originates spontaneously amongst the people. It is therefore evident that the present anti-Japanese movement in China not only is in contravention, both in letter and spirit, of the existing treaties between the two countries, but also constitutes a form of hostile acts without resorting to arms, contrary to all standards of justice and friendship. The Chinese Government will be assuming a very serious responsibility if it should fail to take prompt and effective measures to quell that agitation.

5. JAPAN'S POLICY IN REGARD TO MANCHURIA

The question remains: What does Japan want in Manchuria? The answer to that question is simple and clear. Japan wants China to observe the stipulations of the existing treaties. In other words, Japan insists upon the maintenance of the sanctity of treaty rights and other commitments. The preamble to the League Covenant states that the High Contracting Parties of the League of Nations agree to the maintenance of Justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one another. Therefore, not only the League itself is based on the sanctity of treaties, but also the demand of Japan that China recognize the sanctity of treaties and other commitments would have been asking only that which any other nation would have demanded under similar circumstances.

That is the fundamental issue. To be more concrete, the statement of the Japanese Government dated October 26, 1931, will clarify the 5 Basic Principles which they have laid before the League of Nations—viz.:

- (1) Mutual repudiation of the aggressive policy and conduct;
- (2) Respect for China's territorial integrity;
- (3) Complete suppression of all organized movements interfering with the freedom of trade and stirring up international hatred;

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- (4) Effective protection throughout Manchuria of all peaceful pursuits undertaken by the Japanese subjects;
- (5) Respect for the treaty rights of Japan in Manchuria.

The Japanese Government believes that all of these points being in entire accord with the aim and aspiration of the League of Nations, and embodying the natural basis upon which peace in the Far East must depend, will commit themselves to the approval of the public opinion of the world.

It may be superfluous to repeat that the Japanese Government harbors no territorial designs in Manchuria. All policies of Japan in regard to Manchuria have as their cardinal object: The maintenance of peace and order, and the economic development of the region. It is most essential that in Manchuria the rights and interests legitimately enjoyed by the nations or individuals should be made secure, that their lives and property should be well protected and that safe and peaceful abode should be guaranteed to natives and foreigners.

That is all Japan desires. She has no intention to abridge the Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria nor does she purpose to impede the unification of that country. On the contrary it is the sincere wish of Japan that the whole of China shall be united in peace and order as soon as possible. That would assure the economic progress of that country which will in turn insure Japan's prosperous existence. And Japan wishes to invite economic activities in Manchuria of Chinese, Japanese and other foreigners alike, based upon the principle of the open door and equal opportunity.

As has been repeatedly emphasized, the whole Manchurian affair was occasioned solely by the violent and provocative attack launched by the Chinese army on the railway zone. Certain small contingents of Japanese soldiers still remaining at a few points outside that zone are necessary due to the danger to which the large population of Japanese in that region are exposed both in life and property. The presence of such limited number of troops is quite incapable of being represented as a means of dictating to China, Japan's terms for settlement of the present difficulties. Nothing is farther from the thoughts of Japan than to bring armed pressure to bear upon China in the course of these pregotiations.

The Japanese Government has on various occasions given expression to its firm determination to suffer no abridgment or diminution of the rights and interests of Japan which are vital to her national existence, and which are woven into the complex fabric of her political and economic relations with China. As I have already stated, the so-called "recovery of rights" movements in China which have recently attained extravagant developments and antagonistic feelings toward Japan, have been openly encouraged at various schools in China so as to deeply impress the younger generation. In defiance of treaties and regardless of all history, vigorous agitation has been carried on in China with the object of undermining the rights and interests of Japan, even the most

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vital. As things stand at present, the complete withdrawal of Japanese troops to the South Manchurian Railway Zone under mere assurance of the Chinese Government would create an intolerate situation exposing the Japanese subjects to the gravest danger, which is clearly evidenced by past experience.

The Japanese Government realizes as fully as any other signatories of the Pact of Paris of 1928, the responsibility incurred under provisions of that solemn Pact, that I have made it clear that our military measures now taken in Manchuria have been solely by necessity of self-defense. Nothing is farther from the thoughts of the Japanese Government than to have recourse of war for the solution of outstanding differences in China.

It is our settled aim to compose those differences by all pacific means. The Japanese Government has already declared its readiness to enter into negotiations with responsible representatives of China for adjustment of present difficulties. We have no intention whatever of proceeding with any step that might hamper any efforts intended to assure pacific settlement of the conflict between Japan and China.

On the other hand, we have repeatedly called the attention of the Chinese Government to the organized hostile agitation against Japan now in progress all over China. It will be manifested that those anti-Japanese activities are acquiesced in by the Chinese Government which cannot be regarded as being in harmony with letter or spirit of the stipulations contained in Article 2 of the Pact of Paris. The Japanese Government true to the established policy is prepared to cooperate with the Chinese Government and to work out such constructive plans as will once and for all eradicate causes for future friction. Their willingness remains unaltered and unabated to open negotiations with the Chinese Government on the subject of the 5 Basic Principles above formulated relating to the normal relations between Japan and China and on the subject of withdrawal of the Japanese troops to the South Manchurian Railway Zone.

This aforesaid avowal will be clearly understood in the light of the underlying principles guiding Japanese diplomacy toward Manchuria that I have tried to outline. It is the determination of Japan to safeguard her rights and interests in Manchuria by maintaining peace and order in that region. To develop Manchuria in peace into a productive and prosperous region will mean nothing but a lasting boom to China, Japan, Eastern Asia and the whole of humanity. Therein lie the aim and policy of the Japanese nation in regard to Manchuria.

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