

198

並細亞局

第三課長
第二課長

1482

門ノ類ノ項2日9-8 ; 3


情報部

公第六三號

昭和九年二月一日

在中華民國日本公使館

公使館一等書記官 中山 詳



外務大臣 廣田 弘毅 殿


華北及西北保全問題ニ關スル漢字紙
論評報告ノ件

一月二十日ノ華北日報ハ「西北ヲ固メ華北ヲ保全ス」ト題シ左記要
旨ノ社評ヲ掲載セリ

九一八事變後ニ於ケル華北ノ對日問題ハ幾ト外交ヲ無視シ停戰協
定後ニ於テハ之ニ反シ事々ニ外交手段ニ依頼ス之レ何レモ華北ノ

在中華民國日本公使館

1.1.1.0 - 62 227 248



197

1482

モ日露、日米戦争ノ必然性ヲ高調シ居レリ新聞紙モコレヲ論スルモ
ノ多ク「大公報」ノ如キハ日本ヲ以テ往年ノ日露戦争ニ於ケル「ロ
シア」トナシ「ロシア」ノ地位却テ當年ノ日本ニ類似スト論シ居レリ

外務省

1.1.1.0 - 62 226 247

211

REEL No. A-0048

アジア歴史資料センター

200

1482

クハ西北ニ通スルモノナリ又倫敦「毎日評論」ノ視察ニ依ルニ日本軍事豫算ノ主要部分ハ滿洲各省並其ノ臨接區域ノ兵力擴充ニ當ツルモノナリト日本參謀本部ニ於テモ目下西北ヘノ發展ニ注目シ内蒙新繼ニ於ケル日本政權ノ樹立ヲ謀リ居レリ内蒙ニシテ日本ノ領有ニ歸セムカ其ノ新繼侵入ハ易々タルモノナリ在察哈爾某軍官ノ談ニ依ルニ日本ハ極力察哈爾ノ侵入ヲ謀リ居リ綏遠モ亦其ノ理想トセル好餌ニシテ遠カラス實現ヲ見ルヘシト日人ノ深謀遠略此ノ如シ然ルニ我ハ飽迄モ外交手段ヲ以テ華北ノ安全ヲ謀ラムトス亦笑フヘキ哉

日人ノ西進策ニ對スル我方ノ防禦手段トシテハ先ツ西北ヲ固メテ華北ヲ保全シ更ニ進ムテ東北ノ收獲ヲ圖ルニアリ即チ山西、陝西ノ兩省間ヲ開通シ北ハ内蒙察綏甘寧青ニ向ヒ國防區域ヲ劃定シ兵ヲ練リ將ヲ選フヘシ華北東南ノ過剩軍隊等ハ須ラク移駐セシムヘク尙現地ニ於テ蒙古騎兵ヲ選練シテ之カ補助トナスヘシ

同時ニ又道路、航空路ヲ開キ交通ヲ便ニスルト共ニ文化教育ヲ施

在中華民國日本公使館

250
S 1.1.1.0 - 62 229

214

158

1482

萬全ヲ謀ルノ道ニ非サルナリ停戰協定ハ一片ノ文書ヲ以テ濶東ノ收復、河北ノ保全ヲ得タルノ故ヲ以テ論者或ハ外交ノ效ヲ稱スルモ事實ハ外交界識者ノ不滿トスル所ナリ蓋シ同協定ハ日本ノ對華侵略ノ一時的休止ヲ約セルノミニシテ且河北戰區十九縣ハ日軍ノ出入自由ニシテ我軍ハ進入スルヲ得サレハナリ今ヤ「長城線」ナル語ヲ牽強附會的ニ解釋シテ日偽兩國軍ハ察東ノ侵略ヲ開始セリ之ニ對スル我方ノ態度ハ固ヨリ始終容忍的ニシテ只管事態ノ擴大セサラムコトヲ願ヒ徒ニ乞憐的外交ヲ以テ一時ノ苟全ヲ求メムカ一旦日軍ノ東北ヨリ西北侵出詭計完成セル曉ニハ時既ニ遅ク我外交如何ニ靈妙ナリトモ華北ハ必ス奪取セラレ中華民族ハ永劫ニ興ルコトヲ得サルニ至ルヘシ

昨年日軍ノ將ニ平津ヲ掌握セムトシテ竟ニ取ラス眞ニ中國ヲ厚愛スルカノ如クナリシモ今ヤ東北ノ經營着々成リ更ニ西北ヲ窺ヒテ華北包圍ヲ企圖スルニ至レリ夫レ華北ノ亡ヒサルハ一ニ西北ノ保存セルニ懸ル最近日本ハ東北ニ於テ秘密裡ニ道路ヲ構築シ其ノ多

在中華民國日本公使館

S 1.1.1.0 - 62 228 249

213

201

1482

シ經濟建設ヲナスヘシ斯ノ如クシテ始メテ日人ノ進入ヲ防止スル
 ヲ得ヘク之ニ配スルニ外交工作ヲ以テセハ華北ノ安寧或ハ保全ス
 ルヲ得ヘシ然ラスシテ徒ニ求衷外交ヲ以テ目前ヲ糊塗シテ眼光平
 津ヲ出テサルノミナラハ一旦日人ノ西進策ニシテ成功セムカ華北
 占領ノ容易ナルコト正ニ囊中ノ物ヲ取ルカ如シ謀國ノ士夫レ求衷
 外交ニ満足シテ坐シテ斃ルルヲ待チ誤ヲ無窮ニ貽ス勿レ云々

右報告ス

本信寫送付先 公使

天津 南京

在滿大使

在中華民國日本公使館

11.1.0 - 62

251
230

215

203

1482

領土的野心ナク日支共存共榮ヲ必要ト認メ之カ爲支那各派カ和解シ
 支那ノ統一ヲ速ニ實現センコトヲ望ミ(但シ自分(首相)ハ支那ノ
 内政ニ干渉ストノ誤解ヲ招クコトヲ恐レ余リ之ヲ繰返ササルモノナ
 リト附言セル由)政府ハ決シテ支那ノ一黨派ヲ支援シ内政ニ干渉シ
 居ラサルノミナラス日本國民ハ支那側ノ「ボノコツト」ニ對シ却テ
 平靜ナル態度ヲ持シ居ルコトハ國民カ自分ノ不干渉親善政策ヲ肯定
 シ居ルコトヲ證スルモノナリ又滿洲ニ於テハ既存ノ權益擁護ノ外何
 事ヲモ求メ居ラスト強調セル旨ヲ述ヘ董ハ更ニ原首相ノ暗殺ハ日本
 ノ政策ヲ翻シメタルモノニシテ今日ノ事態ヲ招致シタリト論シ居レ
 リ
 尙詳細ハ別添切抜ニ就キ御承知アリ度ク右何等御參考迄報告ス

在中華民國上海日本公使館

S 1.1.1.0 - 62 232 253

217

202

1482

原首相トノ會見ニ關スル董顯光記事切抜送付ノ件
 二月二日 China Press ハ董顯光カ伊集院情報部長ノ「サジエスチオン」
 ニ依リ大正十年十一月四日故原首相暗殺ノ三時間前全首相ト爲シタ
 ル會見ノ模様ヲ詳細記述シ居ルカ首相ハ其際日本ハ支那ニ對シ何等

在中華民國上海日本公使館

S 1.1.1.0 - 62 252 231

第二課長

公第三八號

昭和九年二月五日

在中華民國

特命全權公使 有吉

外務大臣 廣田 弘毅 殿



別紙添附

216

204

1482

本信寫送付先
南
京
北
平

在中華民國上海日本公使館

S 1.1.1.0 - 62 254233

218

REEL No. A-0048

0155

アジア歴史資料センター

207
1482

Tokyo Policy Shifts With Assassin's Blow

Release Of Killer Of Hara In 1921 Revives Memories Of Former Japanese Leader's Sincere Efforts Toward Far Eastern Peace; Results Were Far Reaching

By HOLLINGTON K. TONG

Kenichi Nakaoka, who stabbed prime minister Takashi Hara to death at the Tokyo railway station on the evening of November 4, 1921, was liberated two days ago, having been in prison for 12 years. Since the tragic event, we have heard more about this murderer than about Hara: his life in prison, his piety and his patriotism. This time between the imprisonment and liberation of the noted assassin marks the period of Japan's intensified aggression in China.

Three hours before the hand of the assassin struck him down, Prime Minister Hara said to the writer in his official residence at Tokyo: "Tell your people that Japan has no territorial ambition in China. The two countries must co-exist. My policy of non-interference in Chinese domestic affairs, is being endorsed by the majority of thinking Japanese. You want some proof for this change of the Japanese policy? For proof I offer the fact that there is an entire absence of any desire on the part of the Japanese to retaliate against China's boycott of Japanese goods and other hostile measures towards us."

Advised to Unite

At the doorway, as the writer took his leave after an interview lasting one hour and a half, the great Japanese statesman reiterated this advice: "Also tell your officials and leaders of commerce and industry for me that if you could get quickly together and form a united government the Far Eastern problems would be much simplified. It is not true that for the last three years Japan, as you have insinuated, has given support now to one Chinese faction and now to the other, thereby prolonging China's civil strife. We desire a united China, and a united China will benefit your people no less than our people."

Prime Minister Hara added: "I do not wish to give this advice too insistently or too frequently lest my good intentions might be misconstrued." Unaware of the tragic fate awaiting him, at the railway station three hours later, he sent me away with a winning smile. Little did he then know that he had given his last advice to China, and that his assurance about Japan's lack of territorial ambition in China would later be disproved by deeds. The interview was an historical one. Hara was the last liberal statesman in Japan. Circumstances leading to the conversation with him were rather unusual.

Invited To Interview

In mid-ocean, while on his way back to China, from the world press congress in Honolulu, the writer received a wireless from Baron Ijūin, former Japanese minister to China, and at that time director of the Intelligence Department in the Japanese foreign office, suggesting an exchange of views with Prime Minister Hara, while passing through Japan. This unexpected suggestion was accepted. On arrival at Tokyo, he lunched with Baron Ijūin and Minister Yoshizawa, who was then in charge of the Far Eastern Department, and called upon Prime Minister Hara at 3 p.m.

Mr. K. Yamada, Hara's secretary, one-time colleague of the prime minister on the staff of the Osaka Mainichi, which at that time had a circulation of only 170,000, interpreted the conversation. What Prime Minister Hara said during the interview was of more than ordinary interest in the light of subsequent events, and deserves reproduction in full to emphasize the great change in Japanese foreign

(Continued on Page 16, Col. 1)

China Press

2-FEB-1934 219

6 11.10 - 62 236 255

(Continued from Page 9, Col. 8.)

policy that has been made since his death.

No Conquests

The writer asked whether there were any truth in the report that the Japanese government was still determined upon the territorial conquest of China. Hara paused and then replied: "I can assure you in all solemnity that my country, for which I am an official spokesman, has no desire for territorial conquest or aggrandizement. Some misunderstandings were created by what Japan had done during the Okuma and Terauchi administrations that had preceded mine. China's suspicion of Japan's intentions was aroused by their indiscretion in words as well as in deeds. The Chinese-Japanese relationship, which once had been cordial, accordingly suffered a break and was at several times much estranged.

"At that time I was the leader of the Seiyukai and denounced that policy, considering it as inexpedient and full of danger. I strongly and repeatedly urged that Japan should leave China alone and let her work out her own domestic problems. Interference in her internal affairs or siding with one faction against the other, or taking advantage of her unstable condition to secure material gains would not improve relations between these two countries. I told our politicians that China and Japan should exist side by side. At that time the opinion of the Japanese people was equally divided. A large section considered my views unsound. I continued preaching this idea of helping China for mutual benefit, and of refraining from interfering in Chinese domestic affairs, when General Terauchi succeeded Marquis Okuma. Most of Terauchi's official acts were done against my wish. Three years ago I was able to put my idea into practice when I headed the cabinet.

Policy Changed

"You may not have noticed the change of Japanese policy beginning three years ago," Hara explained, "but there has been a change nevertheless. It would be hard for you to name any instance in the Chinese-Japanese relationship of the last three years which could be construed as an infringement of Chinese sovereignty, or that was of equal magnitude with

some of the happenings in the time of Okuma or Terauchi. Since I have become prime minister, I have refrained from helping either one party or the other in China and, on the contrary, I have been doing everything within my power to promote better understanding."

The writer expressed satisfaction with Hara's efforts to introduce a new China policy and his assurance that Japan harbored no territorial ambition in China, but asked whether that policy would be continuously carried out by his successors in the event of his retirement. Prime Minister Hara replied, as if with a premonition: "If I should step out of office right at this moment, my policy would be continued." This he proceeded to explain as follows:

No Desire For Revenge

"The sentiment which I have just expressed is shared by a growing majority of the Japanese having a voice in the administration of public affairs. One concrete evidence is the absence of any desire of revenge and the prevalence of a feeling of sympathy with Chinese grievances. We Japanese of late have suffered much humiliation from China's hostile attitude. Strong words have been used by Chinese pressmen and other Chinese in condemnation of what the Japanese have done, or what they imagine the Japanese have done or would do. Notwithstanding all this, the Japanese have shown good-natured indifference in their intercourse with the Chinese. The majority of our people have never thought of retaliatory action on account of China's unfriendliness, and are rather blaming themselves for its existence. Such an attitude on the part of the Japanese was an impossibility before. It indicates the sentiment of the bulk of the people here on Chinese questions. It also indicates the probability of the continuation of my policy by my successors."

Prime Minister Hara's attention was called to a rumor that the participating powers at the Washington conference, which then was proceeding, had admitted Japan's needs for legitimate expansion in an economic way, and that they might even consider the question of giving a slice of Chinese territory to Japan for that expansion. The writer expressed his surprise to hear of such a sinister rumor, and said that if it were not immediately denied, it might increase the bitterness of Chinese feelings. He asked Hara for an expression of his views on the matter.

To Protect Nationals

Hara, after a few seconds' reflection, said: "A slice of territory" referred to in the rumor must mean Mongolia and Manchuria. I have read something about it in the foreign press. But so far as Japan is concerned such a report is far from the truth. In Manchuria and Mongolia Japan has acquired some interest. Many Japanese are living and trading there. Naturally we would continuously see to it that they enjoy proper protection. In other words we retain what we have already got, but we do not propose to get any more."

He added with a smile: "How could the representatives of the different nations at the Washington conference dispose of territory that does not belong to them? Such a question must and can concern only the two countries. As for Japan, she will not dream of attempting to appropriate any territory belonging to another country. In the 20th century territorial conquest is a poor policy indeed. Our present policy in Manchuria and Mongolia, as I have just said, is to protect what we have secured."

Seek Commerce

"What we are seeking, or should seek from China," further explained Mr. Hara, "is her commerce, which is much more important to us than anything else. The territorial propinquity of China and Japan has given the latter country some commercial advantages, but we do not wish to monopolize the trade of China in which representatives of all the nations can compete on an equal footing. If the Japanese have Chinese goodwill in addition to the advantages offered by territorial propinquity, they should be able to get along in China commercially much better than any other nation. If such is the case, other nationals need not grumble at us."

Mr. Hara urged China's acceptance of Japan's assistance to

develop her commerce and industry, and suggested the formation of joint companies to develop Chinese natural resources. "It is very well", said the writer, "for the prime minister to be so considerate of China's interests, but without stability in China such a well thought plan could not be carried out. However rumors were persistently circulated fixing the blame on Japan for the continuation of civil strife in China. What have you to say in regard to this accusation?"

China Press

S 1.1.1.0 - 62 - 235 2562 FEB 1934 220

205

1432

Get Together

The reply was to this effect: "Since the beginning of my administration, no partiality has been shown in Chinese factional fighting. The charge that the Japanese have been backing now one party and now another in your country is not true. As far as I am concerned I have always been advising leaders in both North and South China, who approach me for counsel, to get together as quickly as possible so that Japan can deal with a united China. But my advice cannot be repeated too often lest it should be construed as a form of interference in Chinese domestic affairs. So I am cautious in what I have to say to these leaders, mindful of their sensitiveness and at the same time aware of China's need for freedom from the prolonged civil strife."

On the day after Mr. Hara's assassination, Mr. Yamada, his secretary, told Baron Ijūin: "I am glad that Prime Minister Hara should have given the last interview to Mr. Tong and could have sent to China, through a distinguished Chinese journalist, before his tragic ending, his last public statement on Japan's foreign policy towards China."

During this short period of 12 years, what has happened in the Chinese-Japanese relationship has been diametrically opposite to the assurances that were given by Mr. Hara in his last interview with the writer. Hara said that Japan entertained no territorial ambition in China, but where are Manchuria and Jehol? Hara advocated friendliness as the best policy to further Japanese commercial interests in China, but his successors have ruthlessly persecuted the Chinese in their attempt to increase their trade with them.

Deathblow To Manchuria

Kenichi Nakaoka, who laid Hara, Japan's last liberal statesman, low at the Tokyo railway station, also struck a deathblow at Manchuria and part of Mongolia. The fear of the intrusion of a third party in the midst of the prolonged enmity between China and Japan following the latter's expansionist policy, which Hara gave on parting as his reason for conciliation with China, is capable of being transformed into a fact as long as Nakaoka or other Japanese who carry out assassinations of their statesmen from misdirected patriotism are lauded sky high.

There could be no greater contrast between what might have been and what is, than when Chinese-Japanese relations are considered. Had the liberal policy of Mr. Hara been carried out, China and Japan would now be amicably working together to their mutual benefit, and also to the benefit of the whole world. Instead of that, Japan pursued a persistent policy of aggression culminating in an undeclared war. This led to the augmentation of the territory under Japan's control, but also to the practical ostracism of Japan. She has turned away her eyes from the one true light, and is stumbling on—whither?—guided by the fitful glare of war torches.

S 11.1.0 - 62 234
257

CHINA PRESS

RECEIVED

221

REEL No. A-0048



209

1482

府ヲ訪問スルハ使節ノ職分ニシテ何等不思儀ナルモノニハアラス今
 同有吉氏訪京ノ目的ハ「日支間重要問題ノ討議ニ挨拶ニ廈門福州ニ
 於ケル支那飛行場擴張問題ニ關スルモノナリト傳ヘラレ居ル處其主
 タル目的ハ最近日本側カ頗ル懸念スル飛行場問題ニ關スルモノナル
 モノノ如ク先般議會ニ於テ本件ニ關シ廣田外相カ難問ヲ受ケタルハ
 吾人ノ記憶スル所ニシテ貴院ノ赤池氏ハ中國航空會社飛行機ノ爲ニ
 福建ニ着陸場ヲ建設スルハ一八九八年ノ條約ニ違反スルモノナリト
 聲明シ尙右會社ハ主トシテ米國ノ投資ニ依リ設立セラレタルモノニ
 シテ名義上商用ナリト雖實際ハ米支間ニ締結セラレタリト稱セラル
 、秘密條約ノ結果トシテ軍用ニ供セラル、モノナルヘシ又廈門ニ軍
 用飛行場カ建設セラル、ニ於テハ臺灣ニハ軍用飛行機カ數時間ニシテ

在天津日本總領事館

S 1.1.1.0 - 62

238
259

223

208

第二課長
第三課長
亞細亞局

1482

普通第一九七號
 昭和九年二月二十三日
 在天津
 總領事 栗原
 外務大臣 廣田 弘毅 殿
 有吉公使南京訪問ニ關スル英字紙論調報告ノ件
 有吉公使南京行ニ關シ當地發行京津「タイムス」ハ別紙切抜ノ通り
 南京發特電ヲ掲ケルト共ニ二十三日「日本ト支那ノ航空術」ト題シ
 大要左記譯文ノ如キ社説ヲ掲ケタルニ付何等御參考迄右報告申進ス
 記
 日本ノ公使カ南京訪問ノ場合ハ常ニ風説起ルモ外國使節カ一國ノ首

在天津日本總領事館

S 1.1.1.0 - 62

237

258

222

211

1482

飛到スルコトトナリ日本ノ國防ヲ危殆ニ瀕セシムヘシト述ヘタルカ
 之ニ對シ廣田氏ハ充分調査ヲ要スル旨ヲ聲明セリ右討論ニ次テ紐育
 ノ某官憲ハ米國政府カカ、ル協定ニ參加シタルコトナキモ邁々米國
 人ノ飛行專問家カ支那ノ飛行隊ニ教官トシテ働キ居ル事實ヲ見テ日
 本カ神經ヲ尖ラシタルモノノ如ク所謂論争ノ核心ハ此ノ點ニ存スト
 述ヘ國務省モ明瞭ニ秘密條約ヲ否定セリ實際外國人專問家カ支那政
 府ニ雇傭セラル、コトニ對シ異議ヲ申立ツヘキ何等法律上根據ナキ
 ハ明カナルモ支那ノ航空力將又軍事教練ノ進展カ現ニ杭州及其以南
 ニ行ハレツ、アル事實ハ日本人ノ心配ノ種トナルヘキハ尤モノ儀ナ
 リ然レトモ今ヤ南京及廣東ノ分裂カ多少避ケ難キ情勢ニアルニ顧ミ
 南京政府トシテハ航空軍備カ政府反對側ニ對スル最重要ナルモノト

210

1482

思惟スルニ至リタルハ明カナリ而シテ一八九八年ノ條約ハ支那ニ對
 シ福建ノ沿岸ニ外國ノ軍事施設ヲ禁止シ且ツ外國資本ヲ以テ支那カ
 軍事的施設ヲ爲スヲ許ササルノ規定ナルモ右條約ハ疑モナク當時某
 々外國カ海軍根據地建設ノ意圖アリトノ流説アリタルヲ認識シテ締
 結スルニ至リタルモノニシテ飛行術ニ關シ大ナル關心ヲ有セサリシ
 時代ノコトナリサレハ福建ノ飛行場ハ表向キ中國航空會社ノ商業飛
 行ノ爲ニ使用セラル、モノナルモ萬一該飛行場カ外國ノ借款ニ依リ
 建設セラレタルモノナルコトカ立證セラル、ニ於テハ之ヲ軍事用ニ
 供スルニハ法律上ノ制限ヲ受クルコトトナルヘシ而シテ此點ニ關シ
 日本ハ米國ニ對スル支那麥棉借款ノ一部カ右目的ニ充當セラル、モ
 ノナリト主張シ居ル所以ナルモ一、二飛行場ノ地均シニハサシテ費

在天津日本總領事館

在天津日本總領事館

1.1.1.0 - 62

240 261

225

1.1.1.0 - 62

239 260

224

212

1482

用ヲ要セサルヘク如何ニ支那ノ貧乏政府タリト雖モ之ニ應スルノ力
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 人モ之ヲ以テ臺灣ヲ威嚇スル爲ナリトハ考ヘサルヘシ

本信寫送付 在中公使 北平

在天津日本總領事館

6 1.1.1.0 - 62

262
241

226

REEL No. A-0048

7/3

1482

MR. ARIYOSHI IN NANKING.

Pleased With Discussions.

A NOTE OF SYMPATHY WITH GOVERNMENT.

Frank Exchange of Views.

Nanking, Feb. 21.

Japanese Minister Ariyoshi, accompanied by Chinese Secretary Arino, called on Mr. Wang Ching-wei at the latter's official residence at 4 p.m. to-day, and was closeted with him for over two hours, discussing ways and means of settling various pending questions between China and Japan.

After the meeting, Mr. Ariyoshi stated that he had very delightful conversations with the Chairman of the Executive Yuan, frankly exchanging views on different Sino-Japanese questions. He could clearly note considerable modification of the attitude on the part of the Chinese officials towards Japan. Mr. Wang appears to be greatly concerned with the institution of the Monarchy in Manchuria and Mongolia, although he had no concrete plan against it.

Feeling very grateful towards Japan for the just and impartial attitude taken by her in connection with the Fukien incident, the Chinese authorities seem to be seriously thinking of settling the various questions pending between the two countries, but because of their relations to different domestic administrative problems, they are unable to carry on things as Japan desires. There is every necessity for the Japanese Government to consider with sympathy the difficult position in which they are placed.

The Japanese Minister proposes to visit Nanking as often as the opportunity presents itself, and converse with Chinese

officials on different questions. Mr. Ariyoshi intends to go back to Tokyo probably in April, but the time has not been fixed yet.

He held a banquet at the Japanese Consulate-General on the evening of the 21st to entertain Mr. Wang Ching-wei and nineteen other high government officials. It is considered to be rather unusual to see so many prominent Chinese officials accept the invitation of the Japanese Minister.—Reuter.

Nanking, Feb. 22.

The visit of the Japanese Minister Mr. Ariyoshi, who arrived here yesterday, is attracting close attention in diplomatic circles, though he is scheduled to make a short stay only, returning to Shanghai on Monday next. He called on Mr. Wang Ching-wei, Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, at the Waichiaopu for a conference at 4 p.m. Wednesday.

It is reported that in view of China's efforts to open negotiations between China and Britain, United States and Soviet Russia for the conclusion of new treaties and pacts, which will seriously affect Sino-Japanese relations, the Japanese Government has decided to use every available means within its command to "induce" the National Government to open negotiations for the solution of the Sino-Japanese outstanding problems in North China.

The object of the Japanese Minister's present visit is to ascertain the real attitude of the authorities towards Japan and Manchukuo, in preparation to render a report to his home Government on his return to Tokio. In addition he lodged a verbal protest to the Waichiaopu against the extension of the aerodromes at Foochow and Amoy by the Civil Aviation Co. of China which the Japanese contend is in violation of the existing treaties. Japan practically regards the new aerodromes as part of a Sino-American Aviation Agreement.—Asiatic.

S 1.1.1.0 - 62

242 263

227

215

1482

後ノ今日ハ既ニ殆ト完全ニ實現セラレタルコトヲ指摘シタル上日本ノ對滿對支貿易ノ進展狀態ヲ述ヘ殊ニ對支貿易ニ付テハ對日「ボイコット」カ終熄シタルノミナラス長城附近カ實際上日本ノ勢力下ニアル關係上滿洲方面ヨリ日本品カ盛ニ密輸入サルルコト及阿片其他ノ麻藥カ日本ヨリ滿洲ヲ通シテ密輸入サルルコト與リテ力アリトシ更ニ在支日本紡績ノ活動ニモ觸レ進ンテ一般ニ日本ノ對外貿易ノ發展ハ圓價ノ下落ニ起因スル次第ヲ説明シタル後日本ノ將來ニ對スル暗雲ハ諸外國カ日本品ノ流入ニ對シ障壁ヲ設ケントシ居ルコト及日本ノ膨大ナル軍事費ノ問題ナリトナシ最後ニ日本ハ滿洲克服ニ依リテモ尙石油、「ゴム」、棉花、錫、羊毛其他種々ノ原料品ニ不足ヲ感シ居ル處日本カ外國ト平和ヲ維持シ且其ノ對外貿易力阻マレサ

S 1.1.1.0 - 62

244

265

229

REEL No. A-0048

214

第二課長
第三課長

1482

豆類課長

精報部
普通公第一四一號
昭和九年二月二十六日
在米
特命全權大使 齋藤
外務大臣 廣田 弘毅 殿

「ウイルバー、パトントン」ノ日本ニ關スル評論
報告ノ件



「ボルチモア、サン」特派員「ウイルバー、パトントン」ハ上海ヨリ日本ノ政策其他ニ關スル評論ヲ通信シ右ハ二月二十一日及二十二日ノ同紙ニ掲載セラレタル處要旨左ノ如シ

「日本ノ滿洲克服ハ日本人自身ノ期待ヨリモ遙カニ速ニ行ハレ二年

S 1.1.1.0 - 62

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264 4/2



217

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267

6 1.1.1.0 - 62 246

231

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1482

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
266

6 1.1.1.0 - 62 245

230

218

1482



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6 13.1.0 - 62

268
247

232

REEL No. A-0048



アジア歴史資料センター

JAPANESE IMPERIALISM SLOWS DOWN IN SPOTS

Burton, Analyzing Tokyo's "Moral" Position, Finds Gains That "Justify" Game Played, But Notes Resistance By Western Nations

1482

By WILBUR BURTON
[Special Correspondence of The Sun]

In Wednesday morning's Sun Mr. Burton discussed the economic aspects of Japan's activities in Manchuria. Today he discusses the "moral" side of the question.

SHANGHAI, Jan. 21. ALMOST if not equally as important as Japan's economic position is what may be called her moral position, both on her home front and abroad, after twenty-eight months of conquest of China.

Like her economic position, Japan's moral position has been by no means uniform during this period. I use the word moral here in its broad philosophical rather than its narrow ethical sense; absolute and abstract standards of right and wrong are really of little avail in assaying the actions of nations, for all that really counts is the manner in which a nation is able to proceed with any given policy. This manner, upon being analyzed, depends on two prime factors—the attitude of the nation itself and the attitude of other nations which are affected or interested. And obviously these factors are interacting.

It is true that Japan's policy during the past twenty-eight months has been dominated by her militarists, but to think, as many apparently do, that these militarists are a species of madmen cannot be justified by the course of events. On the whole, despite considerable frothing that is characteristic of either militarists or politicians on a rampage the world over, they appear quite canny and, at times, very cautious. Also, to think, as some liberals in the West apparently do, that these militarists are violently opposed by many Japanese themselves who await an opportunity to alter the national course, is to ignore facts.

IN TRUTH, there is not now and never has been any very great difference of opinion among Japanese groups who have any voice in their Government on policy toward China.

Ever since Japan's rise to international importance—coincidentally with almost constant chaos in China—Tokyo has regarded Cathay as her natural sphere for imperialistic exploitation. Manchuria, especially, was regarded as a "life-line" long before some Japanese military propagandist coined that designation. Prior to 1931 there was for a time a large group in

Japan who believed that the desired exploitation could be carried on peacefully. When increasing Chinese nationalism and, particularly, increasing Chinese development of Manchuria, cast doubt on the success of a policy of peaceful penetration, the military decided on force.

While the wisdom of their actions has at times been questioned by their civilian fellow-countrymen, there has been no dispute over the objective. And since the military have so far proved that they can "get away with it" without much effective opposition from either China or any other country, they have been fully justified in the eyes of the average Japanese.

TO UNDERSTAND this, it is necessary to look at the situation from the Japanese viewpoint. Japan is a small, virile nation that is desperately in need of expansion, but which rose to be a great power late in history when most of the world had been gobbled up by older great powers. The area of Japan proper (exclusive of colonies) is 147,416 square miles, or almost exactly equal to Montana. The area of the empire (exclusive of Manchuria) is 260,186 square miles, or slightly less than Texas. And the productive land of Japan proper—which has a population of almost 65,000,000—is only 23,000 square miles, or about the area of West Virginia.

About fifteen years ago, at the Versailles peace conference, Japan sought a racial equality clause in the League of Nations Covenant which would have guaranteed equal treatment of all participating peoples in matters of immigration, residence, mining and coastal trade. Not only was this concession refused, but practically every Western country today has barred Japanese immigrants. Thus the Japanese are confined largely to the Orient, and why shouldn't they make the most of it? England seized India; the United States seized the Panama Canal Zone and the Philippines; France seized Morocco and Indo-China; et cetera. Why then, reasons a Japanese, shouldn't Japan seize Manchuria?

Of course, Japan has had to violate several treaties in her conquest that did not exist when other great powers were engaged in imperial expansion, but it was a Western, not a Japanese,

statesmen who first designated treaties as "scraps of paper."

WHEREFORE, it should not be difficult to understand that the Japanese are quite united in favor of their present national policy, at least in so far as Westerners might object to it on ethical grounds. Thus Tokyo's moral position at home is very strong.

Further, as I have pointed out in previous articles, the principal victim of this policy—China—has become increasingly friendly to Japan. Aside from the Nanking Government, there are many influential Chinese who regard Japan as the best protector of China and who believe, for example, a current Japanese propaganda thesis that if Soviet Russia should defeat

Japan, China would become Bolshevized, while if the United States should ever crush Japan, China would become an American colony.

AGAIN, many Chinese who once had faith in the League of Nations now believe that China would have lost less had she dealt directly with Japan in the beginning of the Manchurian invasion instead of depending on Geneva. Still further, the largest group of returned students in China were educated in Japan; outstanding among them is Gen. Chiang Kai-shek himself, and many lesser Chinese militarists also were trained in Japan and genuinely admire the Japanese policy of ruthless armed force.

These Japanese-educated and usually actively pro-Japanese leaders have been becoming more and more dominant, not only in Nanking, but in Peiping and elsewhere. One of the most recent results of their influence has been to block a nonaggression pact between Nanking and Moscow; drafts of the treaty had even been exchanged when negotiations were broken off through the diplomacy of Tokyo.

BUT ALTHOUGH Japan's moral position both on her home front and in China is robust, she has been receiving several setbacks elsewhere. Almost two years ago I cited that a major item in Tokyo's facile conquest was the fear of many Western nations that to curb Japan would be to aid Soviet Russia.

Today the menace of Japan on Russia's eastern frontier and the rise of the Nazis in the West (which has alike ended Russia's former cordial relations with Germany and any immediate prospect of a Red Reich) have apparently caused marked modifications in the policy of the U. S. S. R. Certainly, the Roosevelt-Litvinoff agreement indicates definite abandonment of revolution as an instrument of national policy. Thus Moscow may be expected to grow increasingly more respectable in capitalistic eyes, and more than one

nation may soon turn to her rather than with Japan in the Orient, especially if and when the Red movement declines appreciably in China proper.

Nazi Germany, on the other hand, if and when she rearms, may be a prospective Western ally for Japan, but at the present time Tokyo faces increasing isolation among the major world powers. The establishment of relations between the United States and the U. S. S. R., while not unexpected, was displeasing to Japan and she believes, correctly or incorrectly, that Washington and Moscow have reached some understanding to curb her, or at least to prevent any further rampage along the Soviet border.

AT THE SAME time, other nations—notably Great Britain—feel that Japan has already gone too far in quest of Celestial hegemony, and the time has come for application of the brakes. The net effect of these developments has been, on one hand, to check Tokyo's belligerency to Moscow and, on the other, to encourage anti-Japanese groups in China. Even in this war-torn country with fully ninety-five per cent. of the population illiterate, public opinion counts for something, and there has been recently a perceptible slowing up in Sino-Japanese moves for a de jure recognition of Nippon's gains to date.

In November, at the time of T. V. Soong's resignation (in part because of the toboggan speed of General Chiang's pro-Japanese policy), a settlement appeared imminent with perhaps some grand gesture by Tokyo, such as cancellation of the virtually uncollectable Nishihara loans of 600,000,000 yen (which were a bribe to members of the old Peking Government in connection with the Twenty-one Demands) and abolition of extraterritoriality. However, since American recognition of Russia, considerable propaganda by Mr. Soong and the Fukien revolt, all negotiations appear to be in a state of suspended animation.

BUT EVEN though Japan may be halted for some time in going farther, it is doubtful if there is enough pressure from any source to make her retreat either in China proper or in Manchuria.

Even now her armies are stirring again in North China with apparent reiteration of her old threat to the Chinese: Either negotiate or take more punishment. In two months Nanking's deficit has risen from \$10,000,000 (Shanghai currency) a month to \$14,000,000, and it is not unlikely that a default even on foreign debts will be eventually inevitable, for not even the most deadly warships can extract money from an empty exchequer. And if such a situation arises Japan is still probably in the strongest position of any country to turn it to her advantage for the future.

In her moral position as in her economic position, therefore, it appears that, despite setbacks and handicaps, Japan enters 1934 with better prospects than any other nation concerned in the Far Eastern melange.

219
1482

235

672
89-O.T.T-3
269 & 11.1.0-62 248

236

8 1.1.1.0-62 270 218

BALTIMORE SUN
WEDNESDAY FEB 21 1934
222

JAPAN'S TRADE GROWS BUT THREATS APPEAR

Burton Measures Progress Made During Late Year, Especially In Relation To Manchuria And China, But Finds Fundamental Weaknesses, Too

1482
By WILBUR BURTON
[Special Correspondence of The Sun]

SHANGHAI, Jan. 21. WRITING IN this place two years ago on Japan's economic position, I stated that "even with possession of Manchuria, Japan has no prospect of becoming a major industrial nation by Western standards." This conclusion is as true now as it was then, but it is no longer as significant, for the rapidly moving events since it was set forth make necessary a sweeping reevaluation of Nippon's economic status.

Two years ago even many Japanese believed the complete conquest of Manchuria would probably require a decade. Today it is virtually completed. Two years ago it appeared that the Manchurian rampage would cost Japan most of her China trade for a long time as well as cause costly unpopularity in other enterprise south of the Great Wall. Today the anti-Japanese boycott is not only virtually ended in almost all parts of Cathay, but a seemingly unbreakable political and economic strangle hold has been obtained by Tokyo throughout north and central China, and a similar development is distinctly looming in much of south China.

At the same time, the past two years have been marked by a tremendous expansion of Japanese world trade, while the trade of other nations has generally declined.

AT THE END of November Japanese exports amounted to 1,726,531,000 yen, as compared to 1,457,000,000 yen for all of 1932, which figure represented an increase of 24 per cent. over 1931. The 1933 year will record the customary Japanese unfavorable balance of trade, but the import excess will be materially less than in 1932, which was 50 per cent. less than in 1931. These figures are for Japan proper.

Manchukuo, which is a part of Japan in every way except name, has also had a fair year in trade, although with an unfavorable balance. However the bulk of this unfavorable balance disappears if the fiction of considering Japan and Manchukuo separately is ignored, for Japanese exports (far ahead of those of all other nations together) to Manchukuo are almost double Manchukuo's exports to Japan. To ignore the fiction, of course, would change Japanese trade figures

somewhat, but statistics now available make impossible a correct picture of the complicated situation.

Nevertheless, it is certain that both Japan and Manchukuo are enjoying distinct improvement in trade.

JAPAN'S trade increases, it is important to note, have not been primarily through the liquidation of the anti-Japanese boycott in China.

In fact, official figures show a decline in Japanese exports to China (similar to that of other countries) in 1933 as compared with 1932, but these statistics are somewhat misleading because of the tremendous amount of smuggling of Japanese goods into north China via Manchukuo. Since the Chinese have not yet granted *de jure* recognition of the Great Wall as a new international boundary, customs inspection has not been instituted to any appreciable degree and, in view of the fact the Japanese have control of the Wall and also dominate most of the Chinese authorities south of it, Japanese goods can enter China proper without paying any duty or being officially recorded.

The Japanese, however, are willing to terminate this situation on a *quid pro quo* basis, and thus it is one of the many political clubs they hold over China. Naturally, they are in no hurry for a settlement, but when it comes they will probably obtain some concession far greater than the duty they will then have to pay on their goods.

ANOTHER unrecorded item in Japanese exports to China is opium and other narcotics also smuggled chiefly into north China from Manchukuo. The profits of the Manchukuo opium monopoly have risen from 5,000,000 yen to 10,000,000 yen in a year, and most of the increase is probably due to smuggling into China—which is not likely to be ended even when the Chinese establish full customs control along the Great Wall.

Still another item to be considered in Sino-Japanese economic relations is the increasing number of Japanese firms in China itself, particularly in north China. But in Shanghai there are more Japanese textile mills than there are Chinese, and while they naturally reduce the possibility of Japanese textile exports to China they supply Japanese goods from which the empire profits in various ways.

Once these mills were greatly handicapped by the boycott; today their business is excellent even if not booming.

IN JAPAN itself economic conditions have greatly improved in the past year. Obviously, increases in exports have furnished additional employment and nature has contributed her bit by providing good crops in regions that only recently suffered actual famine. Further, there has even been a rice surplus, much of which is being exported to China.

Due to the somewhat Fascist economic system, the constant devaluation of the yen, which is now worth a little less than the Shanghai dollar, whereas it formerly was worth over twice as much, has not caused a rise in internal prices with resulting hardships for wage-earners. On the contrary, incredible as it may seem, many prices have declined as much as fifteen per cent. The reason is that Japan has been growing increasingly able (in part through the conquest of Manchuria) to produce the bulk of what she consumes, and thus fewer and fewer imports, except raw materials, for much of her industry are required.

Further, the world oversupply in many necessary raw materials has made it possible for her to set practically her own price for what she has to buy. Also not without influence is the fact that her robot-like workers do not object to long hours on a piece-work basis.

WHILE NOT injuring her internal economy, the devaluation of the yen has been the chief factor in booming her export trade. In the face of 100 per cent. duty, for example, Japan is able to undersell British textiles in India. She is now threatening to oust American textiles from the Philippines. Just within the past year Japan has become the world's largest exporter of cotton piece goods, substantially exceeding the British output.

But it must not be concluded that Nippon's economic skies are unclouded. Other countries—twenty-seven in all, according to a recent announcement of Tokyo—have taken various forms of political action to curb the rising flow of Japanese goods across their boundaries. The United States is among these nations. So is Great Britain and the U. S. S. R. And British-Japanese parleys are now being held to reach some understanding on Japanese dumping in India and the Malay states.

Just how Japan will fare in face of mounting opposition to her trade tactics remain to be seen, but it is not unlikely, that some nations may seek political commitments in regard to the Sino-Japanese situation in return for any liberality toward Japanese goods.

BALTIMORE SUN
WEDNESDAY FEB 21 1934
221

1482

ANOTHER cause for worry in Tokyo is the ever-increasing budget, particularly for army and navy expenditures. A severe political crisis was narrowly averted in disputes over the 1934 budget.

Finally, the fact remains that Japan's conquest of Manchuria, or even her current conquest of most of China proper, does not offer an adequate source of supply for many essential raw materials to put her on a par in industrial potentialities with such nations as the U. S. S. R., Great Britain, the United States and France. With Manchuria she lacks wholly or in large part oil, rubber, raw cotton, tin, wool, sugar, lead, zinc, antimony, tungsten, many chemicals and wheat. Wool and wheat development, however, are possible in Manchuria, and in food generally it may be said that Japan is now independent.

There is also a possibility of shale oil development in Manchuria, but for the present Japan must import from British territory, the Dutch East Indies, the United States or the U. S. S. R. about nine-tenths of the approximately one billion gallons of petroleum products she consumes annually. China proper can supply antimony and tungsten, although in most other mineral resources the country is very poor so far as is definitely known. Rather poor quality cotton is also produced fairly extensively in China.

WHILE WITH Manchuria, Japan's supply of coal and iron is fairly extensive, neither is of very good quality for the steel industry—Other essentials of the steel industry—nickel and manganese—are totally lacking, although they are required only in sufficiently small quantities, like some essentials for other industries (such as tin) that they can be acquired in time of peace to hoard for a period of emergency.

But a bulky product required in large quantities that is entirely lacking in Japan, Manchukuo or China is rubber. The nearest source of supply is French Indo-China. In chemicals, Japan is not very advanced, although just this month she has been able to end the importation of most dyestuffs. In the manufacture of heavy machinery, she is probably behind present-day Soviet Russia.

THUS IT WILL be seen that despite her amazing strides in trade and territory-grabbing in the past two years, Japan has many exceedingly vulnerable points. As long as she is officially at peace and her export trade is not materially checked, her future prospects as the dominant nation in eastern Asia appear quite bright, but without considerable outside assistance she is now ill prepared for any major emergency—a fact that may not be inconsequential in preventing such an emergency from arising unless the ever-shifting course of international politics should provide Tokyo with a strong ally for the grim court of Mars.

233

234

8 1.1.1.0 - 62

250

272

223

1482

(分類 A 1. 1. 0. 9-8)

(票 合 照)

普通公第 五一 號

昭和九年二月二十八日

記録件名
日支外交關係雜其系
輿論並新聞論調

受信者
外務大臣
廣田弘毅

發信者
特命全權公使
青木新

件名
滿洲國皇帝溥儀氏ト題スル記事ヲ掲ケタル

「フランコ・イ・ネグロ」送付ノ件

原書ハ A 6. 2. 0. 61 / 滿洲國帝政問題一件 ニ在リ

輿論並新聞論調

6 1.1.1.0 - 62

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237

REEL No. A-0048

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 之ヲ論駁セルガ英字新聞ガ我方ニ肩ヲ持チ中國人ノ所説ヲ反駁セル
 ガ如キハ當地トシテハ殆ンド前例無キコトトテ地方的ニ相當注意ヲ
 惹キ居レリ
 右我方ト「チンタオ、タイムス」トノ關係ニモ願ミ御參考迄ニ報告
 申進ス

本信寫送附先 公使 北平 南京

在青島日本總領事館

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229

1482

第三課長
 第二課長

亞細亞局
 外務大臣 廣田 弘毅 殿

機密第一二〇號

昭和九年三月一日

在 青 島

總領事 坂 根 準

「チャイナ、ウイークリー、ポスト」ノ日本
 誹謗論ニ對シ「チンタオ、タイムス」紙ノ反
 駁論說ニ關スル件

當地英文青島タイムス紙ハ上海ニ於テ發行スル雜誌「チャイナ、ウ
 イークリー、ポスト」ガ二月十七日發行ノ同紙上ニ「青島ハ今仍ホ
 日本ノ統治下ニ在リ」ナル論文掲ゲ日本ヲ誹謗セルニ憤慨シ二十二

在青島日本總領事館

6 1.1.1.0 - 62 253
 • 274

238

請報部

第一課長

昭和九年三月七日

9.4.7

2
227

How narrow and bigoted to bring up such a harmless incident in support of entirely wrong premises. Mr. Meng then lends the realm of economic statistics to strengthen his thesis and states that although the total Chinese investment in Tsingtao industries is \$100,000,000 Japan's is ten times more than that at Tsingtao. Has he forgotten that when the Germans developed Tsingtao it contained one or two fishermen's huts, and that during Japan's ten years of occupation here prior to China's recovery of this territory the Japanese developed it enormously, just as the Germans did before them? Is that fact matter for surprise or indignation? These investments provide work for thousands upon thousands of Chinese who swell Tsingtao's population to day to over 400,000. Why then mind 14,000 Japanese industrialists? He claims that nine out of ten of the goods imported at Tsingtao from foreign countries come from Japan. Is that country not China's next-door neighbour? When China has more home industries imported will additional land the Japanese are helping to develop Tsingtao's home industries.

As for the fishery monopoly, when the Chinese fishery association buys up-to-date trawlers with steel nets, it will be able to fish the deep-sea grounds now out of reach of the miserable type of Chinese junk to which Mr. Meng refers where the Japanese 20th century type trawlers resort for the supply of this market in competition with Chinese fishers.

The next hits are directed at the source of income to the form of imported sugar, almost exclusively from Japan. Mr. Meng states that though its revenue should be about one-third of the total Customs revenue of Tsingtao yet since June 1932 to the end of 1933 not a single picul of sugar has been imported here. His explanation is that the sugar though coming in no longer enters by the proper channel but is smuggled by Japanese boats.

How narrow and bigoted to bring up such a harmless incident in support of entirely wrong premises. Mr. Meng then lends the realm of economic statistics to strengthen his thesis and states that although the total Chinese investment in Tsingtao industries is \$100,000,000 Japan's is ten times more than that at Tsingtao. Has he forgotten that when the Germans developed Tsingtao it contained one or two fishermen's huts, and that during Japan's ten years of occupation here prior to China's recovery of this territory the Japanese developed it enormously, just as the Germans did before them? Is that fact matter for surprise or indignation? These investments provide work for thousands upon thousands of Chinese who swell Tsingtao's population to day to over 400,000. Why then mind 14,000 Japanese industrialists? He claims that nine out of ten of the goods imported at Tsingtao from foreign countries come from Japan. Is that country not China's next-door neighbour? When China has more home industries imported will additional land the Japanese are helping to develop Tsingtao's home industries.

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226

What nonsense that paragraph is! Does Mr. Meng not know that contrary to the terms of the Washington Treaty and the codicil, the Shantung Agreement, foreigners, including Japanese, though allowed by its representation in the Tsingtao Municipal Government have never had representation accorded them? Actually the terms of the Agreement have not been implemented BECAUSE THE CHINESE WISED TO SHOW THEIR ABILITY TO GOVERN TSINGTAO—and they have governed with the greatest credit and ability during Mayor Shen Hung-lich's tenure. Mr. Meng claims that with the exception of the first Administration under Dr. C. T. Wang's directorship which was very short-lived, and with perhaps one or two outstanding exceptions, subsequent appointments have proved very poor administrators. Considering that the Nanking Government when first coming into power sent no less than five Governors in succession within the space of 18 months there was absolutely no opportunity of judging their qualities. Our local Administration was nearly ruined by the maladministration from above, which sanctioned such an absurdity, but in longer tenures of office like that of Director Chao Chi and Admiral Shen Hung-lich time has been given to accomplish great things, and the latter's regime, freed as it is from any pressure from Tientsin such as Chao Chi had always to placate,

is remarkable for the enormous strides made in every direction for the advancement of Tsingtao.

We conclude that Mr. Meng is starting a propaganda campaign on behalf of some new candidate for office, and we can assure him Tsingtao does not require his solicitous consideration. He tells us that through years of misrule and negligence on the part of the Chinese, Tsingtao has not only shown no sign of changing from something which is Japanese to Chinese, but on the contrary, Tsingtao remains and shows every sign of being Japanese under Japanese domination, political and economic.

After giving a short summary of Tsingtao's history and stating how China would not sign the Treaty of Versailles because Tsingtao, the chief motive for her entry into the war, might not immediately be returned to China, the writer goes on to relate how three years later, at Washington, after "seventeen conversations" Japan finally agreed to return Tsingtao to the hands of Chinese policy with the desire to win the confidence of China. Mr. Meng makes no mention of the fact that the Versailles Treaty's function was to lay down provisions between victors and vanquished and not for the settlement of questions between the former. That was reserved for subsequent dealings, as at the Washington Conference in 1922.

Mr. Meng then proceeds to claim that upon Tsingtao's restitution the Chinese should have grasped the opportunity to "exert full control over Tsingtao so as to demonstrate her ability of administration. But events after the restoration proved to be quite disappointing.

青島タイムス切り抜き

228 3

1482

In reply we should like to tell Mr. Meng a story of a habit certain Chinese Salt Gabelle people are alleged to have of seizing Chinese junks and coming to the Customs barriers they pass those barriers with a bag of salt on the deck of each junk. The Customs officers may not touch the junks because they are already seized, and so they get through the barriers; but unkind rumour has whispered more than once that it is a profitable business to pay a fine on a bag of salt if beneath deck there is a whole cargo of sugar aboard. Many a time have Customs officers bitten their lips with vexation at the thought of the fine seizure fees escaping from them under their very noses. It is, therefore, clear that to blame the Japanese for smuggling is manifestly unfair, though doubtless people of all nationalities conduct that trade.

We all know that smuggling nowadays has grown to enormous proportions, due to the huge increase in Customs duties.

Finally, we would assure Mr. Meng that Tsingtao people do not in the least consider themselves under Ja-

panese domination. But they do consider that Tsingtao is excellently well governed by the Chinese authorities now in power, and if Mr. Meng would pay a visit to our Harbour Administration and see the work now in progress, or call upon the Government Administrative officials and see our Public Works, our road extensions, etc., our Agricultural and Forestry Department's activities at the Parks and Nurseries and many other departmental activities fostered by Mayor Shen and his subordinates, he would be forced to change his mind and leave Tsingtao alone to develop at its present rapid rate.

There never is trouble of any kind at Tsingtao, except once when the Kuomintang and some other imports from the South got to loggerheads with the Japanese and had their buildings burned. But that seems long ago now.

8 11.1.0 - 62

257

241

278

REEL No. A-0048



230

1482

ナルモ右ハ對日本策ニ何等ノ決意辦法無キヲ證明スルモノナリ畏懼
 無策ハ吾人ノ採ラサル所ナリ少クトモ挑釁ヲナサス外援ニ頼ラサル
 コトヲ前提トシテ最後ノ自衛準備ヲナササルヘカラス中國ハ固ヨリ
 日本ト平和状態ノ恢復スルコトヲ希望シ居レトモ東四省問題ヲ除外
 セル提議ニ對シテハ如何ナル場合ト雖モ之ヲ拒絕セサルヘカラス
 是即消極的ナル自衛ノ態度ナルモ然モ徒ニ手ヲ束ネテ危機ノ到來ヲ
 待ツヘキニハ非スシテ必ス積極的ノ準備ヲ必要トス積極的準備トハ
 先ツ第一ニ統一ヲ鞏固ニスルニアリ日本軍閥ノ中國侵略ハ常ニ此ノ
 不統一ノ障ニ乘シ居ルナリ第二ニ中國ハ物質的建設尙幼稚ナルヲ以
 テ民衆ヲ保護教育シ民力ヲ涵養スル意味ニ於テ軍政民政ノ組織ヲ改
 革セサルヘカラス廣西省ハ之ニ着手シテ未タ數年ナラサルニ僅少ノ

在天津日本總領事館

§ 1.1.1.0 - 62

259 280

243

229

亞細亞局

第二課長 1482
第三課長

4門/類/項0目 9-8

三月十七日ノ當地大公報ハ「中日關係ノ現階段」ト題シ大略左記ノ
 如キ論評ヲ掲載セリ
 最近我政府當局ノ發表スル文書言辭中努メテ「日本」ノ二字ヲ使用
 スルコトヲ避ケ大イニ對日關係ヲ憂慮シ居レルハ吾人ノ諒トスル處

左記

外務大臣 廣田 弘毅 殿

漢字紙社評報告ノ件

在天津
總領事 栗原



在天津日本總領事館

§ 1.1.1.0 - 62

258

279

情報部

普通第二七五號

昭和九年三月二十二日

第一課長

昭和九年三月廿九日



242

232

1482

般日本人ヲシテ我國ニ人無キカ如キ心理ヲ懷カシメタルナリ而モ我國ニ於テハ晉ニ東四省ノ領土ヲ喪失セルノミナラス精神上ニ大打撃ヲ蒙リ國家ノ地位モ亦失墜スル結果トナレリ是レ皆自ラ招キタルモノナレハ人ヲ咎ムヘキニ非ス事實此ノ如クナレハ今日日本ト平等提携ヲ論スルモ絶對ニ不可能ナリ而モ此ノ現状ハ何時迄モ續クモノニ非ス即日本軍閥ハ現在二様ノ見解ヲ持シ居レリ一ハ即前述ノ蔑視心理ニシテ東四省ノ例ニ倣ヒ黃河以北ハ無論長江迄席捲スルハ極メテ容易ナリト考ヘ居ルコトナリ二ハ即國際戰勃發セル際中國カ外援ヲ頼ミテ軍備ヲ設クルコトヲ憂慮シ居レルコトナリ前者ハ中國ヲ輕視シ後者ハ重視セルモノニシテ現在日本ニ於テハ此ノ矛盾セル二種ノ心理カ交錯シ居リ對外對内政策ニ牽制サレ一時休息狀態ニアルニ過

在天津日本總領事館

1.1.1.0 - 62 261 282

245

231

1482

費用ヲ以テ既ニ相當ノ効果ヲ擧ケオレリ以上ノ二點ハ平時ニ於テ効果アルノミニシテ一旦國際戰勃發セハ日本軍閥ハ先ツ中國ノ死命ヲ制セントスルハ必定ナリ故ニ自衛上最小ノ軍備ヲ必要トス以上三點ハ目前ニ於ケル積極的對日改策ナリ
 本來吾人ハ日支兩民族ノ和平ヲ希望シ居レトモ右ハ必ス平等互利ノ立場ニ於テ建立サレ得ヘキモノナリ、九一八事件以後日本人ノ心理ニハ中國ト日本ヲ平等ノ國家トスルコトヲ絶對ニ否認シ居レルヲ以テ根本的ニ交渉ノ餘地無キナリ然レトモ其ノ責任ノ大半ハ固ヨリ中國ニ在ルナリ即九一八事件以後日軍ノ軍事上ニ費シタル犠牲ハ其ノ本國ニ於ケル政治鬭争ノ困難ニ比シ遙ニ少ク熱河征戰ノ如キ宛モ實彈行軍演習ノ如ク思ヒ居レリカカル實力ノ差異カ軍人ノミナラス一

在天津日本總領事館

1.1.1.0 - 62 260 281

244

234

1482

着眼シテコソ始メテ交渉ヲナシ得ヘキコトヲ認識セシメサルヘカラ
 ス然レトモ事實上ニ於テハ中國ノ政府及人民カ大同團結ヲナシ大犧
 牲ヲ忍ンテ始メテ此ノ境地ニ達シ得ルモノナリ云々
 次テ全紙ハ十九日ノ社論ニ於テ「再ヒ對日問題ヲ論ス」ト題シ前日
 ノ説ヲ更ニ補足シ中國ノ當局官憲ノ公式非公式ニ日本ノ軍人外交官
 ト會見セル際徒ニ附和迎合スルコトヲヤメ是是非非主義ニ立脚シテ
 堂々ト所信ヲ披瀝スヘントノ意味ヲ繰返シ主張セリ
 右報告ス

本信寫送附先 在中公使 北平 南京

在天津日本總領事館

S 1.1.1.0 - 62 263
 284

247

233

1482

キス故ニ漸テ又活動カ開始サルヘク最近間々日支親善ノ聲ヲ聞クモ
 其ノ親善ノ意味ハ幣原時代ト迥ニ異リ萬事我國カ彼ノ^後從フ体ノ
 モノナリ經濟問題ニ於テモ中國ノ經濟ヲスヘテ日本資本主義ノ利害
 ニ一致セシメントシ努メテ中國ノ工業發達ヲ阻害シ居レリ此ノ如キ
 ハ東北ヲ失ヒシ以上ノモノニシテ中國ヲ永遠ニ奴隸ノ地位ニ置クモ
 ノナリ要スルニ不平等ノ觀念ヲ持シタル儘正規關係ヲ恢復シ輕蔑ノ
 心理ヲ以テ我國經濟ヲ支配セントスル事即現在彼等ノ高唱セル親善
 ノ内容ナリ故ニ既述セル積極的準備ノ至項ニ全力ヲ盡シ全國民一致
 努力スルコトコソ目前ノ對日關係ニ處スル喫緊事ナリ
 吾人カ日支關係ニツキ考フルニ日本軍閥ヲシテ蔑視侵略ノ非ヲ悟ラ
 シメ其ノ侵略セル領土主權ヲ返還シ經濟上平等ノ提携ヲナス大利ニ

在天津日本總領事館

S 1.1.1.0 - 62 283
 262

246

236

1482

ヤ之ヲ討匪トスレハ察東ノ現狀ハ安定シテ討匪ノ必要ナクヨシ其ノ必要アリトスルモ我軍自ラ爲ス可キモノニシテ他力ヲ求ムルノ理ナシ侵略トセムカ日本ハ平素日支親善ヲ強調セルニハ非スヤ今ヤ我國ノ討孫軍事モ漸ク一段落セルニ日本ハ又モ危ニ乘シテ察東ニ進出シ内蒙ヲ擾サムトス斯ノ如キ舉動アリテハ日本カ北支侵略ノ意圖ナシト言フモ誰カ信セムヤ

三、日本ノ意圖及増兵ノ眞疑如何ヲ問ハス連日ノ謠言ヲ事實ト假定シテ言ヘハ日本ノ舉動ハ餘計ナ事ト言ハサルヲ得ス蓋シ日本ノ察東増兵ノ結果ハ徒ニ我國ノ對日惡感ヲ助長スルノミナラス益重大ナル結果ヲ惹起スルニ至ル可ク赤露ニ對シテモ亦外交、軍事上ノ重大ナル紛糾ヲ誘發シ其ノ極東平和ニ及ホス影響タルヤ輕視ヲ許サス虛心坦懷ニ見テ日本ノ察東ヲ窺フハ内蒙併呑カ目的ニシテ所謂滿蒙帝國ナル陰謀ノ下ニ我國西北地方侵略ノ基礎ヲ鞏固ニシ又日露間有事ノ際ハ内蒙ニ出テテ庫倫赤塔ノ前線ヲ占領シ赤露ヲシテ「シベリヤ」鐵道ノ運輸作業ヲ斷タシメムトスルニアルナリ

在中華民國日本公使館

§ 1.1.1.0 - 62 286 265

249

235

第二課長
第三課長
1482

國務院

情報部
公第一八六號
昭和九年三月三十日

在中華民國日本公使館
公使館一等書記官 中山 詳

外務大臣 廣田 弘毅 殿

察東問題ニ關スル漢字紙論評報告ノ件

三月二十二日ノ華北日報ハ「察東問題」ト題シ左記要旨ノ社評ヲ掲載セリ

一、平津地方ノ外國新聞ハ連日日本軍隊ノ内蒙ヘノ移動ヲ傳ヘ謠言紛々或ハ日本ハ再ヒ沽源ニ増兵シ内蒙ヲ窺ヒツツアリト云ハル火ナキ所ニ煙ハ立タス若シ事實トスレハ日本ハ何ヲ以テ之ヲ辯解スル

在中華民國日本公使館

§ 1.1.1.0 - 62 285 264

248

238

亞細亞局

第二課長
第三課長 1482

分類 門類 項 03 9-8

情報部

公第二三五號

昭和九年四月十三日

在中華民國日本公使館

大使館參事官 中山 詳

第一課長

昭和九年四月卅日 接

別紙添附



外務大臣 廣田 弘毅 殿

昭和九年四月十三日附有吉公使宛公第一一二號信寫送付

四月八日「ベキン、クロニクル」記事
切抜送付ノ件

在中華民國日本公使館

1.1.1.0 - 62 267 288

251



237

1482

併シ吾人ハ本問題カ赤露國防ニ關スルノ故ヲ以テ不問ニ附シ赤露ノ交渉ニヨリテ坐シテ日兵撤退ノ實惠ヲ收メムト欲スルモノニハ斷シテ非ス若シ日本増兵ノ事實アラハ察東治安ノ如何ヲ問ハス其ノ撤兵ヲ要請スヘキ當然ノ理アリ日本トシテハ既ニ各口ノ接收モ終リ各方面ノ空氣モ稍緩和サレツツアルコトナレハ此際宜シク時機ヲ洞察スヘキテアリ吾人モ亦其ヲ欲スルナリ
三以上ノ消息ハ神經過敏者ノ推測ニ止マラムコトヲ希望スルモ現在既ニ此種風評アル以上日支兩國關係ノ前途及極東平和ノ爲ニ日本當局ヨリ此ノ事ニ對シ明確ナル表明アラムコトヲ切望ス云々
右報告ス

本信寫送付先 公使

天津 南京 張家口
在滿大使

在中華民國日本公使館

1.1.1.0 - 62 266 287

250

239

1482

公第一一二號

昭和九年四月十三日

在中華民國日本公使館

大使館參事官 中山 詳一

別紙添附

在 中華民國

特命全權公使 有 吉 明 殿

四月八日「ベキン、クロニクル」記事
切拔送付ノ件

北支ニ於ケル日支關係ニ關スル英漢字紙報道振リニ付四月中旬貴電
ヲ以テ御申越ノ件ニ關シテハ既ニ回電濟ミナル處前顯貴電中御引用
ノ八日ノ「ベキン、クロニクル」記事切拔御參考迄別添送付ス
本信寫送付先 外務大臣 南 京

在中華民國日本公使館

S 1.1.1.0 - 62

268
289

252

REEL No. A-0048



アジア歴史資料センター

件 名

1482

新 聞 名

THE PEIPING CHRONICLE, Peiping, April 8, 1934.

Japanese send 100 Officers To North China

Military Men to Make Tour of Strategical Cities

Agents Sent by S.M.R. also Active in this Province

It was confirmed in Chinese official circles yesterday that over a hundred Japanese military officers had arrived in Peiping in the past few days on their way to Chahar, Suiyuan, Shansi, and Southern Hopei, to conduct an investigation. The spokesman of the Peiping Branch Military Council told a representative of THE PEIPING CHRONICLE yesterday that all these Japanese military men had been sent by the General Staff at Tokyo for "getting acquainted" with the principal strategical cities in North China.

Japanese military officers as well as agents specially sent by the South Manchuria Railway, are extremely active in North China, the former in charge of investigating political and military conditions, and the latter entrusted with the duty of reporting on economic conditions in the North.

A number are now operating along the Pingsui Railway, and the various towns in Shansi and Shantung provinces, including Tatung, the "Northern Gate" of Shansi, and Tsingtao, Shantung's biggest sea port.

Authoritative circles further informed our representative yesterday that all these military investigators sent by the General Staff at Tokyo conferred with the Japanese military authorities in Peiping first before proceeding to the various provinces, chiefly in the Northwest.

S. M. R. sends Investigators

Japanese press reports stated that in order to "strengthen its influence" in North China, the South Manchuria Railway recently dispatched a number of energetic young men to North China to investigate economic conditions in this part of the country. Special emphasis in this respect was laid on Shantung province.

Japanese investigators also appeared at the Lienyun Kang, the seaport at the eastern end of the Lung Hai Railway, ac-

ording to Chinese press reports.

Reuter

PEIPING, April 7.—According to information from Chinese circles the Japanese are showing increasing activity in the de-militarized zone, particularly at Malanyu, where they have erected a large flying field.

It is stated that the Japanese military authorities have asked the Chinese for permission to hold manoeuvres in the de-militarized zone. The Chinese have not yet replied to the request. The Japanese troops participating in the proposed manoeuvres will be from their garrison in Tientsin.

Another Chinese report states that 29 Japanese aeroplanes arrived at Malanyu from Chengteh and Chinchow yesterday.

General Yu Hsueh-chung, Chairman of the Hopei Provincial Government, declared in press interview in Tientsin yesterday that the negotiations for the retrocession of Malanyu had been suspended on account of the insistence of the Japanese on keeping the pass for the time being. It is believed in local Chinese circles that the negotiations will not be resumed until after the return of General Huang Fu, Chairman of the Peiping Political Council, from the South.

242

新聞
保存

1482

新聞部 9-8

普通第九五號
昭和九年四月二十六日

在杭州
領事館事務代理 松村 雄 藏

外務大臣 廣田 弘毅 殿

杭州發行有力支那新聞見本送付ノ件

最近ニ於ケル我帝國ノ動向乃至這般閣下ノ御發表セラレタル帝國ノ對支方針等ニ對シ支那民衆ヲ指遵シ一方ニハ國民黨及官憲側ノ代辯者タル當地ニ大有力支那紙カ如何ナル態度ヲ以テ批判シ報道シ居ルカヲ實物ニツキ御承知相成ルコトモ何カノ御參考タルヘント存シ不

在杭州日本領事館

1.1.1.0-62 271 292

情報部

第一課長

別添附

昭和九年五月拾五日

255

241

1482

公文書	御參考ノ爲別紙送附ス	名件	名 人 信	受	報	主	管
(昭和九年三月十日附在支(少)館來往第一八七號並附席世)		客車向款ニ關スル支那民請評ニ關スル件		柳川陸軍少佐	第一三三七號	情報部長了	文書課發送
外務省					昭和九年四月拾九日附附局	主任第一課長了	昭和九年四月廿日發送済
			名件録記	名人信發			正校(原稿) 淨書
				一筆先少佐			昭和九年四月十九日起草

1.1.1.0-62 270 291

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取敢四月二十六日當地發行ノ杭州國民新聞（蔣介石ヨリ毎月一千元宛補助ヲ受ク）及民國日報（省黨部機關紙）各一部御送付致スニ付
御高閣相成度

在 杭 州 日 本 領 事 館

D 258

293

1.1.1.0 - 62 272

REEL No. A-0048